

CONFIDENTIAL

(9552.)

PART XIX.

---

FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE

RESPECTING THE

AFFAIRS OF PERSIA.

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July to September 1909.

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136	" ..	567 Tel.	13,	Appointment of Zil as Governor of Shiraz. Refers to No. 133. Reports. His son will act as deputy for the present. It has been explained to Saad-ed-Dowleh that Zil's return not desirable at present ..	74
137	" ..	568 Tel.	13,	Entry of Nationalists into Tehran. Reports. Absence of looting; no danger to Europeans. No opposition to entry of Nationalists ..	75
138	" ..	569 Tel.	13,	Russian troops in Persia. Colonel Liakhov has been urging Russian chargé d'affaires to order Russian troops from Kazvin to Tehran. Latter will not do so unless absolutely necessary ..	75
139	" ..	570 Tel.	13,	Nationalist forces in Tehran. Desultory street fighting continues. Sardar Assad hopes Shah will take bast, but M. Sabline hears he intends to hold out ..	75
140	" ..	571 Tel.	13,	Shiraz. Force available for, if necessary. Announcement of Zil's appointment may improve situation ..	75
141	Consul Stevens ..	Telegraphic	13,	Russian troops for Persia. Reports further embarkation. Vice-consul at Baku is trying to ascertain particulars ..	76
142	To Mr. O'Beirne ..	887 Tel.	13,	Zil-es-Sultan. To suggest to Minister for Foreign Affairs that if Zil is appointed Governor of Fars he might return to Persia via Bushire. Also to communicate substance of No. 133 ..	76
143	" ..	889 Tel.	13,	Dispatch of Russian troops to Persia. Interview with Russian Ambassador about dispatch of further troops. Has pointed out difficulty of justifying, and danger that might ensue ..	76
144	To Sir G. Barclay ..	365 Tel.	13,	Danger of disturbances at Shiraz. Admiralty have been requested to instruct commander of "Sphinx" to do anything required by Major Cox should the latter, in concert with His Majesty's consul at Shiraz, ask for protection ..	76
145	To Sir G. Lowther ..	202	13,	Situation at Urumia. Transmits No. 798, Part XVIII. Turkish Ambassador has been informed that instructions have been given for representation to be made respecting action of Turkish consul-general at Tabreez ..	77
146	Admiralty ..	..	13,	Shiraz. Transmits copy of telegram, dated 12th July, from His Majesty's ship "Sphinx," asking for instructions as to detachment being sent to Shiraz ..	77
147	" ..	.. Confidential	13,	Shiraz. Refers to No. 146. Transmits telegram from commander-in-chief, East Indies, reporting that latter has approved proposal of senior naval officer, Persian Gulf, to send detachment ..	78

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149	" ..	358 Tel.	14,	Zil-es-Sultan. Refers to No. 142. Has made communication to M. Isvolsky respecting proposed return of to Persia ..	79
150	Sir G. Barclay ..	572 Tel.	14,	Situation at Tehran. Reports bombardment of revolutionary forces by Persian Cossacks ..	79
151	" ..	573 Tel.	14,	Situation at Tehran. Reports bombardment of town. Is taking steps to induce the two parties to open negotiations. Attitude of Shah ..	79
152	" ..	574 Tel.	14,	Situation at Tehran. Refers to No. 151. Reports audience with His Majesty, which was of a distressing character ..	79
153	Sir G. Lowther ..	238 Tel.	14,	Priests of Nejed and Kerbela. Transmits telegram from His Majesty's consul-general at Bagdad reporting great resentment felt at Nejed and Kerbela ..	80
154	" ..	239 Tel.	14,	Turkish attitude with regard to Anglo-Russian intervention in Persia. President of Chamber has written unofficially stating that unfortunate impression has been produced in Constantinople. Letter acknowledged privately ..	80
155	" ..	240 Tel.	14,	Turkish forces at Urumia. Refers to No. 106. Has made communication to Porte ..	80
156	To Sir G. Barclay ..	369 Tel.	14,	Warning to Baluchis. Approves No. 132 with regard to instructions to His Majesty's consul at Seistan. India Office are being consulted. To obtain, if possible, original of letter referred to in No. 129 ..	80
157	To Sir G. Lowther ..	403 Tel.	14,	Anglo-Russian co-operation in Persia. Refers to No. 154. To explain to Ahmed Riza real positions held by His Majesty's Government and Russia in Persia ..	81
158	To Sir F. Cartwright ..	265 Tel.	14,	Zil-es-Sultan. To refrain from further representations until decision has been arrived at on question of allowing Zil to return to Persia via Bushire ..	81
159	To Count Benckendorff ..	..	14,	Zil-es-Sultan. Suggests that Zil should be allowed to return to Persia now that he is appointed Governor-General of Shiraz. Should return to Persia via Bushire ..	81
160	To Sir G. Barclay ..	102	14,	Steam-ship "Shushan." Refers to No. 47. Concurs, and refers to No. 317, Part XIV ..	82
161	To India Office ..	..	14,	Protection of Bahreinis in Persia. Refers to No. 401, Part XVII. Transmits copy of No. 49. Sir E. Grey proposes to approve terms of Sir G. Barclay's note to Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs ..	82
162	" ..	..	14,	Intention of Baluchis to attack Bam and Kerman. Transmits copies of Nos. 129, 132 and 156. Enquires whether resident at Chagai is in position to carry out instructions similar to those in No. 132, and whether Lord Morley can suggest any other steps ..	83

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164	To Messrs. F. C. Strick and Co. ..	..	14,	Moin's oxide concessions. Refers to No. 29. Information has been telegraphed to His Majesty's Minister at Tehran. Latter has been unable to see Minister for Foreign Affairs, but thinks it inexpedient to press for Hormuz concession ..	83
165	Consul Stevens ..	10	6,	Dispatch of Russian troops to Persia. Reports departure of regiment of Cossacks, one battery of guns, and two companies of sappers for Enzeli ..	84
166	" ..	11	6,	Return of Russian troops from Persia. Reports return to Caucasus of two companies of Rifle Brigade ..	84
167	Sir F. Cartwright ..	120	12,	Zil-es-Sultan. Reports interview with, in concert with Russian Ambassador. Zil's reasons for returning to Persia. Arguments against his immediate return ..	84
168	" ..	121 Confidential	12,	Zil-es-Sultan's views of Persian affairs. Refers to No. 167. Has been able to ascertain from private conversation. Gives Zil's reasons for wishing to return, his opinion of strength of revolutionary party in Persia, and his views as to possible means of restoring order in Persia ..	85
169	Anglo-Persian Oil Company ..	..	13,	Agreement with Bakhtiari khans. Refers to No. 85. Surmise contained in last paragraph is correct. Asks that an independent translation may be obtained from Tehran ..	86
170	India Office ..	..	14,	Karun irrigation. Refers to No. 785, Part XVIII. Lord Morley finds no reason to modify views expressed in Mr. Campbell's letter of 12th June, or to suggest any alteration of instructions sent in No. 736, Part XVIII ..	86
171	" ..	..	14,	Kherka irrigation scheme. Refers to No. 34. Lord Morley agrees, but thinks local officers concerned take too sanguine a view of the future of the project, and thinks they should be warned not to let sheikh overlook difficulties ..	87
172	" ..	..	14,	Transfer of Consul McDouall from Moham-merah to Kermanshah. Refers to No. 84. Lord Morley concurs ..	87
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174	Sir G. Barclay ..	575 Tel.	15,	Nationalist occupation of Tehran. Bombardment of town by Shah's troops. Royalist resistance in town at an end. Persons and property of foreigners have not suffered ..	88
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177	" ..	578 Tel.	15,	Situation in Tehran. Reports continued fighting. Refugees in legation. Estimated casualties ..	88
178	" ..	579 Tel.	15,	Wounding of one of legation gholams. Reports ..	88
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181	Consul Stevens ..	Telegraphic	15,	Russian ships. Reports movement of to Persian waters ..	89
182	Mr. O'Beirne ..	359 Tel.	15,	Zil-es-Sultan. Russian Government agree with His Majesty's Government as to desirability of return of, and have instructed their Ambassador at Vienna to make identic communication to Zil in concert with His Majesty's Ambassador ..	89
183	" ..	360 Tel.	15,	Shiraz. Has communicated substance of Nos. 123 and 123* to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. Russian Government agree to proposed steps to prevent arrival of Seyyid Lari at Shiraz ..	90
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185	To Mr. O'Beirne ..	909 Tel.	15,	Anglo-Russian co-operation in Persia. Refers to Nos. 148 and 175. Appreciation of moderation and restraint observed by Russia ..	90
186	To Sir G. Lowther ..	404 Tel.	15,	Russian troops in Persia. Refers to No. 153. To send instructions to His Majesty's consul at Bagdad to explain to ulema purpose of dispatch of Russian troops ..	90
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189	" ..	583 Tel.	16,	Crisis in Tehran. Shah expected to seek bast in Russian Legation at any moment. Reports dispatch of sowars to guard His Majesty ..	91
190	" ..	584 Tel.	16,	Crisis in Tehran. Reports situation. Shah has fled to Russian Legation ..	91



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192	" ..	586 Tel.	16,	Ex-Shah. Transmits text of telegram addressed by him to Czar ..	92
193	" ..	587 Tel.	16,	Cossack brigade. Refers to No. 174. Negotiations for continuation of employment of. Situation in Tehran ..	92
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195	" ..	589 Tel.	16,	Departure of ulema for Persia. Refers to No. 120. His Majesty's consul-general at Bagdad has not yet replied. Suggests instructing Colonel Ramsay to inform ulema that Russian troops were not sent for purpose of intervention. No. 153 has not yet arrived ..	93
196	" ..	590 Tel.	16,	Situation at Tehran. Refers to No. 193. Action of Colonel Liakhov. Reports situation ..	93
197	Mr. O'Beirne ..	361 Tel.	16,	Anglo-Russian co-operation. Shah in refuge at Russian Legation. Has communicated No. 185 to Minister for Foreign Affairs. Future policy of Russia in view of action of Shah ..	93
198	Sir G. Lowther ..	242 Tel.	16,	Turco-Persian frontier. Effect of communication of 13th July. Grand Vizier's reply ..	94
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203	Anglo - Persian Oil Company ..	..	16,	Geological survey. Enquires whether Foreign Office possess any records of topographical survey of Persia. Proposes scheme for survey ..	95
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205	Count Benckendorff..	..	16,	Possibility of Shah taking refuge at one of the legations. Transmits telegram to M. Sabline, communicated by M. Isvolsky, reiterating instructions of 1907..	95

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207	" ..	592 Tel.	17,	Nationalist request for audience of Shah to announce change of Sovereign. Transmits telegram from the two nationalist leaders. Shah declines to receive deputation. His proposals as to succession ..	96
208	" ..	593 Tel.	17,	Situation in Tehran. Reports all quiet. Asks whether warning could be given to "Daily Telegraph" as to exaggeration of their correspondent's report ..	97
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210	Sir F. Cartwright ..	148 Tel.	17,	Zil-es-Sultan. Has suggested to Zil, in concert with Russian Ambassador, that he should return to Persia via Bushire. Zil's reasons for not falling in with this suggestion ..	97
211	" ..	149 Tel.	17,	Zil-es-Sultan. Refers to No. 202. Has assured Zil of continued protection of His Majesty's Government. Zil's approval of Anglo-Russian agreement ..	98
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215	To Count Benckendorff ..	..	17,	Communication to ulema of Nejef and Kerbela. Informs of ..	99
216	To Anglo - Persian Oil Company ..	Confidential	17,	Difficulty arisen between His Majesty's consul at Ahwaz and manager of concessions syndicate. Transmits No. 602, Part XVIII. Sir E. Grey concurs in Sir G. Barclay's recommendations ..	99
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218	" ..	595 Tel.	18,	Situation at Tehran. Reports all quiet. Proclamation issued by Sipahdar and Sardar Assad announcing voluntary abdication of Shah and appointment of new Shah and Regent ..	100
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221	Sir F. Cartwright ..	150 Tel.	18,	Zil-es-Sultan. Zil has received news of dethronement of Shah. His own position thus changed, and he wishes now to return to Persia and to Tehran. Special appeal to His Majesty's Government ..	101
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223	" "	5 Commercial Confidential	27,	Karkhab irrigation scheme. Refers to No. 736, Part XVIII. Transmits copy of letter from Lieutenant Wilson and report by Lieutenant Wilson on Karkhab River, with special reference to its suitability for irrigation ..	128
224	Mr. O'Beirne ..	425	July 8,	Proposed dispatch of Russian troops. Refers to Nos. 10 and 12. Describes representations made to Minister for Foreign Affairs dissuading. Latter's mind appears to be made up. Reasons for dispatch of troops alleged by Minister for Foreign Affairs ..	137
225	" "	426	8,	Proposed dispatch of Russian troops. Refers to No. 224. Reports decision of Council of Ministers to dispatch troops. Instructions to commander. Has communicated suggestion in No. 23 to Minister for Foreign Affairs, who has sent instructions to M. Sabline ..	138
226	" "	427 Confidential	8,	Policy of non-intervention in Persia. Reports views of Minister for Foreign Affairs on, elicited during the course of several conversations. Minister for Foreign Affairs' two main lines of argument, which disclose considerable difference between his way of looking at the matter and the point of view of His Majesty's Government ..	140
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228	" "	435	15,	Dispatch of Russian troops. Has communicated substance of No. 143 to Minister for Foreign Affairs, who denies that additional troops have been sent. Minister for Foreign Affairs read reassuring telegram from M. Sabline. Objects of proposed dispatch of troops to Tehran ..	142
229	Sir G. Lowther ..	545	14,	Interference of Turkish Government in Persian affairs. Transmits communications made to Porte jointly with Russian colleague. Comment on slight divergence of expressions in the two communications ..	143
230	" "	551	14,	Attitude of Turkish public opinion towards Anglo-Russian intervention in Persia. Refers to No. 154. Transmits copy of letter from Ahmed Riza respecting ..	144
231	Messrs. F. C. Strick and Co.	..	17,	Hormuz oxide. Refers to No. 164. Would not hesitate, as far as they are concerned, to make it unpleasant for the Mouin ..	145
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234	" "	599 Tel.	19,	Deposition of Shah, and accession of new Shah. Refers to No. 233. Transmits text of note announcing ..	146
235	" "	600 Tel.	19,	Shiraz. Reports state of anarchy at. Refusal of late governor to leave in spite of Zil's appointment. Has pressed for confirmation of Zil's appointment ..	146
236	" "	601 Tel.	19,	Ex-Shah's departure. Desirability of. Ex-Shah hopes for Russian support, and messages reaching him from the provinces promising support ..	147
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238	Mr. O'Beirne ..	363 Tel.	19,	Situation at Tabreez. Minister for Foreign Affairs has instructed Russian chargé d'affaires to impress upon Persian Government necessity of sending governor-general with troops at once. Minister for Foreign Affairs' reasons for taking this action. Fears trouble also at Ardebil ..	147
239	" "	364 Tel.	19,	Situation at Tabreez. Refers to No. 238. Minister for Foreign Affairs has been informed by Turkish Ambassador that Sublime Porte have sent instructions to Turkish consul-general, on subject of Sattar and Baghir Khans, to effect that bast should not be accorded to them any longer ..	148
240	Consul-General Cox	730 Tel.	19,	Arms traffic and disturbances at Bushire. Refers to No. 222. Importance of keeping secret names and identity of parties of whose information use has been made (see No. 382, Part XVIII). Is investigating further evidence respecting part played by Mirza in arms traffic ..	148
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242	" "	387 Tel. Confidential	19,	Departure of ex-Shah. Refers to No. 13, Part XIII, and No. 236. His Majesty's Government's proposals with regard to escort. Enquires views ..	148
243	To Mr. O'Beirne ..	932 Tel.	19,	Anglo-Russian co-operation in Persia. Count Benckendorff is evidently relieved that intervention has not been necessary at Tehran. Appointment of Governor of Tabreez ..	149
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245	" "	935 Tel.	19,	Deposition of Shah and accession of Sultan Ahmed Shah. Refers to No. 233. Count Benckendorff has been informed that His Majesty's Government think ex-Shah should leave for Russia without delay, and that new Shah should at once be recognised ..	149



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247	To Colonial Office ..	..	19,	Peter Ellow. Refers to No. 86. Impossible to ask for extradition, and impolitic to ask for surrender of as a favour from Persian Government ..	150
248	India Office ..	..	19,	Seistan consulate and proposed threat to Baluchis. Transmits telegram sent to Viceroy, dated 16th July, referring to Nos. 129 and 132 ..	150
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250	" "	604 Tel.	20,	Ex-Shah's appeal to Czar. Refers to No. 236. Gives substance of telegram sent by ex-Shah to Czar. M. Sabline's proposals as to wording of reply ..	151
251	" "	605 Tel.	20,	Amir Bahadur Jang's followers. Reports taking of bast by in neighbourhood of Russian Legation ..	151
252	" "	606 Tel.	20,	Appointment of Zil-es-Sultan as Governor-General of Fars. Refers to No. 244. In view of unwillingness of Government to confirm, it would be better to postpone Zil's return to Persia ..	151
253	" "	607 Tel.	20,	M. Sabline and Colonel Liakhoff. Reports difficulties between. Colonel Liakhoff under impression that Russian protection was extended to Cossack Brigade ..	151
254	" "	608 Tel.	20,	Situation at Tabreez. Has no news confirming Russian information as to unsatisfactory nature of (see No. 238), but, if His Majesty's acting consul-general corroborates news, will support Russian colleague's representations ..	152
255	" "	609 Tel.	20,	Kermanshah. Reports decided improvement in situation since dispatch of No. 219 ..	152
256	" "	610 Tel.	20,	Shiraz. Transmits telegram from Shiraz (No. 72) reporting agreement arrived at with Russian consul that reinforcements should be sent at once if Assef-ed-Dowleh not removed from his post ..	152
257	" "	611 Tel.	20,	Alleged anti-Russian agitation in Tabreez. Refers to No. 254. Gives summary of report from Mr. Smart: popular meeting at chief mosque ..	152
258	" "	612 Tel.	20,	Departure of ex-Shah. Agrees with M. Sabline as to arrangements for escort. Possible delay in departure ..	153
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260	" "	390 Tel.	20,	Baluchi advance on Kerman. Refers to No. 237. To warn Persian Government that His Majesty's Government will hold them responsible for damage to lives or property of British subjects ..	153

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262	Anglo-Persian Oil Company ..	..	20,	Agreement with Sheikh of Mohammerah. Transmits copy of telegram from agents in Mohammerah, dated 17th July, giving substance of, and reporting signature. Thanks His Majesty's Government on behalf of company ..	154
263	Sir G. Barclay ..	613 Tel.	21,	Appointments to new Cabinet and other posts. Informs of ..	154
264	" "	614 Tel.	21,	Governor of Shiraz. Has informed Mr. Bill that Ala-ed-Dowleh has been appointed, and instructed to restore order as soon as possible ..	155
265	" "	615 Tel.	21,	Zil-es-Sultan. Refers to Nos. 210 and 252. Recommends that the Zil should keep away from Persia as long as possible, but if he goes, suggests he had better go to Tehran and not to Ispahan ..	155
266	" "	616 Tel.	21,	Recognition of new Shah by two legations. Informs of ..	155
267	" "	617 Tel.	21,	Situation at Kerman. Requests authorisation to use own discretion as to right moment for addressing warning in No. 260. Will hold Persian Government responsible if danger becomes imminent ..	155
268	" "	618 Tel.	21,	Ispahan-Kum road. Change of Shah has produced good impression in provinces. Reports measures for ensuring security on road ..	155
269	To Sir G. Barclay ..	393 Tel.	21,	Kherkha irrigation scheme. India Office considers that officers in Kherkha district should be cautioned to see that sheikh does not overlook financial and other difficulties of the scheme. Approves No. 773, Part XVIII ..	156
270	To Mr. O'Beirne ..	948 Tel.	21,	Departure of ex-Shah. To ask Russian Government their opinion of proposal in No. 258, telling them that His Majesty's Government approve the scheme. His Majesty's Government think question of civil list arrears, crown jewels, &c., could be settled afterwards ..	156
271	To Sir F. Cartwright	275 Tel.	21,	Zil-es-Sultan. To inform Zil that his appointment as Governor of Fars will not be confirmed by new Government, and that his return at present inadvisable ..	156
272	To India Office ..	..	21,	Situation at Kerman. Refers to No. 162. Transmits No. 237. Sir E. Grey will be glad of early reply to No. 162 ..	156
273	To Anglo-Persian Oil Company ..	..	21,	Agreement with Sheikh of Mohammerah. Gives substance of No. 14. Suggests advisability of complying with request of sheikh ..	156
274	Sir G. Barclay ..	620 Tel.	22,	Ex-Shah's financial affairs. Refers to No. 270. Crown jewels constitute chief difficulty. Joint advice to Persian Government ..	157

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276	" "	.. 622 Tel.	22,	Anti-Russian agitation in Tabreez: disorders at Ardebil. Refers to No. 257. Gives substance of two notes addressed by M. Sabline to Persian Government. Has supported M. Sabline's representations ..	158
277	Mr. O'Beirne	.. 365 Tel.	22,	Departure of Shah. Is laying before Minister for Foreign Affairs views contained in No. 270. Russian Government agree, but fear that expenses of his support will fall on them unless some arrangement made before he leaves .. .. .	158
278	To Sir G. Barclay	.. 395 Tel.	22,	Kerman. Refers to No. 267. To use his discretion .. .. .	158
279	India Office	.. ..	21,	Protection of Bahreinis in Persia. Refers to No. 161. Lord Morley concurs ..	158
280	Anglo-Persian Oil Company	.. ..	21,	Imperial commissioner. Reports visit from Sadigh-es-Sultaneh, who showed copy of telegram from Nezameddin authorising him to receive full salary. Enquires whether July instalment is to be paid, or whether it should be refused in view of Foreign Office letter of 12th June ..	159
281	" "	.. ..	22,	Agreement with sheikh. Refers to No. 273. Understand that it is Sir E. Grey's desire that the whole sum of 16,500l. should be remitted in gold to sheikh. Instructions have been given accordingly. Difficulty of keeping arrangement secret for long ..	159
282	Sir F. Bertie	.. * 291 Confidential	22,	Nasr-ul-Mulk. Transmits copy of letter from, enclosing translations of telegrams exchanged with newly appointed Regent in Persia relative to his appointment as Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs .. .. .	159
283	Sir G. Barclay	.. 623 Tel.	23,	Russian troops for Persia. Refers to No. 275. Movement of .. .. .	161
284	" "	.. 624 Tel.	23,	Ex-Shah's departure. Refers to No. 250. States answer of the Czar to ex-Shah's telegram. Persian Government are formulating proposals respecting crown jewels, &c. .. .. .	161
285	Sir F. Cartwright	.. 151 Tel.	23,	Zil-es-Sultan. Refers to No. 271. Has tried to persuade Zil not to return to Persia yet. Zil wishes to be allowed to go to Tehran or Ispahan .. .. .	161
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287	To Sir G. Barclay	.. 397 Tel.	23,	Salary of oil commissioner. Refers to No. 647, Part XVIII, and No. 113. Oil company have been shown telegram by Sadigh-es-Sultaneh from Nezameddin stating that former will claim July instalment. To enquire whether Persian Government wish salary still to be paid to Sadigh-es-Sultaneh till appointment of successor .. .. .	162

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291	India Office	.. ..	23,	Assurances to Sheikh of Mohammerah. Refers to No. 152, Part XVIII. Transmits copy of enclosures in letter to Government of India, dated 1st July, relative to ..	163
292	Count Benckendorff..	.. ..	24,	Disorders at Kermanshah. Transmits telegram reporting that Turkish Ambassador at St. Petersburg has announced proposal of Porte to send detachment to Kermanshah, and giving M. Isvolsky's reply. Enquires views of His Majesty's Government .. .. .	165
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295	Mr. O'Beirne	.. 366 Tel.	24,	Disorders at Kermanshah. Turkish Ambassador has enquired how Russian Government would view dispatch of Turkish troops. Russian reply .. .. .	167
296	" "	.. 367 Tel.	24,	Russian troops in Persia. Persian Minister has enquired whether Russian Government are prepared to withdraw. Minister for Foreign Affairs' reply. Conversation with Minister for Foreign Affairs as to means of withdrawal .. .. .	167
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303	" ..	579	21,	Mujtehedes of Nejef and Kerbela. Transmits paraphrase of telegram dispatched to His Majesty's consul-general at Bagdad in accordance with No. 186 ..	170
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305	India Office ..	..	24,	Kerman. Transmits telegram to Viceroy, dated 22nd July, relative to position of British community at ..	171
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310	To Mr. O'Beirne ..	964 Tel.	26,	Disturbances at Shiraz. Refers to Nos. 301 and 309. To explain to Minister for Foreign Affairs that reinforcements have been sent on recommendation of His Majesty's consul-general at Bushire ..	173
311	" ..	965 Tel.	26,	Dispatch of Turkish troops to Kermanshah. Enquiry has been made by Turkish Ambassador similar to that reported in No. 295. Reply of His Majesty's Government ..	174
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317	Mr. O'Beirne ..	369 Tel. Confidential	27,	Encroachments on Persian territory. Turkish Ambassador has shown telegram reporting encroachments by Russians. M. Sazonow speaks as if he knows nothing about it ..	175
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319	Sir G. Barclay ..	633 Tel.	28,	Tehran elections. Reports dates fixed 6th, 7th, and 8th August ..	176
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322	To Count Benckendorff ..	..	28,	Disorders at Kermanshah. Turkish proposal to send troops. Refers to No. 292. Tewfik has made similar communication. Reply of His Majesty's Government ..	176
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324	India Office ..	..	28,	Kerman. Refers to Nos. 162 and 272. Lord Morley enquires whether Sir E. Grey would think it desirable to warn Government of India to be ready to dispatch troops to the Gulf at short notice ..	177
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333	Mr. O'Beirne ..	370 Tel.	30,	"Novoe Vremya" Tehran correspondent. Refers to No. 330. Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs will see if hint can be conveyed to "Novoe Vremya." Gives substance of article complained of ..	180
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339	" ..	131	30,	Hormuz oxide. Difficulties to which Messrs. Ellinger refer are a thing of the past. Messrs. Ellinger seem to fail to realise debt of gratitude which Moin owes for action of His Majesty's consul at Bunder Abbas. Is making representation to Moin with regard to his language reported in Messrs. Ellinger's letter of 11th May .. ..	183
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345	" ..	140	16,	Movements of Bakhtiari khans and their attitude towards constitution. Transmits Memorandum by Major Stokes on ..	199
346	Sir G. Lowther ..	592	26,	Mujtebeds of Nejef and Kerbela. Refers to No. 302. Transmits despatch from His Majesty's consul-general at Bagdad enclosing translation of reply from to consul-general's letter requesting them to endeavour to restore peace in Persia ..	202
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350	Sir G. Barclay ..	643 Tel.	3,	Disorders at Ardebil. Refers to No. 276. Russian Minister is making representations. Is supporting Russian colleague in urging measures for restoring order ..	207
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354	" ..	647 Tel.	3,	Shiraz. Reports arrival of reinforcements ..	208
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356	Sir G. Barclay ..	648 Tel.	4,	Ardebil. Refers to No. 350. Russian chargé d'affaires has been promised a note from Persian Government announcing departure of strong governor for, with strong escort ..	209
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359	" ..	651 Tel.	4,	Shah's tutor. Impression at St. Petersburg of reported intention to remove M. Smirnow is very bad. Dr. Lindley has as yet received no proposal .. .. .	210
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365	Sir G. Barclay ..	652 Tel.	5,	Hormuz oxide. Hears that Moin's concession is to be cancelled, and that a Persian subject is ready to give Government 80,000 tomans per annum for the concession. Refers to No. 351 .. .. .	211
366	" ..	653 Tel.	5,	Indian guard for oil company. Major Cox reports that company's agent has agreed to withdrawal of. Major Cox has submitted proposal to Indian Government for retention of portion of guard as escort for Lieutenant Wilson (see No. 327) ..	211
367	" ..	654 Tel.	5,	Ex-Shah's financial arrangements. Gives results of negotiations referred to in No. 352. Russian colleague suggests Shah should start on 17th August ..	212

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369	To India Office ..	..	5,	Escorts for Indo-European Telegraph Department's repairing parties. Transmits No. 335. Sir E. Grey is disposed to approve Sir G. Barclay's suggested communication to Persian Government .. .. .	213
370	" ..	Confidential	5,	Persian telegraphs. Refers to No. 427, Part XVIII. Transmits copies of No. 535, Part XVIII, and No. 318 .. .. .	213
371	India Office ..	..	5,	Geological surveys in Persia. Refers to No. 289. Lord Morley agrees. In view of their letter of 15th July, Lord Morley would suggest that Anglo-Persian Oil Company might be warned that no financial assistance can be afforded towards projected survey .. .. .	214
372	Sir G. Barclay ..	655 Tel.	6,	Special tribunal. Refers to No. 331. Nationalists have now dispensed with .. .. .	214
373	Mr. O'Beirne ..	376 Tel.	6,	Departure of ex-Shah. Refers to No. 367. Has spoken to M. Sazonow in sense of Sir G. Barclay's telegram. His Excellency says immediate departure is desirable, though in this case Medjliss might refuse to ratify arrangement about Shah's pension ..	214
374	To Sir G. Barclay ..	412 Tel.	6,	Oxide concessions. To support Moin if it is of any use obtaining concession for him; if of no use, to try to secure it for Strick. For details, to communicate with latter's agent .. .. .	214
375	To Mr. O'Beirne ..	1021 Tel.	6,	Departure of ex-Shah for Russia. Refers to No. 367. To communicate arrangements to Russian Government, and to ask them to invite ex-Shah to start for Russia on the 17th August .. .. .	215
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377	" ..	233 Confidential	6,	Russian policy regarding Persia. Reports conversation with M. Isvolsky and Count Benckendorff at Cowes on 3rd August respecting .. .. .	215
378	Sir G. Barclay ..	656 Tel.	7,	Chief of Tehran police. Refers to No. 368. Individual referred to was leading spirit of Sipahdar's forces. Interference by Russia would only aggravate difficulties of Persian Government. Excellent order has been maintained in Tehran .. .. .	216
379	" ..	657 Tel.	7,	Zil-es-Sultan. Reports departure of from Resht for Tehran .. .. .	217
380	" ..	658 Tel.	7,	Mr. New. Has decided not to approach Minister of Telegraphs on matter in No. 376 .. .. .	217
381	" ..	659 Tel.	7,	Russian troops in Azerbaijan. His Majesty's consul at Tabreez reports withdrawal of a portion .. .. .	217

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383	" "	661 Tel.	8,	Governor of Shiraz. Refers to No. 354. Reports appointment of Ain-ed-Dowleh. Part of reinforcement for His Majesty's consulate can now be withdrawn .. .. .	218
384	Mr. O'Beirne	382 Tel.	8,	Departure of ex-Shah. Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs says no decision can be taken as to His Majesty's future place of residence until next meeting of Council of Ministers .. .. .	218
385	Consul-General Cox	7 Commercial	July 18,	Condition of trade routes. Transmits memorandum on, especially Bushire - Shiraz route, drawn up by His Majesty's vice-consul. Suggests possibility of taking action .. .. .	218
386	" "	8 Commercial	18,	Anglo-Persian Oil Company's agreement with Sheikh of Mohammerah. Refers to No. 212. Transmits copy of, dated 16th July, 1909 .. .. .	224
387	Sir G. Lowther	626 Confidential	Aug. 4,	Views of Mujtehed of Bagdad on presence of British and Russian troops in Persia. Transmits memorandum by His Majesty's consul-general at Bagdad giving .. .. .	227
388	Manchester Chamber of Commerce	..	7,	Insecurity of trade routes in Middle and Southern Persia. Refers to No. 355. Transmits letter from Messrs. E. S. Davids, Sons, and Co. and others respecting .. .. .	228
389	Imperial Bank of Persia	..	7,	Situation in Tehran. Transmits extract from letter from chief manager of bank in Tehran, dated 21st July, describing .. .. .	229
390	Sir G. Barclay	662 Tel. Confidential	9,	Russian bastis in Western Persia. Reports that relative of Maku khan has taken bast at Bayazid. Opinion of M. Sabline as to steps to be taken. Suggests general amnesty. Comments on situation .. .. .	230
391	" "	663 Tel.	9,	Zil-es-Sultan. Progress arrested by Persian Government .. .. .	231
392	" "	664 Tel.	9,	Departure of ex-Shah. Refers to Nos. 373 and 384. Stipulations regarding departure are essential part of recent agreement between Persian Government and two legations .. .. .	231
393	Mr. O'Beirne	383 Tel.	9,	Loan of Mr. New. Refers to No. 376. In view of No. 380, no further action is being taken .. .. .	231
394	To Sir G. Barclay	414 Tel.	9,	Kherkha irrigation. Refers to No. 327. Suggestion is being made to India Office to sanction Wilson's survey .. .. .	231
395	" "	415 Tel.	9,	Zil-es-Sultan. Approves action reported in No. 391 .. .. .	231
396	To Mr. O'Beirne	230	9,	Anglo-Russian co-operation. Records interview with M. Isvolsky, who expressed pleasure at the agreement between the policies of the two Governments .. .. .	232

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398	" "	.. ..	9,	Geological and topographical survey. Refers to No. 289. The company are already acquainted with publication referred to, which is insufficient for their purposes. Enquires whether Government of India would be ready to share in expense of survey proposed by the company .. .. .	233
399	Mr. F. C. Strick	.. ..	9,	Hormuz oxide. Transmits copy of telegram from Mr. Brown. Thanks for promise to communicate at once what Sir G. Barclay reports .. .. .	233
400	Akbar Mirza	.. Telegraphic	10,	Guarantees to Zil-es-Sultan. Zil understands that assurances as to property during absence are annulled by his return, but trusts former assurances hold good. If so, hopes His Majesty's Minister will be instructed to help him to return to Europe .. .. .	234
401	Sir G. Barclay	665 Tel.	10,	Governorship of Fars. Refers to No. 383. Hears that Persian Government intend to revoke appointment of Ain-ed-Dowleh. Is urging them not to do so .. .. .	234
402	Mr. O'Beirne	386 Tel.	10,	Departure of ex-Shah. Refers to No. 392. Has spoken to Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs on subject of, in anticipation of instructions, suggesting that His Majesty might reside temporarily at Tiflis. M. Sazonow does not anticipate serious difficulties, though he cannot get his instructions until next Council of Ministers .. .. .	235
403	To Mr. O'Beirne	1069 Tel.	10,	General amnesty. To ascertain views of Russian Government as to suggestion in No. 390. To inform Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs that His Majesty's Government will instruct Sir G. Barclay to press on Persian Government adoption of this suggestion, if Russian Government concur .. .. .	235
404	To Admiralty	.. ..	10,	Bluejackets landed at Bushire. Transmits No. 338. Hopes that Lords Commissioners may comply with wish of Sir G. Barclay and His Majesty's consul-general that officers concerned should be thanked for their services .. .. .	235
405	Sir G. Barclay	666 Tel.	11,	Zil-es-Sultan. Reports Zil taken back to Resht by Nationalists. Zil's son has again requested intervention of His Majesty's legation (see Sir C. Spring-Rice's despatch No. 59 of 27th March, 1907) .. .. .	235
406	" "	667 Tel.	11,	Bastis at Russian legation. Refers to No. 316. Some of bastis would naturally leave with ex-Shah, and would <i>ipso facto</i> share joint protection. Presumes there is no objection to granting protection during journey only .. .. .	236



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408	To Sir G. Barclay ..	418 Tel.	11,	Zil-es-Sultan. His Majesty's Government will reply that they consider Zil's return releases them from all guarantees, but they will do all they can to facilitate his departure. Enquires views .. ..	236
409	To India Office ..	..	11,	Loan of Mr. New. Transmits copies of Nos. 380 and 393. Sir E. Grey proposes to authorise Mr. O'Beirne to abstain from approaching Russian Government again on the subject .. ..	236
410	Mirza Mehdi Khan ..	..	11,	Russian troops in Persia. Transmits two telegrams from Persian Government protesting against .. ..	237
411	India Office ..	..	11,	Withdrawal of sepoys from Jask. Transmits copy of enclosures in letter from Government of India, dated 1st July, relative to ..	238
412	Sir G. Barclay ..	668 Tel.	12,	Governorship of Fars. Anticipations in No. 401 realised. Noticeable tendency to give governorships to men new to provincial administration .. ..	238
413	Mr. O'Beirne ..	390 Tel.	12,	Departure of ex-Shah. Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs hopes to obtain assent of Czar to Shah's residing at Kieff. Russian Government cannot consent to His Majesty's departure until Persian Government guarantee his debt to Russian Bank ..	239
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415	" ..	394 Tel.	12,	General amnesty. Refers to No. 407. Russian Government have sent instructions as proposed to Russian chargé d'affaires, and hope His Majesty's Minister at Tehran will be similarly instructed. .. ..	239
416	To Sir G. Barclay ..	419 Tel.	12,	Zil-es-Sultan. Approves last paragraph of No. 405 .. ..	240
417	" ..	420 Tel.	12,	Tutor for Shah. Refers to No. 414. To do what is possible to prevent removal of M. Smirnov, and to see that solution of the matter is satisfactory to Russian colleague .. ..	240
418	To Messrs. Andrew Weir and Co. ..	..	12,	Hormuz oxide. Enquires as to accuracy of statement that on 4th December, 1908, contract was signed with Messrs. Ellinger for purchase of oxide .. ..	240
419	India Office ..	..	12,	Escorts for Indo-European Telegraph Department's repairing parties. Refers to No. 369. Lord Morley concurs, but action to be taken will require careful consideration. Transmits copy of memorandum by director-in-chief of Indo-European Telegraph Department .. ..	240
420	To Sir G. Barclay ..	421 Tel.	13,	General amnesty. Refers to Nos. 415 and 403. To concert with Russian colleague as to best means of procuring .. ..	241

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491	" " ..	693 Tel.	26,	Messrs. Wright and James. Refers to No. 486. Deprecates sending force where danger to British subjects is incidental merely to robber raids..	285
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498	" " ..	..	26,	Kerman. Refers to No. 488. Transmits No. 491. Sir E. Grey concurs and suggests telegram might be sent to Government of India instructing them to take no steps ..	287
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527	Mr. O'Beirne ..	474 Confidential	23,	Withdrawal of Russian troops. M. Poklewski has stated what he believes to be views of M. Isvolsky as to. Gives substance of this statement .. ..	321

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529	" " ..	701 Tel.	30,	Zil-es-Sultan. Refers to No. 501. His Majesty's vice-consul at Resht has announced Zil's intention of coming to Tehran, but has since reported his departure has encountered opposition. Time has arrived for using greater insistence. Suggests measures .. ..	322
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532	" " ..	704 Tel.	30,	Shah's tutor. Reports discharge of M. Smirnow, and probability of dismissal of Russian doctor. Has urged reinstatement of Smirnow and retention of doctor ..	323
533	Mr. O'Beirne ..	424 Tel.	30,	Ex-Shah's property. Refers to No. 531. M. Sazonow has at present no news of report in No. 506, nor of appeal from Shah to Emperor. Such appeal would not influence attitude of Russian Government ..	323
534	To Mr. O'Beirne ..	1263 Tel.	30,	Ex-Shah's property. Refers to No. 531. Russian chargé d'affaires has not yet received instructions to make communication indicated in No. 440. Should ask Russian Government to send instructions ..	324
535	" " ..	1265 Tel.	30,	Zil-es-Sultan. His Majesty's Government agree with objection in No. 529. Should explain attitude of His Majesty's Government and ask Russia to instruct M. Sabline to join in communication suggested by His Majesty's representative ..	324
536	To Anglo-Persian Oil Company ..	..	30,	Salary of Imperial Commissioner. Refers to No. 449. Informs of No. 528 ..	324
537	Sir G. Barclay ..	705 Tel.	31,	Ex-Shah's pension. Persian Government may not be in a position to pay first instalment, and this might delay ex-Shah's departure. Suggests that the two banks might advance the sum, if necessary ..	324
538	Mr. O'Beirne ..	425 Tel.	31,	Ex-Shah's property. Refers to No. 534. Written undertaking (refers to Nos. 506 and 533) must be given. Ex-Shah's telegram to Czar will have no effect on decision of Russian Government .. ..	325
539	" " ..	426 Tel.	31,	Zil-es-Sultan. Refers to No. 535. Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs will telegraph to chargé d'affaires at Tehran in sense of No. 529 .. ..	325
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542	" " ..	1273 Tel.	31,	Shah's tutor. Should communicate substance of No. 532 to Russian Government, and say that Persian Minister in London will be informed accordingly ..	326
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544	To Messrs. Ellinger..	..	31,	Hormuz oxide. Contract with Messrs. Andrew Weir and Co. has been known for some time to Messrs. Strick. Obligation to maintain secrecy is source of difficulty to Sir G. Barclay ..	327
545	Sir G. Barclay ..	706 Tel.	Sept. 1,	Navigation of Lake Urumia. Transmits telegram from His Majesty's acting consul-general at Tabreez, referring to No. 508, stating that Imam Kuli has said that if Stevens refused the offer he would call in Germans. M. Sabline suggests Imam should form company under Russian name, taking a Russian into partnership, and giving management to Stevens..	327
546	" " ..	707 Tel.	1,	Affray at Urumia. Transmits telegram (No. 186) from His Majesty's acting consul-general at Tabreez reporting attempt of Russian force to dislodge a number of Kurds engaged in persecuting inhabitants of a Christian village. Still no governor or troops at Urumia ..	328
547	" " ..	708 Tel.	1,	Hormuz oxide. Refers to No. 530. Complete suspension of negotiations respecting concession. Moin and committee have probably come to terms ..	328
548	" " ..	710 Tel.	1,	Anti-Russian attitude of Persian Government. M. Sabline has telegraphed at length to his Government complaining of. To be hoped Russian Government will not adopt unfriendly attitude ..	328
549	" " ..	711 Tel.	1,	Proposed Anglo-Russian loan to Persian Government. Refers to No. 541. Attitude of committee towards financial assistance from Russia and England ..	329
550	Mr. O'Beirne ..	427 Tel.	1,	Shah's tutor. Refers to No. 542. Has communicated No. 532 to Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. Attitude of Russian Government to dismissal of M. Smirnow ..	329
551	" " ..	428 Tel.	1,	Proposed joint advance. Refers to No. 541. Minister of Finance has refused to allow Russian Bank to join. Will interview M. Kokovtsoff. Will explain considerations in No. 541 to Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, but Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs is averse to a loan ..	329
552	" " ..	429 Tel.	1,	Ex-Shah's property. Refers to No. 538. Russian chargé d'affaires is being instructed to press His Majesty to accept present arrangement, as nothing more favourable will be offered. Conversation with M. Sazonow concerning ..	330

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555	Note communicated to Mirza Mehdi Khan ..	..	1,	Shah's tutor. His Majesty's Government strongly urge advisability of cancelling dismissal of M. Smirnow ..	330
556	To Mirza Mehdi Khan ..	..	1,	Withdrawal of Russian troops. Sir E. Grey cannot see his way to again approach the Russian Government. Departure of refugees with ex-Shah ..	331
557	India Office ..	..	2,	Kherka irrigation. Transmits telegram to Viceroy, dated 27th August, informing of Nos. 327 and 366 ..	331
558	" " ..	..	2,	Kerman. Transmits copy of telegram to Viceroy, dated 29th August, informing that troops will not be required ..	332
559	Messrs. Ellinger ..	..	1,	Hormuz oxide. Refers to No. 544. Withdrawal of request for secrecy regarding contract with Weir ..	332
560	Anglo - Persian Oil Company ..	..	Aug. 31,	Company's agreement with Sheikh of Mohammerah. Refers to No. 499. Thanks Major Cox for his assistance ..	332
561	Sir G. Barclay ..	712 Tel.	Sept. 2,	Question of amnesty. Refers to Nos. 390 and 480. Reports a more satisfactory note from the Persian Government, proclaiming an amnesty for political offenders in Tehran, with the exception that certain persons in bast in Russian Legation and Turkish Embassy are exiled ..	333
562	" " ..	713 Tel.	2,	Russian troops at Kazvin. Refers to No. 541. Reports no need for ..	333
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564	" " ..	433 Tel.	2,	Russo-Persian relations. Refers to No. 548. Comments on attitude of Russia in view of anti-Russian attitude of new Persian Government as manifested by dismissal of M. Smirnow, &c. Question of loan. Does not think Russia will abandon her attitude of moderation ..	334
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566	Mr. O'Beirne ..	434 Tel.	3,	Russian troops in Tabreez. Refers to No. 565. Has mentioned complaint of Persian Minister in London to Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. Reply of M. Sazonow ..	335



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569	Sir G. Barclay ..	714 Tel.	4,	Persian politics. Dissension between Cabinet and committee reported in No. 548 is only a disagreement between the latter and the Sipahdar .. ..	336
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572	To Persian Transport Company ..	..	4,	Messrs. Lynch's property at Shelllieh. Informs of No. 518 (see also No. 701) ..	337
573	Sir G. Barclay ..	716 Tel.	5,	Persian Government and committee. Refers to Nos. 567 and 569. Reports that the Sipahdar has requested M. Sabline not to make any advance to the committee. M. Sabline would be prepared to recommend Anglo-Russian advance to Persian Government on conditions mentioned in No. 58 .. ..	338
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579	" ..	..	7,	Imperial commissioner's salary. Refers to No. 536. Salary for August has been paid to Sadigh-es-Sultaneh. Transmits copies of correspondence with latter and of letters exchanged between the company and Persian Legation ..	341

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591	To Sir G. Barclay ..	458 Tel.	9,	Oil-guard. Refers to Nos. 563 and 588. Repeats authorisation to retain, and enquires cost. Treasury sanction necessary for division of cost with Government of India .. ..	349
592	" ..	459 Tel.	9,	Claims of Imperial Bank of Persia. Refers to Nos. 135 and 466, Part XI. Bank hope claims will not be omitted. Has replied that there is no reason they should be ..	349
593	To Mr. O'Beirne ..	247	9,	Relations between Russians and Persians in Tabreez. Refers to Nos. 564 and 566. Has communicated first and second sentences of 2nd paragraph of No. 574 to Russian Ambassador .. ..	349

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595	To India Office ..	..	9,	Anglo-Persian Oil Company's privileges with regard to telegraphing. Transmits No. 526. Sir E. Grey concurs with Major Cox, but enquires Lord Morley's views ..	351
596	" " ..	..	9,	Proposed establishment of wireless telegraphy in the Gulf. Refers to No. 509. Sir E. Grey concurs. Transmits No. 594..	351
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598	India Office ..	..	9,	Anglo-Persian Oil Company and Ispahan consular guard. Transmits letter from Government of India respecting salary of Lieutenant Ranking ..	352
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604	To Sir G. Barclay ..	461 Tel.	11,	Bunder Abbas. Should give instructions as suggested in No. 589 ..	354
605	To Sir G. Lowther ..	666 Tel.	11,	Turkish interests at Bunder Abbas. Refers to No. 581. Should inform Porte that, pending appointment of vice-consul, His Majesty's consuls at Bunder Abbas and Linga will take charge of ..	354
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610	To Sir G. Barclay ..	462 Tel.	12,	Shah's birthday. Should consult colleagues as to steps to be taken and act accordingly ..	355
611	Sir G. Barclay ..	162	Aug. 24,	Insecurity of roads in Persia. Refers to Nos. 52 and 297. Suggests scheme for putting an end to. Transmits correspondence with Consul-General Grahame and Acting Consul Bill ..	355
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613	" " ..	487	6,	Advance to Persian Government. Refers to No. 576. Attitude of Russian Government. M. Poklewski's anticipations (see No. 551) justified. Conversation with M. Poklewski. Comments ..	361
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616	India Office ..	..	11,	Indo-European Telegraph Department staff. Concurs in suggestion in No. 471. Transmits minute by director-in-chief of department concerning conduct of in crisis at Tehran ..	370
617	Sir G. Barclay ..	727 Tel.	13,	Russian troops at Tabreez. Refers to No. 503. Transmits telegram from His Majesty's acting consul-general at Tabreez reporting dispatch of telegram by General Snarsky and Russian consul advocating reduction forthwith ..	371
618	" " ..	728 Tel.	13,	Persian Government and committee. Reports supercession of committee by an advisory commission of forty members ..	371
619	Treasury ..	..	13,	Loan of Imperial Bank. Refers to No. 585. Treasury have no objection to release of Mohammedan receipts for service of. Considers that Persian Government should be pressed for further payment of Anglo-Indian loan ..	372
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621	Sir A. Nicolson ..	444 Tel.	14,	Advance to Persian Government. Persian Government have applied to Russian Bank at Tehran for 200,000L. Will enquire view of Russian Government ..	372
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632	India Office ..	..	Sept. 15,	Loan of Imperial Bank. Refers to No. 586. Lord Morley concurs in release of Mohammedan receipts for ..	379
633	" ..	..	16,	Kherka irrigation scheme. Transmits copy of telegram from Viceroy relative to proposed retention of four sowars ..	380
634	Sir G. Barclay ..	729 Tel.	16,	Advance to Persian Government. Refers to Nos. 580 and 622. Reports sanction by board of directors of Imperial Bank of an advance on security of the Crown jewels ..	380
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636	" ..	137	16,	Advance to Persia by Imperial Bank. Reports interview with Persian Minister, who asks His Majesty's Government to urge bank to advance on current account, and complains of action of Russian troops. Answer of His Majesty's Government ..	381

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638	To India Office ..	..	16,	Recent disturbances at Tehran. Acknowledges No. 616. Concurs in suggestion of making communication recognising services of certain gentlemen during ..	381
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641	India Office ..	..	16,	Military attaché at Meshed. Refers to India Office letter of 18th December, 1908. Transmits copy of letter from Government of India, dated 12th August, drawing attention to miscellaneous expenses connected with the appointment, which should be shared between British and Indian Governments ..	382
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643	To India Office ..	..	17,	Meshed-Nasratabad telegraph line. Transmits No. 623. Cites similar case last March. States and asks concurrence in proposed reply. Transmits also No. 629 ..	385
644	India Office ..	..	16,	Escort for Mr. New. Refers to India Office letter of 19th October, 1908. Transmits copy of telegram from Viceroy suggesting that escort of thirty men from Mekran levy corps should be given to Mr. New while on tour ..	385
645	Sir G. Barclay ..	731 Tel.	19,	Zil-es-Sultan's contribution. Refers to No. 642. Reports negotiations for loan from Imperial Bank ..	386
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647	" ..	733 Tel.	20,	M. Sadowsky and M. Smirnow. Reports prospect of withdrawal of troops from Kazvin in return for reappointment of ..	386
648	" ..	734 Tel.	20,	Outstanding Godar bridge account. Refers to despatch from Tehran, No. 122 of 21st May, 1908. Mr. Ranking has asked for permission to accept sum originally claimed free of interest, or half the sum with interest. Hopes that Messrs. Lynch will concur ..	386
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658	" "	738 Tel.	22,	Additional consular guard at Shiraz. Reports that he has authorised further retention of, in consideration of reply of Mr. Bill to telegram reported in No. 649 ..	390
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673	" "	168	Sept. 9,	Disturbances in provinces. Reports on, and on general situation with special reference to "Times" report from St. Petersburg..	398
674	" "	169 Confidential	9,	Perso-Turkish boundary-line affecting Mo-hammerah territory. Refers to No. 437, Part XVII. Transmits despatch from His Majesty's consul-general at Bushire, with correspondence. Suggests, in accordance with the contents, that the ruling recorded in despatch to Constantinople No. 75 of February 25, 1908, should be reconsidered ..	400
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677	" "	172	10,	Events in Persia. Transmits monthly summary of ..	410
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682	" ..	501	14,	Repairs on Meshed-Nasratabad telegraph line. Intention of Russian Government to execute is not in accordance with No. 416, Part XIII, but execution of repairs urgently needed. It would be difficult to object to Russians undertaking the work. . .	420
683	" ..	503	16,	Loan to Persian Government. M. Kokovtsoff personally opposed to any further advances being made, and thinks efficient control would be difficult to exercise. Does not see use of small advance ..	421
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## ERRATA.

Page 59, No. 82, line 2.—For "No. 342" read "No. 535."  
 Page 68, No. 113, line 2.—For "Mr. Kihahji" read "Mr. Kitabji."  
 Page 234, No. 401, line 2.—For "No. 66" read "No. 661."  
 Page 278, No. 472, line 2.—For "14th August" read "14th July."  
 Page 286, No. 494, line 2.—For "your telegram" read "my telegram."  
 Page 335, No. 568, line 1.—For "25th ultimo" read "26th ultimo."  
 Page 351, No. 595, line 2.—For "to His Majesty's" read "from His Majesty's."

CONFIDENTIAL.

## Further Correspondence respecting the Affairs of Persia.

### PART XIX.

[24788]

No. 1.

*India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received July 1.)*

Sir,

*India Office, June 30, 1909.*

IN reply to your letter of the 10th instant, I am directed to enclose copy of telegraphic correspondence with the Viceroy concerning the proposal to transfer Consul McDouall from Mohammerah to Kermanshah, and the appointment of Lieutenant Wilson to the charge of the consulate at Mohammerah.

It will be seen that the Government of India have taken the necessary action to give effect to the proposal, but they consider that Lieutenant Wilson's appointment at Mohammerah should be temporary pending further consideration.

It will also be seen that the Government of India favour the proposal made in Lord Morley's telegram to the Viceroy of the 7th instant, regarding the permanent assignment of Mohammerah to the India Political Service and of Kermanshah to the Levant Service.

Lieutenant Wilson's emoluments will be for the present at the rate of approximately 718 rupees\* a month, as stated in the letter from this Office of the 18th November, 1908.

I am, &c.

A. GODLEY.

Inclosure 1 in No. 1.

*Viscount Morley to Government of India.*

(Telegraphic.) P.

*India Office, June 7, 1909.*

IT is considered desirable by Foreign Office, in present circumstances, that present incumbent of Mohammerah consulate should be removed and that suitable officer of Political Department should be appointed in his place; such an officer, besides keeping in closer touch with resident, would be better able than present incumbent to guide the sheikh, and to restrain efforts to improve German position on the part of sheikh's subordinates. In order to provide for present incumbent, Foreign Office propose his transfer to Kermanshah, and the appointment to Mohammerah of Captain Haworth. If you see no good reason to the contrary, instructions should be sent accordingly without delay. The matter is an urgent one. His Majesty's Minister at Tehran was informed on the 4th instant by telegraph.

It is also proposed by Foreign Office that Mohammerah shall be assigned to Indian service, and Kermanshah to Levant service as a permanent arrangement. The exchange proposed would be in accordance with a scheme which is now under consideration, and as to which I shall shortly address you, for allotting all consulates in Persia, except Seistan and those on Gulf littoral, to the Levant service. This scheme commends

\* 574l. 8s. per annum.



itself to me both on political grounds and because it will reduce expenditure, owing to salary and establishment in the Levant service being on a lower scale. I propose to agree to present proposal respecting Mohammerah and Kermanshah in anticipation of decision on general scheme. Please let me know if you have any observations to make.

Inclosure 2 in No. 1.

*Viscount Morley to Government of India.*

(Telegraphic.) P.

*India Office, June 11, 1909.*

MOHAMMERAH. See my telegram dated the 7th June.

As Haworth is taking sick leave, Foreign Office propose that, when McDouall goes to Kermanshah, Wilson, of Oil guard, should take charge at Mohammerah. Please say whether you have any objection to this, and what rate of pay should be drawn by Wilson.

Inclosure 3 in No. 1.

*Government of India to Viscount Morley.*

(Telegraphic.) P.

*June 19, 1909.*

MOHAMMERAH. See your telegrams dated the 7th and 11th instant.

Proposed transfer of McDouall to Kermanshah from Mohammerah has our concurrence. Resident, Persian Gulf, is being instructed to request Sir G. Barclay, that McDouall may be directed to take over Kermanshah, after making over charge of Mohammerah to Wilson, of Oil guard. Wilson should, in our opinion, draw his present emoluments sanctioned in your telegram dated the 17th March, and his appointment should be purely temporary pending deliberate consideration. Permanent exchange of Mohammerah and Kermanshah commends itself to us.

[24789]

No. 2.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 1.)*

(No. 520.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Gulahek, July 1, 1909.*

RUSSIAN consular agent at Shiraz.

I learn from His Majesty's consul at Shiraz that Nasr-ud-Dowleh has been granted by the Russian Government the post of consular agent at that town. He is a brother of the Kawam-ul-Mulk whose family are great landed proprietors in the province of Fars and the leaders of a powerful faction to which the enemies of the family, in the guise of Nationalists, are bitterly opposed. This appointment cannot but reduce to matters of the personal concern of a Russian consular agent all the important interests centred in this province, and must inevitably be looked upon here as meaning the adoption by Russia of the reactionary cause at Shiraz, and as tending greatly at the same time to the establishment of a predominating Russian influence in the neutral zone. You will see from recent summaries that the Kawami family has frequently urged upon His Majesty's consul the necessity for British intervention and a movement in favour of this was only checked by the firm attitude of this officer.

Between the attitudes of the two Powers on this question there is a divergence too wide to be explained away and one which will make a deplorable impression.

I have begged M. Sabline, to whom, I believe, the full bearing of the question was not until now apparent, that the appointment may be cancelled pointing out that, after our complete abstinence from any grant of protection of this kind, such strong support accorded by the Russian Government to the Kawami interests is not calculated to give a good impression of the value of the Anglo-Russian agreement. I have also expressed regret that in a matter so closely affecting the interests of the two Powers in this province no notice of the projected appointment should have been given either to myself or to His Majesty's consul until it was actually carried out; and this, although, my Russian colleague informs me, the matter had been under consideration for six months.

M. Sabline has promised to do what he can to settle this question. He, however, sees no reason for me to delay reporting the matter to you.

His Majesty's consul has just telegraphed that another member of the same family is endeavouring to secure an appointment as British Consular agent. It is much to be regretted that British and Russian protection should be struggled for in this manner.

A paraphrase of above is being sent to the Russian chargé d'affaires.

[24790]

No. 3.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 1.)*

(No. 521.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Gulahek, July 1, 1909.*

I LEARN from Mr. Wratislaw that the only bastis still in the Turkish consulate-general at Tabreez are Saltar and Bagher Khans.

[24792]

No. 4.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 1.)*

(No. 522.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Gulahek, July 1, 1909.*

THE director of the Indo-European Telegraph Department has been requested by the Minister of Telegraphs to put temporarily at his disposition a clerk capable of undertaking the correspondence with the telegraph administration of foreign countries and the Central Bureau of International Telegraphs at Berne, of regulating traffic, keeping accounts, and other such duties. The Persian Armenian who was formerly charged with these functions have now left Persia, and there is for the moment no employé of sufficient standing in the Persian Administration to replace him. Mr. Barker has communicated this request to the director-in-chief, and has been authorised temporarily to lend the services of Mr. New until such time as a definite appointment (probably of three years' duration) may have been decided.

Presuming that you would decide to consult Russian Government on this subject, I have laid the matter before my Russian colleague.

Mukhber-ed-Dowleh is desirous of an early reply.

[24793]

No. 5.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 1.)*

(No. 523.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Gulahek, July 1, 1909.*

GREAT activity is being shown at Ispahan in the preparations to supply the Sirdar with reinforcements.

Resht has sent reinforcements for the nationalist cause, which should arrive to-day at Kasvin. This I learn from my Russian colleague.

I have received a telephone message from Tehran that the bazaars are shut to-day.

[24795]

No. 6.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 1.)*

(No. 524.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Gulahek, July 1, 1909.*

I HAVE received the following telegram No. 162 of the 30th June from His Majesty's consul-general at Tabreez:—

"In a sudden and apparently groundless access of panic the Turkish representative at Urumia on the 26th June called in all Turkish soldiers in the neighbourhood, with a considerable number of Samsi villagers and some 400 Kurds. Looting by the Kurds took place, and there was some fighting, in the course of which one Turkish soldier was wounded, and some ten casualties in all occurred.



"The Russian vice-consul on the following day succeeded in making peace, and secured the departure of the Kurds, who then proceeded to ravage the neighbourhood. There are at present some 150 Turkish troops at Urumia.

"Several days ago the Turkish consul for Urumia reached Tabreez, but has not yet left."

[24798]

No. 7.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 1.)*

(No. 525.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Gulahek, July 1, 1909.

THE foreign legations have received a telegram from the "constitutionalists" of Kasvin.

The gist of it is that they are marching on the capital with a view to settling accounts with certain members of the Cabinet, who have in their opinion been guilty of inviting foreign Powers to intervene. They protest their loyalty to the Shah, and deny that their object is bloodshed.

They say that although a foreign Power has intervened in Tabreez and Meshed, and has its officers at the capital and at Kenedj, the constitutionalists have from the very beginning of the revolution cared for the security of foreign interests.

If complications should arise the responsibility must rest with the Power that intervenes.

[24802]

No. 8.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 1.)*

(No. 526.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Gulahek, July 1, 1909.

THE Bakhtiari advance.

The Russian and Persian officers of the Cossack brigade met this morning, when they decided that the latter will not oppose the advance of the Nationalists.

My authority for the above statement is a secret source which appears to me to be reliable, but its nature precludes my asking M. Sabline whether he can corroborate the information.

If the report is correct, it would appear that, should the Nationalists advance, they might very probably win an almost bloodless victory.

Should this occur, it is possible that the royalist notables who are on the fedais prescribed list would have a fair chance of escape, but the landing of Russian troops might have the effect of precipitating acts of vengeance against these persons.

[24763]

No. 9.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.*

(No. 322.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, July 1, 1909.

THE presence of Ismail Mirza in London (see your telegram No. 516 of 30th June) is unknown to Preece, and the latter thinks that he must have seen Ismail if he had been here. One of the Zil's other sons recently informed Preece that he was about to proceed to Vienna, where he would join his father and his brothers.

[24641]

No. 10.

*Sir Edward Grey to Mr. O'Beirne.*

(No. 801.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, July 1, 1909.

YOUR language, as reported in your telegram No. 332 of yesterday, is approved. The prospect of an advance of Russian troops and the action contemplated by the Russian Government cause me great apprehension when I consider their consequences. The present unrest in Persia has been mainly caused by the opposition previously

offered to reforms by the Shah, and by the distrust generally felt for His Majesty. By the terms of the understanding, the Shah was to receive protection if he took refuge in a legation, and was to be provided with an escort to the frontier, and it is probable that many difficulties would be solved by this arrangement. Whatever form of Government took his place would probably prepare the way to a better state of things, without any diminution of Russian influence in Persia. If the Russian Government, on the other hand, insist on pursuing the policy of keeping the Shah on the throne by force, they will concentrate on themselves all the odium now felt for His Majesty. The dependence of the Shah's Government on Russian support will be more than ever increased, and, so far from withdrawing their troops, their position will have to be maintained against anti-Russian feeling by the use of more and more force.

An increase in the guard of the Russian legation, and the presence of Russian officers with the Persian Cossacks would amply suffice for the protection of missions, of foreign subjects, and of the Russian bank at Tehran. It would be much better to let things take their course as regards the rest.

If my apprehensions are realised we shall be unable to affirm that policy of non-intervention can be maintained, and the whole course of policy with regard to Persia will undergo a serious change. The situation thus created will be more inconvenient and more difficult to cope with than that produced by mere abstention from interference in internal affairs.

Pray lose no time in placing yourself in communication with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and urging these considerations on his Excellency's attention.

[24789]

No. 11.

*Sir Edward Grey to Mr. O'Beirne.*

(No. 803.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, July 1, 1909.

REPRESENTATIONS should be made to M. Isvolsky, urging the desirability of reconsidering the appointment of Nasser-ed-Dowleh as Russian consular agent at Shiraz, in view of the considerations set forth in Sir G. Barclay's telegram No. 520 of to-day's date. You should do your best to induce him to reverse his decision.

[24798]

No. 12.

*Sir Edward Grey to Mr. O'Beirne.*

(No. 804.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, July 1, 1909.

THE expressed intentions of the Kasvin revolutionaries, as reported in Sir G. Barclay's telegram No. 525 of the 1st July, are a further argument in favour of strict adherence to the policy of non-intervention, and you should instance this in your representations to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, pointing out that a general rising against Russians and probably, as a consequence, against all Europeans in Persia may be provoked by the dispatch of Russian troops.

[24792]

No. 13.

*Sir Edward Grey to Mr. O'Beirne.*

(No. 805.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, July 1, 1909.

PLEASE let me know whether the Russian Government have any objection to the Persian Ministry being lent the services of Mr. New (see Tehran telegram No. 522 of 1st July).

[1665]

C



[24894]

No. 14.

*Anglo-Persian Oil Company to Foreign Office.—(Received July 2.)*

Sir,  
*Winchester House, Old Broad Street, London, July 1, 1909.*  
 I THANK you for your letter of the 28th June, asking for any observations that occur to me in regard to its enclosure.

I find that the enclosure was communicated to you by a telegram a paraphrase of which was communicated by you to Sir Hugh S. Barnes in your Office letter of the 24th May.

The telegram was full, conveying substantially the whole of the information contained in your present enclosure, and I wrote to you fully regarding it on the 27th May.

I find that I have now nothing to add to what I wrote then and in subsequent letters, and said in the interview which you were good enough to give me.

I am, &c.

C. W. WALLACE, *Vice-Chairman.*

[24962]

No. 15.

*Memorandum communicated by Count Benckendorff July 2, 1909.*

(Confidentiel.)

D'APRES les rapports du chargé d'affaires de Russie à Téhéran, la présence à Koum de Sadar Asad et de Sepehdar ne manquera pas de provoquer de très graves désordres à Téhéran; le Comité des Arméniens transcaucasiens, qui vient d'entreprendre son action dans la capitale, se mettra à la tête du mouvement, compliquant ainsi la situation. Le Gouvernement est complètement impuissant à résister au mouvement, car il ne peut compter que sur la Brigade cosaque, qui est chargée de la garde du Palais, qui a fourni un détachement pour Keradj, et qui occupe la ville par des gardes; cette brigade, disséminée sur une grande distance, pourrait facilement être démoralisée et écrasée par parties. Conscient de son absolue impuissance, le Schah considère sérieusement le projet de prendre refuge avec sa famille et sa suite dans le best d'une des légations de l'entente, ce qui mènerait à des complications qui préoccupent vivement Sir George Barclay et M. Sabline.

Or, il est encore possible actuellement de garantir le Gouvernement sur un front et de le mettre en mesure de détacher de la Brigade cosaque une force suffisante contre les Bakhtiari. Le Gouvernement lui-même en indique le moyen. Le Schah, de son côté, exprime l'espoir qu'une fois qu'il a promulgué la constitution et qu'il s'est conformé aux conseils du Gouvernement Impérial, ce dernier ne le laisserait pas périr de la main des révolutionnaires russes, seul élément dangereux dans l'ensemble des nationalistes persans. Le Schah invoque les garanties à lui promises et insiste sur le fait qu'il n'a pas violé la constitution et que le mouvement actuel dégénère en anarchie, formant ainsi un obstacle à la réalisation de la constitution.

Le seul moyen encore possible serait de renforcer la garde du consulat à Kazvine d'un détachement de cavalerie. Cela ferait réfléchir le Sepehdar et l'obligerait à quitter Kazvine et à se rendre à Téhéran, ce qui mettrait la capitale à l'abri du côté du nord. Le Gouvernement se trouverait alors en mesure de détacher contre les Bakhtiari des forces suffisantes et de chasser ceux-ci de Koum.

Il n'y a pas lieu de craindre que l'envoi d'un détachement à Kazvine provoque des protestations de la part des nationalistes sérieux, car, aux yeux de toutes les classes raisonnables de la population, les agitateurs de Kazvine et de Koum sont un obstacle au rétablissement de l'ordre dans le pays et à l'établissement de la constitution.

Le chargé d'affaires insiste en disant que tout retard dans la mise à exécution de cette mesure peut avoir des conséquences très préjudiciables à la situation générale, en un moment où le moindre prétexte suffirait pour déterminer à Ispahan les complications les plus sérieuses.

D'après M. Sabline, il n'est pas impossible que le moyen qu'il propose soit interprété comme destiné à soutenir le Schah dans sa lutte contre son peuple. Pareille interprétation ne résiste pas à la critique. Il ne s'agit pas du Schah, mais de l'intégrité d'un pays voisin du nôtre et entraîné aujourd'hui à sa perte par de pures révolutionnaires guidés par des anarchistes russes.

[24912]

No. 16.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 2.)*

(No. 527.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Gulahek, July 2, 1909.*

I HAVE now received telegram No. 332 from St. Petersburg.

M. Sabline concurs in my view that a report that Cossacks had been dispatched here might possibly render the situation in town more serious. My colleague is, however, in a most awkward situation. He is unable to supply guards to all the Russian subjects who are vehemently demanding them, although he considers their agitation far from unwarranted.

I must admit that some danger does exist in view of the possibility that the Russian officers may fight, and also of the feeling against Russia, which at present is very strong.

This danger might, in my opinion, be materially reduced if the present instructions to the Russian officers were revoked, and others were substituted, forbidding them to take part in any engagement.

I learn from M. Sabline that the Cossack brigade is quite demoralised, and in his opinion, this constitutes a most grave situation. I incline to the view, however, that such demoralisation might well lead to there being no fighting, in which case, if the Russian Government land no more troops in the country, their nationals would be subject to only an infinitesimal amount of danger.

[24899]

No. 17.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 2.)*

(No. 528.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Gulahek, July 2, 1909.*

I REGRET that there was a slight inaccuracy in my telegram No. 522.

The man whom New is to replace is an Armenian of Turkish nationality.

[24913]

No. 18.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 2.)*

(No. 529.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Gulahek, July 2, 1909.*

BAKHTIARI advance.

The Sirdar Assad has left Kum and is marching in a northerly direction at the head of 1,200 men.

[24907]

No. 19.

*Mr. O'Beirne to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 2.)*

(No. 335.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*St. Petersburg, July 2, 1909.*

SITUATION in Tehran.

I saw Minister for Foreign Affairs yesterday afternoon. His Excellency assured me that his Government would adhere strictly to a policy of non-intervention, and had no intention of giving military assistance to the Shah. They were, he said, only concerned with the security of the Enzeli-Tehran road and with the protection of the legations and the lives and interests of foreigners in the capital. If troops were sent to Tehran a large force would have to be sent, and it would have to go to Kasvin in the first place. His Excellency, however, said that no decision had been come to as yet as regards sending troops either to Kasvin or to Tehran.

M. Isvolsky said that the responsibility for the lives of foreigners in Tehran rested on Russia, and that this consideration caused him the greatest anxiety.



[24908]

No. 20.

*Mr. O'Beirne to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 2.)*

(No. 336.)

(Telegraphic.) *En clair.**St. Petersburg, July 2, 1909.*

FOLLOWING is summary of official communiqué published to-day in press:—

"In view of alarming state of affairs in Persia, Viceroy of Caucasus has been ordered to prepare military detachments and also vessels for transporting these from Baku to Enzeli. These preparatory measures are being taken in good time in event of further movement of Bakhtiari and fedais of Kazvin on Tehran leading to anarchy, which might seriously threaten Russian and foreign institutions and subjects as well as Enzeli-Tehran road."

\* [24915]

No. 21.

*Mr. O'Beirne to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 2.)*

(No. 337.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*St. Petersburg, July 2, 1909.*

RUSSIAN force for Persia. Your telegrams Nos. 801 and 804 of yesterday's date. I have to-day impressed strongly your views on the measures contemplated, as expressed in the above-mentioned telegrams on M. Isvolsky. His Excellency was about to have a consultation with M. Stolypin on this subject, and he promised that your views would then be carefully considered.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs, however, appeared to me to be convinced that the Imperial Government would be obliged to send troops into Persia. But for the opposition of His Majesty's Government, he observed, this measure would have been taken before, and the present crisis might not have arisen at all. As to assisting the Shah, he said there was no question of such action—in fact, he would not be surprised to hear at any moment that His Majesty had been dethroned. He was concerned simply with saving Tehran from pillage, and a general massacre at the hands of Caucasian revolutionaries and hordes of Bakhtiari tribesmen. He would not admit the soundness of the argument that the very violence which he apprehended would be directly provoked by the dispatch of Russian troops; his view was, on the contrary, that a deterrent effect would be produced if it were known that the troops were about to arrive.

On my enquiring whether the danger of a massacre of foreigners was definitely forecasted in the reports received from the Russian chargé d'affaires at Tehran, M. Isvolsky replied that such was certainly the case. His Excellency added that he had just received a telegram from M. Sabline, according to which 800 men only of the Cossack brigade were available at Tehran. Revolutionary propaganda had demoralised the force; to hold their own barracks would be the utmost they could do. Further, even if, as was possible, the Russian troops did not arrive in time, an indefinite continuance of the excesses which he feared could not be tolerated.

His Excellency is quite alive to the force of your views, which I urged upon him, as to the disadvantages which must in the long run result from any support which the Shah may get through the action of the Russian Government. But his view is that the Shah's disappearance could only give rise to general anarchy and brigandage, and then intervention on a large scale by Russia would be inevitable.

Please treat the following as confidential:—

A consideration which evidently carries great weight with the Russian Government is that the safety of the Russian bank at Tehran must be assured. M. Isvolsky informed me that a deposit of 2,000,000*l.* was kept there. I think much will depend on the effect which to-day's announcement as to Russian military preparations produces; it is possible that the Russian expedition may be suspended if the advance of the fedais on Tehran should be thereby checked.

[24904]

No. 22.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 2.)*

(No. 221.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Constantinople, July 2, 1909.*

PERSIA.

I have received the following telegram from His Majesty's resident and consul-general at Bagdad:—

"We need, I think, expect little help from Nedjef and Kerbela priests until the withdrawal of Russian troops from Persia, as they bitterly resent their presence on Persian soil, which they say is worse than the Shah's delay. I hear that Sayid Kadhan Yedzdi, who has till now had nothing to do with politics, and who, my Russian colleague informs me, possesses considerable influence in the Caucasus, has addressed a telegram to the Shah deploring the occupation of Persian territory by foreign troops. I have said nothing to the Russian consul-general about this telegram."

[24798]

No. 23.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.*

(No. 325.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Foreign Office, July 2, 1909.*

ADVANCE on Tehran.

Your telegram No. 525 of the 1st July has been shown to Count Benckendorff. At the same time I suggested to him that, if it was the wish of the Russian Government, you should join with their representative at Tehran in making representations to those who are marching upon the capital. The latter might be assured that the only hope of avoiding intervention lay in the restoration of order and in a fair trial of the newly re-established constitution. We are quite ready, if they wish it, to do what we can to obtain guarantees for the carrying out of the constitution, if they, on their part, will specify what guarantees are required.

[24629]

No. 24.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.*

(No. 326.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Foreign Office, July 2, 1909.*

PROVIDED that you see no objection, could you arrange for the appointment of Vincent Kitabji as Imperial Commissioner in London?

D'Arcy says that Sadigh-es-Sultaneh does not count for anything, and is most anxious that Kitabji should be appointed in his stead.

[24802]

No. 25.

*Sir Edward Grey to Mr. O'Beirne.*

(No. 808.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Foreign Office, July 2, 1909.*

YOU should quote Sir G. Barclay's opinion, namely, that the fedai will meet with no resistance from the Persian Cossacks if they attempt to enter Tehran, but that reprisals will be taken on Royalist notables if Russian troops are dispatched there (see Tehran telegram No. 526 of 1st July).

[24904]

No. 26.

*Sir Edward Grey to Mr. O'Beirne.*

(No. 809.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Foreign Office, July 2, 1909.*

INFORM the Russian Government of the substance of the telegram from His Majesty's consul at Bagdad, repeated by Sir G. Lowther in his telegram No. 221 of the 2nd July, referring to his telegram No. 192 of the 31st May.



[24486]

No. 27.

*Foreign Office to Messrs. F. C. Strick and Co.*

Gentlemen,

*Foreign Office, July 2, 1909.*

I AM directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to inform you that on the receipt of your letter of the 24th ultimo, relative to the further report received from your agent at Bussorah, he addressed a telegram to His Majesty's Minister at Tehran suggesting that an enquiry should be made of His Majesty's consul at Mohammerah as to whether the Hamburg-Amerika line had in fact opened an agency there and were working the Moin-ut-Tujjar's steamers.

I am to state that a telegram has now been received from Sir G. Barclay reporting that the consul has informed him that the rumour is unfounded.

Mr. McDouall adds, however, that Messrs. Wöckhaus's agency at Mohammerah is in charge of a German.

I am, &amp;c.

LOUIS MALLET.

[24972]

No. 28.

*India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received July 3.)*

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Viscount Morley, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a note by the director-in-chief, Indo-European Telegraph Department, India, dated the 18th June, regarding the Seistan-Bandan section of the Meshed-Seistan Telegraph line.

*India Office, July 2, 1909.*

Inclosure in No. 28.

*Note by the Director-in-chief, Indo-European Telegraph Department, dated June 18, 1909.*

BANDON is the first telegraph station on the Meshed side of the line from Seistan. It appears to be about 50 miles distant from Seistan. The report on this section of line shows it to be in a very bad state. We might have expected that the Russians for their own purposes would have maintained the line in fair order. This is evidently not the case, and perhaps the knowledge that the line cannot stand up much longer without thorough repair explains why the Russians are so anxious for an early transfer of it, in exchange for the Tehran-Meshed line, which is in good order.

H. A. KIRK.

[24964]

No. 29.

*Mr. F. C. Strick to Foreign Office.—(Received July 3.)**Baltic House, Leadenhall Street, London,  
July 2, 1909.*

Sir,

I RECEIVED a letter on Saturday last, dated the 9th June, from Mr. David Brown, who, as you are aware, is acting as my agent at Tehran, which letter you may be interested to peruse, and I therefore take the liberty of inclosing a copy of it.

Knowing that, if the Mouin-ut-Tujjar's concession for Ormuz is in the market, our continental competitors are sure to make efforts to obtain it, immediately on receipt of the above letter I cabled to Mr. Brown to the effect that if the concession had expired I should be prepared to bid for same. I inclose copy of my telegram and of Mr. Brown's reply.

As Mr. Brown states that there is nothing to be done for the present, I shall, of course, not take any further steps until I hear from you again, and, in any case, I shall do nothing without communicating with you.

Meanwhile, I have, &amp;c.

FRANK C. STRICK.

P.S.—Since writing the above letter, I have received a further communication from Mr. Brown, dated the 19th June, copy of which I inclose.

F. C. S.

Inclosure 1 in No. 29.

*Mr. Brown to Messrs. F. C. Strick and Co.*

Dear Sirs,

*Tehran, June 9, 1909.*

I CONFIRM my letter of the 5th instant.

I have now received assurances that the Persian Government will be prepared to arrange the terms of a concession with you. The terms of the concession to be arranged and placed on a similar basis to that of the Arabistan telegraph concession to be submitted to Parliament when it meets for approval and ratification. Of course, the Medjliss may refuse to pass it.

So far, however, I have not received any definite details as to what rights they may be prepared to concede, but the Moin-ul-Vazareh informed me on the 6th instant that the term of Mouin-ut-Tujjar's concessions had expired and would have to be renewed. He mentioned that, in the event of your concession being approved by Parliament, it would then be duly ratified, unless the Mouin-ut-Tujjar or some other Persian subject offered a similar amount for it, in which case it would be given to the Persian subject. He mentioned that he did not think that the Mouin-ut-Tujjar would be a member of the new Medjliss.

I am, &amp;c.

DAVID BROWN.

Inclosure 2 in No. 29.

*Messrs. F. C. Strick and Co. to Mr. Brown.**Baltic House, Leadenhall Street, London,  
June 28, 1909.*

(Telegraphic.)

HAVE received your letter of 9th June. Are we to understand that Mouin-ut-Tujjar concessions Ormuz and other islands expired? If so, is there any chance of our securing these concessions? Prepared to pay good sum down in cash. Telegraph full particulars immediately.

Inclosure 3 in No. 29.

*Mr. Brown to Messrs. F. C. Strick and Co.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Tehran, June 29, 1909.*

UNDERSTAND Mouin-ut-Tujjar concessions Ormuz and other islands expired, but it is difficult to obtain definite information. There is a chance of our securing these, but it is impossible to do anything for the present.

Inclosure 4 in No. 29.

*Mr. Brown to Messrs. F. C. Strick and Co.*

Dear Sirs,

*Tehran, June 19, 1909.*

I CONFIRM my letter of the 9th instant, and have since received your letter of the 4th idem, for which I thank you.

On the 10th instant, his Excellency Saad-ed-Dowleh, having received threatening



notices, left town, and has since remained in his summer residence up-country. Other Cabinet Ministers have followed his example, also most of the Foreign Office officials.

The political situation is very unsettled and uncertain in the extreme. Under the circumstances, progress is impossible.

I am, &c.  
DAVID BROWN.

[25064]

No. 30.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 3.)*

(No. 530.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Gulahek, July 3, 1909.

YESTERDAY evening I and my Russian colleague went to the Palace at His Majesty's request.

He informed us that it had always been his wish to see a constitutional Government established in the kingdom, even though the nation suffered from ignorance. He had carefully considered the advice which had been given him by the British and Russian Governments, and had in consequence restored the previous constitution. He had agreed to the whole of the Anglo-Russian programme, and had called upon Saad-ed-Dowleh to put its various points into execution. There were people, however, who maintained that the views of his Excellency were those of an absolutist, that the constitution was neither more nor less than a fraud, and who had prevented the electoral law from being published at the very last moment when it had already received His Majesty's signature.

The capital had now summoned the provinces to supply forces, and these were already on the march hither, although he had been given to understand by us that all his difficulties would be removed if he carried out the joint programme. He had made a reduction of 7,000 men in his troops, but now with only 5,000 (instead of 12,000) he would fight to the bitter end. His object in summoning us that afternoon was that he might consult us on the situation.

In replying to His Majesty's observations I pointed out that it was now many months since the two legations had tendered him advice of a similar nature; it was not until May, however, that he made up his mind to act on it, and in the meantime unfortunately the situation had got beyond control—the crisis now was most serious.

Although at the time it had seemed to us that His Majesty's best chance of success lay in faithfully carrying out our proposals, yet the situation had become so critical that we were no longer in a position to say that it would succeed.

In reminding His Majesty that we had assured him of our support and sympathy, and of his personal safety, provided that, and so long as, his rule was that of a constitutional monarch, I pointed out that he had proof of our support and sympathy quite recently in our endeavours, which unfortunately had failed, to stop the advance of Sardar Assad and the Sipahdar. I here observed that as for the former, he had not even stated what it was that he demanded.

Saad-ed-Dowleh hereupon interposed with the remark that Sardar Assad demanded (1) that Tabreez should be evacuated; and (2) that certain ministers and other personages should be expelled. The Shah exclaimed that the Fedai's real objects were of a different nature, their demands as above-mentioned being merely a cloak.

I and the Russian chargé d'affaires informed His Majesty that, although we could at present give no other counsel, he might rest assured that we should, if an opportunity occurred, use our influence to bring about a settlement of the difficulty by peaceful means. Tabreez was not mentioned by the Shah, although he cannot fail to realise that the rescue of that town by Russian troops is largely responsible for his present parlous position. His Majesty entered upon no discussion and bore himself with considerable dignity; the audience was, however, none the less painful on that account.

[25066]

No. 31.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 3.)*

(No. 531.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Gulahek, July 3, 1909.

HIS Majesty's consul-general at Bushire reports that he has received a telegram from the Sheikh of Mohammerah expressing regret at the transfer of Mr. McDouall, and

begging for that officer's retention in his present post. The reason which he puts forward is that the removal of a consul who is well acquainted with the conditions of the tribal sheikhs would at the present moment be inopportune.

Major Cox thinks this idea due to a certain stir among the tribesmen provoked by the sheikh's recent arrest of his nephew on a charge of treason.

He has replied to Sheikh Khazzal that he need have no fear that any modification of our policy of non-interference is portended by this transfer, and has assured him that he will do his best to ensure the new incumbent of the post being both an officer of ripe experience and a friendly adviser for him. He further promised to transmit to the proper quarter the sheikh's representations on this subject.

I am authorising Major Cox, on his own suggestion, to reply from me, repeating what he has already said, and adding that the step in question is one item of a departmental scheme, and cannot therefore be revoked.

(Reference is to my telegram No. 488 of the 22nd June.)

[25041]

No. 32.

*Mr. O'Beirne to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 3.)*

(No. 338.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

St. Petersburg, July 3, 1909.

DISPATCH of Russian troops to Persia.

The immediate dispatch to Enzeli of a regiment of infantry with guns and a regiment of Cossacks has been decided on by the Council of Ministers. The expedition has been instructed to proceed no further than Kasvin, and not to advance on Tehran unless ordered to do so by the Russian legation in the event of serious danger to the lives and property of foreigners in the capital. The most stringent orders have been given to the commander of the troops to avoid any intervention in the internal struggle, and to restrict himself to the protection of the lives and interests of foreigners.

[25069]

No. 33.

*Mr. O'Beirne to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 3.)*

(No. 339.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

St. Petersburg, July 3, 1909.

MINISTER for Foreign Affairs promised me to-day that instructions should be sent to Russian chargé d'affaires at Tehran in the sense suggested in your telegram No. 325 to Sir G. Barclay.

I pointed out to M. Isvolsky that if the leaders of the advance on Tehran believed that the Russian force would arrive in any case, there was every probability that they would dethrone the Shah, an eventuality which was viewed with the gravest apprehensions by the Russian Government. I therefore strongly urged his Excellency to empower Sabline to inform the leaders of the bodies advancing on Tehran that, if they listened to the advice of the Russian and British Ministers, the Russian expedition would be stayed. I expressed the opinion that in sending instructions to Sabline in this sense lay the only hope of averting the dethronement.

Minister for Foreign Affairs said he must take time to think over my suggestion, but in any case he must consult with the other Ministers before deciding anything.

His Excellency also told me that the motives of his Government in sending troops to Persia are to be explained in a circular telegram which he is issuing immediately.

[23950]

No. 34.

*Foreign Office to India Office.*

Sir,

Foreign Office, July 3, 1909.

WITH reference to your letter of the 12th ultimo, relative to the scheme for the irrigation of Arabistan, I am directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to transmit to you herewith copy of a telegram from His Majesty's Minister at Tehran on the subject of the measures which it is desirable to take to carry out this project.\*

\* See Part XVIII, No. 773.

[1665]

E



I am to state that Sir E. Grey is disposed, with the concurrence of Viscount Morley, to approve Sir G. Barclay's action in authorising His Majesty's consul-general at Bushire to send a copy of Lieutenant Wilson's report on the Kheskha scheme direct to Sir W. Willcocks at Bagdad and to ask his advice.

I am, &c.  
LOUIS MALLET.

[25080]

No. 35.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 4.)*

(No. 224.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Constantinople, July 3, 1909.

TURCO-PERSIAN frontier.

I am informed by His Majesty's vice-consul at Van that on the 20th ultimo one battalion of Turkish troops marched into Urumia, and that two more companies left Van for the frontier on the 1st instant.

[25067]

No. 36.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 4.)*

(No. 532.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Gulahek, July 4, 1909.

LATE in the evening of the 2nd July I received a visit from my Russian colleague, who urged me vigorously to make with him a threatening joint communication to the approaching revolutionary forces. This I declined to do.

Yesterday afternoon your telegram No. 325 reached me, and I forthwith communicated the substance of it to M. Sabline.

Representatives have now been sent by both legations to make the communication indicated in your telegram to both Sirdar Assad and Sipahdar.

M. Sabline has received, in addition to the implied threat from the Nationalists at Kasvin to which I referred in my telegram No. 525, further letters of a menacing character. One of these was signed by a number of Tehran Nationalists, some of whom, at least, should have known better than to commit this folly. Certain of the nationalist leaders have now, at my request, issued a circular to the legations, assuring them that foreign subjects are in no danger.

It is in great part due to these menaces from the more foolish members of the popular party, which this step has unfortunately come too late to remedy, that those apprehensions arose which warranted the communication that the two legations are now about to make to the commanders of the approaching armies.

[25068]

No. 37.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 4.)*

(No. 533.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Gulahek, July 4, 1909.

PLEASE see my telegram No. 532 of to-day.

I have received a report from Major Stokes (who, with the chief dragoman of the Russian legation was sent out to convey our communication to Sipahdar), to the effect that fighting was in progress at Shahabad, the first stage out from Tehran on the Kasvin road. The Cossacks had previously retired from Keredj to this point, fearing a flanking movement by the enemy.

The revolutionaries were ultimately defeated with a loss of twelve fedais killed.

On nearing Shahabad while fighting was in progress, Major Stokes and M. Baranowski were fired on by mistake; they retired to a safe distance, and will now continue their journey to Keredj.

[25070]

No. 38.

*Mr. O'Beirne to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 4.)*

(No. 340.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

St. Petersburg, July 3, 1909.

MY telegram No. 339. Situation in Tehran.

I am informed by Minister for Foreign Affairs that telegraphic instructions have been sent to the Russian chargé d'affaires at Tehran to report, after consultation with Sir G. Barclay, whether, taking local conditions into account, the mediation with the Bakhtiari and Kasvin fedais, as suggested by you, offers any chance of preventing the entry into Tehran of the forces advancing upon it.

[25071]

No. 39.

*Mr. O'Beirne to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 4.)*

(No. 341.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

St. Petersburg, July 4, 1909.

AS Shah may seek refuge in one of the legations, Minister for Foreign Affairs thinks it would be well to renew the instructions already sent to the representatives for their guidance in such a contingency.

[25072]

No. 40.

*Mr. O'Beirne to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 4.)*

(No. 342.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

St. Petersburg, July 4, 1909.

IN reply to my representations, M. Isvolsky has promised to make inquiries about the appointment of a Russian consular agent at Shiraz (see your telegram No. 803 of the 1st July).

[25074]

No. 41.

*Mr. O'Beirne to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 4.)*

(No. 344.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

St. Petersburg, July 4, 1909.

MINISTER for Foreign Affairs informs me that the Russian chargé d'affaires at Tehran has telegraphed that officials from the two legations have been sent by himself and Sir G. Barclay to negotiate with the leaders of the forces marching on Tehran, and that the eventual dispatch of a Russian expedition is to be used by them as a threat in case their advice is not listened to.

His Excellency thinks that the Russian troops will not be ready to embark in less than four days. This delay should be enough to make the dispositions and intentions of the leaders of the advance on Tehran quite clear. His Excellency cannot, he stated, countermand the embarkation of the expedition unless he is quite sure of the success of the negotiations begun by the two legations.

[25071]

No. 42.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.*

(No. 331.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, July 4, 1909.

INSTRUCTIONS have already been given to you as to your action in the event of Shah taking refuge at one of the two legations. In view of St. Petersburg telegram No. 341 of the 4th July, you are reminded that these instructions hold good.



[25126]

No. 43.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 5.)*

(No. 108.)

Sir,

*Gulahek, May 23, 1909.*

IN my despatch No. 101 of the 20th instant I forwarded copy of the joint note by which my Russian colleague and I gave in writing the assurances to the Shah which had been given to His Majesty verbally on the 22nd December last.

I have since been approached by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, on behalf of the Shah, with the request that the text of these assurances might be modified. The Shah desired that the words "so long as the Shah fulfils sincerely the rôle of a constitutional monarch" might be omitted, and that the assurances might be extended so as to cover his throne and family.

I have told Saad-ed-Dowleh in reply that it would serve no useful purpose to submit this request to His Majesty's Government, whose instructions to me had been quite precise and had been executed in the joint note which I had addressed to him in concert with my Russian colleague.

M. Sabline tells me that he has also been approached in a similar sense and that he, like me, has discouraged the reopening of the subject.

I have, &amp;c.

G. BARCLAY.

[25127]

No. 44.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 5.)*

(No. 109.)

Sir,

*Gulahek, May 23, 1909.*

IN my despatch No. 106 of the 20th instant I reported that the Nationalists were pressing for the issue of an explanatory decree by the Shah, making it quite clear that the old Constitution re-established by His Majesty by the decree of the 10th instant included the supplementary articles added in 1907.

I have now the honour to transmit a translation of a decree issued on the 20th instant, by which His Majesty has given satisfaction to the Nationalists' requirement on the point in question.

I have, &amp;c.

G. BARCLAY.

Inclosure in No. 44.

*Imperial Rescript, dated May 20, 1909.*

(Translation.)

WHEREAS the contentment and appeasement of our subjects, who are our spiritual children, is more than ever in view, and the strengthening of the bonds of unity between the Government and the nation is, more than in the past, our gracious intention; and whereas the explanation of every obscurity and the elucidation of every difficulty is the object of our special care in order to prove our gracious intention, and in order to remove all disquietude and to reassure the public mind; therefore, in order to explain the previous rescript and to enlighten the public, we write that the Persian Constitution is established in accordance with the very same 158 articles of the fundamental law, and is the pivot of the future prosperity of the State.

MOHAMMED ALI SHAH KAJAR.

*Rebbi-us-Sani 28, 1327 (May 20, 1909).*

[25128]

No. 45.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 5.)*

(No. 111. Confidential.)

Sir,

*Gulahek, May 24, 1909.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copy of an interesting despatch from His Majesty's consul-general at Tabreez regarding the final stages of the investment of that town.

In doing so, I venture to record my high appreciation of the assistance which His Majesty's consul-general has rendered me since his return to Tabreez in the discharge of my duties at this post, and to express the hope that the manner in which he has conducted the affairs of his consulate-general during the past trying months will be held to merit the entire approval of His Majesty's Government.

I should add that my Russian colleague informs me that the Russian acting consul-general has written to him in high terms of appreciation of the loyal manner in which Mr. Wratislaw has co-operated with him during the recent crisis.

I have, &amp;c.

G. BARCLAY.

Inclosure 1 in No. 45.

*Consul-General Wratislaw to Sir G. Barclay.*

(No. 16. Confidential.)

Sir,

*Tabreez, May 2, 1909.*

I HAVE the honour to submit the following remarks on the final stages of the investment of Tabreez, in supplement to my telegrams on the subject.

Although the suff-rings of the population were daily increasing and the store of grain in the ark was rapidly dwindling, it was not until towards the end of March that the nationalists seem to have had any idea that their position was at all critical. It was then decided that a *sortie en masse* should be directed against the royalist positions near the village of Barinch, whither their head-quarters had been removed from Basminch. This took place on the 24th March and had no material result. A small band of about twenty determined men, including several Caucasian Christians, carried one royalist position by assault, losing eight killed and wounded in the effort; but Bagher Khan, who commanded in that direction, left them unsupported while he and his men remained idle in their trenches. A mob of armed townspeople went as far as the advanced nationalist positions, suffering some losses from the fire of the royalist artillery, but they did not summon up courage to deliver an assault.

Further feeble sorties took place on the 28th and 29th March, but it was by this time plain that the nationalists were quite unable to take the offensive successfully against the far superior royalist forces which surrounded them.

On the 1st April M. Pokhitonow, the Russian consul-general, left Tabreez. The nationalists endeavoured to pay off old scores by offering him useless indignities on his departure, such as examining his luggage at the Aji Bridge on the pretext that he was carrying ammunition to Rahim Khan.

The royalist artillery at Barinch had hitherto fired exclusively against the nationalist defences at or near Khiaban, but on the 4th they dropped shells indiscriminately into the town, killing and wounding several non-combatants and doing some injury to buildings.

On the 8th April the foreign consuls telegraphed to their respective legations asking that a supply of flour should be sent in for the use of the foreign subjects in the town. Little hope was felt that the Shah would accede to this request, and as a matter of fact nothing came of it. Many foreigners were now hard pressed for food, and there was special difficulty in feeding their servants whom the patriarchal relations existing between master and man in Persia bound them to provide for. By this time quite three-quarters of the bakers' shops were closed permanently, meat was very bad and procured with difficulty even by those with money to pay for it, while very few luxuries were obtainable.

Strong hopes of a favourable settlement with the Shah were raised by a telegram

[1665]

F



from His Majesty to Sikkat-el-Islam, the only Mujtehid remaining in Tabreez, who had begged the Shah to consider the sufferings of his people, and grant them the constitution they required. The Shah's reply was couched in cordial if vague terms, and acting on it Sikkat-el-Islam proceeded on the 10th April to Basminch with the consent of the Anjuman, though not as their accredited agent. His mission was a failure, and produced intense disappointment, but for the moment it effected a slight fall in prices generally, as persons who had secreted grain and other provisions brought out their stores for sale.

On the 15th a party of Kurds from Samad Khan's camp raided past the Aji bridge. They were attacked by Satar Khan's men, and two were killed. At the same time the Barinch artillery again bombarded the town promiscuously, a couple of shells falling close to the Anjuman's place of meeting, which is near the European quarter.

Next day I received a private visit from one of the leading members of the Anjuman, who informed me that the game was up, and that the only hope for Tabreez lay in the intervention of Great Britain and Russia. Even while speaking frankly on other points, he could not tell me the truth regarding the food question, and assured me that there was still grain enough in the ark to last for three weeks at the present reduced rate of distribution. I asked him whether in view of the difficulty in providing food it would not be possible to allow those of the foreign subjects who wished it to leave the town, but he replied that it could not be thought of.

On the following day I, in common with my colleagues, received a letter from the Anjuman, of which I enclose a translation, drawing our attention to the shortness of food in the town and the difficulty in feeding foreigners and natives alike, and calling on us to do something to remedy this state of things. Later in the day M. Miller, the acting Russian consul-general, and I were invited to visit the Anjuman to discuss the question. We found all the members there, as well as Ijlal-el-Mulk, the nominal Governor of the town, who acted as spokesman. He said that they had requested us to come in order that they might put before us the very serious situation, and beg us to do something to avert the danger which lay before us all. The supply of grain, he said, was all but exhausted; the great majority of the population of over 200,000 souls were starving; and they feared that it would not be possible much longer to hold them in check. They might break out at any moment into rioting and pillaging of the houses, in which they hoped to find a supply of food.

At this point one member of the Anjuman, a mollah, broke in with a statement to the effect that the mob would be no respecter of persons, and that there was no doubt as to who would have to bear the brunt of any disturbance. He said this in a manner which left no doubt that the foreign residents were meant. Only one other member, however, at all supported him, and the rest made him stop.

We replied that we were just as anxious to end a very trying situation as anyone else, only we did not exactly see what could be done. If they would make some suggestion, we would consider the possibility of carrying it out. Ijlal-el-Mulk replied that what they wanted was an armistice, during which the Basminch (Tehran) road should be opened and provisions allowed to enter the town. Advantage would be taken of it to enter into negotiations with the Shah with a view to peace, for which purpose they would choose delegates, and they would at the same time communicate with the nationalists in other towns. After some discussion they came to the conclusion that 150 kharvars of wheat was the daily allowance for the town under normal circumstances, and they undertook that if this quantity were allowed into the town daily while the armistice lasted none of it should be diverted to combatants, who for the rest had still a sufficient supply in the hands of Satar and Bagher.

These proposals they asked us to submit to the British and Russian legations, begging your Excellencies on their behalf to urge their acceptance on the Shah, and at the same time to assure His Majesty that the people of Azerbaijan were only fighting for their constitution and not in any way against him personally.

We agreed to do as they requested, but we pointed out that such terms were not likely to be accepted considering the straits to which the town was known to be reduced, and we suggested that they might have some alternative proposition to make—meaning that they might wish us to act on their behalf with a view to obtaining a favourable capitulation. They replied, however, that there was nothing else.

Bread was very short next day; indeed only a favoured few apart from the soldiery could obtain any at all. The day after hardly any bakers' shops were open, and crowds of women assembled in various parts of the town and had to be dispersed by force. This was rather an ominous sign, as women are always pushed forwards to start bread riots. On the 19th again they gathered in great numbers at a shrine, from whence

they were dislodged after some difficulty by the persuasive eloquence of a mollah especially told off for the purpose.

The same day I received information that the plan of attacking foreign consulates and houses (of which I had previously received warning as reported in my telegram No. 55 of the 28th March) was again mooted, and that Bagher Khan was again the leader who chiefly favoured the idea. At the same time Mr. Moore, the "Daily News" correspondent whose adherence to the nationalists I had already reported, informed me that he had been sounded as to the probable effect an attack on the British and Russian consulates would have, and that he replied that it would inevitably result in a Russian occupation and the execution of all concerned. My Russian colleague received much the same information from entirely separate and independent sources, and taking into consideration what had been told us by the Anjuman two days before, the desperate condition of the town, and the horror known to be felt at the idea of its falling into the hands of the Shah's troops, we did not feel justified in ignoring what we had heard. I should add that when these reports were mentioned to Satar Khan he denied that he had encouraged any such plan, laying all the blame on Bagher; and that when some days later the latter was interrogated on the subject by a European friend he in his turn denied responsibility, though acknowledging that his soldiers had formed some such project.

On receipt of your Excellency's telegram No. 42, I addressed a letter to the Anjuman informing them that your general representations to the Shah would be made on the morrow. This I believe to have had a calming effect.

The same day I informed the British subjects that, in view of the reports circulating of danger to foreigners, any of them who wished could at any time take up their quarters in the consulate. None of them cared to accept for the moment, though they had been rather disquieted about their situation for several days past; but later in the day they addressed a telegram to His Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, in which they stated that they were in imminent danger and that the consulate guard was insufficient for their protection.

The Russian subjects were in a state of panic, and crowded into the Russian consulate and neighbouring houses. All the valuables from the Russian Bank were deposited in the consulate, which M. Miller placed in a state of defence. Guarded as it was by fifty Cossacks with two machine-guns, no attack of which the inhabitants of Tabreez, even including some fedais, were capable would, in my opinion, have had any chance of success; and there is such a vast space to be traversed in Persia between talk and action that danger for the consulates was never at all imminent. The case of the houses of foreign subjects was, however, different, and they might easily, had not circumstances altered in time, have been pillaged by the mob as well as the dwellings of the richer Persians.

A forlorn hope in the shape of an assault on Samad Khan's positions round Karamelik had been arranged for the night of the 19th-20th April. Owing to the inevitable procrastination of the nationalist leaders it did not take place till dawn on the 20th, and, as the royalists had as usual timely information of what was intended and were fully prepared, it had no chance of success. There were two assaulting parties, led respectively by Mr. Moore and Mr. Baskerville, a teacher in the American Mission school, who had joined the nationalists about the same time as the former. Both of these gentlemen behaved with the greatest pluck, but their men failed to support them and they reached the royalist positions with only the merest handful of followers. Mr. Baskerville was shot dead, but Mr. Moore escaped unhurt. With regard to the latter gentleman it is but fair to state that, reprehensible as his conduct was in taking part in hostilities, his influence with the nationalists was always exerted for good, and that I am indebted to him for much timely and useful information.

Firing continued till late in the afternoon, though the failure of the assault was assured early in the day. The nationalists lost about twenty killed and wounded.

At about 4 in the afternoon I received your Excellency's telegram informing me that the Shah had granted a six days' armistice, during which provisions were to be allowed into the town. M. Miller, having received a similar telegram from the Russian legation, we at once proceeded to the Anjuman and communicated the news. We requested them at once to obtain a cessation of hostilities, which was immediately done, and to take measures for the strict observance of the armistice on the nationalist side. We informed them that we proposed to send representatives to Ain-ed-Dowleh to press the sending of provisions, and we urged them at once to write to him announcing their intention of choosing delegates to treat for peace. After the first ebullition of joy over



the removal of their immediate apprehensions, the foolish members began to raise all sorts of pettifogging objections, going so far as to refuse to write to Ain-ed-Dowleh, because they feared he might slight their dignity by not replying. I was finally compelled to tell them that if they did not write neither would we, which reduced them to reason.

Mr. Vice-Consul Stevens went to Basminch as my delegate, and M. Nazarbeggoff, the Russian tadjir bashi, represented my Russian colleague. They carried a letter from the Anjuman, as well as one from us jointly, in which we informed Ain-ed-Dowleh of the Shah's orders concerning an armistice, and requested him to co-operate with our delegates in ensuring the entry of an immediate supply of provisions. I am much indebted to Mr. Stevens for the readiness with which he accepted an unsatisfactory mission, and for the unhesitating way in which he set out on a dark night to pass without previous warning through the royalist lines.

Next day the Anjuman set about choosing delegates, and, being under the impression that serious peace negotiations were about to begin, M. Miller and I thought it advisable to call on Satar Khan, and secure his co-operation. We found him rather depressed after the failure of his last effort against Samad Khan, but he had still sufficient spirits left to brag a good deal of what he intended to do rather than surrender, including a determination to eat his little son when other food supplies failed. In the end, however, he agreed with us that in view of the representations being made to the Shah by the British and Russian Governments the present moment was very favourable for an attempt to come to terms, and he promised not to oppose the negotiations in any way.

In the evening we received word from our delegates at Basminch that Ain-ed-Dowleh denied having received any orders whatever from the Shah regarding armistice or provisions, but that they had persuaded him to open the Basminch road on the strength of our assurances. They further stated that though the telegraph line from Tehran to Basminch had been working all the previous day, it was reported on the morning of the 21st to be interrupted, and that they therefore forwarded to us a telegram to the Shah from Ain-ed-Dowleh, to be transmitted by the Indo-European line. In this telegram Ain-ed-Dowleh inserted both our letter to him and that of the Anjuman, and asked for instructions, and at the same time he pointed out that orders concerning the armistice should be sent direct to the military commanders. We duly forwarded this telegram, as well as another to the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

On receipt of your Excellency's telegram No. 53 we at once wrote to Ain-ed-Dowleh that the Shah had assured the Ministers that he had again telegraphed orders to him to facilitate our efforts to secure provisions.

At midday on the 22nd Ijlal-el-Mulk informed us that the troops of Samad Khan had occupied Khatib, and asked us what was to be done. We replied that if the royalists did not observe the armistice the nationalists must naturally defend themselves. Later in the day the royalists retired after some firing. They did not actually occupy the nationalist post at Khatib, though they came very near it.

In the afternoon news came in that a consignment of some 25 kharvars of grain, sent by a private person at Basminch, with Ain-ed-Dowleh's permission, as a present to the poor of Tabreez, had been turned back by the Shah's generals, who declared that they had no instructions to allow provisions into Tabreez, and would not obey them if they had. They had not, they said, been suffering all sorts of privations for months past in order to see their prey escape them at the last moment. This was subsequently confirmed by our delegates, who also informed us that there had been an angry scene between the royalist general and Ain-ed-Dowleh, and that the latter had threatened to take himself off to Tehran, as no one obeyed his orders. Ain-ed-Dowleh, in a subsequent letter to us, referred to the disobedience of the royalist commanders.

The disappointment in Tabreez at this fiasco was very great. We had already communicated to the Anjuman a copy of Ain-ed-Dowleh's telegram to the Shah, and had kept them throughout fully informed of what we were doing; but very injurious things were openly said about our motives in urging a cessation of hostilities. Our position became very unpleasant. We therefore suggested that a sufficient force of Russian troops should escort provisions from Julfa and keep the road open, and we also wrote a hint to Ain-ed-Dowleh that this would happen unless the Shah's supposed orders were executed.

On this point I am inclined to believe that the Shah never issued the orders at all, at least not in such a manner as would allow them to reach their destination. I understand that your Excellency's interview with His Majesty took place on the 20th at noon, and he had till late at night to telegraph instructions to Ain-ed-Dowleh, yet no

telegram of the sort was handed in that afternoon to the Persian office in Tehran. Subsequently, on receipt of Ain-ed-Dowleh's telegram, forwarded by us through the Indo-European office, he had only to reply in the same way for his orders to reach Basminch within a few hours, yet he failed to do so. Some days after, when he knew that the Russian troops had crossed the frontier, he was quick enough to avail himself of this means of communication.

On the 23rd my Russian colleague was informed by his Government that a force of Russian troops was ordered to Tabreez, and we accordingly acquainted the Anjuman with the threat we had made to Ain-ed-Dowleh about opening the Julfa road by force. This led to remonstrances by Taghi Zadeh, but the Anjuman made no reply. In general, the coming of the Russians was looked on as the only way in which Tabreez could be saved. The town was now in the last extremity, many of the poorer classes lying exhausted in the streets, and few of them finding any food but green-stuffs. A few fanatics, however, egged on by interested persons, attempted to get up an agitation against Russian intervention, but it never really caught on, and we heard little of it after we had written to inform the Anjuman of the motives of the Russian Government and of the purely temporary character of their military action.

On the 24th the Anjuman entered into direct communication with the Shah, and it having become known that some Russian troops had already crossed the frontier, His Majesty on the 25th telegraphed through the Indo office at Tabreez precise orders to Ain-ed-Dowleh and the royalist generals to cease hostilities, open the roads, and send provisions into Tabreez. The telegrams were at once sent out to Basminch, and reached Ain-ed-Dowleh the same evening.

On the Shah's telegram reaching Tabreez, a deputation from the Anjuman called on us to ask whether the Russian troops could not be kept back for a few days, in order to see if the Shah was this time serious in his good intentions, but the manner of the petitioners did not lead us to think that they made a great point of their request being granted. We replied that we would report their desire, but that the matter had now passed entirely out of our hands.

For the next two or three days, until provisions came in in quantities, great scarcity continued to prevail, and no bread whatever was baked, but the Shah's orders were obeyed with satisfactory promptitude, and things soon began to right themselves.

On the 29th Satar Khan called on me to express his gratitude to His Majesty's Government, and then went on to the Russian consulate to do the same by M. Miller. When the first detachment of Russian troops arrived at the bridge that evening, he at once telephoned the news to M. Miller, and offered his services in any way that might be required.

The Tabreez nationalists, who behaved well in prosperity, have certainly not shone in adversity, and their conduct during the last month or two has been of a nature to cause deep disappointment to their warmest admirers. The Anjuman completely lost their heads, were seldom of the same mind for two days together, and being themselves always sufficiently fed, showed complete callousness towards the sufferings of their poorer fellow-citizens. Satar Khan towards the end lost the reputation for personal bravery, which he had previously deserved, and he is believed to have taken to deep drinking. Bagher Khan is simply an unprincipled ruffian, whose loyalty to the cause which has filled his pockets has long been suspected, and who is believed to be ready to sell himself and his bravos to the highest bidder.

In conclusion, I should say that my relations with M. Miller have throughout been most cordial, and that we have found ourselves in agreement on every point. His conciliatory attitude towards the nationalists has already done much towards effacing the suspicion of everything Russian, which was an unfortunate legacy from his predecessor.

I have, &c.

A. C. WRATISLAW.

Inclosure 2 in No. 45.

*Tabreez Anjuman to Consul-General Wratislaw.*

(Translation.)

April 17, 1909.

ALL the representatives of the Great Powers know that during the ten months that the revolution and siege of Tabreez have lasted whatever provisions and food were



in the town or brought in from outside were shared equally with the foreign subjects up to now. The object which we have always had in view was the well being and happiness of mankind. But now provisions are getting short, and this scarcity will probably continue for some little time until the rights of the nation are obtained. Therefore we have the honour to inform you and the other representatives of friendly nations, so that for the sake of doing service to the world of civilization and humanity you may pay attention to this matter and take effective measures forthwith so as to make the future of the population generally, and foreign subjects in particular, peaceable and turn them to a normal existence.

We feel convinced that for humanity's sake you will not refrain from doing the needful and will comply with the wishes of the members of the Anjuman.

(Seal of Anjuman.)

Inclosure 3 in No. 45.

*Mr. H. F. Stevens to Consul-General Wratislaw.*

Dear Mr. Wratislaw,

April 19, 1909.

I HAVE been requested by the British community to send you a copy of a telegram we have just addressed to the Foreign Office and the Minister at Tehran.

H. F. STEVENS.

*Telegram addressed to Sir Edward Grey and Sir G. Barclay.*

We British subjects, Tabreez, feel compelled advise you we are imminent danger attack upon us owing desperate situation town. Impossible leave town. Consular guard utterly inadequate protect us either in consulate or residences.

Inclosure 4 in No. 45.

*Consul-General Wratislaw and M. Miller to Ain-ed-Dowleh.*

(Translation.)

April 22, 1909.

ACCORDING to the telegram we have received to-day, the Russian and British Ministers had an audience to-day of the Shah, and inquired the reason for the delay in sending his orders to open the roads and stop hostilities. In reply, His Majesty stated explicitly that he had sent telegraphic orders to open the roads and cease hostilities, and that, moreover, he had urged you personally to hasten to send food into the town.

The delay in carrying out the Shah's orders has caused suspicion against us among the inhabitants. Moreover, the citizens have elected their delegates to enter into negotiations with you, and it is possible that these delegates will come with us to-morrow to Basminch or some other suitable place.

In continuation of our former communications, we have now the honour to request your Highness to send immediate orders to all commanders at Marend, Sarderud, and Basminch to open the roads on all sides for importing food into the town, and to stop hostilities completely without delay. Thus the delegates will be able to enter into negotiations for making peace. With the help of God, the Shah's favour, your good intentions, and our sincere assistance, as we are the well-wishers of the Persian nation, the disorders in Persia will be calmed and peace will prevail, and we also shall be free from the ill-founded suspicions of the people.

A. C. WRATISLAW.  
A. MILLER.

Inclosure 5 in No. 45.

*Ain-ed-Dowleh to Consul-General Wratislaw and M. Miller.*

(Translation.)

3 Rabi-us-Sani, 1327.

I ACKNOWLEDGE receipt of your letter of the 1st Rabi-us-Sani. Regarding the opening of the road to bring in provisions, the British vice-consul and the Russian

tajir bashi witnessed how earnestly I desired to comply with it. It is my desire always to remove difficulties and put down disorders in a peaceable way. As soon as I received your first letter I prepared a telegraphic petition to the Shah, and in order to get a speedy answer I handed it over to the British vice-consul to transmit it through the Indo-European line.

The line being cut there is no communication from this side, and I have got no answer to my telegram.

Keeping in view my inclination to settle things in a peaceable manner and not cause delay, I did not wait for the answer to my telegram or for the lines to be repaired. I took some steps to arrive at our essential object, but did not succeed, for the commanders, who get their instructions direct from Tehran, rejected my advice. From the beginning of this trouble they have been instructed by the central authorities, therefore they are right also not to begin anything before they get special orders from the Central Government. As I said in my telegram, on this occasion they require a special order; my authority is limited to public affairs, and I cannot make them obey in matters military.

Regarding the question of bringing food from Russia, for the above reasons I have no obligation, and the military commanders, having received no orders from their Government, cannot change former regulations. Of course you have accepted personal responsibility in taking so precipitant a measure without referring the matter to Tehran and before our functionaries receive instructions. I draw your attention to the following words in your letter:—

"If they give any annoyance or put hindrances, Russian Cossacks in sufficient numbers will protect the importers of food against the wild horsemen of Karadagh."

On this occasion to take such a measure is not only incorrect and contrary to public law, but will produce difficulties. It is better to arrange with the central authorities and obtain instructions to the commanders; otherwise I can express no opinion and take no step. As my disposition is to cultivate peace, so I am ready to do my utmost within my powers. As I have explained, the military authorities are only obedient to orders from Tehran, and they do not feel obliged to do anything without permission from the capital.

AIN-ED-DOWLEH.

Inclosure 6 in No. 45.

*Consul-General Wratislaw and M. Miller to Ain-ed-Dowleh.*

(Translation.)

April 23, 1909.

AS Mr. Charles Stevens, British vice-consul, and M. Zacharia Nazarbeggoff, Russian tajir bashi, write to us, your Highness, in compliance with our request, and in order to carry out the promise which the Shah gave to the Russian and British Ministers at Tehran, gave permission to bring food into the town from Basminch and Barinch. But now, at 1 P.M. in the afternoon, there is no sign of food coming in.

These two consulates, having reliance on the Shah's promises given to the Russian and British Ministers, have sent the required telegrams to import food to Tabreez from Russia by the Julfa road.

Therefore, we have the honour to request you to forbid Serdar-i-Nustet (Rahim Khan) and Sujai Nizam to molest the importers of food coming down to Tabreez. If they prevent them, Russian Cossacks, in sufficient numbers to afford protection, will do their military duties and deal with the Karadagh horsemen.

Finding it necessary to inform you of this, we wrote these few lines.

A. C. WRATISLAW.  
A. MILLER.

Inclosure 7 in No. 45.

*Consul-General Wratislaw and M. Miller to Tabreez Anjuman.*

(Translation.)

April 25, 1909.

MIRZA MOHAMMED TAGHI AGHA, the President of the Anjuman, Ijlal-el-Mulk, and Hadji Ali Agha called upon us to-day. After talking over several matters,



they enquired about the reason for Russian troops crossing from Julfa into Persian territory. In reply, we gave them the necessary details, and have now the honour to repeat them for the information of the Anjuman.

According to the promise the Shah gave to the British and Russian Ministers at Tehran, it was necessary to cease hostilities and open the roads in order to bring food into the town, but the commanders of the army did not respect the conditions of the armistice nor allow provisions to be brought in. With the savage horsemen of Karadagh on the road, it cannot be opened and made safe for travellers. Therefore, the British and Russian Governments have agreed that a sufficient force should be assigned to escort the importers of food and make the road safe. At the same time this force, after having brought in food and opened the road, will protect the inhabitants and foreign subjects against the outrages of the Government horsemen, who, if they enter the town, will not shrink from committing every kind of outrage. When there is tranquility and security, this force will leave Persian territory for Russia without delay or condition, and without having any claim in future.

We are instructed by our respective Governments to announce this and give assurances to the Anjuman.

A. C. WRATISLAW.  
A. MILLER.

[25129]

No. 46.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 5.)*

(No. 112.)

Sir,

*Gulahek, May 26, 1909.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copy of a despatch which I have received from His Majesty's consul-general at Tabreez, in regard to the composition and total strength of the Russian force which entered Azerbaijan at the end of April for the protection of foreigners at Tabreez, and the maintenance of order on the Tabreez-Julfa road.

I have, &c.  
G. BARCLAY.

Inclosure in No. 46.

*Consul-General Wratislaw to Sir G. Barclay.*

(No. 18.)

Sir,

*Tabreez, May 12, 1909.*

WITH reference to my despatch, No. 16 of the 2nd instant, I have the honour to report that the Russian force which has entered Azerbaijan is composed as follows:—

- 2 battalions, rifles.
- 400 Cossacks.
- 1 battery, field artillery.
- 1 " howitzers.
- 1 " mountain guns.
- 1 company sappers.
- 1 machine-gun detachment with 8 machine guns.
- 1 transport company.

In all, about 4,000 men. The discrepancy between these figures and the estimate of the Russian Foreign Minister, is mainly due to the units being on a war instead of a peace footing, and to the addition of a third battery and a machine-gun detachment.

Of these, a company of rifles was originally stationed at Marend, and 300 Cossacks were told off to patrol the road. Subsequently, the force at Marend was increased, when it seemed likely that Nationalists from Julfa would attack the Royalists there, but nothing happened.

When the troops passed through Marend on their way to Tabreez, they released the clerk of the Russian vice-consulate at Urumia with three Cossacks and two servants, who had been imprisoned there for a week and badly treated. Sujai Nizam, the youthful Governor of Marend, declared that he had arrested them because he believed them to be revolutionaries in disguise. Mr. Miller subsequently claimed from him compensation to the amount of 2,000 toman, whereon he fled.

This same Sujai Nizam, who is an irresponsible boy, also arrested and detained for several days a Turkish officer and two soldiers, who were proceeding through Marend to Salmas. They were finally released by the Russians.

While passing along the road near Sophia, the Russians soldiers were fired on and one man slightly wounded in the leg. The villagers gave up seven Karadaghli, who were obnoxious to them, as the culprits, but no evidence was forthcoming against them, and they were released after a few days detention.

The bulk of the Russian troops are encamped on the far side of the Aji Bridge, between two and three hundred having been brought into the town. It is probable that the camp will have to be shifted before long, as the water of the Aji Chai will be quite unfit to drink, even for horses, as soon as the spring floods have subsided.

On the night of the 9th instant, a Russian sentry on the roof of a house near the Russian consulate was fired on from a neighbouring roof and severely wounded in the arm, which will have to be amputated. The culprit, or culprits, have not yet been discovered, but my Russian colleague tells me that he suspects them to be Caucasians having an old grudge against the Russian troops.

General Snarsky is inclined to make exaggerated demands from the town on account of this outrage, including an indemnity of 10,000 toman, but Mr. Miller is endeavouring to reduce them. No claim has yet been presented.

I have, &c.

A. C. WRATISLAW.

[25130]

No. 47.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 5.)*

(No. 113.)

Sir,

*Gulahek, May 27, 1909.*

WITH reference to your despatch No. 213 of the 7th December, 1908, respecting the running expenses of the steam-ship "Shushan," I have the honour to state that on the 15th May I forwarded to the Minister for Foreign Affairs Messrs. Lynch's account in this connection for the year 1908.

I enclose herewith the reply which I have now received from the Saad-ed-Dowleh, and to which in the present circumstances I do not think it necessary to send an answer until the time arrives for presenting the next account.

I have, &c.

G. BARCLAY.

Inclosure in No. 47.

*Saad-ed-Dowleh to Sir G. Barclay.*

(Translation.)

Your Excellency,

*Tehran, May 18, 1909.*

I HAVE received your Excellency's note of the 15th instant respecting the income and expenditure of the steam-ship "Shushan," and have the honour to refer you to the statements made by my predecessors in their notes addressed to the legation, and to state that I concur in their opinion.

I avail, &c.

SAAD-ED-DOWLEH.

[25132]

No. 48.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 5.)*

(No. 115. Confidential.)

Sir,

*Gulahek, June 3, 1909.*

WITH reference to my telegram No. 412 of the 23rd ultimo and to your reply of the 24th ultimo No. 261, I have the honour to report that at an interview I had with the Minister for Foreign Affairs a few days ago he reverted to the question of the return of Zil-es-Sultan. I told Saad-ed-Dowleh that I could give him no positive answer until he had also approached my Russian colleague on the subject, but that I

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could tell him that I personally had no objection to the Zil's return, provided His Imperial Highness were appointed Governor of Fars instead of Ispahan. He agreed with me that it would be better if His Imperial Highness were given the former post, and said he would take an early opportunity of mentioning the matter to M. Sabline.

I told my colleague of this conversation. He seemed quite to concur in what I had said, but when Saad-ed-Dowleh approached him he expressed himself in such a manner as to leave his Excellency in doubt whether he approved of the Prince's recall or not. In the meanwhile I had learnt from Sir A. Nicolson's telegram No. 273 that the Russian Government were not altogether in favour of it, and on further conversation with M. Sabline I saw that he was distinctly lukewarm, as he had reason to believe that the Shah did not desire his uncle's return, and that it was only Saad-ed-Dowleh wished it, and was anxious for the two legations' support to obtain it. In these circumstances, although M. Sabline would, I think, have been ready to waive such objections as he had to the Prince's return, it was obviously undesirable that I should press him to do so. I accordingly told him that I was indifferent in the matter, and we agreed to say nothing unless Saad-ed-Dowleh pressed it, and if we found it necessary to give an answer to state that the two legations, though they would not oppose Zil-es-Sultan's return, could not recommend it. His Imperial Highness will, of course, by returning, forfeit the guarantees given him by M. de Hartwig and Mr. Marling.

I have, &c.  
G. BARCLAY.

[25133]

No. 49.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 5.)*

(No. 116.)

Sir,

*Gulahek, June 4, 1909.*

I HAVE the honour to forward copy of the note in which I informed the Persian Government that you had approved my action in accepting Saad-ed-Dowleh's note of the 12th January in regard to the ill-treatment of a Bahreini at Lingah last year in the place of the objectionable note addressed by Mushir-ed-Dowleh to Mr. Marling on the 9th April last year.

You were good enough to leave the wording of this communication to my discretion, and you will see that I made a slight change in the text previously suggested by you, omitting the words "His Majesty's Government cannot consider this arrangement as final." These words, I thought, might provoke a reply, and, therefore, as the moment is inopportune for pressing the Bahrein question to an issue, it seemed to me better to omit them.

I have, &c.  
G. BARCLAY.

Inclosure in No. 49.

*Sir G. Barclay to Saad-ed-Dowleh.*

Your Excellency,

*Tehran, May 13, 1909.*

I FORWARDED to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs a copy of the note which I had the honour to receive from your Excellency, dated the 12th January, on the subject of the ill-treatment of a Bahreini by the deputy-governor of Lingah. At the same time I reported the action taken by me which led to the substitution of the note in question for the communication addressed by Mushir-ed-Dowleh to Mr. Marling on the 9th April, 1908.

The Secretary of State has now expressed his approval of my action, and has instructed me to inform your Excellency that His Majesty's Government maintain, as regards the status of the Bahreinis in Persia, the attitude explained in Mr. Marling's note of the 30th March, 1908, and that they will be guided entirely by their own views of the position, should any action of the Persian authorities make representations necessary.

I avail, &c.  
G. BARCLAY.

[25137]

No. 50.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 5.)*

(No. 120.)

Sir,

*Gulahek, June 8, 1909.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith copy of a despatch which I have received from His Majesty's consul-general at Bushire, enclosing a communication from the British Chamber of Commerce at that place, conveying the thanks of that body for the protection afforded to them during the recent disturbances.

I have, &c.  
G. BARCLAY.

Inclosure 1 in No. 50.

*Consul-General Cox to Sir G. Barclay.*

Sir,

*Bushire, May 13, 1909.*

I HAVE the honour to forward a copy of a communication, dated the 11th instant, received by me from the British Chamber of Commerce here.

I should, under ordinary circumstances, refrain from complying with their request to send the letter forward for the information of higher authority, but as I note that certain of the newspapers, ignoring Russian action at Resht, suggest that the landing of bluejackets at Bushire had brought on the entry of Russian troops into Tabreez, I venture to forward it as indicating at all events the trend of public feeling locally.

Of one thing I feel convinced, namely, that had the action taken not been taken when it was, the German Government would have sent a ship to protect her nationals.

A copy of this despatch is being forwarded to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, for information.

I have, &c.  
P. Z. COX, Major,  
*British Resident in Persian Gulf, and His Britannic  
Majesty's Consul-General for Fars, &c.*

Inclosure 2 in No. 50.

*Mr. Moir to Consul-General Cox.*

I HAVE the honour to inform you that at a general meeting of this chamber, held on the 6th instant, I was instructed to convey to you an expression of the chamber's deep appreciation and sense of gratitude for the prompt and effective measures taken to restore and maintain order in Bushire since the outbreak of the 7th April—measures which, it is felt not only by British and other European subjects, but by practically the entire native population of Bushire, are the only ones which give that sense of security for life and property which, for some days, had entirely disappeared.

I am directed also to request you to send copies of this letter to the Foreign Offices, London and Calcutta.

*British Chamber of Commerce, Bushire,  
May 11, 1909.*

[25138]

No. 51.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 5.)*

(No. 121.)

Sir,

*Gulahek, June 15, 1909.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 28 of the 17th February last, I have the honour to transmit herewith copy of a despatch which I have received from His Majesty's consul at Ahwaz, reporting that the wali of Pusht-i-Kuh has definitely accepted the governorship of Luristan, though I understand from a report from Captain Haworth that the post will not include Burujird.



I shall not fail to do what I properly can to induce the Persian Government to maintain the wali in his new appointment.

I have, &c.  
G. BARCLAY.

Inclosure in No. 51.

Consul Ranking to Sir G. Barclay.

Ahwaz, May 12, 1909.

Sir, I HAVE the honour to address your Excellency on the subject of the Luristan road.

2. From information lately received from Luristan, it appears that not only has the wali been offered the governorship of Luristan, but also that he has definitely accepted it.

He is reported, on credible authority, to have already moved one section of the Sagwand and settled them, for the present at least, at or near Deh Luran, and further to have written to the Yam-ul-Mulk, governor of Khuramabad, and to the local Khans informing them that he is coming there.

3. From the above it would appear that he intends to try to become *de facto* governor of Luristan and reduce it to order.

4. Such being the case, if through the good offices of His Majesty's legation, the governorship of Luristan could be continued to the wali for some space of years, it might reasonably be hoped that good results would accrue to the Luristan road project.

5. I write from memory, Captain Lorimer having taken his report away with him unfinished, leaving no copy here, but as far as my memory serves me this was one of the wali's chief stipulations with regard to the Luristan road that he should be guaranteed the governorship of Luristan for some term of years, on receipt of which he was willing to take up the road scheme.

6. If the obtaining of this promise of continued governorship is possible and not contrary to the policy of His Majesty's Government, I am of opinion that much might be done towards the furtherance of a project which has long been hanging fire, the concession for which expires comparatively soon.

I have, &c.  
L. RANKING.

[25139]

No. 52.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 5.)

(No. 122.)

Sir,

Gulahek, June 15, 1909.

WITH reference to your despatch No. 219 of the 24th December last, inclosing copies of correspondence with Messrs. Dixon in regard to the insecurity of trade routes in Southern Persia, I have the honour to report that Messrs. Dixon at the same time instructed their representative at Ispahan to discuss with His Majesty's consul-general a proposal for policing the roads similar to that submitted to you, but with the difference that the firm suggested the employment of telegraph gholams for the purpose instead of that of India soldiers.

His Majesty's consul at Shiraz, to whom Mr. Grahame forwarded copies of Messrs. Dixon's letter, and to their agent, and of his own covering despatch to me, has now approached me urging the pressing necessity for introducing some adequate measures of policing the roads. Mr. Bill, who is in agreement with Mr. Grahame as to the urgency of finding some means of allaying the growing sense of uneasiness among British and British-Indian traders in regard to the trade routes of Southern Persia, puts forward a scheme, based on Messrs. Dixon's suggestion, that gholams of the Indo-European Telegraph Department should be employed as road guards. He suggests the gradual establishment by the department of a staff of well mounted and armed gholams, whose primary object would, of course, be the care of the telegraph line, but whose presence on the road would, in his opinion, go far to prevent the present frequent robberies and to ensure the good conduct of the tribes. He further suggests that small parties of these gholams should accompany caravans travelling on the road at a charge to be paid by the merchants interested.

The director of the Telegraph Department, to whom I have submitted Mr. Bill's

despatch for his observations, points out, however, the many objections to which the scheme is open. He argues that, apart from the initial cost of such an undertaking, the maintenance of such a force would entail an annual extra expenditure of from 6,000*l.* to 7,000*l.* a-year, which it is unlikely would be covered by charges made on traders claiming protection for their caravans, though Mr. Bill is sanguine that the scheme, when once in working order, could become self-supporting.

Mr. Barker adds that, as by its convention with the Persian Government the department is entitled to protection from the Persian Government, were the policing of the southern roads entrusted to its staff, it would to some extent abrogate its right to be protected.

As stated in another despatch, I hope to discuss with Major Cox, in the course of his approaching visit to Tehran, the question of the insecurity of the southern roads, and I shall then have the honour to address you again on the subject.

I have, &c.  
G. BARCLAY.

[25140]

No. 53.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 5.)

(No. 123.)

Sir,

Gulahek, June 16, 1909.

AS reported in my despatch No. 106 of the 20th ultimo, the Shah, in response to one of the demands of the nationalists, dispatched a telegram to the ulema of Kerbela and Nejef informing them of the re-establishment of a constitutional régime.

I have now the honour to transmit herewith copy of a despatch which I have received from His Majesty's consul-general at Bagdad in regard to the reply of the ulema.

I have, &c.  
G. BARCLAY.

Inclosure in No. 53.

Consul-General Ramsay to Sir G. Barclay.

Sir,

Bagdad, May 31, 1909.

I HAVE the honour to submit for your Excellency's information the following extracts from my diary to the Government of India for the week ending the 31st May, 1909:—

The vice-consul, Kerbela, reports that the Persian consul-general went to Nejef as the bearer of a special telegram from the Shah to the ulema, in which it is understood that the Shah tried to obtain the support of the ulema. The consul-general has returned, and the vice-consul reports that as he passed through Kerbela he had a royalist named Mishkat-ul-Atibba arrested, flogged, and thrown into the Turkish gaol, from whence he was sent to Bagdad on his way to Persia. The consul-general said that he was acting on the orders of the ulema. It is said that the ulema have ordered ten persons to be banished from Kerbela to Persia. The mutessarif is said to have thanked the Persian consul-general for his action, as it showed that neither of them had royalist sympathies. The vice-consul has seen a copy of the reply which the ulema wrote to the consul-general with reference to the Shah's telegram. The substance of it is as follows:—

"The telegram you brought notifies the introduction of constitutional law, and it has already been published; still the fact remains that the best of words are those which are endorsed by acts. Promises which have repeatedly been broken have shaken the faith of the nation. Those who stir up strife are still in Tehran; royalist troops are at Tabreez; Russian and English troops are on Persian soil; the military stores, revenue, telegraphs, and other departments of Government have not been handed over to responsible Ministers; there is a censorship on telegrams, and there are other matters which we have discussed with you verbally. All this is opposed to the statements contained in the telegram. You should report exactly to the Shah what we have said. All this should be altered, and the constitutional law should be introduced

[1665]



in letter and in spirit. A temporary Cabinet should be formed of members of the former Parliamentary Government and of persons who enjoy the confidence of the nation. The nation requires some assurance that promises will not again be broken. How can we give effect to the telegram until we hear from the provinces that the constitution is a reality? Proverb: 'He who a second time tries that which he has already proved (and found wanting) is sure to repent.'

Sayed Abdulla, the President of the first Persian Parliament, has arrived at Kerbela. The shops were closed in honour of the occasion, and the Seyed was given a great reception, headed by Seyed Mohammed Bakir, Tabatabayi, one of the leading Mujtehids of Kerbela.

I have, &c.

J. RAMSAY.

[25141]

No. 54.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 5.)*

(No. 124.)  
Sir,

*Gulahek, June 16, 1909.*

EXCEPT for the arbitrary action of General Snarsky at Tabreez, which has lowered the credit of the Anglo-Russian agreement in Persia and given the Turkish local agents in Azerbaijan an opportunity to increase their activity and influence, the course of events during the past four weeks has presented no very noteworthy developments. Good progress has, however, been made in the execution of our programme for the restoration of constitutional government, and there is good reason to hope that in the course of the next few days an electoral law, which should satisfy the most exacting Nationalists, framed by the committee formed for the purpose, will be promulgated, and a date fixed for the elections for the Assembly. There have been dissensions in the Cabinet due generally to the mistrust felt for Saad-ed-Dowleh, and in particular the jealousy between him and Ferman Ferma, Minister of the Interior. Given Saad-ed-Dowleh's masterful character and Ferman Ferma's vanity, given also the more than ordinary Persian faculty for intrigue possessed by both, complete harmony was not to be expected in a Ministry of which both were members. It was realised at the time the two legations suggested its composition that it would be difficult for some of its members to agree. A more harmonious Cabinet might have been got together, but it would have lacked any element of strength or courage, and it is these elements embodied in Saad-ed-Dowleh which have enabled the present Ministry so far to superintend, not unsuccessfully, the execution of the programme which it is hoped will, before long, lead to the assembling of Parliament. It is unfortunate that Nasr-ul-Mulk has not been available at this juncture. Had he been able to take up his post as president of the Council he would have served as a check on Saad-ed-Dowleh, thus mitigating one of the chief causes of friction, and, what is more important, he would have gained for the Cabinet the confidence of the Nationalists, who, despite the progress which has been made towards the re-establishment of parliamentary government, cannot bring themselves to believe that any good can really come of a Ministry controlled by Saad-ed-Dowleh. This distrust has been accentuated by General Snarsky's ill-advised harshness at Tabreez, which has aroused great indignation amongst all classes of Nationalists, who, knowing their impotence as against Russia, are inclined to vent their wrath on Saad-ed-Dowleh; and there is many a Nationalist in Tehran to-day who looks on Saad-ed-Dowleh as in league with the Shah to retain the Russian troops in Azerbaijan, and who attributes to Russian influence every act of government to which the Nationalists take exception. This is particularly the case in Ala-ed-Dowleh's appointment as governor of Tabreez, and in placing of the policing of Tehran in the hands of the Cossack Brigade under Colonel Liakhoff. The latter measure was certainly a wise one. It had my entire approval, and has resulted in a notable improvement in the state of public security in the capital. The appointment of Ala-ed-Dowleh was doubtless made at Russian suggestion, but it was made in the interest of order, and it remains to be seen whether the views of the two consuls-general is not correct, i.e., that the appointment is in Tabreez only unpopular among a noisy section of the inhabitants.

Taking stock to-day of the results of the execution of the programme of the two

Powers, so far as it has yet gone, we find that it has not yet produced any great amelioration of the general situation. It is true that the reactionary clique which surrounds the Shah, and whose activity was a source of constant terror to the Nationalists of the capital, is now no longer in evidence. Amir Bahadur Jang has, indeed, formally announced to the leading Nationalists that he has followed the example of his Sovereign and himself become a constitutionalist; and it is also true that the danger of the Bakhtiari in Ispahan and the revolutionaries at Kazvin marching on Tehran; which was at one time believed to be imminent, is now probably remote. Though, however, Semsem-es-Sultaneh had at one time disbanded a large part of his force, a number of his men have now been recalled to Ispahan owing to the continued presence of the Shah's troops at Kashan, who cannot be withdrawn or disbanded, for want of funds; and though a number of the Kazvin revolutionaries have left for the north, Sepahdar, notwithstanding that the Government have appointed him governor of Ghilan and Mazanderan, and that the newly appointed governor of Kazvin has arrived at his post, still stays in Kazvin or its neighbourhood with a good number of followers under arms. This force continues to be in some degree a menace to the capital, and with the suspicions felt as regards every act of Saad-ed-Dowleh, and with the deep-seated distrust of which the Shah is the object, it will be difficult to induce it to disarm.

Of other towns which are prominent centres of the Nationalist movement, or where the state of public order has of late given cause for anxiety, Bushire and Bunder Abbas alone, under the strong hand of Darya Beggi, have returned to normal conditions.

For the rest, Resht is still in the hands of the Nationalist Committee, while Sepahdar, as mentioned above, remains at, or near, Kazvin. Meshed is reported to be in a state of complete anarchy, and the same may be said of Kerman, and in a less degree of Yezd. Shiraz, which under the incompetent rule of Assef-ed-Dowleh, is a prey to the rivalry of local factions, seems to be perpetually on the verge of disorders. The state of the roads in the south could not be worse, though the Bakhtiari route is a conspicuous exception, with the result that it is favoured by traders, to the serious loss of Bushire, where the custom receipts have dwindled almost to vanishing point. In the north Tabreez remains in the occupation of the Russian troops, and, though it is intended to withdraw a considerable portion of these at an early date, this may be delayed owing to Sattar Khan's and Bagher Khan's having taken asylum, with their followers, at the Turkish consulate-general. It is to be hoped that these troublesome national heroes can be induced to leave Tabreez. Compulsion would, of course, be undesirable; but until they leave the Turkish consulate-general, where their presence is tantamount to a demonstration, under Turkish protection, against the presence of the Russian troops, the withdrawal of the latter would have the appearance of a concession to Turkey. In the rest of Azerbaijan the situation is as bad as can be. Near Ardebil the Shahseven are plundering the villages, and the Russian consular escort is being increased. In the north-west the meagre reports which I receive suffice to show that the district is in a state of chaos, offering a tempting field for Turkish encroachments and for a counter-demonstration to Russia. The Turkish activity there is an additional complication in a situation already sufficiently perplexing, and it is to be hoped that it may be restrained by joint representations from the two Powers at Constantinople.

It was, of course, never expected that the chaos in Persia would at once give place to order on the restoration of the constitution. What was expected was that it would produce a *détente*, and that expectation has been fulfilled. It remains to be seen whether the coming constitutional government will be able to quiet the forces of disorder which have gained such strength during the late corrupt and impotent régime. If it conducts itself reasonably, and, in particular, it shows a desire and sets to work sensibly to reorganise the financial administration, I presume that the Powers will facilitate for it adequate pecuniary assistance. It should then have within its reach funds, which the present Ministry totally locks, but which are absolutely necessary if the Government is to make any serious attempt to grapple with the prevailing chaos. All the present Cabinet can do in its desperate financial straits is to select the best men available as provincial governors, and trust to them to improve matters by their influence. The 100,000*l.* which Russia is about to advance will be employed to pay off a number of unnecessary troops and to meet urgent arrears. This manner of using the money is the most useful at the present juncture, but I trust that when the time comes to furnish our share of the advance agreed upon by the two Powers we shall see our way to insisting on its use for more positive methods of combating the disorder. A substantial portion should, I venture to submit, be earmarked for starting some system of road guards to secure order on the southern routes, the present condition of which is



ruining our trade in Persia; but on this subject I hope to address you further after I have had the advantage of consultation with Major Cox, whom I expect in Tehran next month.

I have, &c.  
G. BARCLAY.

[25142]

No. 55.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 5.)*

(No. 125.)

Sir,

Gulahek, June 17, 1909.

WITH reference to previous correspondence, I have the honour to forward a convention which I have this day signed with the Persian Government placing the control and supervision of the Arabistan telegraph lines under the Indo-European Telegraph Department till 1945, and prolonging the telegraph concessions held by that department in Persia until the same date. I also enclose copies of the notes exchanged simultaneously with the signature of the convention recording that the arrangement requires the ratification of the Assembly.

It will be observed that the share in the cost of the construction and maintenance of the Arabistan lines to be borne by the department is fixed at 5,000*l.* towards the construction and 300*l.* a-year towards the maintenance, which is considerably less than the department was prepared to spend. The credit for this satisfactory arrangement belongs to the director of the Persian section of the department and to Mr. King-Wood, who have conducted the negotiations with the Minister of Telegraphs with much skill and patience. I should also wish to accord my appreciation of the sensible and conciliatory spirit shown throughout by the Minister of Telegraphs, Mukhber-ed-Dowleh. Unfortunately he was not allowed a free hand, but met with much obstruction from certain members of the late Cabinet, the stupid and reactionary Minister of Finance, Kavem-ed-Dowleh, in particular. Had it not been for the ignorant and corrupt obstruction of this Minister, the convention would have been signed some months ago, when there would not have been the same necessity for the ratification by the Assembly, as the constitution had not been restored, though the Ministers responsible for the conclusion of the arrangement would doubtless have been vehemently attacked in the Medjliss for having consented to the prolongation of concessions without the consent of the nation.

I have, &c.  
G. BARCLAY.

Inclosure 1 in No. 55.

*Anglo-Persian Convention, signed June 17, 1909.*

## ARTICLE 1.

TO improve the telegraphic communication between Borazjoon and Mohammerah and Borazjoon and Dizful it is arranged that from the date of this agreement until January 1945 the above-mentioned telegraph lines shall be under the control and supervision of the British Government telegraph officials now controlling the international lines in Persia.

## ARTICLE 2.

The British Government agrees to pay for the cost of the construction and the establishment of the above-mentioned lines, such as iron posts, wire, insulators, &c., which may be required, up to 5,000*l.*, and also to pay an annual sum of 300*l.* on account of the maintenance of the above-mentioned lines, and the pay of a mechanic up to the year 1945. Other expenses, such as the changing of the wooden posts for iron ones and the annual expenses of the maintenance of the above-mentioned lines, which may be in excess of the 5,000*l.* and the annual amount of 300*l.*, shall, after the completion of the work, and the submission of the accounts, be paid gradually to the British Telegraph Department by the Persian Government.

## ARTICLE 3.

In return for the expenses incurred gratis by the British Government, and referred to in article 2 for the construction and maintenance of the above-mentioned lines, the Persian Government agrees to consider the following conventions to be in force and binding up to 1st January, 1945 :—

The Telegraph Convention of the 2nd April, 1868.  
The Telegraph Convention of the 2nd December, 1872.  
The Telegraph Convention of the 16th August, 1901.

## ARTICLE 4.

The pay of the telegraphists, and other workmen, such as gholams and ferrashes, batteries and instruments, and the hire of telegraph offices, will be borne by the Persian Telegraph Department.

## ARTICLE 5.

Guards and telegraph gholams, who must be Persians, will be required for the maintenance of the above-mentioned lines; the control and payment of these will be in the hands of the director and British staff.

## ARTICLE 6.

In order to ensure the proper working of these telegraph lines the British director will be at liberty to station British telegraphists, at the expense of the British Government Telegraph Department, at any telegraph office on the above-mentioned lines which he may consider necessary.

## ARTICLE 7.

In case of necessity, and with the permission of the Persian Government Telegraph Department, the British Government Telegraph Department can join the above-mentioned lines at their eastern extremity to the line between Tehran and Bushire.

## ARTICLE 8.

If the British Government Telegraph Department considers it necessary it can, at its own expense, add a second line for its own use to the above-mentioned lines.

## ARTICLE 9.

The Persian Government agrees not to employ in the telegraph offices of the above-mentioned lines, without the concurrence of the chiefs of the British Telegraph Department, anyone except Persian subjects or members of the British Government Telegraph Department.

## ARTICLE 10.

It is agreed that, should the Persian Government in the future wish to extend the above-mentioned lines in any direction, the co-operation of the Indo-European Telegraph Department in the construction and maintenance of such extension will be asked for.

Done at Tajriche in duplicate on the 17th June, 1909.

(Sealed) G. BARCLAY.  
(Sealed) DJEVAD, SAAD-ED-DOWLEH.



Inclosure 2 in No. 55.

*Copy of Note signed by Sir G. Barclay and Saad-ed-Dowleh.*

Your Excellency,

June 17, 1909.

I HAVE the honour to state to your Excellency that it is fully understood between us that the convention for a telegraph line between Borazjoon and Mohammerah and between Borazjoon and Dizful, which your Excellency and I have signed together, will require the approval of the Persian National Assembly.

I avail, &amp;c.

G. BARCLAY.

JEVAD, SAAD-ED-DOWLEH.

[25143]

No. 56.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 5.)*

(No. 126.)

Sir,

Gulahek, June 17, 1909.

THE electoral law was completed by the committee of twenty persons chosen to elaborate it on the 10th instant, and was presented to the Shah on the 13th, but has not yet received His Majesty's approval.

The persons chiefly responsible for the measure are Mushir-ed-Dowleh, Motasin-ul-Mulk, Sani-ed-Dowleh, Farman Farma, Hussein Kuli Khan Nawab, and Mustashar-el-Dowleh.

The new law provides for 120 members of Parliament, in place of 156 decreed by the law of the 8th September, 1906. Elections which in 1906 were direct and on a class basis are now indirect, and the class basis has disappeared. The electors are to choose three times the number of persons eventually to represent them in Parliament, and the College of Electors thereby formed will elect one-third of their number by vote to go to the House. Each province is divided into electoral districts, with a specified number of representatives to be chosen by the inhabitants of that district qualified to vote. Those chosen in this manner will meet in the capital of the province, and in their turn choose from among themselves those to be sent to Parliament. Although it is stipulated that the deputies need not necessarily be natives of the province electing them, they must be on the spot to be elected in the first instance, but when vacancies occur through death or resignation they may be filled by persons, not necessarily natives of the province they represent, to be elected by the National Assembly itself. In this way by degrees it will be possible to have a majority of persons from Tehran or Tabreez in the Assembly. Elections are to begin at Tehran ten days after the regulations have received the Shah's approval, and in the provinces five days after their receipt.

The qualifications for the electorate are of the usual kind as to age, sex, &c., and include provision for a certain stake in the land.

The deputies are not required to have any fixed means, but the usual qualifications are laid down as in the last electoral law.

The National Assembly is to open as soon as one-third of the deputies are present, and they are elected for a term of two years, which period will begin when Parliament opens.

The question of salary of the deputies is left to the Assembly to decide upon when it meets. Travelling expenses for the deputies from the provinces to the capital and back are provided for.

Elaborate regulations are laid down for the procedure to be observed at the elections, which are to be supervised by a committee including the provincial authorities and local councils provided for in the constitution of the 7th October, 1907 (articles 90 to 93). The electors are to obtain from the central committee electoral vouchers, entitling them to vote, after having satisfied the committee that they enjoy the necessary qualifications. On an appointed day they will meet at the hustings, where voting will take place for the Electoral College in accordance with the regulations laid down.

Another innovation provides for representatives of the five principal tribes, i.e., Bahktiari, Shahseven of Azerbaijan, Kashgai of Fars, Khamseh of Fars (known as the Arab tribes), and the Turkomans, who are to have one deputy each. The following non-Moslem communities are also to have a deputy each: Chaldeans of Azerbaijan, Armenians of Ispahan, Jews, and Parsees.

Although a copy of the electoral law, as presented to the Shah, is in my possession and has been translated, I will refrain from transmitting it for the present, as some change may yet be made.

The Shah on the 15th instant made the following observations on the measure:—

1. The idea of giving representatives to the tribes was, in His Majesty's opinion, likely to lead to trouble, as each tribe is divided into numerous subdivisions often not on very good terms with each other.

2. An article stipulates that at the end of the two years' session the electorate may, if they so desire, re-elect any of the old members. This His Majesty finds fault with, but it has been pointed out to him that there is no means of preventing the election of former members of Parliament, or, in fact, of influencing the electorate by any clause in the electoral law which would not be a violation of the constitution, or by the omission of any clause. The Shah no doubt had in his mind his old objection to seeing men like Taki Zadeh, Said-ed-Dowleh, and his followers, re-elected to the second Parliament, but it will be difficult, if not impossible, to prevent it. My Russian colleague has since sent a message to the Shah advising him to accept the law without reserve, and His Majesty stated yesterday, in reply, that he would withdraw his objections and sign the law forthwith as it stood.

An attempt will be made by the Cabinet to bring about the simultaneous opening of the senate as provided for in the constitution of the 30th December, 1906 (articles 43 to 48). So far some resistance has been manifested against a tentative attempt to raise the question, and article 44 of the constitution of 1906 is quoted as an obstacle in the way, but this article, which runs as follows:—

"The regulations of the senate must be approved by the National Assembly,"

does not refer to elections for the senate, but only to its internal regulations which will have to be drawn up later, just as internal regulations were drawn up for the last Assembly. The Cabinet would wish the senate to be formed according to the provisions of article 45 of the 1906 constitution, which enacts that thirty members must be elected by the people, of which fifteen for Tehran and fifteen for the provinces—the remaining thirty members to be chosen by the Shah, of whom half from Tehran and half from the provinces.

I have, &amp;c.

G. BARCLAY.

[25145]

No. 57.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 5.)*

(No. 128.)

Sir,

Gulahek, June 18, 1909.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith the usual monthly summary of events in Persia for the past four weeks.

I have, &amp;c.

G. BARCLAY.

Inclosure in No. 57.

*Monthly Summary of Events in Persia during the past four weeks.*

Tehran.

THE principal events of the four weeks under review were the completion of the electoral law on the 10th instant, and the discussion between the Persian Government and the Russian legation concerning the Russian advance of 100,000*l.* These questions have been dealt with fully in separate despatches.

2. Colonel Liakhoff has been entrusted with the duty of policing the town of Tehran and the summer quarters known as "Shemran." The result has been that order has been well maintained. The proximity of the Shah's new camp at Sultan-etabad to the village of Gulahek has not been without inconvenience. Incidents of a



more or less trivial character have occurred through the want of discipline among the Silakhori irregulars under Amir Bahadur Jang who still remains at the Shah's side.

3. There has, unfortunately, not been complete harmony among the members of the new Cabinet, one of whom, Motamin-ul-Mulk, has tendered his resignation. The British and Russian legations found it necessary to urge upon Ferman Ferma, the Minister of the Interior, the desirability of solidarity in the Cabinet, and their advice had a good effect.

4. The Ain-ed-Dowleh with a considerable portion of the Royalist forces lately before Tabreez, arrived in Tehran on the 9th June. Ain-ed-Dowleh called on the Shah the following day. He is not likely to play any political part for some time at any rate.

5. The Arabistan telegraph line convention was signed on the 17th June, subject to the eventual approval of the National Assembly.

6. Two British naval officers, Messrs. Smithies and Adams, travelled from Ahwaz to Tehran, via Ispahan, in April and May. Though the guards promised by the Bakhtiari chiefs for the journey from Ahwaz to Tehran were not forthcoming, they found the road quite safe and were not molested anywhere.

7. The Russian legation guard now consists of one second lieutenant of the Labinsky Kuban Cossacks, and thirty-three Cossacks drawn from three different regiments.

G. P. CHURCHILL.

#### *Tabreez.*

On the 19th May His Majesty's consul-general at Tabreez reported that, since the blowing up of the Nationalists' barricades, the Russian military authorities had shown less tendency to interfere in internal affairs of the town. The author of the shooting outrage on the Russian sentry had, it was believed, been discovered, though the enquiry had not been concluded. Meanwhile no further demand for an indemnity was to be pressed beyond the 3,000 tomans already paid.

The Caucasian fedais had almost all left the town or gone into hiding. A general disarmament had taken place, and, though many weapons were probably concealed in the houses, yet for some days past no armed men, except Russian soldiers and the police of Ijlal-ul-Mulk, the vice-governor, had been seen in the streets. The people of Tabreez were still very nervous regarding the Russians, and suspicious of every action on their part. The behaviour of the Russian troops in the town is reported as being generally exemplary.

Four days later Mr. Wratislaw reported that the vice-governor's police force had been largely increased. This had been done with the intention of soothing the feelings of Sattar Khan and Bagher Khan, by allowing them the control of fifty policemen each, and the concession had been very liberally interpreted by the two ex-generals, who were said each to have put into uniform some 200 men, who were little inclined to consider themselves under the orders of the deputy-governor. It was evident that Sattar Khan and Bagher Khan were both disposed to give trouble, and His Majesty's consul-general stated that the arrival of a strong governor, who would be superior to local influences, was very desirable. Ala-ed-Dowleh, who is generally considered to be one of the "strong men" in Persia, has now been appointed. His Excellency is at this moment at Charlottenburg in Germany, and has telegraphed accepting the appointment. He will come to Tehran before proceeding to his new post.

At the end of May an unfortunate incident occurred in connection with the doings of the Russian authorities in Tabreez, who appear to have been inclined to take too active a part in local affairs. Several Russian subjects were arrested, including one who had been an active member of the Nationalist Assembly, nominally for disloyalty shown to the Russian Government. The real reason, however, appears to have been the part they had played in the recent movement. This action caused considerable anxiety among the Persian Nationalists; it was further accentuated by the arrest of a Persian fedai and the blowing up of his house, and by the claim presented by the Russians against Sattar Khan and Bagher Khan for pecuniary compensation for damages done to the Russian road, and for which they, in their capacity as nationalist leaders, were to be held responsible. Both of them sought refuge at the Turkish consulate-general, with certain other notables, and were taken under Turkish protection, and it was more than probable that the movement was encouraged by the Turkish consul-general. The Turkish chargé d'affaires denied this, but maintained

that the bast had taken place, owing to the arbitrary measures taken by the Russian military authorities. It was at one time proposed that it should be suggested to Sattar Khan and Bagher Khan that they should proceed on a pilgrimage, in order to keep out of the way for the present. This would, however, have looked too much like an expulsion, and the suggestion was accordingly dropped. Both of the men continue for the present to remain in bast at the Turkish consulate-general.

Reports show that there has been renewed Turkish activity in the frontier districts, and the local consular officers seem to have been busy extending Turkish protection to Turkish subjects. One of these, Peter Ellow, consular agent at Urmia, is a notorious Nestorian swindler, who is "wanted" by the police of British Columbia on a charge of obtaining money by false pretences under the alias of "the Rev. J. A. Day, D.D." Lately, at Urmia, he has been making a comfortable income by the sale of certificates of Turkish protection, which he has been endeavouring to induce both villagers and townspeople to apply for.

As regards the late nationalist rising in the Salmas and Urmia districts, the facts appear to be that Said-ul-Mamalek, who is already nationalist governor of Salmas, came to Urmia on the 13th April and took over the administration. He remained in power some five weeks and kept fairly good order. But the heavy contributions he levied on the wealthier citizens were unpopular, and in the middle of May another revolution was engineered by a local fedai leader who, calling some Kurdish auxiliaries to his assistance, compelled Said-ul-Mamalek to retreat hastily to Salmas. The Turks profited by the general disorder to encroach further on Persian territory.

On the 28th May Mr. Wratislaw reported that Turkish soldiers were in occupation of Kutchi at the foot of the pass and on the high road between Urmia and Salmas. They had also summoned the inhabitants of the Karabagh district on the promontory to the east of Kutchi to submit, but the latter had refused, and said they would resist any Turkish advance.

On the 7th June Mr. Wratislaw reported that forty Russian infantry were under orders to proceed to Urmia to serve as an escort to the Russian vice-consul there. This force was to protect Russian and, in case of need, all foreign subjects, but their instructions were to avoid interfering in local affairs.

On the 11th June Mr. Wratislaw reported that an affray had taken place at Dilman, the capital of Salmas, between Turkish soldiers and Nationalists arising out of an attempt on the part of the Turkish consul for Khoi, then at Dilman, to protect a local Kurd from the Persian authorities. Several casualties occurred on both sides, and finally, on the news that the Kurds were approaching, the nationalist governor fled, and the population agreed to submit to the Turkish consul.

Sir G. Barclay communicated the above information to the Turkish chargé d'affaires, who told him that he had no direct news of the incident, but said he had recommended his Government to send a commission to enquire what was going on in the district. Sadr-ed-Deen Bey subsequently informed Sir G. Barclay that the tribes had attacked the Turkish guard at Khoi, and that, in view of the inability of the Persian Government to prevent incursions across the frontier, a small movement of Turkish troops towards that place had taken place. He added that the object of the Porte was to restore order in the districts and to protect Turkish and other subjects.

E. R.

#### *Resht.*

Sepahdar, lately in command of the nationalist forces here and at Kazvin, has been appointed governor of Ghilan and Mazanderan. He is said to intend leaving Kazvin for Resht shortly. The nationalist force at Kazvin remains under arms, and is likely to do so until the National Assembly meets.

#### *Asterabad.*

It appears that the Turkomans, having done all that the Shah wished them to do, were requested to disperse, but some of them were dissatisfied at not having received the money they were promised. They consequently resorted to robbery, and are reported to have plundered four villages, one of which they burnt. A fifth village, Kalander Mahaleh, repulsed the Turkomans after several hours' fighting. The grant of the constitution was notified to the people, and was received with expressions of joy. Considerable friction, however, still exists between Royalists and Nationalists.



*Meshed.*

1. Rukn-ed-Dowleh, on reappointment as governor-general, left Tehran for Meshed in the first week of June.

2. On the 13th May the Shah telegraphed that the original constitution was restored. People paraded the streets, but there was no idea of praising His Majesty. It was known that the two Powers had forced the Shah to take this step, and everyone was sceptical of the result. At his Russian colleague's request Major Sykes agreed to have a meeting with the two leading priests, at which the situation was to be explained in accordance with the instructions of the two legations. The priests, however, declined to meet Prince Dabija, and the meeting fell through.

3. M. Yakovlev, of the Russian consulate-general, having become insane, has left Meshed. He is succeeded by the acting diplomatic agent at Askhabad.

4. A large party of Arab pilgrims, who reached Meshed about the 22nd May, reported that near Meiomai, some 40 miles east of Shahrud, they were attacked by Turcomans, and forty-five of their number were killed. Property to the value of 400 liras was also taken. This is confirmed by a waggon driver employed on the Tehran-Meshed telegraph line, who adds that on the 8th May the Turcomans surrounded Meiomai and drove away all the camels and cattle they could find. The marauders numbered about 300.

5. In the Nishapur district Gholam Ali, a well-known bandit, with 200 horsemen, was committing robberies during the latter half of May.

6. Telegrams from His Majesty's consul state that on the 4th June an attempt was made to kill the Karguzar, and a leading shrine official was murdered in his house. On the 7th June there was a murder in the local assembly, and the Begler Beggi was also murdered. There was firing near the consulates, both of which were struck. On the 9th June an attack was made on the house of the chief of police, which is near His Majesty's consulate-general. About forty shots were fired, but no one was killed.

*Turbat-i-Hayderi.*

1. The following movements of Russian cossacks are reported: on the 26th April eight arrived from Karez, four for Birjand, and four for Kerman. On the 5th May six arrived from Seistan en route to Meshed. On the 9th May two arrived from Karez for Seistan. On the 15th May five arrived from Meshed for Seistan, and on the 16th May three from Bunder Abbas for Meshed.

2. Dr. Otto, the newly appointed Russian vice-consul for Seistan, arrived on the 27th April.

3. On the 6th May a copy of the Shah's proclamation announcing the re-establishment of the constitution was posted on the gate of the town. The people were absolutely indifferent.

4. On the 17th May Mohammed Khan, of Dowletabad, with two of his relatives, took refuge in the consulate. Salar Khan and Assadullah, with a party of Turks and Baluchi, had seized his fort. They were said to have found much treasure in it, and were reported to be quarrelling over the spoil.

*Seistan.*

1. His Majesty's consul left Seistan on the 3rd April for Meshed and Birjand. He is expected at Birjand about the 15th June.

2. Mr. Hewson reported that early in May the Afghans accompanying a large caravan which passed through Aliabad caught two Russian cossacks who were on the Birjand-Seistan road. They stripped them to their shirts, seized their rifles, and released them.

3. During April 3,441 cases were treated at the consular hospital. Captain Hunter performed sixty operations, some patients coming from as far afield as Herat.

4. The people of Seistan generally have, under instructions from the Meshed Assembly, ceased to pay revenue to the Shah's officials at Birjand Hissam-ed-Dowleh appears to have tried to maintain the Shah's authority, but with little success.

C. B. S.

*Ispahan.*

During the latter part of May the dissensions among the Bakhtiari khans at Ispahan continued, and though it was decided to disband their forces in view of the Shah's concessions, and this measure was indeed in part carried out, a false report, to the effect that the Shah's forces at Kashan had received orders to march on Ispahan, produced a reversal of this decision, and some 200 horsemen who had left Ispahan were recalled. It is, however, probable that the khans will shortly return to their own country, with the exception of Serdar Assad, who proposes to remain in Ispahan until the arrival of a governor, and then to proceed to Tehran for the elections.

Some anxiety has been felt by British firms at Ispahan on account of the probable insecurity of the Ahwaz road consequent on the rivalry between the factions of Semsam-es-Sultaneh and Serdar Mohtashem. Semsam-es-Sultaneh at first disclaimed responsibility for any disorder that might occur, which he averred would be caused by Kuhgelu tribesmen. His Majesty's consul-general has repeated to the khans a warning from His Majesty's Minister that both factions of the khans will be held responsible for any loss to British trade.

E. F. G.

*Yezd.*

1. Dr. Pugin and M. Wahlmann left Yezd at the end of April. A local notable, who was instrumental in settling a case in which Dr. Pugin's Armenian clerk was concerned, is reported to have received a telegram from the Prime Minister (Naib-es-Sultaneh) thanking him for his efforts in aid of a subject of "our good friend Germany." Dr. Pugin denied any connection with the proposed German Bank, but admitted that his Minister had requested him to make a few inquiries relative thereto.

2. News of the grant of the constitution by the Shah was very coldly received, the general opinion being that the Shah was only trying to gain time. One idea was that the constitution had been granted to induce people to pay revenue; this done, it would be withdrawn.

3. A caravan for Meshed, which left Yezd towards the end of April, reached Turbat safely, while another got through to Tabbas. With the exception of the Meshed road, all roads to Yezd continue to be infested with bands of robbers, and a change in the command of the road guards has had no good result.

4. There have been two outrages on Parsees during the past few weeks. In one case a Parsee wine seller was shot in cold blood by a customer for no apparent reason. He died a few days later. The murderer took refuge in a shrine and subsequently escaped from the town. In a second case a youth, who was extorting money from Parsees in a suburb of Yezd, stabbed an old man who had already given him some money. The wound is dangerous. The local authorities seem powerless to keep order. Strong representations have been made by His Majesty's Minister, in reply to which Saad-ed-Dowleh has stated that Prince Moayyed-es-Sultaneh has been appointed governor and will go to Yezd, taking with him a force sufficient to maintain order.

*Kerman.*

1. Sahib Ekhtiar having been dismissed and Nizam-es-Sultaneh appointed governor, but not having yet left Tehran, the town is in a chaotic condition, there being no authority to appeal to. Early in May Hajji Ibrahim Naib took refuge in the consulate, but subsequently left on being appointed to charge of the town. Telegraphing on the 11th June His Majesty's consul reported that the state of the town and district was very serious and that the leading men of the town threatened to take refuge in the consulate as they could get no answer to their complaints to Tehran. In answer to representations, Saad-es-Sultaneh has promised to hasten Nizam-es-Sultaneh's departure.

2. Colonel Von der Flass when at Bam tried to obtain admission to the fort, but without success.

*Kermanshah.*

1. Zahir-ed-Dowleh has been appointed governor. The local assembly, which was elected during the former constitutional régime, has resumed its sittings, but rather to discuss affairs and policy than for purposes of government.



2. Hamadan has remained quiet, the nationalist force expected from Kazvin not having arrived.

3. The Kermanshah-Hamadan road, which was closed for a while owing to the presence of robbers, is now open again.

4. Captain Haworth has been granted leave on medical certificate and starts for Europe shortly, Captain Crossle, I.M.S., officiating for him.

#### Shiraz.

1. Soulet-ed-Dowleh has remained the dominant factor in the Shiraz situation. His Majesty's Consul visited him on the 2nd May, at his invitation in his camp some miles from Shiraz, and discussed several pending matters of no great importance. As regards his own intentions he was very guarded, and confined himself to expressing his strong desire to keep out of the turmoil of Shiraz politics. He spoke bitterly of the Qavamis, accusing them of hereditary and incurable bad faith, and also stating that their power over the Arabs was gone, since they had been reduced to flattering the chiefs, and "once you show a nomad you're afraid of him, it's all up with you." He also spoke very bitterly against the Mullahs, and laughed at the present local assembly of Shiraz, which he said was irregular. As regards himself and his tribe, he declared that he could put the Bushire road in perfect order in a month, but that it would cost money, which he could not be sure of recovering from the Shah or the assembly. Consequently he proposed to get away from Shiraz as quickly as possible, and take no part in politics beyond keeping the Kashgai as quiet as possible. In this last respect it must be admitted that he has reason to congratulate himself, the behaviour of the tribe as a whole during this migration having been remarkably good, and there can be little doubt that Soulet's attitude is the best he could adopt in his own interest, and shows remarkable moderation and foresight in a chief of nomads. It remains to be seen whether he will be able to maintain it against the stream of intrigue which is being ceaselessly directed against his camp from Shiraz. His language tended to confirm an idea previously formed by Mr. Bill that Mansur-es-Sultaneh secretly meditates contesting the headship of the Arabs with the Qavami family. Soulet left the immediate neighbourhood of Shiraz about the 10th May, apparently intending to proceed to his summer quarters. He received extraordinary attentions from the governor-general, who went out 5 miles to visit him, and ostensibly made great efforts to reconcile him with the Qavam, who went so far as to await a summons from the governor-general, in a neighbouring garden; but it appeared that Soulet absolutely refused to see him.

The grant of the constitution was duly announced, and was received with somewhat remarkable coldness, even the popular party apparently confining themselves to awaiting the details of the constitutional law with a good deal of scepticism, while the Shirazis in general were as usual more absorbed in local than in general politics. The fact is that no one seems disposed to attach any credit to anything bearing the Imperial signature.

The question of possible action by Soulet-ed-Dowleh being set at rest, attention was again focussed on the situation at Lar, whence the usual contradictory rumours constantly arrived. The position of Nasr-ed-Dowleh, whether he was victorious or defeated, was a delicate one. He was fighting for his own hand (for he had been recalled by the governor-general at the instance of the popular party) against an eminent constitutional leader, and he had so many people with him who had blood-feuds with Seyyid Abdul Hussain Lari, that an agreement was practically impossible, especially as the Seyyid had for months been issuing public notices condemning him and his brother as infidels worthy of death.

On the 15th May Haji Ali Agha, the leading priest in the extreme constitutional party, arrived quite unexpectedly at the consulate, accompanied by his son, and explained that he had a telegram from Bunder Abbas to the effect that Nasr-ed-Dowleh had taken Lar, killed the Seyyid, massacred the inhabitants and plundered the town, that as this had occurred subsequent to the amnesty he had no longer any faith in the latter, and he expected to be treated in the same way. He also declared that he would accept no guarantee from Azef-ed-Dowleh, who had formally promised the Shiraz Assembly that Nasr-ed-Dowleh would not go to Lar, and that he would not leave the consulate without a guarantee from the legation. He added that numbers of the popular party might be expected to follow him. Some eight persons of position arrived later and were admitted, while a large crowd assembled outside the consulate. They complained at great length against the Qavamis. Eventually Mr. Bill, having interviewed the governor-general and the Qavam, obtained a written assurance for all the

refugees, who, with the exception of Haji Ali Agha, left the consulate; the crowd also dispersed. Mr. Bill considers it certain that the real motive of the agitation is to weaken the Qavamis before Nasr-ed-Dowleh returns with his victorious Arabs, and there is good reason for believing that Ata-ed-Dowleh, and some say Asef-ed-Dowleh also, are fomenting it. There is no doubt that the complaint made of violation of the amnesty is a mere pretext to cover animosity to the power of the Qavam. The bazaars remained closed for some days, and mourning ceremonies for the alleged deceased Seyyid were held in several mosques. The agitation soon lost force, but it resulted in open war between Asef-ed-Dowleh, and the Qavam over the question whether the former did or did not send Nasr-ed-Dowleh to Lar, the former maintaining that he did not, and the latter that he holds the governor-general's written orders to proceed to Lar and re-establish the Shah's Government there at all costs. The Qavamis concentrated their attacks on Ata-ed-Dowleh, who was held responsible for getting up the agitation of the previous week.

On the 21st May a fairly well-known priest was assaulted in the street, severely beaten, and his life threatened. On the following day another priest was attacked in the same quarter, and Ata-ed-Dowleh consequently flogged the head-man of the quarter. The inhabitants promptly raised a riot, and were joined by the people of the adjoining quarter, where the Qavam's town house is situated. Ata-ed-Dowleh appealed to the Qavam to restrain the latter, who eventually agreed to stop rioting on condition that Ata-ed-Dowleh should be dismissed within five days.

From a telegram received on the 30th May it appears that Nasr-ed-Dowleh has telegraphed to the Shah, complaining that he has been recalled from Lar by the governor-general at the instigation of certain members of the Shiraz local assembly, though he went to Lar by His Majesty's orders. He added that he felt aggrieved at this action of the governor-general, as for the last two years he had made great endeavours to carry out the Shah's orders. He asked for a reply through his brother, the Qavam.

2. On the 1st May His Majesty's consul paid an official visit of congratulation to the Turkish vice-consul on the occasion of the accession of Sultan Mohammed V, of which he had been officially apprised.

3. M. Lebovici, assistant in the School of the Alliance Israelite, recently threatened a Jew with a revolver. The Jew took refuge in His Majesty's consulate, and, as a result of Mr. Bill's representations to M. Nataf, the head of the school, M. Lebovici was suspended and ordered to leave Persia.

4. The roads in Fars continue very unsafe, and robberies of posts, &c., are frequent. In the neighbourhood of Konartakhte a local feud has been the cause of a good deal of fighting, during which the Indo-European Telegraph Department's office was invaded and some damage done to the building. The governor-general has now placed a guard of soldiers in the building. The Russian acting consul-general at Bushire, while on his way to Shiraz, appears to have been fired on in this neighbourhood, his own and another horse being hit. The leading Persian merchants of Shiraz have telegraphed to the Minister of the Interior complaining bitterly of the state of public order and the incapacity of the governor-general. The appointment of a strong governor—for choice, Zil-es-Sultan—would appear to give the best hope of restoring order. The governor-general has officially notified His Majesty's consul that Saulet-ed-Dowleh has undertaken the protection, for part of the journey, of caravans using the Firouzabad route to Bushire. It is too early to say whether this will be sufficient to restore trade to its normal condition. As illustrating the present condition of Fars it may be mentioned that quite recently the governor-general had great difficulty in getting anyone to take a message from him to the Kashgai Chief.

5. A party of 100 men of the Chaharmahal Regiment took refuge in the consulate on the 11th May, demanding arrears of pay. Mr. Bill made an unofficial representation on the subject to the governor-general, who promised to pay the men, but at the end of May they were still in the consulate.

C. B. S.

#### PERSIAN GULF.

##### Bushire.

*Note.*—Some facts here recorded are anterior to events reported in the last summary despatch respecting Bushire, as recently it was convenient to report separately and immediately incidents telegraphed to His Majesty's legation. With the restoration



of order, however, such a course is no longer necessary, and in future events at Bushire, as also those at Tabreez and Ispahan, will be incorporated in the general summary.

1. On the 27th April 100 soldiers took refuge under the residency flagstaff, as a protest against their arrears of pay being withheld. They were, however, induced to leave on the 6th May, when the main part of their claims had been met and a written insurance given to His Majesty's consul-general that retaliatory measures would not be taken against them.

Normal arrangements have now been restored in the customs at Bushire, and the impounding of the receipts by the bank, a temporary expedient made by Major Cox, with the Minister's approval, in order to secure the receipts from improper use, has now ceased. During the time it has been in force the Bushire receipts have been very low, owing partly to the uncertainty of the situation and partly to the insecurity of the road, and after paying the expenses of the Customs Administration and a small daily allowance to the governor to enable him to maintain order, a balance of only 12,000 tomans remained, which has now been remitted to the Imperial Bank as part of the interest on their advances to the Persian Government.

The British bluejackets were re-embarked on the 19th and 20th May, and since Darya Beggi's arrival order has been well maintained except that Seyed Morteza, whose conduct had been a constant source of anxiety, introduced a force of tangestanis into the town. Darya Beggi, however, took decisive steps and succeeded in driving them out, and on the 8th June it was reported that Seyed Morteza himself had been taken prisoner.

2. On his arrival from Bussorah on the 26th April the commander of the fast mail-steamer "Dumra" reported three deaths among his crew which had taken place since his departure from Bussorah. From the circumstances mentioned by him it appeared that the deaths were due to plague. On the 30th April a coolie from the same ship died in the quarantine station from plague.

3. M. Zwinne, acting director of Customs, notified to the Residency on the 27th April that M. Leleux had assumed charge of the Customs at Bushire.

4. His Excellency the naval commander-in-chief arrived in His Majesty's ship "Hyacinth" on the 27th April, the Resident calling on him on board the same day. Admiral Slade landed on the 28th and remained till the 30th when the flag-ship left for Muscat.

5. The Resident left in His Majesty's ship "Lapwing" on the 12th May for Mohammerah.

6. News reached Bushire on the 14th May that plague had broken out at Bahrein, three cases and two deaths having occurred. Quarantine restrictions have consequently been imposed against Bahrein.

L. O.

#### *Bunder Abbas.*

1. During the whole of April Seyed Abdul Hussein Lari continued to send messengers to the leading Nationalists in Bunder Abbas ordering them to close the Customs. Their reply that this was impossible only drew from the Seyed a threat to send a force to enforce his orders. This threat caused considerable uneasiness in the town and though Lar was taken by Nasr-ed-Dowleh and the Seyed reported a fugitive early in May, as late as the 29th May His Majesty's consul reported that the people of Bunder Abbas were in a state of painful anxiety owing to the Seyed being still at large. In view of the loss to British trade and the possibility of damage to life and property of British subjects, he suggested that the Persian Government be asked to take active measures against the Seyed. In reply to representations, Saad-ed-Dowleh said that he was unable to do anything at present.

2. All British Indian subjects who were residing at Minab arrived at Bunder Abbas on the 12th April with all their goods and valuables. Minab was threatened at the time by one Mir Barkat Khan with a large Baluch following.

3. Captain Shakespear handed over charge of the consulate to Captain Mackenzie and left for Koweit on the 13th April. Captain Rae, second assistant to the Resident at Bushire, took over charge of the consulate from Captain Mackenzie on the 19th May.

#### *Lingah.*

1. The repeated orders of Seyed Abdul Hussein Lari to the leading Nationalists here to close the Customs and dismiss the director of Customs and the deputy-governor have been entirely disregarded. A notice, signed and sealed by the Seyed, was posted up in the bazaar to the effect that anyone who paid customs dues would be liable to a fine of 200*l.* payable to the Nationalists. It was torn down by order of the deputy-governor.

2. On the 16th April the director of Customs dispatched the steam launch "Khorassan" with a customs munshi on board to reinstate the customs officials at the Shib Kuh ports but she returned without carrying out the object. The sheikhs, while expressing their wish to co-operate, would not allow any customs dues to be levied or cargo imported or exported.

#### *Mohammerah.*

1. The Darya Beggi, while at Bagdad in April, was said to be in communication with the Russian consul at Bussorah.

2. Mr. Pearson, of the American Magnetic Survey, arrived on the 20th April, from Ahwaz, and left for Bussorah the same day.

3. Mr. Carstem, Messrs. Wonckhaus' agent, visited Mohammerah in April for the purpose of looking for a house for office and quarters. A small house is to be built for him near the firm's yard. Meanwhile he remains at Bussorah.

4. Crops on the Karun have failed. There is a surplus in other districts, but probably only enough to supply the deficiency from Karun in the local markets.

#### *Ahwaz.*

1. It is reported on good authority that during March two Russians, "dressed as Cossacks," came to Burujird. Shortly afterwards, a telegram was received in Burujird from the Prime Minister saying that another Russian, accompanied by his interpreter, was coming to investigate the damage done by the earthquake. On the arrival of the latter, who was said to be assistant to the Russian consul at Kermanshah, a house was taken on one year's lease. The interpreter was said to be a man of good birth from Kermanshah. After making exhaustive inquiries as to roads, stages, &c., in the district, the latter arrival and his interpreter started towards the Ispahan road via Silakhor and Chaharlang Bakhtiari with the ostensible object of visiting the places devastated by the earthquake. They were escorted by a party under the Mansur-ul-Mamalek who had been appointed by the Amir Afkham.

2. His Majesty's consul left Ahwaz for Ispahan on his summer tour on the 24th May.

C. B. STOKES, Major,  
Military Attaché.

[25146]

No. 58.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 5.)*

(No. 129.)  
Sir,

*Gulahek, June 18, 1909.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit copy of the amended draft loan contract which my Russian colleague, as reported in my telegram No. 431 of the 1st June, submitted to his Government for approval.

M. Sabline tells me that he has now received his Government's reply, instructing him that the representative of the Russian Bank mentioned in article 1 is to be selected by the Russian legation and the manager of the bank, and that the bank employé selected is to make no payments to the Persian Government without M. Sabline's sanction. Subject to these modifications the draft contract is approved.

As regards the programme of expenditure, I understand that M. Sabline is furnished with general instructions as to the employment of the 100,000*l.* Arrears of pay to the troops and, in particular, to the Cossack Brigade, and arrears of salary to the diplomatic service are the chief items.

I have, &c.  
G. BARCLAY.



Inclosure in No. 58.

*Draft Loan Agreement.*

ENTRE le Gouvernement Impérial de Perse, représenté par son Excellence le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères, président *ad interim* du Conseil des Ministres, d'une part, et la Banque d'Escompte de Perse, représentée par M. Exemplaroff, d'autre part ;

Vu l'exécution par Sa Majesté le Schah des articles 1<sup>er</sup> à 5 des conseils amicaux soumis à Sa Majesté par les Gouvernements de Russie et de la Grande-Bretagne, tendant au rétablissement du régime constitutionnel en Perse et à l'apaisement du pays, et conformément au § 6 du dit programme,

Il a été convenu ce qui suit :—

Article 1. Le Gouvernement Impérial de Russie met à la disposition du Gouvernement Impérial de Perse une somme de 2,500,000 fr., versée à la Banque d'Escompte de Perse à Téhéran, sous les conditions suivantes :—

1. La somme ci-dessus mentionnée est destinée à subvenir aux dépenses immédiates nécessitées par l'introduction des réformes et sera dépensée d'après un programme qui sera établi entre la légation de Russie et le Gouvernement persan.

2. Chaque mandat devra être ordonnancé par le Ministre responsable du département intéressé et revêtu du "vu bon à payer" du Ministre des Finances.

3. Un caissier-comptable, désigné d'accord entre le Gouvernement persan et la légation de Russie sera chargé du paiement des dépenses imputées sur la dite somme.

4. Le Conseil des Ministres devra rendre compte au Parlement de l'emploi de cette somme.

Art. 2. Cette avance aura la même garantie que les emprunts conclus en 1900 et 1902 entre le Gouvernement persan et la Banque d'Escompte de Perse.

Art. 3. Le taux des intérêts est fixé à 6 pour cent l'an, payables tous les six mois.

Art. 4. Cette convention est rédigée en langue persane et française avec la même signification.

Fait en double à Téhéran, le

[25100]

No. 59.

*Mr. Garnett to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 5.)*

(No. 398.)

Sir,

*St. Petersburg, June 23, 1909.*

WITH reference to Sir A. Nicolson's telegram No. 302 of the 13th instant, I have the honour to inform you that, hearing a rumour to-day to the effect that fresh bodies of Russian troops were pouring into North Persia, I enquired of M. Isvolsky if there were any truth in this report.

His Excellency said that the only increase of Russian troops was that a sotnia of Cossacks was being sent by the Governor of Tiflis to reinforce the consulate guard at Erdebil, where there had been a good deal of pillaging, and where a large number of people had taken "bast" in the Russian vice-consulate.

I gathered from the Assistant Minister for Foreign Affairs that a good deal of hostility had been shown and threatened to the sotnia on the march.

I have, &c.

W. J. GARNETT.

[25102]

No. 60.

*Mr. Garnett to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 5.)*

(No. 402.)

Sir,

*St. Petersburg, June 25, 1909.*

I HAVE the honour to report that on the receipt of your telegram No. 764 of the 21st instant I wrote privately to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, informing him that, for the reasons given in Sir G. Barclay's telegram No. 478 of the 19th instant, you were of opinion that the question of the publication of our Persian programme had

presumably better be delayed, and I begged him to be kind enough to grant me an interview during the course of the day, when he would be able to give me the views of the Russian Government. His Excellency authorised me, when I saw him in the afternoon, to inform you that he agreed to delaying the publication, and he informed me that he would instruct the Russian chargé d'affaires at Tehran in that sense.

On the receipt of your telegram No. 773 of the 22nd June, enquiring what the final views of the Russian Government were as to the publication of the whole programme, in view of the fact that the Bakhtiaris had got hold of the travesty of our programme, in which case it would be well if Sirdar Assad could be enlightened as to the true contents of the document, I again spoke to the Minister for Foreign Affairs on the subject, and laid before him the reasons why it would be well to let the Sirdar know the real version, as in that case there appeared some hope of arresting his march on the capital. M. Isvolsky said that he would think the matter over, and added that he was very averse to anything being published which would show that the two Governments were not completely in accord on one point. It is evident that his Excellency sets great store on this, as he had already mentioned it in his previous interview of the day before. I urged his Excellency to let me have his views as soon as possible; and, knowing that he was leaving the next morning for Sweden, I thought it as well to write a private letter to him at his house on the islands that same evening, expressing the hope that I might be put in possession of his views before his departure. In consequence of this his Excellency sent me an *aide-mémoire* yesterday morning, copy of which I have the honour to inclose, and a summary of which was telegraphed to you in my telegram No. 323 of yesterday's date. From this memorandum you will see that the Russian Government have no objection to the publication of a portion of the programme, but cannot depart from their point of view regarding the omission of point 6.

I have, &c.

W. J. GARNETT.

Inclosure No. 60.

*Aide-mémoire communicated to Sir A. Nicolson.*

LE Ministère Impérial des Affaires Étrangères a l'honneur de faire savoir à l'Ambassade britannique que le Gouvernement russe n'a pas d'objections à ce que le programme des conseils que la Russie et la Grande-Bretagne ont donné à Sa Majesté le Schah soit publié par les représentants des deux Gouvernements à Téhéran pour renseigner le public persan sur la teneur exacte du document en question.

Le Gouvernement Impérial ne saurait cependant se départir de son point de vue que le § 6 du dit programme devrait être omis, vu que ce paragraphe pourrait être interprété comme un manque d'accord entre la Russie et l'Angleterre au sujet de l'avance de 2,500,000 fr.

Le chargé d'affaires de Russie à Téhéran est invité par télégraphe à s'entendre avec Sir G. Barclay à ce sujet.

*Saint-Petersbourg, le 10 (23) juin, 1909.*

[25103]

No. 61.

*Mr. Garnett to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 5.)*

(No. 403.)

Sir,

*St. Petersburg, June 25, 1909.*

I HAVE the honour to report that I had an interesting conversation yesterday with M. Klemm, who is the official at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in charge of Persian matters. It will be remembered that this gentleman has previously been consul-general at Meshed and also at Bombay. In view of the fact that Sir G. Barclay had given the substance of his telegram No. 489 to the Russian chargé d'affaires at Tehran, I thought there could be no harm in my reading a paraphrase of it, as also of Sir G. Barclay's telegram No. 490, to M. Klemm, and I asked him whether the Persian Minister had already made the representation which his Government had instructed him to make, to the effect that, unless the Russian troops were withdrawn from Tabreez, the Cabinet would be compelled to resign. M. Klemm replied that the

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representation had been duly made the day before, that no note had been handed in, but that the Persian Minister had left a copy—in Persian—of his telegraphic instructions. To my inquiry as to what answer had been given to his Excellency, M. Klemm said that he had been reminded that some of the Russian troops had been withdrawn, and informed that the reduction of these would be carried on when the new governor-general reached his post. As the Minister seemed inclined to complain of the behaviour of the Russian troops, M. Klemm told him that such complaints could not be accepted unless substantiated by proofs. I then asked M. Klemm what his opinion was as to the threat of the resignation of the Cabinet, and the reply was that in any case he did not think that the Cabinet would survive for long.

Our conversation then turned on the presence of the Russian forces at Tabreez, and I enquired whether there was any further information as to their withdrawal. M. Klemm gave me to understand that it was no longer in the hands of the Minister for Foreign Affairs to settle the question of the reduction of the troops, as this matter had become one for the Council of the Empire to decide (by this it is possible he meant the Council of Ministers), but he reiterated that the troops would be withdrawn when the new governor-general arrived at his post.

I then turned the conversation on to the presence of Sattar and Baghir Khans in the Turkish consulate-general at Tabreez, and M. Klemm stated that the Turkish Ambassador here had been informed that the fullest guarantees would be given by the Russian authorities to these two refugees. He was sure that Turkhan Pasha, who was a conscientious man, reported fully to his Government, but he added that the fault was at Constantinople; if the refugees were to be got out of the consulate, pressure must be exercised at the Porte, and I was informed that instructions are going at once to the Russian Ambassador in London to consult with you as to making joint *démarches* with the Turkish Government on the subject. I asked if M. Klemm knew why Sattar and Baghir would not accept the guarantees offered them, and the reply was that these men simply wished to make trouble, and that they are being used as pawns in the intrigues of the Turkish authorities (in this connection it is interesting to note that the Turkish Ambassador had said to M. Klemm the other day that there would not have been all this trouble if the British and Russian Governments had invited Turkish co-operation in Persian affairs), and that they have taken into the consulate an enormous amount of loot, which they would be obliged to leave behind if they quitted that refuge.

Before leaving I read to M. Klemm the substance of Sir G. Barclay's telegram No. 492 of yesterday's date on the subject of Meshed, leaving out the sentence about the "exasperated Russian colleague probably introducing a large force and occupying the city"; and I begged him to send immediate instructions to the Russian chargé d'affaires at Tehran to the effect that the Russian consul-general at Meshed should adopt a conciliatory attitude. M. Klemm replied that this should be done without delay. He promised to give a faithful account of our conversation to the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, whom I was unfortunately unable to see.

I have, &c.

W. J. GARNETT.

[25106]

No. 62.

Mr. O'Beirne to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 5.)

(No. 410.)

Sir,

St. Petersburg, June 29, 1909.

I HAVE the honour to enclose a summary of a report published this morning by the "Novoe Vremya" of an interview with "a person competent in Persian affairs." To all appearance the personage interviewed is an official connected with the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, and his remarks are doubtless intended to prepare public opinion for the possible dispatch of troops to Tehran. His views on the situation, which are expressed on the whole with studied moderation, are to the effect that the revolutionary movement in Persia has degenerated from a struggle for freedom and reform into pure anarchy. The revolutionary leaders are now animated solely by a thirst for plunder, and are not to be disarmed or mollified by the genuine commencement of reforms which the Shah, yielding to the advice of the British and Russian Governments, has recently made. The two Governments have done all that lay in their power to bring about an appeasement, but the difficulties of the situation are increasing, more particularly for Russia. With the advance of the revolutionaries against Tehran,

Russia, though hampered by her declared policy of non-intervention, may be compelled against her wish to take measures for the protection of Russian subjects and their interests in Persia. The Shah's troops are worthless, and the only force that can be depended upon for His Majesty's protection and that of the foreign missions is Colonel Liakhoff's brigade of 1,400 men. The person interviewed also refers at some length to Turkish encroachments on Persian territory, and to grounds that in his opinion exist for suspecting German intrigues.

The "Novoe Vremya" in a leading article enforces the moral of this interview, and calls on the Government to adopt a more energetic line of action in Persia. Russia, the "Novoe Vremya" contends, makes a mistake in using mild language to the Persian agitators (a reference, apparently, to the negotiations with Sirdar Assad). Nothing but a strong hand will serve for the present situation. The Government showed culpable weakness in sending a weak detachment instead of an imposing force to Tabreez, and in withdrawing a portion even of that small body. They should choose one of two courses: either to sit down meekly at home and await the course of events, or else to act with energy and decision. There is no room in Persia for timid half-measures.

I have, &c.

HUGH O'BEIRNE.

Inclosure in No. 62.

*Summary of a Report of a Conversation of a "Person conversant with Persian Affairs" with a Correspondent of the "Novoe Vremya."*

THE movement that went on in Persia some months ago and the one that we see going on there now have little in common. Then the country was seized with the excitement of a new era and sincerely aspired towards political renovation. The Russian Government went hand in hand with the British Government in supporting the idea, and serious steps were taken by both Powers in that direction. The Shah, in spite of great obstacles, was willing to meet the wishes of both Governments, and at the present time his past promises are ceasing to be mere words and begin to enter the region of actual realisation. This should be enough to produce tranquillity and restore the normal course of political life. But those at the head of the so-called "liberating movement" have no desire for such a condition of things. They wish for sedition and anarchy in order to be able to rob and produce disturbance to their heart's content. Some of the champions of Persian liberty are the most ordinary brigands and thieves who perpetrate their dark deeds under the guise of a national idea. Recently news was received in St. Petersburg of the number of things stolen by Sattar Khan. Among them were twelve grand pianos, ten carriages, &c. Surrendering authority to such persons is quite out of the question, and now, when the chief tasks have been fulfilled by the Shah, it has been proposed to introduce order by means of a whole series of measures and the appointment of more or less trustworthy officials. This does not suit Sattar Khan and others who know that with the establishment of normal conditions they would have to relinquish robbery and restore what they had stolen. The appointment of the new Governor of Tabreez, Ala-ed-Dowleh, who is an energetic and conscientious man, was a warning to all those gentlemen that they would not be spared, and so they gathered round themselves their partisans in the name of liberty for the struggle against the despotic régime of the Shah. They robbed and plundered right and left. Most of their booty went into their own pockets, but a part was given towards the revolution. The revolutionists resorted to blackmailing. They sent out threatening letters in Tabreez, Meshed, and Resht, and many merchants felt obliged to give them pretty large sums. With the aid of this money they were able to hire followers. At the present moment we have a picture of complete anarchy which promises not a little difficulty for international diplomacy. Bakhtiari to the number of about 2,000 men headed by Sirdar Assad have concentrated at Kum, and on the other side the rebels are gathering at Kasvin (about 800) and are marching on Tehran, and according to the latest news there is uninterrupted connection between the two bodies. From the same source of information it is stated that the rebels at Kasvin expect reinforcements from Resht. The Shah's troops are in the most pitiable condition, most of the men being ragged, good-for-nothing beggars who would betray the Shah at any moment without the slightest remorse. The only force that can be depended on is that of Colonel Liakhoff's Cossack brigade of 1,400 men for the defence of the foreign



diplomatic missions (except those of England and Russia, which have their own body-guards).

Russia and England are doing all they can to produce pacification. The Russian and English consuls were sent to Kum to negotiate with Sirdar Assad and to convince him of the folly of marching on Tehran. He was assured that the constitutional régime was secured, and that the Shah had listened to England and Russia in this respect. Sirdar Assad declared that neither he nor his followers believed the Shah, who would again go back on his word at the last moment. He promised to give an answer on the 16th June (o.s.), and it will probably be a negative one.

The position is very difficult. If the Bakhtiari go to Tehran the capital may join the rebellious movement. The Russian Government is in a peculiarly awkward predicament, as having declared a policy of non-interference they may yet be compelled by the consequences of a march to Tehran to take steps necessary for the protection of Russian subjects and their interests in Persia.

It is quite possible that this Sirdar Assad dreams of gaining the throne, but nothing is clear in the present state of anarchy.

Our action in Persia at first was regarded with much sympathy, and our soldiers were received as liberators. Little by little, however, these views, under the influence of somebody, are changing. A Russian sentry is fired at, and rumour has it that the shot came from one of our revolutionaries from the Caucasus. Speaking of how in the present events some outside influence is observable, I cannot help mentioning the strange rôle which Turkey has taken upon herself. Not so long ago Sattar Khan asked for the protection of Russia, and it was offered to him in view of the Shah's general amnesty, but he suddenly broke his word and took refuge in the Turkish consulate, where revolutionary meetings take place and proclamations are drawn up, &c. This is a regular centre of agitation. I have heard that negotiations have been going on about this with the Turkish chargé d'affaires. He hinted that Turkey was offended by not taking part in the Anglo-Russian agreement in Persia. The doings of the Turks in Persia induce one to think that they are carrying out a deliberate programme. They favour sedition in Persia, and many of them go to Urumia, the proximity of which to their frontier gives them a favourable position when we consider the presence of their army corps in Armenia and of another corps in Bagdad. I believe that in the present case we do not forget the position that will be taken up in relation to the Caucasus.

Besides those of Turkey, there are many other intrigues which lead to various reflections. It is known that even in European centres committees have been formed, which are not devoid of a certain influence. In Germany, for instance, there is a committee for the defence of the interests of the Persian people presided over by Drs. Rorbat and Sensius. The following fact invites attention: Not long ago a proclamation was found at Tehran inviting the Persian Cossacks to disobey their officers. The person distributing that proclamation was arrested, and during a search made at his residence a form was found with the inscription: "Long live the constitution! The central committee of Mujtehids of Azerbaijan, German section." This offender was a Russian subject and was expelled from Persia. Much attention has been attracted by the doings of one Shinman or Shineman, a German subject, who has the air of a conspirator. German officials aver that he has no mission, and sincerely disavow him. If his movements were looked into it would soon be clear whose guidance he is following.

Our troops are at present in the suburbs of Tabreez, where there is comparative quiet.

There are now no British troops in Bushire, but they could be introduced at any moment from the cruiser. The English have shown great firmness and energy at Bushire. On their insistence Said Murtaza, head of the "liberating movement," was expelled.

[25108]

No. 63.

*Mr. O'Beirne to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 5.)*

(No. 412.)

Sir,

*St. Petersburg, June 30, 1909.*

THE Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs informed me yesterday, as I had the honour to report in my telegram No. 330 of the same date, that a telegram had been received from M. Sabline asking the Russian Government to consider whether, in view of the threatened advance of the Bakhtiari and fedais on Tehran, it would not be advisable to make some preparations with a view to the eventual dispatch of Russian

troops to the Persian capital, should that step prove necessary. A consultation on the subject was, M. Sazonow told me, to take place at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs that afternoon, and this morning I called on his Excellency to ask what decision had been arrived at. He stated that it had been decided to adopt certain preparatory measures with a view to the eventual dispatch of a force to Kasvin, and instructions on the subject had already been sent to the Caucasian military authorities. The advantages of this course were, he explained, that it would give Russia complete command of the road to Tehran, that it would result in clearing out the revolutionaries now collected in Kasvin, and that it would obviate the necessity of occupying Tehran, to which the Russian Government were particularly averse.

The Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs showed me a further telegram received from M. Sabline, in which the Russian chargé d'affaires gave an alarming description of the position at Tehran. He pointed out that the Cossack brigade was necessarily split up into several detachments, expressed the opinion that it was liable to become demoralised, and that it was not strong enough to cope with the situation if the threatened advance on Tehran took place. M. Sabline pointed out that there was a strong likelihood that the Shah would take refuge in the British or Russian legation; he further urged that the two Powers were morally bound to support the Shah, and suggested as the best means of doing so that a force of Cossacks should be sent to Kasvin, thus relieving the pressure on Tehran from one side. This telegram had, however, M. Sazonow explained, reached the Ministry too late to be considered in yesterday's consultation, and the decision to send an expedition to Kasvin was not taken on M. Sabline's advice.

I asked M. Sazonow what were exactly the dangers which he apprehended in the event of the threatened attack on Tehran taking place? He replied that there was the danger of the Russian bank being looted, and there was the danger to the foreign missions and foreign subjects. There was also the likelihood that the Shah might take refuge in the Russian legation, which would be extremely embarrassing to Russia. He went on to speak of the moral obligation resting on the two Governments to support the Shah, who had after all, he said, been brought to this pass by acting on our advice in according liberal institutions to his people.

I reminded his Excellency that the two Governments were not bound to lend assistance to the Shah in the present struggle. They had, on the contrary, particularly avoided doing more than promise His Majesty protection for his person and family. I pointed out that, if Russia sent troops to Kasvin and cleared the revolutionaries out of that town, this would be interpreted by the Persians as an armed intervention in the struggle. Russia would have the whole of Persia, with the exception of the royalists, against her; and what, I asked, became of the policy of non-intervention?

M. Sazonow did not directly answer that question, but enquired what steps I suggested ought to be taken. I said that Sir G. Barclay was best qualified to give an opinion on that point, but it seemed to me, speaking personally, that, if the Cossack brigade was not strong enough to provide for the protection of the Shah's person and of the foreign missions, the natural remedy for the Russian Government to adopt was to reinforce their legation guards to the extent necessary. M. Sazonow maintained that to send troops to reinforce the legation guard would produce a worse effect than to send an expedition to Kasvin.

I asked how many men it was contemplated to send. His Excellency said he thought about 1,500. In reply to a further question, he said that if the Bakhtiari desisted from their march the proposed expedition would be at once abandoned; and in view of that possibility the preparations for the expedition would be given full publicity. He also said that the Russian Government would be prepared to give the most solemn pledges that the troops would be eventually withdrawn.

From M. Sazonow's references to the Shah's moral claim on the support of the two Powers I gathered the impression that, in making preparations for an expedition to Kasvin, the Russian Government are actuated to a large extent by the desire to give His Majesty the military assistance necessary to save him from final defeat in the present struggle. The same idea was clearly expressed in the telegram from M. Sabline which his Excellency showed me. At the same time, M. Sabline's description of the weakness of the Cossack brigade and its liability to demoralisation certainly seemed, on the face of it, to furnish ground for fearing that that force could not afford adequate protection to the foreign missions, and to foreign lives and interests, in the event of Tehran becoming the scene of serious street fighting.

I have, &amp;c.

HUGH O'BEIRNE.

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P.S.—Since the above was written I have had a conversation with M. Isvolsky. His Excellency declared to me that the Russian Government had no intention whatever of rendering military assistance to the Shah. Their sole concern was the protection of the foreign missions and foreign lives and interests at Tehran. They could not send troops to Tehran without their going to Kasvin, but they had as yet arrived at absolutely no decision as to sending a force to either of these localities. They had only decided on making preparations with a view to what it might become necessary to do.

H. O'B.

[25109]

No. 64.

*Mr. O'Beirne to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 5.)*

(No. 413.)

Sir,

*St. Petersburg, June 30, 1909.*

HAVING had the honour to receive your telegram No. 790 of yesterday's date, I asked the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs this morning whether it was the fact that the Russian Government had decided to suspend the reduction of the Russian force at Tabreez.

His Excellency replied in the affirmative, saying that it had been intended to send four more sotnias back to Russia, but that this idea had been abandoned. He added that the situation at Tabreez was too disturbed to permit of further reducing the force.

I remarked that our information was to the effect that things at Tabreez were tolerably quiet. There appeared to have been no recent incident with the exception of one or two cases of misconduct on the part of the refugees at the Turkish consulate-general. I said that I should be grateful if his Excellency would explain to me what the Russian Government were now waiting for before withdrawing the force. As I understand the situation, anti-Russian manifestations would continue so long as the force remained at Tabreez. They would cease as soon as it was withdrawn.

M. Sazonow replied that, for one thing, they were waiting until a governor-general arrived at Tabreez, and not only arrived, but effectively established his authority. The Russian troops had been sent because Russian trade had been intolerably interfered with by the revolutionaries. Russia could not consistently with her dignity withdraw her force so long as there was a probability that on her doing so "brigands" like Sattar and Bagher Khans would again become masters of the situation and recommence their arbitrary treatment of Russian commerce. The Russian Government had said that they would withdraw, and intended to do so, but if they withdrew now they would probably have to send their force back again.

M. Sazonow also referred to Turkish action at Tabreez, and to the appointment of a new Turkish consul at Urumia, but remarked that there was a wide difference between Turkish promises and their fulfilment.

I have, &c.

HUGH O'BEIRNE.

[25176]

No. 65.

*Inclosures 3 and 5 in Sir G. Lowther's No. 507 of June 30, 1909.—(Received July 5.)*

Inclosure 3.

*Report on the Turco-Persian Frontier.*

FROM an inspection on the field of the disputed district between the bend of the lesser Zab and Salmas I am more than ever decided that the frontier question concerns tactical necessities more than political or religious claims.

Roughly, the configuration of the country in question may be described as a long, high valley, offering easy communications, running north and south from Salmas to Sulimania. From Salmas to Wazna the range of hills on the east side is low, and has the Persian plains beyond, while on the west the range is high, with a series of tangled chains beyond. South of Wazna the reverse is the case. On the east the hills become higher, with the Persian mountains beyond, while on the north the chain of Kurdistan

crag gives place to a series of hills, low on their eastern slopes, dropping suddenly and precipitously to the Mosul and Mesopotamian plains on the west. Barring this sudden drop from the high valley at some 4,800 feet to the plains at some 2,000 feet a gap in the western chain at Wazna, where it changes from mountains to hills, gives the opportunity for a road from the Black Sea littoral to Mesopotamia. This gap is actually on the frontier, and the ground on the Turkish side, descending suddenly to the plains, gives the Turks no chance for a defensive position, or there is no available position which might be defended by a small force until reinforcements could be brought up. This to the Turks, with their slow mobilisation, movement, and want of transport would be a necessity. On the other hand, north and east of Wazna there is nothing to stop rapid advance and movement of troops. The country being more or less open right up to Tabreez and Julfa. On the other hand, an excellent position on the Geugai Dag and Kalesepan, south of Pesvey, and the Lahjan plain guards the only two roads to Wazna from the north, i.e., that by the Lahjan, and that by Karakhidar. This position could easily be held by a small against a much larger force, and would give the necessary delay. The country between there and the Russian frontier is open and favourable to cavalry, and no doubt the Turks imagine that their Kurd irregulars would be useful there.

To sum up, previous to the occupation of the disputed districts the Turkish frontier consisted of an indefensible pass, which could be reached by an easy road from Russia, while if the pass was once taken nothing but plain country lay before the invading force. By the occupation the Turks have secured a tract of country offering a series of easily defensible positions in the front of the pass and the opportunity of mobilising forces in peace time in a position whence they can menace the Russian flank at Julfa.

#### *Road between Sulimania and Urumia.*

Leaving Sulimania the road crosses the Werga Dag, a range of steep, grassy slopes which offers no great difficulties, then descending a wide, open basin broken by wooded nullahs, grassy glades, and here and there the fields of some Kurd village. This is the Sharbazar valley and kaza, with its centre at Seetah. The valley is watered by the Karacholan Su, the road crossing it by an easy gravel ford at its junction with the Harrik Chai and near a ruined masonry bridge. From here it crosses by easy gradient a wooded limestone ridge with several villages on it, and descends into the Siwell valley, crossing the Siwell Su by a ford which would probably be difficult in most seasons near Kenaru. Up to here the road is an excellent track, and could be easily used for wheel transport. From the Siwell Su to the Lesser Zab basin and the Bana Su the road has to make a steep ascent of some 3,000 feet across a rough wooded, stony spur, broken by many small valleys and gullies, and then descending very rapidly to the Bana Su gorge at Merwa. The track, though rough, could be easily made serviceable for wheels, and easy gradients could be found. The Bana Su is here forded in a deep rocky gorge, and the track becomes very difficult and dangerous for anything but mules. Climbing over a rocky crag it slides down the other side into the Zab gorge at its bend near the picturesque village of Alot perched on a terrace of rocks projecting from the long precipitous wall which here separates the Bana and Zab. The road zigzags down to the river and passes it by a good wicker bridge, passable for animals. It then winds high up to cross a rocky spur, later descending and following the deep rocky scarped gorge of the river to Risgir, after which it ascends to the higher slopes above the gorge, at Shelmarsh. This portion from Merwa to Shelmarsh, some 14 miles, of deep ravines, precipices, and gorges would offer considerable obstacles to road or rail construction. It would probably be more costly than difficult, as washouts and avalanches might be expected frequently. From Shelmarsh to Wazna through Serdesht the road lies across high, undulating, wooded country, with a succession of rocky peaks to the west, and broken up to the east by numerous small valleys, which rapidly become deep as they near the Zab. No serious difficulty would be experienced here in making a road, gentle gradients could always be found.

Serdesht and Bana are now occupied by the Turkish troops, who administer the country in an arbitrary fashion. Certain Kurd Aghas have been appointed as mudirs and kaimakams, but these are merely the tools of the officers who run them. Thus Karami Agha, the chief of the Pisdu Asshiret, is kaimakam at Serdesht, is a mere puppet in the hands of the orderly-room clerk of the commandant at Serdesht. The Turks have constructed barracks for one battalion at Serdesht and for one battery and one battalion at Bana, and these units are quartered there. Besides these there is one battalion at Sulimania, one at Tekrit, one at Kalediz, one at Chemchemal, one at



Pesvey, one distributed along the roads between Pesvey and Rowanduz. These are all of the VIth Army Corps. At Ushnu is a battalion of IVth Army Corps and another at Keukey, on the edge of the Urumia Plain.

About Serdesht the Turks seem to have more power, and are detested by the inhabitants, whom they bully unmercifully. Neither officers nor men seem to have suffered pecuniarily by their stay in this district. These Serdesht and Bana troops are victualled from Kirkuk by the road through Kalediza, that being the easiest one. The Kurds about this district belong to the Pishdir Asshoret, with its numerous divisions, Pisdu, Alan Harz Alan, Malakari, Bashi Kolossa, &c.; they are all well armed and mounted, and have the reputation of being warlike, though the occupation of their territory by the Turks in the last few years seems to have damped their ardour, and they are pretty cowed now in this district. This is not the case with the Hangor and Mamash sections of the Bilbass Asshoret farther north in Wazna and Lahjan. These have by no means submitted quietly to the Turks, and their presence there is rather precarious and more or less on sufferance, the Turks flattering their chiefs with decorations and titles, and humouring them by allowing them to raid the Persian towns of Sujbulak and the Urumia Plain from time to time as it suits their politics. The Turks take no liberties with these Bilbass, and I hear that during their occupation there they have lost some hundreds of men in attempts to subdue the Bilbass. At the present moment things are quiet. Bais Agha, their chief, was made a Pasha recently by the Turks.

Wazna is a district of high yailas, or grassy basins, some 5,000 feet high, surrounded by rocky mountains. These basins drain indiscriminately east or west to the Zab or Wazna Sus. Those going to the Zab descend rapidly, but regularly, through thickly wooded valleys dropping some 2,000 feet in some 5 miles. Those going to the Wazna Su have a more rapid fall in a shorter distance, as they pass through the Malimosa Dagh gorge to the Pishdir Plain, dropping some 3,000 feet in 4 or 5 miles.

From Wazna down the spurs of Kandil and Koteril Daghs into the Lahjan, and so on through Ushnu to Urumia, the road is easy, and presents no difficulty either for road making or railways, easy gradients can be got round all spurs, a few small streams and mountain torrents could easily be forded or bridged, and the only rivers of any importance, the Zab, can be easily bridged, while the Ushnu River and Baranduz Chai are wide, partly dry, watercourses in open plains.

The question of the best trace for a railway between Urumia and Kirkuk seems to resolve itself into which is the better trace, following the Zab valley in its bend or mounting the Wazna Pass. As I have mentioned above, the Zab valley is by no means impossible, but difficult and costly. Without actually going over the road, which, I believe, has been done by my predecessors, but seeing the ground from the pass and the hills above, it seemed to me that the easier trace would be found down to the Pishdir Plain from Wazna by winding round the valley of the Wazna Chai, which, though similar to the Zab in its gorge and rapid descent, does not take such a large sweeping detour among high hills, and would thus necessitate a shorter length of difficult construction, and, being on the western slope of the frontier range, would have less liability for washouts.

B. DICKSON, *Captain, R.F.A.*

June 10, 1909.

Inclosure 5.

*Report on Frontier Question round Urumia and Salmas.*

WITHIN the last few months the Turks seem to have recommenced their intrigues in the Urumia and Salmas districts. They have no properly appointed consular representative at Urumia but, a certain Peter Ello, a man wanted for fraud by the police of British Columbia, has had himself appointed Tajir Bashi, and is now recognised in some sort of way by the Van authorities, sufficiently to enable them to use him as their agent when it suits them, and to repudiate him when necessary. During the various panics that have taken place from time to time lately in Azerbaijan, the Turks have seized the opportunity to send detachments of troops to various posts in Persia to protect the interests of their own and other foreign subjects. Under this guise, they sent a detachment of twelve soldiers as guard to the acting vice-consul at Urumia. This guard has lately been increased by an officer and thirty men, since the Russian

occupation of Tabreez. With these twelve men Peter Ello has been able to exert an unheard of influence in the affairs of Urumia, and I am told was mainly instrumental in restoring order and protecting Persians from the blackmail levied by the "fedai." The awe inspired in the Persian mind at the sight of a Turkish soldier is quite extraordinary and, needless to say, very overrated. The majority of the inhabitants of Urumia are quite indifferent as to what form the Government takes, and only desire peace and quiet. The "fedai" that have dealt with them have been mere blackmailing brigands. Up to early in this spring Mukhteshem-es-Sultanah had been in charge of the Government at Urumia. Though nominally governing in the name of the Shah, he was a clever man and managed to balance both parties, and was fairly satisfactory. Then the Salmas enjuman, who are run by a Caucasian band, thought they would extend their power to Urumia and get a larger recruiting ground. They were aided in their design by the fact that Mukhteshem's guard of Persian Cossacks with which he had been keeping order in Urumia, was at this time taken from him to reinforce the Shah's forces round Tabreez. The result was that, after a small skirmish, the Salmas "fedai," under a certain Saïd-ul-Mamulik ousted Mukhteshem and seized the Government. Then commenced a reign of extortion and corruption which disgusted everyone and alienated all from the Nationalist cause, and set them to seek for means to protect themselves and their property.

This gave the Turks their opportunity, which Peter Ello and the various officers in charge of the military posts round, were not slow to seize. By one means or another, promises of protection from "fedai" blackmail or Kurd raiders, relief from paying rents and taxes to their Persian landlords and feudal chiefs, &c. They have managed to induce, I am informed, some 50 per cent. of the Urumia population, all the Sunni villages and a large proportion of the Christian villages in the plain to ask for and receive dakhilat from the Turks.

This dakhilat means that the Persian is given a paper by the Tajir Bashi, saying that so and so has on this day given dakhilat (or asked for and been accorded protection) by Turkey, and must not be molested. The peasants believe and insist that they have become Turkish subjects, and refuse to pay their rents, taxes, debts and arrears. In this they are backed up and encouraged by the Turks unofficially. The peasants pay for this dakhilat sums varying according to their position, from 5 piastres to £ T. 5. Turkish flags are also sold them. When this dakhilat has been given the people are left in peace, the various posts of Turkish soldiers which swarm round and over the plain, officially or unofficially, in uniform or in multi, but always armed, ensure that. Those villages that have not asked for dakhilat are threatened by the Turkish agents with raids from the Turkish Kurds. It is rumoured that this is all a swindle got up by officers and the Tajir Bashi, for their own benefit, as are also the false rumours about large bodies of troops waiting over the Turkish frontier. The presence of the Russian troops at Tabreez has had a reassuring effect in Urumia, so much so that the arrival of thirty Turkish soldiers to reinforce the consular guard at Urumia, had not the effect it would have had previously. The Turks are creeping very close to Urumia, on the 20th May they occupied Gootchi and the pass above, and now completely cut off Urumia from the north. On the 27th May, the day I left Urumia, it was reported that Peter Ello, with a Turkish officer and a detachment of troops with a flag, had gone down to the lake shore to plant it there. I mention this with reserve. In any case they seem to be quietly annexing the country in a bloodless fashion. No one in Urumia can make any resistance, as there is no government or troops. The actual governor appointed by the Shah is Mukhteshem-es-Sultanah. He is at Tabreez and has nominated a local man Wali as his gerant. This Wali complains to the Turks, and asks them why they are there, but they ignore him or only give frivolous and unofficial replies. At times the Turks pretend that they are there only to pacify the country and to protect foreigners and their protégés from the blackmail of the "fedai." But, on the other hand, by their action they plainly intimate that they have annexed it. They collect taxes, caution villagers not to pay rents, &c., to the Persians, have established customs posts in the plain and generally speaking taken charge. I was frequently stopped in the plain and cross-questioned by Turkish soldiers, and in one case by a customs official. I chaffed him as to what he was doing in Persia, and he said that the district was now Turkish, as their troops had occupied for two years and the Persians had not objected. Actually Wali is merely the representative of a phantom government. He has asked for instructions from Tehran, but, as the Turks have cut all communications, the chance of a quick reply is small.

It would seem as if the Turks intend to occupy Salmas and Urumia so long as the Russians remain at Tabreez, and thus give the Russians no excuse to come to these



districts to protect foreigners. The Turks would no doubt like to possess Urmia, although I do not think it was in their original scheme, as Tahir Pasha's commission only claimed the ground included in Dervish Pasha's line, and not the plain country, and up to quite recently they had not been pursuing an aggressive policy there. It is only since the Russian occupation of Tabreez that this policy of "dakhilat" and occupation has been pushed. These districts can never be of use to Turkey except from the tactical point of view (see my No. 7 of the 15th March, 1908), as from the configuration of the country they must be either Persian or Russian economically.

On the entry of the Russian troops to Tabreez it appears that strict orders were sent to Saïd-ul-Mamulik, the "fedai" leader at Urmia, that on no account was he to allow any bloodshed or disturbances to occur which might give the Russians an occasion to come to Urmia. The local Urmia constitutionalist party, under their leader, Meshted Begir, seized this opportunity to turn out Saïd-ul-Mamulik and his Salmas "fedai," who departed, without a fight, at night with an escort of Turkish troops. He wished for the Cossacks of the Russian consulate, and would have got them if he had agreed to hand over the archives of the frontier commission to be kept under seal in the Russian consulate. This he would not do, and so went off to Salmas under Turkish protection, taking the archives with him.

At the present moment things are quite quiet at Urmia. There are practically no "fedai," or none of any importance; the only interest is the Turkish occupation. All communications have been cut off by the Turks, and Peter Ello and the Turkish troops seem to be masters of the situation, while the Russian consul is grinding his teeth with vexation at not being able to get any word through to his embassy.

#### *Affairs at Salmas and Young Turk Revolutionary Band.*

In my No. 4 of the 31st March, 1909, I gave an account of the revolutionary organisations at Salmas and of the intentions of Halil Bey, the Young Turk leader, and his band. It appears that on his return to Salmas they were badly received by the Caucasians and their leader, Haider Khan Emi Oglu. I am told that the Caucasians accused the Turks of being interested intriguers, and these responded by calling the Caucasians blackmailing brigands: some scuffle occurred and the Turks returned to Turkey vowing vengeance. This took the form of setting on the Shekak Kurds of Kotur and Somai to attack Salmas. This occurred about the 12th and 14th April, and fifteen villages in Khoi and Salmas were pillaged, some twenty villagers killed, and the "fedai" and Caucasians badly beaten. They were obliged to sue for peace and help from Halil Bey, who imposed the following conditions: an apology from the Caucasians; Mukhteshem-es-Sultaneh to be handed over to the Turks; the "fedai" governors of Khoi, Salmas, and Urmia to be replaced by Simco (the notorious Shekak brigand of Kotur), Ibrahim Bey, and Meshted Begir respectively. Negotiations seem to have been going on when the Russian occupation of Tabreez altered everything. At present I understand that the "fedais" are being disbanded at Salmas. Halil and his band are at Van, though to-day there is a rumour that the Turkish consulate at Khoi has been bombarded by the "fedai," and two extra companies of Turkish infantry are being dispatched there from Serai and Chairay.

B. DICKSON, Captain, R.F.A.

[25492]

No. 66.

*Memorandum communicated by Count Benckendorff, July 5, 1909.*

MALGRÉ les mesures prises par le Gouvernement du Schah à la suite des conseils de la Russie et de l'Angleterre pour le rétablissement en Perse d'une forme de gouvernement représentatif, ainsi que pour la réalisation de réformes indispensables, le mouvement révolutionnaire dans le centre de l'Iran ne s'est pas apaisé.

Les démarches faites par les légations de Russie et de la Grande-Bretagne dans le but de prévenir tout mouvement contre la capitale de la part des Bakhtiars sous les ordres de Serdar Asad, un des khans de cette tribu, aussi bien que de la part des forces réunies des révolutionnaires de Kazvin et de Resht et des aventuriers caucasiens, ayant le Sipehdar, gouverneur du Ghilan, à leur tête, sont restées infructueuses. Les forces des adversaires du Gouvernement du Schah avancent graduellement sur Téhéran où se

trouvent des éléments qui leur sont favorables et où l'on peut constater dès aujourd'hui une forte agitation.

Ayant mûrement pesé l'état de choses résultant de la situation indiquée, le Gouvernement Impérial a établi que la politique russe en Perse doit continuer à être basée sur le principe de non-intervention absolue dans les affaires intérieures du pays, ainsi que dans la lutte entre le Schah et son peuple, quelle que soit l'issue de cette lutte, mais en même temps nous devons avoir en vue que l'entrée des Bakhtiars, et des révolutionnaires à Téhéran pourra exposer au plus grand péril les légations, les entreprises, et les sujets russes et étrangers, aussi bien que notre route Enzeli-Téhéran, d'autant plus que, d'après nos renseignements, la seule troupe persane organisée, c'est-à-dire, la Brigade de Cosaques, est extrêmement affaiblie et sera probablement impuissante à maintenir l'ordre à Téhéran.

Tout cela nous impose l'obligation morale de prendre toutes les mesures en notre pouvoir pour que les institutions et les sujets susindiqués puissent recevoir une protection effective et pour que les communications entre Téhéran et Enzeli restent libres en toute occurrence. Dans ce but, il a été décidé d'envoyer immédiatement de Bakou à Enzeli un détachement composé d'un régiment de Cosaques, d'un bataillon d'infanterie, et d'une batterie, ce détachement ne se portera pas au delà de Kazvin et veillera à l'établissement d'une libre communication entre ce point et la mer; son mouvement ultérieur dépendra du cours des événements et ne pourra avoir lieu que sur l'ordre de la légation Impériale à Téhéran en cas de grave péril dans le sens susindiqué. Le chef du détachement sera muni d'instructions catégoriques à l'effet que nos troupes auront pour but exclusif de protéger les légations, les entreprises, et les sujets russes et étrangers sans immixtion aucune dans les luttes politiques en Perse ou dans les affaires intérieures de ce pays en général.

Les troupes russes ne resteront en Perse que jusqu'au moment où la vie et la propriété des représentants diplomatiques, ainsi que des institutions et des sujets russes et étrangers, seront à l'abri de tout péril.

*Ambassade de Russie, Londres,  
le 4 juillet, 1909.*

[25348]

No. 67.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 5.)*

(No. 534.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Gulahek, July 5, 1909.*

MR. CHURCHILL and Major Stokes have now returned from their interview with Sardar Assad and Sipahdar. It appears that our joint communication has made but little impression on either nationalist leader. The Sipahdar has put forward some demands and has promised to await a reply until midday to-morrow. As soon as I have seen my Russian colleague I shall telegraph the text of these.

In the opinion of Major Stokes, yesterday's defeat has not discouraged the Kasvin force. Three fedais were admittedly torn in pieces by the Cossacks; and much of the odium for this act of brutality will, it is to be feared, fall on the Russian officer who was in command of these troops.

I cannot help fearing that the dispatch of troops may precipitate matters and exasperate the fedais against Russia. I trust that this danger is realised by the Russian Government.

Reference is to my telegram No. 533 of the 5th July.

[25407]

No. 68.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 5.)*

(No. 535.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Gulahek, July 5, 1909.*

MAJOR SYKES'S telegram No. 40 is dated the 2nd July, and is to the following effect:—

"To-day the governor-general, the Russian consul-general, and the principal members of the local Assembly met at this consulate-general. They succeeded in sinking their differences and became friends, and it was decided to disarm the populace.



This decision was ratified by the Assembly, and the governor-general then went back to the citadel. My Russian colleague co-operated in this settlement.

"Although the situation at the present time is without doubt promising, it must be borne in mind that Meshed will be inevitably influenced by the march of events in the capital."

The action of Major Sykes through all these troublous times appears to me to be worthy of commendation. Do you authorise me to convey to him your approval?

[25408]

No. 69.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 5.)*

(No. 536.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Tehran, July 5, 1909.

FOLLOWING is summary of letter of nationalists of Tehran to legation, mentioned in my telegram No. 532 [of 4th July], penultimate paragraph:—

"Constitutionalists of Persia regret that the march of the nationalist forces to Tehran, which is only to request fulfilment of Shah's promise, has been interpreted in certain quarters as an intention to molest foreigners. This interpretation is entirely unfounded. Foreign subjects are in no way exposed to danger from the nationalists. Persons and property of foreign subjects will be always safe, and whenever necessary will be protected by constitutionalists."

[25409]

No. 70.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 5.)*

(No. 537.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Gulahek, July 5, 1909.

THE Russian consul-general at Tabreez has been instructed by M. Sabline to arrange for the departure of Sattar and Bagher Khans in concert with Turkish consul-general. Their safety as far as Batum will be guaranteed by the Russian general, and, should they desire to return to Tabreez when the Russian troops have been withdrawn, a safe-conduct to Julfa will be given to them.

The Turkish consul-general will settle between himself and the Persian authorities the question of guarantees for their property.

[25410]

No. 71.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 5.)*

(No. 538.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Gulahek, July 5, 1909.

DEMANDS made by the Sipahdar, as foreshadowed in my telegram No. 534 of to-day's date, are the following:—

1. Both Sardar Assad and Sipahdar, each accompanied by 150 men, shall be allowed to enter the capital to debate on the points mentioned below, viz.:—
2. Neighbouring Powers' withdrawal of their forces from Persian soil.
3. Until meeting of the assembly takes place, Cabinet to be selected by local assemblies.
4. Such persons as the people distrust or regard as traitors to be expelled.
5. Such persons as without having formerly been in the army have lately been carrying arms to be deprived of them.
6. The army to be under the command, and at the orders, of the War Minister. (Evidently this is directed against the Russian officers.)
7. Minister of Telegraphs to be dismissed.
8. Provincial governors not to be elected unless the local assemblies approve their nomination.

Some of the above demands concern questions which must be dealt with by the Persian and Russian Governments, while others are unreasonable.

Nos. 4 and 7 alone would come within the letter or spirit of our joint programme.

and at the present time I am loath to advise the Shah beyond the limits of that document.

My Russian colleague and I have informed Sipahdar in reply that we have brought his demands to the notice of our Governments, but that unless he tells us that he would be content with the acceptance of Nos. 4 and 7, it would be useless for us to present them to the Shah, as the two above mentioned are the only ones we could urge His Majesty to accept.

[25395]

No. 72.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 5.)*

(No. 226.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Constantinople, July 5, 1909.

RUSSIAN troops in Persia.

With reference to my telegram No. 221 of the 2nd instant, His Majesty's consul-general at Bagdad is now informed that the Seyyid did not send his telegram further than Bagdad.

[25411]

No. 73.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 5.)*

(No. 227.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Constantinople, July 5, 1909.

RUSSIAN troops in Persia.

A written communication of an unofficial nature concerning the dispatch of Russian forces to the Tehran road was made to-day by the Russian chargé d'affaires to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

[25399]

No. 74.

*Mr. O'Beirne to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 5.)*

(No. 345. Confidential.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

St. Petersburg, July 5, 1909.

MY telegram No. 344, Confidential, of the 4th July.

I am informed privately that the Caucasus authorities have been instructed to delay the departure of the troops, when they are ready to embark at Baku, until St. Petersburg has been informed and twenty-four hours have been allowed to elapse in which final orders may be sent.

[24964]

No. 75.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.*

(No. 339.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, July 5, 1909.

I SHOULD be glad if you could ascertain whether it is true that the Moin-ut-Tujjar's oxide concessions have expired. Strick has received a report to this effect from his agent in Tehran, Mr. Brown, and has made an offer for the concessions by telegraph.

[25069]

No. 76.

*Sir Edward Grey to Mr. O'Beirne.*

(No. 828.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, July 5, 1909.

ADVANCE on Tehran and proposed dispatch of Russian troops.

I approve the language held by you to the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, as reported in your telegram No. 339 of the 3rd July.



[25492]

No. 77.

*Sir Edward Grey to Mr. O'Beirne.*

(No. 830.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

PERSIA. Dispatch of Russian force.

*Foreign Office, July 5, 1909.*

I have received a circular from Count Benckendorff on the subject of the action contemplated by Russia, and have replied that, if the situation is really so dangerous that an armed force must be sent, I am glad that its action is to be restricted by instructions so definite as those mentioned in the circular. I said that our own experience had shown us what difficulties and complications could arise from intervention of this kind, and that, that being the case, I felt that I ought to remark upon the risks involved by such a measure. I also said that, in my opinion, the excellent relations between ourselves and Russia had in no way suffered from this discussion as to the advisability of dispatching troops to Persia, and that whatever might occur it was my earnest wish to preserve intimate relations with M. Isvolsky.

[25563]

No. 78.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 6.)*

(No. 539.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Gulahek, July 6, 1909.*

I HAVE heard very confidentially from M. Sabline that he has received a message from His Majesty to the effect that he will seek asylum at the Russian Legation in the event of the royalist resistance breaking down.

[25566]

No. 79.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 6.)*

(No. 540.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Gulahek, July 6, 1909.*

DESPATCH of Russian troops.

M. Sabline has, he informs me, been instructed to notify the Persian Government and the nationalist party of the dispatch of Russian troops. His orders are to make it clear that this force is sent to Persia with the sole object of affording protection to the lives and property of Europeans, and that it will not advance beyond Kazvin unless foreign interests in Tehran are in danger.

[25567]

No. 80.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 6.)*

(No. 541.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Gulahek, July 6, 1909.*

IT is reported by the British and Russian consuls at Shiraz that the situation there is very serious.

I am in consultation with Mr. Bill on the measures to be taken, but I am inclined to think that the most salutary step would be to ensure the removal of the Kawami brothers.

Even if His Majesty's consul confirms this view I shall be unable to ask for the execution of this measure until the appointment of Nasr-ud-Dowleh as Russian consular agent is cancelled.

It appears to me from the telegrams received from the two consuls that at any moment a serious outbreak may take place.

[25573]

No. 81.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 6.)*

(No. 542.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Gulahek, July 6, 1909.*

M. ISVOLSKY appears, from Mr. O'Beirne's telegram No. 337, to overestimate very considerably the danger to which foreign subjects in the capital are exposed at the hands of the forces which are now marching on the capital.

Not for one moment do I believe that foreigners here are exposed to the risk of being massacred, and I was never informed by M. Sabline that he had reported in such sense to St. Petersburg. Neither the Kazvin nor the Bakhtiari forces have ever by their action justified such a fear.

If the Russian legation guard were to receive an increase of 200 or 300 troops, all possible danger either to Russian institutions or subjects would, I think, be obviated.

In the light of our recent communication to Serdar Assad and the Sipahdar they would be justified in considering the dispatch of a large force as nothing more nor less than intervention on His Majesty's behalf.

[25407]

No. 82.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.*

(No. 342.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Foreign Office, July 6, 1909.*

I APPROVE the action of His Majesty's consul-general at Meshed reported in your telegram No. 342 of yesterday's date.

[25395]

No. 83.

*Sir Edward Grey to Mr. O'Beirne.*

(No. 837.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Foreign Office, July 6, 1909.*

ATTITUDE of the priests at Kerbela and Nejef.

M. Isvolsky should be informed of the telegram from His Majesty's consul at Bagdad repeated in Sir G. Lowther's telegram No. 226 of the 5th July.

[25066]

No. 84.

*Foreign Office to India Office.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, July 6, 1909.*

WITH reference to your letter of the 30th ultimo relative to the exchange of posts between His Majesty's consuls at Mohammerah and Kermanshah, I am directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to transmit to you herewith copy of a telegram from His Majesty's Minister at Tehran, reporting that the Sheikh of Mohammerah has raised objections to this step.\*

I am to state that Sir E. Grey is disposed, subject to Viscount Morley's concurrence, to inform Sir G. Barclay that the reply returned by His Majesty's consul-general at Bushire to the Sheikh's representations, as well as his own instructions to Major Cox as to a further answer, have the approval of His Majesty's Government.

I have, &amp;c.

W. LANGLEY.



[23928]

No. 85.

*Foreign Office to Anglo-Persian Oil Company.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, July 6, 1909.*

I AM directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 25th ultimo on the subject of the agreement, signed on the 15th November, 1905, between Mr. D'Arcy and the Concessions Syndicate (Limited), on the one part and the Bakhtiari Khans on the other part.

I am to transmit to you herewith a copy of the translation of the document in question which is in the possession of this Office.\*

This translation was received, through His Majesty's legation at Tehran, from Mr. Preece himself, then His Majesty's consul-general at Isfahan. It is not authenticated in any special manner, and it appears to Sir E. Grey to be probable that it is identical with the translation already in the possession of your company.

Should this be the case, Sir E. Grey will be happy to instruct His Majesty's Minister at Tehran to forward for your information a copy of the authenticated translation said to exist in the archives of His Majesty's legation at Tehran, if that translation proves to have been made independently of the one herewith enclosed.

I am, &amp;c.

W. LANGLEY.

[25645]

No. 86.

*Colonial Office to Foreign Office.—(Received July 7.)*

Sir,

*Downing Street, July 6, 1909.*

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for the Colonies to transmit to you, for the information of Secretary Sir E. Grey, with reference to letter from the Colonial Office of the 1st July, a copy of a telegram from the Officer administering the Government of Canada on the subject of the fugitive offender, P. Ellow.

I am, &amp;c.

FRANCIS J. S. HOPWOOD.

Inclosure in No. 86.

*The Officer administering the Government of Canada to the Earl of Crewe.*

(Telegraphic.)

[Received July 3, 1909.]

YOUR telegram 30th June. Acting Attorney-General of British Columbia states that papers in hands of superintendent of provincial police describe Ellow as native of Turkey.

[25677]

No. 87.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 7.)*

(No. 543.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Gulahek, July 7, 1909.*

IDENTIC replies to my Russian colleague and myself have been returned by the two nationalist leaders. From these, after duly taking into account the distance which separates words from action in this country, it seems pretty clear that the two forces are not to be dissuaded by the two legations from their advance on the capital.

In their replies they ignore our statement of willingness to lend our support to their two demands concerning the Minister of Telegraphs and the "traitors" at the Palace. They declare that the constitution in its present form is useless, that traitors and reactionaries are at the head of affairs, that there is undue delay in promulgating the electoral law, and that steps have been taken in contradiction of the restored charter of the rights of the people of Persia.

\* Enclosure 3 in Mr. Grant Duff's No. 267, December 20, 1905.

(R.) "Therefore the constitutionalists consider it necessary to take measures in accordance with the exigencies of the day to destroy power of traitors, and the Persian nation, having confidence in the two Powers who have entered into agreement, considers itself free to demand and obtain its national rights."

I trust that, in spite of the uncompromising nature of this statement, the Russian Government may be persuaded to delay a few days at least before sending any larger force than a legation guard, in order that we may see what effect is produced by the announcement, which, as reported in my telegram No. 540 of the 6th July, my Russian colleague has made to the Persian Government. The result of this may be that the Tehran Nationalists will persuade the approaching forces to stop their advance. If, on the other hand, it has the effect of precipitating matters, no Russian force could arrive in time to be available for protection to foreigners at the time when the possibility of their being needed is least remote—that is to say, immediately after the entry of the fedai after a fight.

Since receiving the replies I have not seen my Russian colleague, but yesterday he told me that, according to information from a private source, Sunday's defeat had had a most dispiriting effect on Sipahdar.

Yesterday the electoral law was promulgated, and I am now urging Saad-ed-Dowleh to send copies of it forthwith to Sipahdar and Serdar Assad.

[25691]

No. 88.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 7.)*

(No. 544.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Gulahek, July 7, 1909.*

MY Russian colleague informs me that he is telegraphing to his Government that, although the electoral law has now been promulgated, he fears that, in view of existing circumstances, a wrong construction might be put upon an advance to the Shah by the Russian Government. It would, moreover, be difficult to ensure that the money should now be employed for the objects originally in view, and particularly for paying off the Shah's soldiers.

[25692]

No. 89.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 7.)*

(No. 545.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Gulahek, July 7, 1909.*

SITUATION at Shiraz, mentioned in my telegrams Nos. 520 and 541 of the 1st and 6th instant respectively.

His Majesty's Consul has been approached by Nasr-ed-Dowleh's elder brother, Kawam-ul-Mulk, who wishes to place his estates under British protection.

I have telegraphed to Mr. Bill, instructing him to refuse this request for protection, and I have also arranged with M. Sabline that, when there is a Government in Tehran less effete than the one now in power, we will both urge that Shiraz may be freed of the presence of both the brothers Kawam.

[25615]

No. 90.

*Mr. O'Beirne to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 7.)*

(No. 346.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*St. Petersburg, July 7, 1909.*

DISPATCH of Russian troops to Persia. Please refer to my telegram No. 345 of yesterday's date.

I have refrained from making any further suggestion to M. Isvolsky as to departure being delayed, as I felt that such action would be useless in view of the reports hitherto received here, which show that an intractable attitude has been assumed by the leaders of the advance on Tehran.

[1665]

R



[25681]

No. 91.

*Mr. O'Beirne to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 7.)*

(No. 347.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*St. Petersburg, July 7, 1909.*

YOUR telegram No. 803 of the 1st July.

I learn from Minister for Foreign Affairs that instructions have been sent to the Russian chargé d'affaires at Tehran to consult with Sir G. Barclay as to the question of the appointment of Nesr-ed-Dowleh as Russian consular agent at Shiraz, and to examine the question carefully.

[25689]

No. 92.

*Mr. O'Beirne to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 7.)*

(No. 348.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*St. Petersburg, July 7, 1909.*

MINISTER for Foreign Affairs assures me that his one desire is cordial co-operation with His Majesty's Government in Persian affairs, and he is much gratified by your declaration to the Russian Ambassador (see your telegram No. 830 of the 5th July).

[25690]

No. 93.

*Mr. O'Beirne to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 7.)*

(No. 349.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*St. Petersburg, July 7, 1909.*

MY telegram No. 347 of to-day.

In view of this reply I do not propose to act on your telegram No. 841 of to-day until information respecting the results of the conference between the two representatives at Tehran is received from Sir G. Barclay.

[25410]

No. 94.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.*

(No. 343.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Foreign Office, July 7, 1909.*

HAVE you not made some mistake in numbering the demands put forward by Sipahdar, enumerated in your telegram No. 538 of the 5th July? I make this suggestion, as it seems to me surprising that the dismissal of the Minister of Telegraphs should be recommended by you, seeing that during the recent negotiations respecting the Arabistan telegraph concession this official has been of service to His Majesty's Government, and has consistently maintained a friendly policy towards us.

[25567]

No. 95.

*Sir Edward Grey to Mr. O'Beirne.*

(No. 841.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Foreign Office, July 7, 1909.*

SITUATION at Shiraz (see your telegram No. 342 of the 4th July).

M. Isvolsky should be informed of Sir G. Barclay's telegram No. 541 of the 6th July, and you should at the same time inform him that His Majesty's Government hope that, in view of the present state of the situation, as reported by His Majesty's Minister at Tehran, he will return a favourable answer to your representations as early as he conveniently can.



[25791]

No. 97\*.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 8.)*

(No. 548.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Gulahek, July 8, 1909.*

I HAVE received the following telegram, No. 678, from His Majesty's consul-general at Bushire:—

"The communication reported in my immediately preceding telegram appears to be due to instructions received from the assembly at Tabreez, and the Nejef ulema. Seyyid Assadullah Nejefi, who accompanied the governor-general to Bushire, was the bearer of the instructions.

"Darya Beggi paid me an urgent visit in the same connection yesterday evening.

"He told me confidentially that the nationalists are contemplating a complete boycott of Russian goods and subjects, he had however induced the local anjuman to omit from the present communication any reference to it.

"The nationalist's chief object is to prevent the dispatch to Tehran of local customs receipts.

"Darya Beggi begged me to give him my opinion of the anjuman's communication, and asked me for the guidance of my personal advice as to what his attitude should be in his present difficult situation.

"I could not, I replied, return any official answer to the anjuman without previously communicating with you, but the action of this body was, in my personal opinion rash and unnecessary, besides being calculated to lead to those very results the avoidance of which was our general object.

"I pointed out to him that there is no element of reaction, nor possibility of reactionary opposition in the ports of the Persian Gulf; consequently, if the constitutionalists will wait to see the result of the endeavours now in progress in Tehran to give the constitution a fair chance, they can lose nothing by it. I would, therefore, personally advise the anjuman to defer taking any steps in the direction they proposed.

"I have sent a provisional verbal reply to the anjuman, pending your instructions, but I shall have to send a formal reply later. Darya Beggi promised also to advise them as I had suggested."

[25789]

No. 96.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 8.)*

(No. 546.)

(Telegraphic.) Decode.

*Tehran, July 8, 1909.*

FOLLOWING received from Bushire, No. 677, 5th July:—

I received communication from local anjuman, signed by five leading clericals and five principal merchants, saying that having regard to untoward incidents elsewhere it has become necessary that anjuman should forthwith assume control over Government Departments, including customs, whose receipts should be deposited with Imperial bank in name of nation, with the cognisance of selected member of anjuman. Anjuman undertakes to recognise British Government's claim on customs on production of documents, and arranges for payment to consul-general of such share of interest and principal as falls ratably to Bushire and Bunder Abbas. No mention made of Lingah, but I presume it will be included. They also undertake all obligations towards British, such as honourable treatment of British consulate and officials, and protection of lives and properties of British subjects will be scrupulously observed. In conclusion, they ask generally for co-operation of British authority in preservation of rights of Persian nation, and particularly for concurrence in proposed arrangements.

[25790]

No. 97.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 8.)*

(No. 547.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Gulahek, July 8, 1909.*

IN reply to your telegram No. 343 of the 6th July.

Mukhber-ed-Dowleh has always given proof of friendly feelings for His Majesty's Government, but his attitude is markedly reactionary.

When my Russian colleague and I privately suggested to His Majesty the persons whom we thought fit to form part of the Ministry we did not ask for any change in the telegraphs because this portfolio does not imply a seat in the Cabinet and because of the present Minister's experience of the administration of this department. His usefulness, moreover, in the negotiations then pending as to the Arabistan lines inclined me to wish for his retention.

He has, however, now earned violent unpopularity by interference with telegrams from one centre of the nationalist movement to another. Should the nationalist forces succeed in entering Tehran and he be in office, I am inclined to think that his chances of safety would be small. He would, moreover, I have reason to believe, be willing to resign his post and he knows that at any time he would be received at this legation.

The demands numbered 4 and 7 in my telegram No. 538 were, in my opinion, in the spirit of our programme of reforms. They alone appeared to me both to be reasonable and to admit of execution.

The traitors referred to are Amir Yang and other members of the Shah's entourage.

[25792]

No. 98.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 8.)*

(No. 549.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Gulahek, July 8, 1909.*

WITH reference to my telegrams Nos. 546 and 548 of the 8th July, I have telegraphed to His Majesty's consul-general at Bushire as follows:—

(No. 192.)

"I approve of the advice which you have given to the governor-general and of the reply which you gave to the local assembly. It would, however, be better to refrain from any official communication.

"I see no objection to the course which is proposed with regard to the customs receipts, on condition that money is withdrawn only with the consent of some person in whom you can place full confidence. You might in any case point out to the local



assembly that, whatever may happen, the monthly instalments will be entirely devoted to that purpose which the arrangement, concluded between the Persian Government and His Majesty's legation, acting on instructions from Government, prescribes.

"I trust that you will do all in your power to discourage the proposed boycott, a motion which would best serve to defeat its own ends.

"You should lose no opportunity to remind malcontents of the reiterated asseverations of the Russian Government that their troops are merely in temporary occupation of Persian territory. It is expected that a body of Russian troops will arrive almost immediately in Persia. They are destined exclusively for the protection of foreign interests from any changes which may arise from the advance on Tehran of the forces of Sipahdar and Sardar Assad.

"Unless these men are required in Tehran for the purpose mentioned they will not proceed beyond Kassim."

[25793]

No. 99.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 8.)*

(No. 550.)

(Telegraphic) P.

Gulahek, July 8, 1909.

THE foreign legations here have received a telegram from the Sipahdar in which our representations to him, his demands of the Shah, and our reply to these, are set forth.

"He states that if the Court, on the advice of the representatives, accepts the people's demands for constitutional Government, and takes steps to carry them into effect, his followers will remain loyal to the Shah, but that if the nation is forced to take strong action owing to the delay in taking the measures indicated, it will be justified before the world."

[25794]

No. 100.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 8.)*

(No. 551.)

(Telegraphic) P.

Gulahek, July 8, 1909.

WITH reference to my penultimate telegram.

I have received a report from His Majesty's consul-general at Bushire stating that it is believed that the local assembly has addressed a telegram for communication to the Cabinet to the ulema of Tehran. It is said to be to the following effect:—

"The people of the ports of the Persian Gulf will, if Russian troops do not immediately leave Persian territory, decline to recognise the central authorities at Tehran, and constitute themselves as an independent people, taking over control of all Government departments in the Gulf region."

A more serious aspect is given by this to the letter addressed to His Majesty's consul-general by the same body. I have therefore now instructed him to send a formal reply to the assembly. It is to the effect that "it would be clearly inexcusable for the anjuman to usurp the functions of Government now that the Shah has restored the constitution, and the work preparatory for the convocation of Parliament is being taken in hand. That, moreover, it is in the best interest of the integrity of Persia that the people of Bushire should refrain from a second secession from their allegiance, and should give their loyal support to the Central Government, and thus offer a fair opportunity for testing the value of the restored constitution.



[25775]

No. 101.

*Mr. O'Beirne to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 8.)*

(No. 350.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*St. Petersburg, July 8, 1909.*

I AM informed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that the military authorities have received no information to the effect that the Russian expedition has already left Baku. I think, nevertheless, that the troops are probably already on their way.

I have instructed His Majesty's consul at Batoum to report direct to you any information which he may gain on the subject from Baku.

[25795]

No. 102.

*Mr. O'Beirne to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 8.)*

(No. 352.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*St. Petersburg, July 8, 1909.*

PERSIA. Dispatch of Russian troops.

With reference to my telegram No. 350 of to-day's date, I have the honour to report that I learn from the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs that news has been received to the effect that a regiment of Cossacks reached Enzeli on the 7th July.

[25677]

No. 103.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.*

(No. 349.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Foreign Office, July 8, 1909.*

DISPATCH of Russian troops.

Please see your telegram No. 543 of the 7th July.

Armed intervention in Persia would involve considerable danger, and I have endeavoured to make the Russian Government understand this, pointing out to them at the same time that a crisis might be brought about in Tehran by the dispatch of a Russian force, and that in that case foreigners in Tehran who are not at this moment subject to any great risk might be exposed to some danger. In reply, the Russian Government have assured me that they believe the foreign legations to be exposed to a real danger at present, and that they feel that consequently a great responsibility devolves upon them, but they further declare that unless the legations and foreign establishments are in such a critical position after the arrival of the force at Kasvin, the latter will not proceed to Tehran. I shall watch events carefully and keep in communication with the Russian Government on the subject, so as to be able to intervene later, if necessary, with a view to influencing their policy, if possible, in favour of adherence to non-intervention, and you should also endeavour to keep in close touch with your Russian colleague. Meanwhile, it seems to me that any further representations on the subject are at present unnecessary.

[25799]

No. 104.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.*

(No. 353.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Foreign Office, July 8, 1909*

ZIL-ES-SULTAN.

Please see my telegram No. 322 of the 1st July.

Akbar Mirza has written to Preece informing him that the Zil starts to-morrow for Vienna from Ostend, where he is at this moment.

It is improbable, according to Preece, that the Zil intends at present returning to Persia, and he has done his best to persuade him not to do so.

[25796]

No. 102<sup>a</sup>.*Consul Stevens to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 8.)*

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Batoum, July 8, 1909.*

I HEAR from His Majesty's vice-consul at Baku that it is reported there that on the 6th July two companies of sappers, one regiment of Cossacks, and one field battery embarked there for Enzeli.



[25692]

No. 105.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.*

(No. 354.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Foreign Office, July 8, 1909.*

I APPROVE your action with regard to Karam-ul-Mulk's request as reported in your telegram No. 545 of the 7th July.

[25800]

No. 106.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.*

(No. 395.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Foreign Office, July 8, 1909.*

THE Russian Ambassador to-day made a communication, of which the following is a précis:—

"All recent telegrams show that Turks are increasing their forces at Urumia, occupying Persian villages as far as lake, and using the violence of the Kurds as a pretext for inducing the population to apply for Turkish nationality. Turkish consul at Dilman has attacked Persian nationalists, and driven them in flight to Tabreez.

"This interference appears to Russian Government inadmissible, in view of obligations as to maintenance of Persian integrity imposed by Anglo-Russian agreement and previous conventions.

"Russian Government accordingly propose to instruct Russian chargé d'affaires at Constantinople to demand withdrawal of Turkish troops from Persian territory, and dispatch of formal instructions to Turkish consuls in Urumia district not to interfere in Persian affairs nor to grant Turkish nationality to the local population.

"They consider our support to this representation indispensable, and suggest that you should enter into preliminary exchange of views with Russian chargé d'affaires, with a view to make a communication as far as possible identic.

"They mention, as arguments for use at Sublime Porte, repeated assurances of Turkish Government that they intend no aggression nor interference in Persia, and their frequent promises to withdraw their troops from what is indisputably Persian territory."

I concur in the proposal made by the Russian Government, and you are authorised to act accordingly.

In making the representation to the Porte you should especially draw their attention to the impropriety of making use of the action of the Kurds as a pretext for forcing the local population to adopt Turkish nationality.

[25615]

No. 107.

*Sir Edward Grey to Mr. O'Beirne.*

(No. 844.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Foreign Office, July 8, 1909.*

ADVANCE on Tehran and dispatch of Russian troops.

I agree that any further representations on the subject would be of no avail at present (see your telegram No. 346 of the 7th July).

[25690]

No. 108.

*Sir Edward Grey to Mr. O'Beirne.*

(No. 858.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Foreign Office, July 8, 1909.*

SITUATION at Shiraz.

I agree that action should be deferred pending receipt of report from Sir G. Barclay of his conference with the Russian chargé d'affaires (see your telegram No. 349 of the 7th July).

[25780]

No. 109.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Cartwright.*

(No. 261.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Foreign Office, July 8, 1909.*

IF the Zil-es-Sultan were to return to Persia at this moment there is a danger that some section of the population might put him forward as a candidate for the throne; in this case our guarantees would, of course, no longer hold good, and the situation would be greatly complicated. The Russian Government accordingly request that you may be instructed to join your Russian colleague in persuading the Zil, who they say is now in Vienna, not to return to Persia until the present acute crisis is at an end. You are authorised to act in concert with your Russian colleague as desired. So long as the crisis in Tehran continues our attitude with regard to the Zil's return remains unchanged, but we hope that a state of order and security may eventually be restored in Southern Persia, where British trade is at present at a standstill, by the appointment of the Zil as Governor of Fars.

[25800]

No. 110.

*Memorandum communicated by Count Benckendorff, July 8, 1909.*

TOUTES les plus récentes informations télégraphiques portent que les Turcs introduisent à Ourmiah un nombre de troupes de plus en plus considérable, occupent des villages incontestablement persans, jusqu'au lac, et profitent des violences des Kourdes pour induire la population à demander la sujétion turque. A Dinnan le consul de Turquie a attaqué les Nationalistes persans, les obligeant à s'enfuir à Tabreez.

En rapprochant ces faits de la proposition que Turkan Pacha a faite au Gouvernement Impérial de rappeler la garde consulaire russe d'Ourmiah et de confier en ce district la garde des consulats russes aux forces militaires turques, force est de conclure que les agents et officiers turcs à Ourmiah n'agissent pas à l'insu de leur Gouvernement. Il faudrait croire que le Gouvernement turc, continuant en cette partie de la Perse sa politique traditionnelle, aurait décidé de quitter son attitude de neutralité par rapport aux affaires en Perse et d'y prendre une part active—ingérence qui ne nous paraît pas admissible.

D'un côté, l'importance stratégique du district d'Ourmiah pour la frontière russe du Caucase, de l'autre les obligations contractées par la Russie et l'Angleterre par la convention de 1907 concernant l'intégrité du territoire persan, obligent le Gouvernement Impérial à porter une attention spécialement sérieuse sur la politique turque dans la province persane en question.

Nous pensons qu'une protestation résolue auprès du Gouvernement ottoman est devenue indispensable. Nous comptons charger M. Svetchine de demander le rappel des troupes turques du territoire persan et d'exiger que des instructions formelles soient expédiées aux agents consulaires turcs [dans le district d'Ourmiah, de s'abstenir d'ingérence dans les affaires persanes et ne pas accorder la sujétion turque à la population locale.

Mais pour que cette démarche ait le succès désirable l'appui énergique de l'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre à Constantinople nous paraît indispensable—appui exprimé le plus possible en mêmes termes.

Veuillez en conférer avec Sir Edward Grey, lui représenter la sérieuse gravité de cette affaire et me télégraphier sa réponse.

Dans notre idée, Sir Gerard Lowther et M. Svetchine pourraient entamer un échange de vues préalable.

Les arguments qui pourraient fournir une base à cette démarche commune sont les assurances réitérées de la Porte qu'elle ne poursuit en Perse aucune visée de conquêtes et n'a aucune intention de s'ingérer dans les affaires persanes, ainsi que les promesses réitérées de retirer ses troupes de la zone contestée.

*Ambassade de Russie, Londres,  
le 8 juillet, 1909.*



[25884]

No. 111.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 9.)*

(No. 552.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Gulahek, July 8, 1909.

I LEARN from M. Sabline that 500 Cossacks, a battery of four guns, some sappers, and one battalion of infantry constitute the detachment being sent to Engeli.

The orders to the officer in command, which he has read to me, specifically define the purposes which this force is destined to serve in Persia.

Yesterday morning some part of these troops reached Engeli.

A vehement protest has been made by the Resht Anjuman to the foreign legations threatening that a boycott of Russian goods will be imposed.

[25913]

No. 112.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 9.)*

(No. 553.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Gulahek, July 9, 1909.

HORMUZ oxide.

I can ascertain nothing in reply to your telegram No. 339 of the 5th July from the Minister for Foreign Affairs, who is at present seriously ill.

I am at present inclined to suspect that the story is an attempt to blackmail Moin-ut-Tujjar. I do not believe his concession for Hormuz has expired, in which case any effort on our part towards securing this concession would do no good, and would only serve to offend Moin.

[25914]

No. 113.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 9.)*

(No. 554.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Gulahek, July 9, 1909.

IMPERIAL commissioner of oil company.

I see no objection to the appointment of Mr. Kihahji, proposed in your telegram No. 326 of the 3rd July, and will ask it of the Minister for Foreign Affairs as soon as he is well enough to attend to business.

[25904]

No. 114.

*Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 9.)*

(No. 143.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Vienna, July 9, 1909.

ZIL-ES-SULTAN.

On receipt of your telegrams Nos. 261 and 262 of yesterday's date, I went to see the Russian Ambassador. His Excellency has as yet received no instructions as to acting with me in endeavouring to dissuade Zil-es-Sultan from continuing his journey to Persia. The Russian Ambassador has telegraphed for instructions as to how he should act should Zil-es-Sultan come to Vienna. He had not any idea that the latter was about to arrive here.

If I can find Zil-es-Sultan may I act alone, should the Russian Ambassador not receive a reply in time?

[25792]

No. 115.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.*

(No. 358.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, July 9, 1909.

SITUATION at Bushire.

I approve language of Major Cox and your instructions to him, as reported in your telegrams Nos. 548, 549, and 551 of the 8th instant.

[25794]

No. 116.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.*

(No. 359.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, July 9, 1909.

SITUATION at Bushire.

With reference to the action of the local assembly at Bushire, as reported in your telegram No. 551 of the 8th July, it might with advantage be pointed out on a suitable occasion that the present crisis is due to the revolutionaries of Kasvin and the Bakhtiari having threatened the capital at the moment when the constitution had been re-established, and the withdrawal of the Russian troops from Tabreez had actually begun.

[25904]

No. 117.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Cartwright.*

(No. 263.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, July 9, 1909.

ZIL-ES-SULTAN.

In reply to your telegram No. 143 of the 9th July, you should not approach the Zil-es-Sultan until your Russian colleague has received instructions from his Government, with whom the suggestion originated.

[26013]

No. 118.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 10.)*

(No. 555.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Tehran, July 10, 1909.

RUSSIAN chargé d'affaires informs me that Russian detachment left Resht this morning.

[26023]

No. 119.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 10.)*

(No. 556.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Gulahek, July 10, 1909.

SARDAR ASSAD and Sipahdar have addressed telegrams to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, who is attending to urgent business in spite of doctors' orders to the contrary. The former is the less uncompromising of the two telegrams.

Saad-ed-Dowleh has returned a reply to the effect that he is willing to receive the two leaders' delegates and to discuss any legitimate proposals which may tend towards a settlement. He has at the same time made it clear that those of their demands which are evidently unconstitutional cannot be entertained by the Shah's Government.

[26024]

No. 120.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 10.)*

(No. 557.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Gulahek, July 10, 1909.

PERSONS in Shiraz have received a telegram from Constantinople to the effect that the Ulema of Nejef intend to come to Persia to offer resistance to the Russian troops.

Samsam at Ispahan has received another telegram from the same place which states that the independence of Persia is the first object of the Constitution. It goes on to complain of foreign intervention and, urging that matters at Tehran should speedily be brought to a conclusion, extorts Samsam to "warn the tribes that there is grave danger threatening Islam and Persia."



[25794]

No. 121.

*Sir Edward Grey to Mr. O'Beirne.*

(No. 872.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Foreign Office, July 10, 1909.*

SITUATION at Bushire.

M. Isvolsky should be informed of the substance of Tehran telegram No. 551 and my telegram No. 359 to Sir G. Barclay of the 8th and 9th instant respectively.

[26025]

No. 122.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 11.)*

(No. 558.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Gulahek, July 11, 1909.*

I AM telegraphing to Major Ramsay at Bagdad to the following effect:—

Can you inform me as to the truth of a report of a secret nature which has reached me that the Ulema have started for Persia from Nejef to offer resistance to the Russians.

[26026]

No. 123.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 11.)*

(No. 559.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Gulahek, July 11, 1909.*

FOLLOWING is telegram No. 63 of yesterday's date from His Majesty's acting consul at Shiraz:—

"I learn that there is danger, not, however, immediate, that the Lari Seyyid will bring a force to Shiraz at the invitation of the governor-general to attack Kawam. The Seyyid, who is known to be of an irresponsible and violent character, would, it is greatly to be feared, show violence to the Russian consul should he succeed in reaching Shiraz. My Russian colleague is talking of asking for an increase of his Cossack guard. Could you let me know beforehand whether, in case of emergency, I could expect a reinforcement from Bushire if the Seyyid were to advance without giving previous warning."

[26028]

No. 124.

*Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 11.)*

(No. 144.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Vienna, July 11, 1909.*

YOUR telegram No. 261 of the 8th July: Zil-es-Sultan.

The Russian Ambassador and I had an interview this morning with the Zil-es-Sultan, who arrived in Vienna last night. We succeeded, after a protracted discussion, in persuading the Prince not to leave Vienna for a few days, in order that we might have time to refer to our Governments for instructions.

The Prince declared that the reason for his journey to Persia was that the Shah had appealed to him to help to save the dynasty, and had commanded him by telegraph to return. He denied any wish to cause political disturbances; he was not a revolutionist, and had never revolted against the central Government. If he had wished to cause trouble he would have entered Persia by Bagdad, for the southern tribes there had sent to him to say they would accept him as their leader. The Anglo-Russian understanding had his full approval; the rival efforts of the two Powers had formerly been a danger to Persia, and the agreement would be her salvation. He had the integrity of Persia at heart, though he was not anti-Russian. He begged that he might be permitted to resume his journey to Persia, where it was his duty to be at the moment of crisis.

We informed the Zil-es-Sultan that no animosity was entertained against him by our Governments. The Prince seemed to be pleased by the assurance which the Russian Ambassador gave him that the feelings of the Russian Government towards

[26027]

No. 123\*.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 11.)*

(No. 560.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Gulahek, July 11, 1909.*

PLEASE see my immediately preceding telegram repeating Mr. Bill's No. 63.

I have replied as follows, No. 45:—

"Please inform governor-general that he will be held personally responsible for any harm which may result to British interests should the Lari Seyyid come to Shiraz on his Excellency's invitation, and create disturbances there. I am urging the Persian Government to send instructions to governor-general to spare no effort to deter the seyid from taking this step.

"I shall also ask M. Sabline to telegraph similar instructions to your Russian colleague.

"I have repeated the first paragraph of your telegram No. 63 to His Majesty's consul-general at Bushire, and am communicating with him as to the possibility of sending you a reinforcement from Bushire in case of emergency. You should inform him what force would be required."



him were friendly. We told him it was in his own interest that we were giving him this advice. It would be a matter of regret to us if he were to take some foolish action at present which would compromise his future utility. He might, we said, render yet great services to his country in circumstances which might arise later. He would inevitably pass into the hands of the revolutionists if he rejected the advice of the two Powers and went to Persia now; and Russia and England would then be obliged to discontinue their support to him.

The Prince at last consented not to leave Vienna for the present. He is anxious to know whether he can continue his journey or not, and the Russian Ambassador has therefore asked his Government to send as early a reply as possible to his telegram.

[26029]

No. 125.

*Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 11.)*

(No. 145. Confidential.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Vienna, July 11, 1909.

MY telegram No. 144 of to-day: Zil-es-Sultan.

I learn from the chief adviser of His Highness that life in Europe is boring to the Prince, and he also wishes to return to Persia for financial reasons, which influence him largely.

The Zil-es-Sultan made a complaint to me that the undertaking which the British Government gave to protect his property had not been fulfilled by them.

The Prince declared that the revolutionists had no leaders who were capable of creating a stable Government; they could only upset things. They were not, I gathered from the Prince and his advisers, so very numerous, but their efforts to upset the Shah met with the sympathy of many persons, for the royal entourage could be no longer tolerated.

I was told by the Prince's adviser that a very formidable religious rising was likely to take place against the Russian troops if they remained too long in the interior of Persia, and especially if they took up the defence of the hated Palace régime.

The Zil-es-Sultan said to me that Persia needs administrative improvement rather than political changes. The administration might be reorganised, province by province, by an Anglo-Russian temporary board of financial advisers.

The conversations which I had with the Zil-es-Sultan and his adviser left on my mind the impression that they consider the Prince to be the only man who is capable of ruling Persia, perhaps as Regent.

[26073]

No. 126.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 12.)*

(No. 520.)

Sir,

Therapia, July 7, 1909.

I HAVE the honour to report that there appeared in the "Tanin" of the 3rd July a long article by Ismail Hakki, of Bagdad, on the eastern boundaries of Turkey in Asia, containing certain points which may be of interest.

Ismail Hakki doubts whether the Russian troops will be withdrawn from Persia, although perhaps the English Government believes that they will. Defeated in her attempt to expand eastwards, Russia is seeking an outlet in Azerbaijan, and perhaps to-morrow she will turn in another direction, which might be unpleasant for Turkey. The position is very critical from the Turkish point of view. England is following a careless policy with incomprehensible trust. Turkey had formerly one neighbour on the east; now there is the danger of there being two.

If England imitates Russia nothing can be said. Of course the present Liberal Cabinet has no such intention. It wants to facilitate rather than hinder the task of the Persian patriots; but to fulfil this desire, and to save Northern Persia from the "heavy nightmare of interference," the Russo-English agreement should be limited to the economic sphere. On the eastern frontier of Turkey many difficult questions are gathering. "Let us see," he concludes, "what statesman will cut the knot and save our eastern frontier from the storm."

I have, &amp;c.

GERARD LOWTHER.



[26080]

No. 127.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 12.)*

(No. 527.)

Sir,

*Therapia, July 7, 1909.*

I HAVE the honour to confirm my telegram No. 227 of the 5th July, reporting that the Russian Embassy here had made a written communication to the Porte concerning the dispatch of a Russian force to occupy the Resht-Kasvin section of the Tehran road.

As is perhaps natural, an increasing interest has recently been taken by governing circles here in the present developments in Persia. The Persian anjuman here is in close touch with the Committee of Union and Progress, and, as you are aware, Ahmed Riza Bey, President of the Chamber, has been requested by the Persian Nationalists to interest himself in their struggle. He has declared his readiness to do all in his power to support the constitutional cause in Persia. As already explained, his view and that of the Young Turks is that His Majesty's Government has been deceived by the Russians, whose occupation of Tabreez, &c., will be permanent, unless Turkey comes to the rescue by dispatching troops to places in Azerbaijan with the idea of withdrawing them only when the Russian forces retire. This explains the recent increase of Turkish forces at Urumia, Dilman, and Khoi.

Since the deposition of Abdul Hamid, the Turkish view has been that a similar treatment should be meted out to Mohammed Ali Shah, whether he granted a constitution or not, and, according to Turks, this is the idea underlying the present march of the Bakhtiari, &c., on Tehran. There would seem little doubt that the Young Turks have advised the Persians to imitate the action of Mahmoud Shevket Pasha in marching on Constantinople, and deposing a Sovereign whose professed constitutional tendencies were mistrusted by the Liberal leaders, while it is commonly stated that the intention is to get rid of the Kajar dynasty and replace it by a Bakhtiari or Sefavi ruler, if the latter can be found. The Russian Embassy here has apparently looked with complacency on the movement of Turkish troops to Urumia, &c.

I have, &amp;c.

GERARD LOWTHER.

[26285]

No. 128.

*India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received July 12.)*

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Viscount Morley, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, with reference to previous letter, copy of a telegram to the Viceroy, dated the 1st July, regarding Abu Musa oxide.

*India Office, July 10, 1909.*

Inclosure in No. 128.

*Viscount Morley to Government of India.*

(Telegraphic.) P.

*India Office, July 1, 1909.*

OXIDE on Abu Musa. See my telegram dated the 28th May, 1909. The German Government were informed by a note from the Foreign Office, dated the 14th ultimo (a copy of which was enclosed with letter of the 18th ultimo from Secretary, Political Department, India Office), that the mining operations of which complaint was made "have now ceased," and that they were for the extraction, as a sample for a firm interested in the trade, of a few hundred tons of oxide. Oral inquiry has now been made by German Embassy whether the meaning of this was that there would be no shipment of the oxide; otherwise, it was stated, German Government protested against shipment, and requested that it might be stopped. It was explained in reply that the meaning of the words in question was, not that shipments had been stopped, but that mining operations had ceased. Shipment, it was added, had presumably taken place already. I request that facts may be reported.

[26343]

No. 129.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 12.)*

(No. 561.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Gulahek, July 12, 1909.*

I HAVE received the following telegram No. 26 of to-day's date from His Majesty's consul at Kerman:—

"A report has reached me from Dahany, emanating from Redkhoda Kemal Khan Narui, who has recently arrived there, to the effect that Baluchis are making preparations to set out against Kerman and Bam at the end of the present Mahomedan month. He talks of a letter, of which he promises to produce the original, sent lately to the Baluchi chiefs by the Russian consul at Seistan, and promising them a money payment if they will conclude an agreement with Russia. He considers these intrigues to be the sole cause of the present unrest in Baluchistan.

"It is certain that if the Baluchis reach Bam the Afshars will steal a march on them and seize Kerman. The tribes will be completely out of hand, and everyone here will be in serious danger."

[26344]

No. 130.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 12.)*

(No. 562.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Gulahek, July 12, 1909.*

THE invitation issued by the Persian Government to the nationalist leaders to send delegates for purposes of negotiation (please see my telegram No. 556 of the 10th July), afforded a further opportunity for my Russian colleague and myself to use our influence towards bringing about a settlement between the rival parties.

The Shah has secretly promised us that, if the nationalist forces will undertake to abandon hostilities and disperse, he will expel from the palace the persons to whom they take objection. His Majesty, fearing that in the event of the conditional promise becoming known, Amir Jang's followers would desert him, requested us to observe secrecy on this point. Consequently we have made no mention of it to the popular leaders. We have nevertheless assured them that it is our firm belief that the Shah would take into consideration such of their demands as were of a constitutional character, provided that they for their part send delegates and gave the required undertaking.

[26336]

No. 131.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 12.)*

(No. 563.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Tehran, July 12, 1909.*

CRISIS in Tehran.

Since the 10th July there has been fighting about 14 miles west of the town, in which Sipahdar's and Sardar Assad's forces were both engaged on Nationalist side, while on the Royalist side was the Bakhtian Khan Amir Mufakham, with a small following. I hear that the fight is likely to continue, and is at present indecisive. I have no particulars.

[26339]

No. 132.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 12.)*

(No. 564.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Gulahek, July 12, 1909.*

PLEASE see my telegram No. 561 of to-day.

I propose, subject to your approval, to instruct His Majesty's consul at Seistan, if possible to convey to the Baluchis a warning to the effect that intervention would probably result from the disorders which they appear to contemplate, and to make it

[1665]

U



clear to them that Russia has been obliged to send troops into Persia by the revolutionary movements which have taken place.

I would suggest that, if these instructions meet with your approval, the Government of India might, if the Resident at Chogai is in touch with the Persian Baluchis, instruct him in a similar sense.

[26340]

No. 133.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 12.)*

(No. 565.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Gulahek, July 12, 1909.

THE actual position at Shiraz is, I understand, that Assaf-ed-Dowleh has, in order to overawe the Kawamis, called in the Kashgais and also Seyyid Hussein Lari. The Kawami brothers, on the other hand, could, when they wish, call in the neighbouring Arabs as their partisans.

As far as I know the Zil-es-Sultan is alone capable of effectively coping with the situation thus created, but the present crisis might be tided over by the mere announcement of his appointment to the Governorship-General of Fars. I am, therefore, in concert with my Russian colleague, urging the Persian Government immediately to make an announcement to this effect.

We shall not for the present press for the removal of the Kawami brothers as we had intended, as further information points to such a course being undesirable.

[26024]

No. 134.

*Sir Edward Grey to Mr. O'Beirne.*

(No. 882.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Foreign Office, July 12, 1909.

SIR G. BARCLAY'S telegram No. 557 of the 10th July: Ulemas of Nejef. Inform Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

[26416]

No. 135.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 13.)*

(No. 566.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Gulahek, July 13, 1909.

A COMMUNICATION by telephone, which has since been cut, informs me that Tehran was entered by the fedai this morning, and possession was taken of the town. Order reigns, as far as it is possible to ascertain, but I have instructed Major Stokes and Mr. Churchill to go into the town and verify this.

A wish has already been evinced by my Russian colleague to bring the cavalry which is at present in the neighbourhood of Kazvin, on to Tehran.

[26487]

No. 136.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 13.)*

(No. 567.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Gulahek, July 13, 1909.

THE appointment of Zil-es-Sultan as governor-general of Shiraz is announced. His son Sardar Masoud will act as his deputy pending His Imperial Highness's return to Persia.

We have made it quite clear to Saad-ed-Dowleh that the Zil's return was not at present desirable, and that we only wished for the announcement of His Highness's appointment, and the departure of his deputy, to replace Asaf-ed-Dowleh.

A telegram has been dispatched by the Minister for Foreign Affairs to Zil-es-Sultan, stating that his appointment has been announced, and that Sardar Masoud is immediately proceeding to Shiraz to act in his place.

Reference is to my telegram No. 565 of the 12th July.

[26493]

No. 137.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 13.)*

(No. 568.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Gulahek, July 13, 1909.

THE Baharistan and northern quarters of Tehran are now in the hands of the Nationalists. The Royalist forces still hold the Cossack barracks and the Gun Square, where heavy firing is in progress. There has been a complete absence of looting, and, beyond what may possibly result from stray bullets, no danger to European subjects is to be feared.

The Nationalist forces, I understand, evaded the Royalist troops and made their entry into Tehran practically without opposition.

This morning M. Sabline received most alarmist reports from town. He is, however, at present reassured. We have received the most satisfactory assurances as to the safety of foreign interests from the nationalist leaders.

[26494]

No. 138.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 13.)*

(No. 569.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Gulahek, July 13, 1909.

COLONEL LIAKHOW has, I understand, been urging the Russian chargé d'affaires to order the Russian troops at Kazvin to proceed towards Tehran. The above is secret.

M. Sabline assures me that he is determined not to adopt this measure unless extreme need should warrant it.

[26495]

No. 139.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 13.)*

(No. 570.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Gulahek, July 13, 1909.

I LEARN from Mr. Churchill, who has now returned from town, that desultory street fighting in the neighbourhood of the Gun Square still continues.

The town is otherwise quiet, both sides remaining, in general, on the defensive. The Nationalists are in occupation of the European and Medjliss quarters, and the Royalists hold the Cossack barracks as their main position, with a small force in the Gun Square.

I understand from Mr. Churchill that Sardar Assad hopes that the Shah will shortly take bast, and thus bring about a speedy *dénouement*, but M. Sabline tells me that he hears that His Majesty has some 3,000 men and sixteen guns at Sultaneabad, and that he intends to hold out there.

[26496]

No. 140.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 13.)*

(No. 571.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Gulahek, July 13, 1909.

SHIRAZ situation.

His Majesty's consul-general at Bushire could send twenty-five men from his escort, and admiral could dispatch a Maxim party of five or six men under one officer, should imminence of danger at Shiraz command this step. War-ship will remain temporarily off Bushire.

It is possible that Seyyid Hussein Lari will abandon the idea of an advance upon the announcement of the Zil-es-Sultan's appointment, and that a general improvement of the situation will result; yet I should be glad of your permission to order dispatch of these reinforcements in case of emergency.

I trust, however, that this emergency is remote, and have consequently refrained from mentioning the proposed step to my Russian colleague.



[26423]

No. 141.

*Consul Stevens to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 13.)*

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Batoum, July 13, 1909.*

RUSSIAN troops for Persia.

A further embarkation of troops (probably two infantry battalions) took place secretly at Baku yesterday.

Vice-consul reports that he is trying to ascertain the distinguishing marks of and particulars concerning these two battalions.

[26340]

No. 142.

*Sir Edward Grey to Mr. O'Beirne.*

(No. 887.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Foreign Office, July 13, 1909.*

YOU should suggest to Minister for Foreign Affairs, in connection with Zil-es-Sultan's return to Persia, that, if he is appointed governor-general of Fars, he might return via Bushire to Shiraz, which would take him about six weeks.

You should also communicate to M. Isvolsky substance of telegram No. 565 of the 12th July from Tehran.

[26416]

No. 143.

*Sir Edward Grey to Mr. O'Beirne.*

(No. 889.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Foreign Office, July 13, 1909.*

I SPOKE to the Russian Ambassador to-day about Sir G. Barclay's telegram reporting on the situation, and about the information which has reached us that more Russian troops have been embarked at Baku for Persia.

I told his Excellency that the reports which we had received did not indicate the existence anywhere of serious danger to foreign lives and property, and pointed out how difficult it was to show the necessity of sending such large numbers of troops for their protection. We heard that at Tehran order was not disturbed.

Mistrust of the Shah, I said, was the cause of all the disturbances, and if in present circumstances troops were sent to Tehran severe fighting might ensue, the object of which would be simply to keep the Shah on the throne. In consequence, he would be disowned by all the rest of Persia, and his Government regarded as Russian and foreign. Persia would then break up, and the situation of all of us become very difficult and embarrassing.

Count Benckendorff objected that if the force employed were comparatively large it would be more likely to be able to withdraw after the complete attainment of its object; but I fear that an impression of military occupation is already being produced by the great size of the force, and that widespread disturbances may result from the fanatical feeling which it is exciting amongst the ulema.

M. Isvolsky, as I reminded Count Benckendorff, had already declared against intervention by the Russian forces in the internal affairs of Persia. If this principle was maintained, so long as there was no danger to foreigners, there would be no reason for the troops to advance to Tehran.

[26484]

No. 144.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.*

(No. 365.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Foreign Office, July 13, 1909.*

DANGER of disturbances at Shiraz (see your telegrams Nos. 559 and 560 of the 11th July).

We are asking that instructions may be sent by Admiralty to commander of His Majesty's ship "Sphinx" to do anything required by Major Cox, should the latter,

after consulting His Majesty's consul at Shiraz and you, ask for protection. The two consuls should, however, do nothing without instructions from you.

We have heard from Admiralty that His Majesty's consul at Shiraz has asked that, if necessary, sepoys who are to be sent should be accompanied by a naval Maxim detachment.

[24876]

No. 145.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.*

(No. 202.)

Sir,

*Foreign Office, July 13, 1909.*

THE Turkish Ambassador handed to Sir C. Hardinge on the 30th ultimo a communication, copy of which is enclosed,\* relative to the situation created at Urumia by the simultaneous presence there of Turkish and Russian troops. In communicating this document, which contains instructions addressed by the Turkish Government to their Ambassador at St. Petersburg, Tewfik Pasha observed that he did so for the information of His Majesty's Government.

Sir C. Hardinge informed his Excellency that the question is one which does not concern His Majesty's Government, except in so far as they are interested in the maintenance of tranquillity in Persia, and of the integrity of that country. He thanked Tewfik Pasha, however, for the information and assurances contained in the concluding sentences of the communication, and told him that your Excellency had received instructions to make representations respecting the action of the Turkish consul-general at Tabreez.

At the time when the conversation here recorded took place I was unaware of the presence of any Russian troops at Urumia, but I have since received, through His Majesty's Minister at Tehran, a despatch from His Majesty's consul-general at Tabreez, reporting that forty Russian infantrymen have been sent there for the protection of the Russian vice-consulate and of Russian and other foreign subjects.

These are no doubt the troops to which the communication refers.

I am, &amp;c.

E. GREY.

[26484]

No. 146.

*Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received July 13.)*

Sir,

*Admiralty, July 13, 1909.*

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, decipher of a telegram, dated the 12th instant, from His Majesty's ship "Sphinx" at Bushire.

My Lords would be glad to know what instructions the Secretary of State wishes to be sent to the "Sphinx."

I am, &amp;c.

C. I. THOMAS.

Inclosure in No. 146.

*From His Majesty's ship "Sphinx" to Admiralty.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Bushire, July 12, 1909.*

ACCORDING to information received from the political resident that an attack on Shiraz is imminent, additional troops from the Bushire residency guard may be required at Shiraz. Consul at Shiraz has asked for a naval detachment with a maxim gun to reinforce the Sepoys, and the resident is consulting His Majesty's Minister at Tehran on this point. There is no immediate danger, but situation may become serious

\* See Part XVIII, No. 798.



at any moment. If no further orders are received I intend to take action as requested, and in the meantime I am keeping one officer and 6 men, with a maxim gun, ready for service if required. I have asked the commander-in-chief's approval of my proposed action.

[26498]

No. 147.

*Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received July 14.)*

(Confidential.)

Sir,

*Admiralty, July 13, 1909.*

WITH reference to Admiralty letter of to-day's date, I am commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, copy of a telegram dated to-day from the commander-in-chief, East Indies.

I am, &amp;c.

C. I. THOMAS.

Inclosure in No. 147.

*Commander-in-chief, East Indies, to Admiralty.*

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Trincomalee, July 13, 1909.*

THE senior naval officer, Persian Gulf, proposes to dispatch a naval force with maxim gun to Shiraz, if required, acting on requisition from the resident in the Persian Gulf. I have approved the senior naval officer's proposal.

[26621]

No. 148.

*Mr. O'Beirne to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 14.)*

(No. 357.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*St. Petersburg, July 14, 1909.*

SITUATION in Persia. Please refer to your telegram No. 889 of yesterday's date. When I saw M. Isvolsky to-day, a telegram to him from the Russian Ambassador in London had not been completely decyphered, and I therefore communicated to his Excellency the substance of your conversation with Count Benckendorff.

M. Isvolsky denies altogether that any more troops beyond those which it had originally been decided to send had been dispatched, and he also said that the Russian Government had no intention of sending an additional force into Persia. It was possible that the authorities at Baku had made preparations with a view to dispatching more men should the necessity arise.

The information contained in Sir G. Barclay's telegram No. 556, to the effect that order had so far been preserved in the town, was confirmed by a telegram dispatched by M. Sabline yesterday, which his Excellency read to me. M. Sabline also reported that the popular leaders had said at an interview with an official of the Russian legation that they would answer for it that the Russian officers and also foreigners not engaged in the hostilities should be safe. M. Sabline when he dispatched the above telegram apparently had no intention of ordering the Russian troops at Kasvin to advance to Tehran, and, even should it become necessary for him to do so, M. Isvolsky observed that no intervention on the Shah's behalf would be allowed. To this I replied that, although there was no intention on the part of the Russian Government to support the Shah, the result of their troops arriving at Tehran might in fact be to afford His Majesty assistance.

[26622]

No. 149.

*Mr. O'Beirne to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 14.)*

(No. 358.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*St. Petersburg, July 14, 1909.*

PLEASE refer to your telegram No. 887 of yesterday's date respecting the Zil-es-Sultan.

In accordance with your instructions, I have made a communication to M. Isvolsky respecting the proposed return of His Imperial Highness to Persia. His Excellency promised that he would let me have a reply without delay.

[26532]

No. 150.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 14.)*

(No. 572.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Gulahek, July 14, 1909.*

A BATTERY has been placed near the American mission-house, and the Persian Cossacks are now bombarding the revolutionary forces near the legation from this position.

[26614]

No. 151.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 14.)*

(No. 573.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Gulahek, July 14, 1909.*

THE royalist forces have begun to bombard the town. I am proceeding immediately to Sultanabad with M. Sabline, in order to urge upon the Shah the necessity of making a truce for negotiations with the nationalists.

At 8 a.m. the two dragomans started for Tehran, with the object of seeing the nationalist leaders and inducing them to open negotiations. This was at the Shah's own request. The fighting, however, seems to have become more serious, and it is feared that they may not be able to enter the town.

Yesterday His Majesty promised that Tehran would not be bombarded. It was, I believe, because his palace there was being attacked that he changed his mind.

[26623]

No. 152.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 14.)*

(No. 574.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Gulahek, July 14, 1909.*

REFERRING to my telegram No. 573 of this morning, in which I reported the bombardment of Tehran and our contemplated joint representations to the Shah, I beg to state that our audience, which was of a distressing character, had no satisfactory results. We prayed His Majesty to order the cessation of the bombardment, and to proclaim an armistice in order that negotiations might be opened. The Shah replied complaining that when the forces loyal to him were sufficiently strong to overcome the revolutionaries we had restrained him, but now that they were in Tehran and attacking his palace there, he must do what he could to protect himself. At the moment when his troops were being attacked he could not proclaim an armistice; it was for us to compel his adversaries to desist from attacking him, and then any constitutional demands that they might have to make would receive his consideration.

In reply, we stated that efforts had been directed throughout towards a reconciliation between His Majesty and his people. The conciliatory counsels tendered to the latter had, unhappily, been rejected, and to ask them to give up their arms when everything was strongly in their favour would certainly provoke a refusal. If, however, we could assure them that it was the firm intention of the Shah to grant an armistice, we might be able to prevent them from driving home the advantage they had already obtained. His Majesty would not hear of this proposal.

On taking leave of His Majesty, we met the Minister for Foreign Affairs. We told him that it would be useless to ask the revolutionaries to give up their arms, and he



requested us to await the result of an audience which he was about to have of His Majesty before we informed the Sardars of the result of our representations. To this we agreed, but his Excellency has not yet communicated with us.

By reason of the bombardment, Messrs. Churchill and Baronowsky were unable to enter Tehran this morning.

[26511]

No. 153.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 14.)*

(No. 238.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Constantinople, July 14, 1909.

PERSIAN mujtehids.

His Majesty's consul-general at Bagdad reports as follows:—

The excitement now prevailing at the religious centres is intense. The ulema have been talking of going to Persia to rouse the people there; so far, they have taken no action however. Public prayer has been stopped at Nejaf and Kerbela, and from here the position seems critical unless the troops are removed. The ulema have to-day sent the son of Mullah Mohammed Khorassani and the son-in-law of Seyid Abdullah Behihani as their representatives to call on me. They promise that they will and can restore peace in Persia as soon as the Russian troops are withdrawn, and beg England to use her influence in this direction. They declare that the soldiers support the reactionaries and ill-use the people, and thus so excite the populace that they will accept no peaceful counsels. Though apparently well disposed towards us, the ulema resent what they call our present passive attitude, contrasting it with our former support of the constitutional elements.

[26512]

No. 154.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 14.)*

(No. 239.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Constantinople, July 14, 1909.

AFFAIRS of Persia.

The president of the Chamber has written to me unofficially stating that an unfortunate impression has been produced in Constantinople by the joint intervention of Russia and Great Britain in Persian affairs. The two Powers, he says, are believed to be adverse to constitutional rule and to sympathise with the despotism of the Shah.

I have acknowledged the letter privately, and shall inform the Minister for Foreign Affairs, who is probably not aware that the letter has been written.

The president remarks that it is in the interest of the good relations existing between Turkey and Great Britain that he has made me this unofficial communication

[26513]

No. 155.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 14.)*

(No. 240.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Constantinople, July 14, 1909.

AFFAIRS of Persia.

With reference to your telegram No. 395 of the 8th July, after consulting with Russian chargé d'affaires, I have made a communication to the Sublime Porte to-day. The communication was identic in substance though not in wording.

[26339]

No. 156.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.*

(No. 369.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, July 14, 1909.

THE proposed instructions to His Majesty's consul at Seistan (see your telegram No. 564 of the 12th July) have my approval. The India Office are being consulted on the point whether it would be possible to instruct the resident at Chagai in the same

sense, and whether he would be able to take effective action on such instructions. They have also been invited to make any further suggestions they may think fit as to the best course of action.

It might also be well to warn the Baluchis that, should Indian or British subjects suffer any loss as a result of their action, His Majesty's Government will hold them responsible.

The original of the letter from the Russian consul, referred to in your telegram No. 561 of the 12th July, should be obtained, if possible.

Would it be possible for His Majesty's consul to proceed to Birjand, Bunder Abbas, or Yezd if danger is to be apprehended at Kerman?

[26512]

No. 157.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.*

(No. 403.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, July 14, 1909.

ANGLO-RUSSIAN co-operation in Persia.

In connection with opinions expressed by President of the Chamber, as reported in your telegram No. 239 of to-day, you should explain to Ahmed Riza in conversation the position really held by ourselves and Russia with regard to Persia.

In answer to the allegations that we are supporting a despotic Shah, you should point out that an electoral law, considered by Sir G. Barclay as democratic, was issued and the constitution re-established in Persia immediately before the recent outbreak of disturbances.

As regards intervention, we have been most careful to avoid it. Russia has definitely pronounced her intention of withdrawing her force as soon as it is certain that foreign lives and property are safe, and that communication with Tehran will not be intercepted, and she has given assurances that the achievement of these two objects form her sole reason for dispatching troops to Kasvin.

[26487]

No. 158.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Cartwright.*

(No. 265.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, July 14, 1909.

DO not join in making any further representations to the Zil-es-Sultan until a decision has been arrived at, on my suggestion, that leave should be given to the Zil to return to Persia via Bushire.

[26487]

No. 159.

*Sir Edward Grey to Count Benckendorff.*

Your Excellency,

Foreign Office, July 14, 1909.

I HAVE the honour to refer to our conversation of yesterday, relative to the question of the return to Persia of the Zil-es-Sultan, in the course of which you informed me that M. Isvolsky is still of opinion that His Imperial Highness's presence in that country would be undesirable at the present moment.

Your Excellency is aware of the disturbed conditions which have long prevailed in the southern portion of Persia. Trade is at a standstill, while practically no security of life and property exists even in the immediate neighbourhood of the larger towns. This state of affairs has recently become even worse than before, and the latest reports which His Majesty's Government have received from their consular representatives in that part of the country indicate that the situation at Shiraz itself, where the present governor-general is deliberately provoking a civil war, may at any moment become one of peril for the foreign residents. The situation at Shiraz is, indeed, so serious that His Majesty's Government, much against their wishes, have felt themselves compelled to make arrangements for the possible increase of the consular guard for the protection of His Majesty's consulate and of the lives and property of foreign subjects there. Should the disorder at Shiraz continue and spread, it is impossible to foresee the consequences.

[1665]



There can be no doubt that the Zil-es-Sultan is the only governor capable of restoring normal conditions in the south. His authority, energy, and ability fit him, and him alone, for the task.

This fact, as your Excellency knows, has already received practical recognition of the British and Russian representatives at Tehran, who have joined in urging the Persian Government the imperative necessity of appointing His Imperial Highness Governor-General of Shiraz. These representations have been successful, and the appointment has already been announced.

In these circumstances there appears to be every reason why the Zil-es-Sultan should proceed without delay to his new post to take up the work of the restoration of order, for, though the mere announcement of his appointment is thought likely to have a pacifying effect, it is but too probable that this effect will quickly wear off if it is realised that His Imperial Highness is to remain for any length of time a governor-general only in name.

M. Isvolsky fears that, if the Zil-es-Sultan were to return to Persia at once, he would at once be put forward, by one faction or another, as a candidate for the throne, whereby the present difficult situation would be still further complicated, but this contingency could be guarded against by exacting from His Imperial Highness the promise that he should enter Persia by way of Bushire, proceed straight to Shiraz, the capital of his province, and remain within the limits of that province. By this means his active intervention in Persian politics, and, still more, any attempt to put him forward as a candidate for the throne, would be rendered impossible.

I beg your Excellency to urge these considerations on M. Isvolsky, and I venture to express the hope that their contemplation may lead him to modify the opinion which he has expressed in a sense favourable to the views set forth above.

I have, &c.  
E. GREY.

[25130]

No. 160.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.*

(No. 102.)

Sir,

*Foreign Office, July 14, 1909.*

I HAVE received your despatch No. 113 of the 27th May relative to the running expenses of the steam-ship "Shushan."

I concur in your opinion that it is unnecessary, in present circumstances, to take any further action in the matter, and would refer you, in this connection, to my despatch No. 102 of the 22nd June, 1908.

I am, &c.  
E. GREY.

[25133]

No. 161.

*Foreign Office to India Office.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, July 14, 1909.*

WITH reference to your letter of the 12th March last respecting the protection of Bahreinis in Persia, I am directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to transmit to you, to be laid before the Secretary of State for India, copy of a despatch, as marked in the margin,\* from His Majesty's Minister at Tehran, inclosing the text of a note which he had addressed to the Persian Government on this question.

I am to state that, subject to Lord Morley's concurrence, Sir Edward Grey proposes to approve the terms of Sir G. Barclay's note to the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

I am, &c.  
LOUIS MALLET.

[26339]

No. 162.

*Foreign Office to India Office.**Foreign Office, July 14, 1909.*

Sir,

I AM directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to transmit to you herewith copies of telegraphic correspondence with His Majesty's Minister at Tehran relative to the reported intention of the Baluchis shortly to attack Bam and Kerman.\*

I am to enquire whether the Resident at Chagai is in a position to carry out instructions similar to those which Sir G. Barclay has been authorised to address to His Majesty's consul in Seistan, and whether Viscount Morley can suggest any further action which would have the effect of frustrating the intention of the Baluchis and of affording the necessary protection to His Majesty's consulate at Kerman should the threatened attack take place.

I am, &c.  
LOUIS MALLET.

[26484]

No. 163.

*Foreign Office to Admiralty.**Foreign Office, July 14, 1909.*

Sir,

I AM directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 13th instant, marked "Most Confidential," relative to the dispatch from Bushire of a naval Maxim gun detachment to accompany the Sepoys, whom it is proposed to send to Shiraz for the protection of His Majesty's consulate, in case the situation at that place should become sufficiently serious to necessitate such a step.

I am to suggest, in reply, that should the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty see no objection, instructions should be sent to the commander of His Majesty's ship "Sphinx" to comply with any request of the kind which His Majesty's consul-general at Bushire, after consultation with the Minister at Tehran and consul at Shiraz, may make of him.

Sir G. Barclay has been informed by telegraph of the proposal above submitted for their Lordships' consideration, and has been told that the two consular officers referred to should, however, take no action without his authority.

I am to transmit to you herewith, for their Lordships' information, paraphrase of a telegram which Sir E. Grey has been received from Sir G. Barclay† since the dispatch of the message referred to above reporting on the situation at Shiraz, and asking authority to send reinforcements there if necessary for the protection of His Majesty's consulate.

I am, &c.  
LOUIS MALLET.

[25913]

No. 164.

*Foreign Office to Messrs. Frank C. Strick and Co.**Foreign Office, July 14, 1909.*

Gentlemen,

I AM directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 2nd instant, forwarding copies of correspondence with your agent at Tehran on the subject of your proposed acquisition of the concessions now held by the Moin-ut-Tujjar, for the extraction of red oxide in the Persian Gulf.

I am to inform you, in reply, that the information contained in your letter was conveyed by telegraph to His Majesty's Minister at Tehran.

Sir G. Barclay has now reported that the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs is at present too ill to attend to business, and that he has therefore been unable to approach his Excellency personally on the subject. He states, however, that, in his own opinion, an attempt to press for the Hormuz concession would serve no useful purpose, while it would be likely to offend the Moin-ut-Tujjar.

I am, &c.  
LOUIS MALLET.



[26644]

No. 165.

*Consul Stevens to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 15.)*

(No. 10.)

Sir,

Batoum, July 6, 1909.

I HAVE the honour to inform you that it is reported that a regiment of Cossacks, one battery of eight field artillery guns, and two companies of sappers, are on their way to Enzeli in three steamers belonging to the Kavkaz and Mercuri Steam-ship Company.

I have, &amp;c.

P. STEVENS.

[26645]

No. 166.

*Consul Stevens to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 15.)*

(No. 11.)

Sir,

Batoum, July 6, 1909.

I HAVE the honour to report that two companies of the Rifle Brigade belonging to the Russian expeditionary forces before Tabreez, under the orders of General Snarsky, returned to the Caucasus last week.

I have, &amp;c.

P. STEVENS.

[26636]

No. 167.

*Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 15.)*

(No. 120.)

Sir,

Vienna, July 12, 1909.

HIS Royal Highness the Zil-es-Sultan, accompanied by his son and his grandson, arrived in Vienna on the evening of the 10th instant, and I at once sent him word that I wished to see him on the following morning—as I understood that he proposed to continue his journey in the afternoon of yesterday—and I added that I would be accompanied by Prince Ourousoff, the Russian Ambassador.

Yesterday morning the Russian Ambassador drove with me to the Imperial Hotel, where we were closeted together for an hour and a-half with the Zil-es-Sultan, the Persian Minister here and another Persian official—I was told an ex-Minister of Justice, and apparently a confidant of the Prince—acting as interpreters. We enquired of the Prince what his intentions were, and what was the purport of his return to Persia. The Zil-es-Sultan replied that he was obeying the orders of the Shah, who had telegraphed to him urging him to hurry back to Persia in order that he might help in clearing up the situation, and perhaps in saving the Kajar dynasty. He felt he must obey these orders; Persia was passing through perilous moments, her integrity was possibly threatened, and he might do something perhaps to save the independence of his country. He was no revolutionist; he had no intentions of joining the partisans of turbulence, and he merely wanted to help in maintaining the authority of the central Government, for Persia would be lost and go to pieces if at the present moment there was no strong hand to guide her through her troubles. He reminded us that during his father's reign he had always remained a loyal subject, and that, although he had been in a position to threaten the authority of the Shah, and had been advised by many persons to attempt to seize the throne, he had never made any attempt to do so. He had allowed his younger brother to succeed to the throne without causing any trouble, and he had given—and was ready to continue to give—all the assistance in his power to his nephew, the present Shah. If the purport of his journey was to create mischief, he would not have selected the route through Vienna and Russia, but he would have gone secretly through Constantinople and Bagdad, and so would have reached the south of Persia, where his partisans were numerous, and from whom he had received appeals to come and be their leader. The south of Persia, until the recent Bakhtiari movement north, was fairly quiet; it was expectant, but the moment would soon come, if things did not improve in Tehran, when it would play perhaps a decisive rôle in settling the future of Persia. The Zil-es-Sultan spoke with great fluency and much dignity, and pleaded hard to be allowed to continue his journey.

We told him that the British and the Russian Governments entertained no animosity against him personally; we had not come to him with any idea of menacing him; we merely wished to explain to him that in his own interest it was better for him not to hurry back at the present moment to Persia. If he arrived there without the approval of the British and Russian Governments, his position would be very equivocal and dangerous to himself, for he was too big a man to remain in the background at Tehran at the present moment. He would soon be compelled to take sides, either for or against the Shah, and it would be not unlikely that the revolutionists would select him as their leader, with a view to placing him upon the throne. He might in that case find himself in opposition to our two Governments, and it seemed to us that he ran the greatest risk of ruining whatever prospects might be in store for him if he lost the sympathy and the moral support of Great Britain and Russia. He had all to gain by waiting in Europe in a quiet and dignified manner until the situation had cleared up a little in his country.

Prince Ourousoff assured the Prince that he was not aware that the Russian Government entertained any personal animosity against him, and this statement seemed to give the Prince great pleasure. We both impressed upon the Zil-es-Sultan the absolute necessity for him to understand that Great Britain and Russia were determined to work in close union together, with a view to saving Persia from breaking up, and that he would gain nothing by leaning more towards one Power than towards the other, and that his best chance of rendering a signal service to his country was to appreciate this fact, and to let it guide the political steps which he might eventually take.

After a long discussion, the Prince finally agreed to remain till the end of the week in Vienna, so as to give us time to communicate what he had said to us to our respective Governments, and to await their replies.

I have, &amp;c.

FAIRFAX L. CARTWRIGHT.

[26637]

No. 168.

*Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 15.)*

(No. 121. Confidential.)

Sir,

Vienna, July 12, 1909.

WITH reference to my immediately preceding despatch, I have the honour to report that during the long interview which I had yesterday with the Zil-es-Sultan there were moments when I had the possibility of having some private conversation with the Prince through the interpreter, the Russian Ambassador being meanwhile engaged in conversation with the Persian Minister at this Court, who was present in the room. In this way, and also from conversations I have had with the Prince's chief adviser, I have been able to collect some information with regard to the Zil-es-Sultan's views of Persian affairs, which I venture to forward to you for your information.

I learn that the Zil-es-Sultan is discontented with life in Europe, and is longing to get back to his own country. He does not speak any language but Persian, and he finds himself lost in European surroundings. There are other considerations, however, which influence his desire to return to Persia, and they are of a financial character. Life in Europe is expensive, and he finds himself threatened with financial straits. His property in Persia seems to be menaced, and he thinks his presence on the spot might save it. He possesses some thirty to forty villages and a "barrage" which, I believe, is in the neighbourhood of Hamadan. The villagers are not in revolt, but owing to the confusion of political affairs in Persia, they cannot be got to pay the dues to their master while he is far away in Europe. His presence is required to collect the rents. The Prince told me that the British Government had promised to protect his family and his property, but this promise had scarcely been fulfilled, and his property was really in danger.

In answer to a question of mine as to the strength of the revolutionary party in Persia, the Prince declared that their power was not so great as was believed to be the case in Europe. No doubt many people sympathised with their efforts to upset the present "palace régime," and very few people had any interest in defending it, but the mass of Persians did not desire so much political changes of government as administrative improvements. The country in the last few years had gone from bad to worse through absolute anarchy in the administration. Of late, especially under the

[1665]

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present Shah's rule, young men who had acquired influence by immoral practices, had won the Shah's favour and had become governors of provinces and occupied other lucrative posts. Their one desire was to make money as quickly as possible, and consequently plundering had become the order of the day. The people could now stand it no longer, and were rising on all sides against this system of government, although they had no very definite views as to what was to replace it. The Prince's adviser said to me that Persia required a strong hand to rule her, but the great difficulty was to find men of capacity and character for that purpose. There seemed a remarkable dearth of them, both on the Government side and on that of the Revolutionists, who would very likely succeed in breaking down the present Government, but who were, in his opinion, not in a position, through want of serious leaders, to replace it by anything better.

To all my attempts to elicit from the Prince and his adviser any clear and definite statement as to what, in their opinion, was the best to be done for Persia at the present moment, I received but hints and vague replies, but it seems to me that in the Zil-es-Sultan's mind, and in that of his *entourage*, an idea prevails that if peace is to be restored in Persia, it can only be done by the Prince taking the reins of government into his own hands, possibly as Regent during the minority of one of the Shah's children. A Regency under the Naib-es-Sultan, the Zil-es-Sultan's younger brother, would, I was told, make things worse than ever in Persia. From hints thrown out it seems to me that in the Zil-es-Sultan's *entourage* the establishment of an Anglo-Russian temporary financial and perhaps administrative control, province by province, would not be looked upon with disfavour, but I was confidentially told that if the Russian military forces remained too long in the occupation of the country, and especially if they were unfortunately drawn into taking part in the defence of the present hated palace rule, such a feeling of irritation would be engendered throughout the country as might bring about a fanatically religious and national rising against the stranger, which might prove of a very formidable and dangerous character. In that eventuality, to restore peace, England and Russia between them would have to occupy every single province, and to hold it down by considerable forces.

I have, &c.

FAIRFAX L. CARTWRIGHT.

[26684]

No. 169.

*Anglo-Persian Oil Company to Foreign Office.—(Received July 15.)*

*Winchester House, Old Broad Street, London,  
July 13, 1909.*

Sir,

I HAVE to thank you for your Office letter of the 6th July, and to say in reply that the surmise contained in the last paragraph of your letter is correct, viz., that the translation of the Bakhtiari agreement enclosed in your letter is identical with the one sent home to us by Mr. J. R. Preece, with the exception of three words in three different paragraphs, which are obviously printers' errors.

In the circumstances, may I ask of you the favour that in one of your early letters you request His Britannic Majesty's legation in Tehran to have an independent translation of the Persian agreement made and a copy sent home to you for us.

I shall, of course, be glad to repay any expense that this may involve.

I am, &c.

E. W. WALLACE, *Vice-Chairman.*

[26668]

No. 170.

*India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received July 15.)*

Sir,

*India Office, July 14, 1909.*

I AM directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 28th June as to the undertakings given by the Sheikh of Mohammerah concerning the Karun Irrigation Concession, and the minor works to be undertaken by him without reference to the Persian Government.

In reply, I am to say that Viscount Morley finds, in the full text of the sheikh's undertakings, no reason to modify the views expressed in Mr. Campbell's letter of the

12th June, or to suggest any alteration of the instructions on the subject sent to His Majesty's Minister at Tehran in Sir E. Grey's telegram No. 309 of the 22nd June.

I am, &c.

A. GODLEY.

[26670]

No. 171.

*India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received July 15.)*

Sir,

*India Office, July 14, 1909.*

IN reply to your letter of the 3rd instant, I am directed to say that Viscount Morley agrees, on consideration of all the circumstances, in Sir E. Grey's suggestion that Sir G. Barclay's action in authorising Major Cox to send Lieutenant Wilson's report on the Kherkha irrigation scheme direct to Sir W. Willecocks for advice may be approved. But it appears to Lord Morley that the local officers concerned take too sanguine a view of the future of the project, which as yet is purely in the experimental stage, and he thinks it would be well that they should be warned to be cautious not to allow the sheikh to overlook the difficulties, financial and other, that may arise at later stages.

I am, &c.

A. GODLEY.

[26718]

No. 172.

*India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received July 15.)*

Sir,

*India Office, July 14, 1909.*

IN reply to your letter of the 6th instant, I am directed to say that Viscount Morley concurs in Sir E. Grey's proposal to approve the action of His Majesty's consul-general at Bushire and of His Majesty's Minister at Tehran in connection with the Sheikh of Mohammerah's expression of regret at the transfer of Consul McDouall from Mohammerah to Kermanshah.

I am, &c.

A. GODLEY.

[26711]

No. 173.

*"Conseil provincial," Azerbaijan, to the House of Commons.—(Communicated by the Speaker, July 15.)*

(Télégraphique). (*En clair.*)

*Tauris, le 14 juillet, 1909.*

GOUVERNEMENT russe, profitant notre patience dépassant toute limite, continue son action destructrice en Perse, sous prétexte protéger ses sujets, et, contrairement toutes conventions internationales, il a introduit ses troupes Tauris, et persécute brutalement peuple; il intervient chaque instant dans nos affaires intérieures et laisse pas fonctionner administrations gouvernementales.

A Méched il a soutenu ouvertement réactionnaires contre les Libéraux pour empêcher mouvement vers Téhéran troupes nationalistes, qui veulent mettre fin à situation embarrassante. Gouvernement russe envoie troupes contre eux au nom d'un peuple tyrannisé depuis siècles, versant son sang pour sa liberté. Nous protestons énergiquement devant monde civilisé contre violation nos droits nationaux, et, afin éviter complications plus graves avenir, nous prions représentants noble peuple anglais nous venir en aide pour faire retirer plus tôt possible troupes étrangères notre pays et empêcher intervention Gouvernement russe nos affaires intérieures.



[26704]

No. 174.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 15.)*

(No. 575.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Gulahek, July 15, 1909.

YESTERDAY the Shah's troops continued intermittently to bombard the town, without, however, causing any damage of a serious character.

In town, the royalist resistance had come practically to an end last night, and negotiations for the surrender of the Cossacks were proceeding between Colonel Liakhov and the nationalist leaders.

So far as I know, persons and property of foreigners have not suffered, apart from the looting by roughs of a British house and the insignificant damage caused by artillery fire.

[26705]

No. 175.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 15.)*

(No. 576.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Gulahek, July 15, 1909.

I LEARN, very confidentially, from my Russian colleague, that a telegram, urgently begging that Russian troops may be sent to Tehran, has been addressed to the Minister of Finance at St. Petersburg by the manager of the Russian Bank.

M. Sabline shares my belief that there is no need for troops at present, and were they to advance at this juncture, the strong anti-Russian feeling now prevalent in Persia would only be increased.

[26758]

No. 176.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 15.)*

(No. 577.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Gulahek, July 15, 1909.

SHIRAZ situation.

I learn from His Majesty's consul that a great improvement in the situation has resulted from the announcement of Zil-es-Sultan's appointment.

Reference is to my telegram No. 567 of the 13th July.

[26773]

No. 177.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 15.)*

(No. 578.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Gulahek, July 15, 1909.

PERSIAN Cossacks have now received orders from Colonel Liakhov to cease firing. Meanwhile, in the immediate neighbourhood of the British legation, the royalist Bakhtiari are still fighting with the fedai.

Some 200 Armenians have taken refuge in the legation, and a number of wounded combatants are receiving medical aid in the main building.

Including both killed and wounded on both sides, the casualties up to the present do not probably amount to more than sixty or seventy.

[26765]

No. 178.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 15.)*

(No. 579.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Gulahek, July 15, 1909.

THIS morning one of the legation gholams, while standing at the main gate of the legation in town, was seriously though not dangerously wounded.

[26769]

No. 179.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 15.)*

(No. 580.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Gulahek, July 15, 1909.

WITH reference to conversation held between Zil-es-Sultan and His Majesty's Ambassador at Vienna, reported in the latter's telegram No. 145 of the 13th July, I beg to state that the complaint formulated by His Imperial Highness, "that the British Government had not carried out its undertaking to protect his property," referred to the raiding by tribesmen of certain villages in the neighbourhood of Ispahan. As soon as I was acquainted with this matter I did all in my power to induce the Government to restrain the tribesmen.

By this action it seems to me that I more than fully carried out our guarantee, which, in my estimation, only covers cases of spoliation by the Shah or his Government. If it is intended that our guarantee should also cover pillaging by tribesmen, please instruct me, when I would make a claim against them, through the local government; but if this is to be done, the amount of the damages must be notified to me.

[26775]

No. 180.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 15.)*

(No. 581.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Gulahek, July 15, 1909.

THE manager of the Russian Bank has, M. Sabline tells me, just visited him, and pressed him most energetically to bring on to Tehran the Russian troops now at Kazvin. Although my Russian colleague is still of opinion that there is no need to summon these troops, such strong pressure has been brought to bear on him that he feels that his Government must be left the responsibility of a decision. He has telegraphed asking that if it is decided to comply with the bank manager's urgent request, the St. Petersburg authorities may issue the necessary orders. He suggests that if any troops are sent the Russian Bank should have a guard of fifty men.

The two legations have received a telegram from the popular leaders, to the effect that the Russian Bank premises are being used for hostilities by the Royalist troops.

One cannot, of course, answer for its safety if this story is true. But I consider that so long as no improper use is made of it, it is as likely to be immune from attack as our legation. The guard, which I think consists of twenty-five men, should be able to prevent it being used for such purposes. Although my Russian colleague places no credit in this statement, he is nevertheless bringing it before the notice of the manager.

I hear that there is still a great deal of firing in town, but I have not lately received any reliable information.

[26628]

No. 181.

*Consul Stevens to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 15.)*

(Telegraphic.) P.

Baku, July 15, 1909.

LAST night all available men-of-war of Caspian flotilla left here for Persian waters.

[26762]

No. 182.

*Mr. O'Beirne to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 15.)*

(No. 359.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

St. Petersburg, July 15, 1909.

ZIL-ES-SULTAN.

Russian Government inform me that they agree with His Majesty's Government that the Prince's return to Shiraz would contribute to the pacification of Farsistan and concur in proposal to allow his Highness to return via Bushire.

[1665]

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Russian Ambassador at Vienna has been instructed to make an identic communication in this sense to Zil-es-Sultan in concert with His Majesty's Ambassador.  
(Sent to Tehran.)

[26763]

No. 183.

*Mr. O'Beirne to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 15.)*

(No. 360.)

(Telegraphic.) R.  
SHIRAZ.

*St. Petersburg, July 15, 1909.*

I informed Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs of the substance of Tehran telegrams Nos. 559 and 560 [of the 11th July]. Russian Government agree to proposed steps to prevent arrival of Seyid Lari at Shiraz, and Russian chargé d'affaires has been instructed to telegraph necessary directions to Russian consulate at Shiraz.  
(Sent to Tehran.)

[26764]

No. 184.

*Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 15.)*

(No. 146.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Vienna, July 15, 1909.*

YOUR telegram No. 265 of yesterday: Zil-es-Sultan.

Instructions have reached the Russian Ambassador to inform the Zil-es-Sultan, in conjunction with me, that the governorship of Fars has been conferred on him, and to invite him to take the Bushire route to that province.

His Excellency will not act until I have received instructions to associate myself with him in this action.

The Zil-es-Sultan's son left last night for Persia, having been given a *laissez-passer* by the Russian Ambassador. A French newspaper correspondent accompanied him, by name M. Anet.

[26621]

No. 185.

*Sir Edward Grey to Mr. O'Beirne.*

(No. 909.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Foreign Office, July 15, 1909.*

ANGLO-RUSSIAN co-operation in Persia: (see Tehran telegram No. 576 of to-day, and your telegram No. 357 of yesterday).

His Majesty's Government are fully conscious of the moderation and restraint which Russia has observed, and fully understand the difficulties of their position in regard to Persia. The best impression possible will be created in this country if there is no interference between the rival parties at Tehran, and if they are allowed to settle their quarrel independently.

Russian attitude makes it much easier for us to work frankly and loyally together, and you can assure M. Isvolsky that his conduct strengthens our desire to co-operate with him.

[25611]

No. 186.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.*

(No. 404.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Foreign Office, July 15, 1909.*

RUSSIAN troops in Persia.

In connection with your telegram No. 238 of the 14th July, you may send instructions to His Majesty's consul-general at Bagdad to explain to the ulema the exact purpose for which Russian troops have been sent, and the restrictions which Russian Government have placed upon them. In making these explanations, he should avoid expressing any opinion as to the reliability of the assurances given by Russia with regard to the action of their troops.

[26768]

No. 187.

*Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received July 15.)*

(Confidential.)

Sir,

*Admiralty, July 15, 1909.*

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, copy of a telegram dated the 14th instant, to the commander-in-chief, East Indies.

I am, &amp;c.

C. I. THOMAS.

*Inclosure in No. 187.*

*Admiralty to Commander-in-chief, East Indies.*

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Admiralty, July 14, 1909.*

YOUR telegram No. 108, if British consul-general at Bushire, after consultation with His Majesty's Minister, Tehran, and consul at Shiraz, asks for assistance of a naval force with maxim gun, the senior naval officer, Persian Gulf, is authorized to comply, but unless the concurrence of the Minister is obtained, no steps will be taken by the two consular officers. Foreign Office concur in above.

[26822]

No. 188.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 16.)*

(No. 582.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Gulahek, July 16, 1909.*

PLEASE see my telegram No. 581 of yesterday.

I hope most earnestly that the bank manager's application for protection will be rejected by the Russian Government. The arrival of Russian troops might at the present juncture do much harm, and could certainly do no good. The risk of accident to which foreigners are now exposed could not be warded off by their dispatch, and, in comparison with the danger of still further aggravating the prevalent anti-Russian feeling, the possibility of excesses at a later stage is a negligible quantity.

[26823]

No. 189.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 16.)*

(No. 583.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Gulahek, July 16, 1909.*

THE Shah is expected at any moment to follow his wife, who has just sought refuge at the Russian Legation.

Four sowars of the legation guard have been dispatched to form part of the combined guard for His Majesty at the Russian Legation.

[26824]

No. 190.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 16.)*

(No. 584.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Gulahek, July 16, 1909.*

HIS Majesty has now arrived at the Russian Legation, where he has taken refuge. Serious fighting, I regret to say, is still in progress in Tehran.

We have sent the two dragomans to town with instructions to endeavour to arrange terms between the Cossacks and the Nationalist leaders.



[26882]

No. 191.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 16.)*

(No. 585.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Gulahek, July 16, 1909.*

I HAVE received the following telegram, No. 712, from Bushire:—

"To-day I received a visit from the Karguzar, who informed me, on behalf of the Anjuman, that their intention was not properly expressed by their last letter. They have, it appears, no desire to take over all the various departments of Government, but merely wish to satisfy themselves that, pending the present unsettled state of things, no part of the customs receipts shall be sent to Tehran.

"They propose either: (1) that 30,000 tomans monthly from the customs receipts shall be handed over to the consulate-general; or (2) that the entire net receipts of the Bushire customs (including probably Lingah and Bunder Abbas) shall be paid into, and retained at, the Imperial Bank until such time as order is restored, and constitutional government established at the capital."

I have authorised Major Cox to accept the latter alternative, provided that he can ensure that no part of the sums thus deposited at the bank be improperly withdrawn.

[26883]

No. 192.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 16.)*

(No. 586.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Gulahek, July 16, 1909.*

I LEARN from M. Sabline that the Shah has addressed a telegram to the Czar to the effect that:—

"Following the advice of the two Governments, he had granted the constitution, but the anarchist movement from Constantinople, Kerbela, Tabreez, and Tehran had plunged his country into disorder, and he had had to seek the protection of His Imperial Majesty's powerful flag.

"He counted on His Imperial Majesty's support for himself, his family, and his country, and would await His Imperial Majesty's gracious counsels."

[26884]

No. 193.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 16.)*

(No. 587.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Gulahek, July 16, 1909.*

WITH reference to my telegram No. 575 of the 15th July, regarding the negotiations for the surrender of the Cossack brigade, it was not evident, from the terms which the Sardars had expressed their willingness to accord, whether the entire brigade, together with its Russian officers, was to be kept up. I was asked by my Russian colleague to give him my support in earnestly requesting the continuation of the employment of the officers. To this I agreed, and the following promise was given by the Sardars to Mr. Churchill and M. Baranowsky:—

"We, the undersigned, temporary chiefs of the Persian Government and nation, hereby declare that the Cossack brigade remains temporarily as before under the orders of Colonel Liakhoff on condition that he is completely under the orders of the Minister of War, who will to-day be appointed."

Mr. Churchill and M. Baranowsky will take this document and inform Colonel Liakhoff of its contents. Colonel Liakhoff is requested by the Sardars to go to Baharistan—their head-quarters—whither he will be accompanied by Sardar Assad's brother and an escort of the Bakhtiari.

As soon as the Shah was under the joint protection of England and Russia at the latter's legation, the two legations immediately notified the Sardars of this by telegraph.

According to information received from Tehran, the fighting there has nearly ceased. There is, however, still a little skirmishing in the neighbourhood of the legation; but this, it is thought, will finish almost immediately.

[26885]

No. 194.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 16.)*

(No. 588.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Gulahek, July 16, 1909.*

THE refugees at the Russian Legation now include Naib-es-Sultaneh, Amir Bahadur Jang and a few palace favourites, in addition to Mohamed Ali and his wife. In Tirkundeh village some 800 troops and retainers are encamped.

In this legation there are now Saad-ed-Dowleh and Mukhtar-ed-Dowleh.

[26886]

No. 195.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 16.)*

(No. 589.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Gulahek, July 16, 1909.*

I HAVE not yet received a reply from His Majesty's consul-general at Bagdad as to the alleged departure of the ulema for Persia, to which I referred in my telegram No. 557 of the 10th July.

It would perhaps be well to instruct Colonel Ramsay to impress on the ulema that the Russian troops were not sent to Persia for the purpose of intervention, that the rival Persian factions have, indeed, been allowed to fight out their differences without interference.

Sir G. Lowther's telegram No. 238, to which you refer in your telegram No. 373 of the 15th July, has not yet reached me.

[26887]

No. 196.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 16.)*

(No. 590.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Gulahek, July 16, 1909.*

MY telegram No. 587.

Colonel Liakhoff, who was escorted to Baharistan by Sardar Assad's brother and the dragomans of the two legations, has placed himself under the orders of Sipahdar, whom a Nationalist Committee has elected Minister of War.

It has been decided by the committee that a proclamation to the effect that Mohamad Ali Shah has abdicated shall be issued.

The cessation of hostilities is complete, and the Cossacks and Fedais are beginning to rise.

I omitted to mention in my telegram of this morning that the Valiahd and his brother have accompanied the Shah into "bast."

Mr. Churchill was told confidentially by Sardar Assad that the intention of the Nationalist party was to place the Valiahd on Mohamad Ali's throne.

[26878]

No. 197.

*Mr. O'Beirne to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 16.)*

(No. 361.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*St. Petersburg, July 16, 1909.*

YOUR telegram No. 909 of the 15th July.

I saw M. Isvolsky this morning and I read to him your telegram above-mentioned, containing expressions of your gratification at the policy of restraint followed by the Russian Government in connection with recent occurrences in Persia.

A Reuter telegram, which his Excellency had just received, stated that the Shah had sought refuge in the Russian Legation. M. Isvolsky said that his Government had never wished to support the Shah although they had been suspected of doing so; he added that the news he had just received was a relief to him. His Excellency told me that the Russian Government would intimate to whatever Government was now established that they would recognise them if they succeeded in keeping order. But Russia would be obliged to take the steps necessary to protect her interests if it appeared that the Persian Government were incapable of maintaining tranquillity.



[26867]

No. 198.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 16.)*

(No. 242.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Constantinople, July 16, 1909.*

TURCO-PERSIAN frontier.

Our communication of the 13th instant seems to have produced a considerable impression on both the Grand Vizier and the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and a reply has been prepared by the former. They declare that the Porte have no desire to do more than protect their own subjects, and disclaim any intention of seeking territorial aggrandisement in Persia, though their sympathies are naturally on the side of the Nationalists. A commission will be dispatched to make enquiry into the alleged irregularities, and to withdraw Ottoman protection where it is found to have been improperly given. The Ottoman consul at Urumiah has been changed.

[26769]

No. 199.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.*

(No. 374.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Foreign Office, July 16, 1909.*

YOU are right in your interpretation of guarantee to protect Zil-es-Sultan's property (see your telegram No. 580 of the 15th July). The guarantee only refers to damage done by Persian Government or by the Shah.

[26878]

No. 200.

*Sir Edward Grey to Mr. O'Beirne.*

(No. 919.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Foreign Office, July 16, 1909.*

NEW Government in Persia.

His Majesty's Government will follow the same course as that of M. Isvolsky, mentioned in your telegram No. 361 of to-day, as regards recognition. You should inform Minister for Foreign Affairs of this, and say that we will consult with him before finally recognising whatever Government is created.

[26764]

No. 201.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Cartwright.*

(No. 268.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Foreign Office, July 16, 1909.*

ZIL-ES-SULTAN'S return to Persia.

You are authorized to act with your Russian colleague in making the communication referred to in your telegram No. 146 of the 15th July, and Mr. O'Beirne's telegram No. 359 of the same date.

[26769]

No. 202.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Cartwright.*

(No. 270.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Foreign Office, July 16, 1909.*

GUARANTEE of property of Zil-es-Sultan.

You should assure the Zil that His Majesty's Government will continue to look after his interests in Persia, and explain to him in a friendly manner the exact extent of the guarantee which we have given. You may add that, if it is of the action of tribesmen that His Imperial Highness is complaining, His Majesty's representative at Tehran has more than carried out the terms of the guarantee.

[26837]

No. 203.

*Anglo-Persian Oil Company to Foreign Office.—(Received July 16.)*

Sir,

*Winchester House, Old Broad Street, London, July 16, 1909.*

NOW that this company has undertaken the development of the supposed oil fields of Persia, it has become necessary for it to arrange for an exhaustive geological survey.

Preparatory to this, however, a detailed and reliable topographical survey is necessary, and I cannot find that anything of the kind has ever yet been made.

In these circumstances I venture to ask you, firstly, whether there are in your Office any records of any such survey; and, secondly, whether, if there are no such records, it is likely that the British Government or the Government of India would probably be willing to co-operate in such a survey.

I do not know whether either of the Governments is anxious for a reliable and detailed topographical survey of Western, or of any part of, Persia, but if either is, or both are, I should be grateful for an opportunity of laying before you a scheme.

Speaking generally, it would take the form of Government's supplying an officer to do the triangulation, and to connect up the country to be surveyed with points already fixed on the Persian Gulf. This could obviously be done much more quickly and easily by an officer of the Indian Survey, who would have at his disposal the records of the mapping already done along the Gulf of Persia. The details would then be filled in by this company's surveyors, who would in turn be followed by geologists employed by this company, and all our maps would of course be at once made available to the Government.

As it is necessary for us to proceed with the survey of a section of country in the neighbourhood of Shuster during the coming cold weather, I take the liberty of begging for your early consideration of the question.

I have, &amp;c.

C. W. WALLACE, *Vice-Chairman.*

[26758]

No. 204.

*Foreign Office to Admiralty.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, July 16, 1909.*

WITH reference to my letter of the 14th instant, relative to the state of affairs at Shiraz, I am directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to inform you that, according to a further telegram from His Majesty's Minister at Tehran, His Majesty's consul at that place reports a great improvement in the situation since the publication of the news of the Zil-es-Sultan's appointment as governor-general of Fars.

I am, &amp;c.

LOUIS MALLET.

[26891]

No. 205.

*Count Benckendorff to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 17.)*

Cher Sir Edward,

*Ambassade de Russie, Londres,  
le 16 juillet, 1909.*

M. ISVOLSKY me télégraphie d'urgence qu'il redoute quelque divergence d'appréciation entre nos représentants à Téhéran au sujet de l'interprétation des instructions qu'ils ont reçues en 1907 pour le cas où le Schah prendrait "bast." M. Isvolsky, dans un télégramme à M. Sabline, vient de confirmer l'essence de ces instructions. Il vous serait très obligé de vouloir bien en faire autant.

Je joins une traduction du télégramme à M. Sabline.

Sincèrement à vous,

BENCKENDORFF.



## Inclosure in No. 205.

*M. Isvolsky to Count Benckendorff.*

(Télégraphique.)

JE télégraphie à M. Sabline, au sujet des instructions de 1907 :—

1. Observer la neutralité la plus stricte dans les luttes entre le Schah et son peuple ;
2. Ne pas refuser "bast" au Schah s'il le réclame et si, en le lui accordant, la vie de personne d'autre n'est mise en danger ;
3. Ne donner en aucun cas lieu au soupçon que le "bast" accordé au Schah constitue un appui qui lui serait accordé contre l'Assemblée, et ne pas perdre de vue que le "bast" est accordé au Schah comme à tout autre Persan dans les mêmes circonstances ;
4. Pour le cas où le Schah se verrait forcé de quitter la Perse une garde anglo-russe lui est donnée jusqu'à la frontière ;
5. Si le Schah se réfugie dans la Légation de Russie, c'est à celle-ci à demander l'envoi d'une escorte anglaise à la légation ; si c'est dans la Légation britannique que le Schah cherche refuge, celle-ci demandera de lui envoyer une escorte russe. La légation où le Schah aura pris "bast" arborera les pavillons des deux Puissances.

[26890]

No. 206.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 17.)*

(No. 591.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Gulahek, July 17, 1909.*

MY Russian colleague, it appears, has apprehensions that the provisional Government may place Zil-es-Sultan on the throne.

Such a selection, he writes me, would make M. Isvolsky's position intolerable, bringing him into violent conflict with Russian public opinion, and might even be a serious menace to our *entente*.

This legation will, I have clearly pointed out to him, neither recommend nor oppose any candidate, unless instructed to the contrary by His Majesty's Government. M. Sabline promises that his legation's attitude will be identical.

We cannot altogether exclude the possibility of Zil-es-Sultan's selection, though this is not the most probable contingency.

[27000]

No. 207.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 17.)*

(No. 592.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Gulahek, July 17, 1909.*

EARLY this morning the two legations received the following telegram from the two nationalist leaders :—

(R.) "According to a resolution taken at an extraordinary meeting held to-day at the Baharistan, it is necessary that a deputation on behalf of the above-mentioned Assembly should be received by His Majesty Prince Mohamed Ali to announce a change of Sovereign.

As His Majesty for his personal safety is at present in refuge in the Russian legation under the protection of the two Great Powers, Great Britain and Russia, we request your Excellencies to appoint an hour during to-morrow at which His Majesty can receive the above-mentioned deputation, and to inform us, for which we will be obliged."

This message was communicated to the Shah by my Russian colleague. His Majesty was already aware that, at a meeting held yesterday at Baharistan, the Valiahd had been chosen to succeed him, this decision having been announced last night informally.

Both Mohamed Ali and his consort are most reluctant to part with their elder son, although they would accept a separation from the younger.

The Shah proposed to M. Sabline, at the end of a long and distressing interview, that the Valiahd should ascend the throne, but that he should be allowed to travel

abroad for some time with his mother, or, if this arrangement be inadmissible, that the younger brother should be proclaimed.

His Majesty requested the two representatives to reply to the nationalist leaders that His Majesty declined to receive any deputation, and declared that he had already abdicated by leaving Sultan-et-abad for the Russian legation.

My Russian colleague and I replied to the nationalist leaders as desired, but did not mention His Majesty's views as regards the succession. His first alternative proposal would certainly not be accepted by the nationalists, and the second he might himself wish later to withdraw. Ex-Shah's consort kept appearing in the doorway during the audience, and it was doubtless her tears which influenced His Majesty in the proposals he put forward.

[27001]

No. 208.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 17.)*

(No. 593.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Gulahek, July 17, 1909.*

TEHRAN is now quiet. The nationalist soldiery are fraternising with the Persian cossacks.

Could you warn the "Daily Telegraph" that the reports sent to them by their local correspondent are greatly exaggerated.

I am hinting to this gentleman to be more careful in future.

[26888]

No. 209.

*Mr. O'Beirne to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 17.)*

(No. 362.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*St. Petersburg, July 17, 1909.*

SIR G. BARCLAY'S telegrams No. 581 of the 15th July and No. 582 of the 16th July.

Dispatch of force for protection of Russian Bank.

Minister for Foreign Affairs has gone to Peterhof this evening but I have written to him laying the views contained in Sir G. Barclay's telegrams before his Excellency. I have also said that I could not imagine that hostilities would last long now that the Shah was in "Bast" in the Russian Legation.

[27006]

No. 210.

*Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 17.)*

(No. 148.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Vienna, July 17, 1909.*

SITUATION in Persia.

This morning the Russian Ambassador and I called on the Zil-es-Sultan and had a long conversation with him. His Highness was informed of his appointment to the governorship of Farsistan and of the desire of our two Governments that he would go by way of Bushire in proceeding to his province.

On the ground that a long sea voyage was impossible in view of his health, Zil-es-Sultan declined to fall in with this suggestion. But for this refusal there are also other grounds, and he is not desirous of the post to which he is named. He said the establishment of his Government last time he was made governor of Fars had cost him 30,000*l.*, and then he had been overthrown and obliged to go to Europe after three months. Under the existing circumstances he could not hope for any success in governing the province: he did not wish and he had not the means to begin the work again. Whilst there was no Shah, no Regent, not even a parliament at the capital, and whilst Persia was in a state of anarchy he could not be expected to govern well having no money and no armed force. His one wish was to assist, if called upon to do so, in maintaining the integrity of Persia, guided, of course, by the two Powers. He might, if he had wished, have caused the overthrow of the Shah when he was dismissed from his post, but he had no intention of intriguing to make himself Regent or Shah: it was for Russia and England to settle those questions. He pleaded earnestly to be

[1665]

2 C



permitted to go home to Ispahan: this was all he asked for now, and he gave us his word that, without the Russian and British consuls' approval, he would do nothing there.

The Prince suggested that he might go to Kasvin and thence, without going to the capital, proceed direct to Ispahan, and he gave us a solemn promise he would not, without our Governments' consent, proceed to Tehran. He was, moreover, ready to go to St. Petersburg and London, should it be desired, in order to give assurances of his peaceful intentions. He was even ready to renounce all the rights of Persian princes both for himself and his family. To end his life at his home and in peace was all he begged.

Zil-es-Sultan is anxious to know as soon as possible the decision of the two Governments as to his return, and he will stay within call of Vienna in the meantime. Being unwilling to be obliged to explain his views again to others he particularly asks that any messages for him should be made through the Russian Ambassador and myself.

[27007]

No. 211.

*Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 17.)*

(No. 149.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Vienna, July 17, 1909.

WITH reference to your telegram No. 270 of yesterday. Persia.

This morning I saw the Zil-es-Sultan and told him he could count on receiving the same protection as had always been given him by His Majesty's Government, and I told him what had been done for the protection of his property by His Majesty's Minister at Tehran. This seemed to please him very much.

The Prince was at pains to give the Russian Ambassador to understand that he entirely approved of the Anglo-Russian agreement and to assure him that his own feelings towards Russia were quite loyal.

Zil-es-Sultan said that, as the Persian representative here had now no means of communication with Tehran, he would be glad if I might inform him of the principal events taking place there.

[26998]

No. 212.

*Consul-General Cox to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 17.)*

(No. 305.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Bushire, July 17, 1909.

OIL company and Sheikh of Mohammerah have at length reached an agreement, terms of which company's agent and I consider reasonable and satisfactory. All the essential conditions are preserved, while a few of the less important details have been altered. I found it necessary to give the separate and confidential assurance with regard to reversion, which Sir G. Barclay suggested in his telegram No. 460 of the 11th June. The agreement was ultimately concluded after several days' negotiations.

16,050*l.* should be ready at Mohammerah within the next few days, and the sheikh agrees to the conditions which the Government have attached to the loan, and asks that, instead of the advance being in bank draft, may be made in gold. Meanwhile he undertakes to obtain an endorsement of the agreement from the tribal elders.

I submit that it would be advisable for His Majesty's Government to recommend the company to keep the execution and details of the agreement quiet for the present, and not to begin overt operations at Mohammerah until events have settled down at Tehran. Sheikh is most anxious that they should act in this manner, as he is afraid that, through having executed an agreement with a foreign company, he will incur the hostility of the Ulema and of the nationalist leaders.

[26886]

No. 213.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.*

(No. 380.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, July 17, 1909.

START of Ulema for Persia. See my telegram No. 373 of the 15th July, which repeated telegram No. 404 of the 15th July to Constantinople.

Communication which His Majesty's consul-general was authorised to make to Ulema in above telegram covers same ground as the communication proposed in your telegram No. 589 of yesterday. I think it unnecessary to make any further communication.

Please notice that my above-mentioned telegram repeated telegram No. 404 to, not from, Sir G. Lowther.

[27456]

No. 214.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.*

(No. 383.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, July 17, 1909.

SEE my telegram No. 373 of the 15th July.

His Majesty's consul-general was authorised in above telegram to make communication to ulema on the subject of their start for Persia. This communication is practically the same as that proposed in your telegram No. 589 of yesterday, and therefore it does not seem necessary to make any further communication.

Telegram No. 404 was sent to, not received from, Constantinople.

[26511]

No. 215.

*Sir Edward Grey to Count Benckendorff.*

SIR EDWARD GREY presents his compliments to the Russian Ambassador, and, with reference to his letter of yesterday to his Excellency,<sup>\*</sup> has the honour to inform him that His Majesty's consul-general at Bagdad has been authorised by telegraph to explain to the Ulema of Nejef and Kerbela the objects and limitations of the action in Northern Persia of the Russian troops, of whose presence they have complained.

Foreign Office, July 17, 1909.

[21110]

No. 216.

*Foreign Office to Anglo-Persian Oil Company.*

(Confidential.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, July 17, 1909.

WITH reference to Foreign Office letter of the 27th April to Mr. D'Arcy, relative to the working of the oilfields in South-Western Persia, I am directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to transmit to you herewith, for your confidential information, copy of a despatch from His Majesty's Minister at Tehran,<sup>†</sup> relative to the difficulty which lately arose between His Majesty's consul at Ahwaz and the manager of the Concessions Syndicate.

I am to inform you that Sir E. Grey concurs in the recommendations made by Sir G. Barclay as to the nature of the instructions with which it would be desirable to furnish the manager, with a view to facilitate the smooth working of his relations with His Majesty's consul.

I am, &c.

LOUIS MALLET.

\* Not printed.

† See Part XVIII, No. 602.



[27002]

No. 217.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 18.)*

(No. 594.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Gulahek, July 18, 1909.*

I HAVE addressed the following telegram [No. 14 to His Majesty's consul at Kermanshah:—

"You should make a communication to Daoud Khan in the following sense:—

"Although you regret that the men have taken bast without your permission, it would not be compatible with civilised usages to surrender them without obtaining guarantees for their lives once that they have taken refuge in the consulate. If he carries out his threat of putting the town to plunder foreign intervention may result, in which case the whole responsibility will fall on him personally."

"Should it, however, appear to you that to surrender the men is the only way of averting the threatened pillage, you should give them up to the Governor, who, however small his real authority may be, is responsible for the preservation of order, and consequently obliged, if you request him to do so, to take over the bastis from you."

[27003]

No. 218.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 18.)*

(No. 595.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Gulahek, July 18, 1909.*

SITUATION at Tehran.

All quiet.

Sipahdar and Sardar Assad, the Ministers of War and of the Interior, issued yesterday a proclamation to the effect that Mohamed Ali Shah has voluntarily abdicated, and that an extraordinary grand council, convened on the 16th July at Baharistan, has "appointed" Sultan Ahmed Mirza Valiahd as Shah of Persia. Pending the convocation of Parliament, Ayad-ul-Mulk, head of the Kajar tribe, is to exercise the functions of Regent.

[27004]

No. 219.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 18.)*

(No. 596.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Gulahek, July 18, 1909.*

THE circumstances in which I sent the instructions to His Majesty's acting consul at Kermanshah, reported in my telegram No. 594 of last night, were as follows:—

After a faction fight three men of the defeated side took refuge in the grounds of the consulate without Captain Crossle's permission. The chief of the Kalhor tribe, Daoud Khan, had entered the town and threatened that, unless His Majesty's consul surrendered the men unconditionally, he would pillage Kermanshah.

[27005]

No. 220.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 18.)*

(No. 597.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Gulahek, July 18, 1909.*

THE valiahd is this morning proceeding to Sultanabad, where he will be received as Shah by a deputation of the extraordinary grand council. A combined guard, furnished by the two legations, will accompany him to Sultanabad. After his arrival there he will no longer be under Anglo-Russian protection, and the guard will then leave him.

The deputation has designated another palace for His Majesty's residence, to which they will themselves escort him.

[27008]

No. 221.

*Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 18.)*

(No. 150.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Vienna, July 18, 1909.*

RUSSIAN Ambassador and I have just received a message from the Zil-es-Sultan to the following effect:—

Official confirmation of the Shah's dethronement, the succession of his son, and a temporary regency has reached the Zil by telegraph from Persia. The situation with regard to himself is thus changed, and he now appeals urgently for permission to return to the capital. Now, if he should go to Ispahan via Kasvin and avoid Tehran he would be looked upon by the Nationalists as showing disapproval of what has taken place, and by the new Shah's people as a dissatisfied pretender; thus he would not be left in peace at home. He promises to remain in Tehran a few days only, but he must go there in order to do homage to his nephew.

As to being Governor of Farsistan, whilst under the late régime he could not have accepted the post, now he would, perhaps, undertake this thankless and difficult task, provided that the two Powers give him a pledge that without their consent he would not afterwards be removed from the post.

This last part of the above message has been made only to me and not to Russian Ambassador, who therefore says he will not mention it in telegraphing to his Government.

The following is confidential:—

The Prince made a very urgent personal appeal to me that I would remind you of the loyalty he has—under circumstances occasionally very trying—shown to Great Britain. He appeals to His Majesty's Government, in consideration of the support given several times to their interests, to help him to return to Persia as soon as possible, and he promises to act always under the advise of the two Powers.

I gather the Prince's opinion to be that the temporary regent, having no experience of government, cannot remain long.

Until an answer is received to this message the Zil-es-Sultan has promised to stay in Vienna.

[27220]

No. 222.

*Consul-General Cox to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 19.)*

(No. 3. Confidential.)

Sir,

*Bushire, June 27, 1909.*

BY direction of His Majesty's Minister I have the honour to submit copy of a report furnished to him on the subject of the attitude of the German vice-consulate in connection with the recent disturbances at Bushire, together with a copy of my despatch (27th June, 1909) giving cover thereto.

I have, &amp;c.

P. Z. COX, Major, British Resident in the Persian Gulf, and His Britannic Majesty's Consul-General for Fars, &c.

Inclosure 1 in No. 222.

*Consul-General Cox to Sir G. Barclay.*

(No. 36.)

Sir,

*Bushire, June 27, 1909.*

WITH reference to your telegram No. 113 dated the 5th May, 1909, I have the honour to place before you a report on the subject of the efforts, real or alleged, of the German vice-consulate during the course of the disturbances which were in progress in Bushire from the end of March until recently, to pull strings in directions calculated to embarrass us and to render our task more difficult than it need have been.

I much regret that, owing to the pressure of constant petty interruptions upon my

[1665]

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time, due to the unsettled condition of things prevailing, and also owing to the calls of urgent work unconnected with Bushire, I have been unable to complete and submit this report before.

Finding the material too unwieldy to be dealt with satisfactorily in the space of a single despatch, I have had to resort to the alternative of submitting separate notes on different phases of the subject. A list of these notes accompanies, and I think that for the most part they may be best left to speak for themselves. It is necessary, however, that I should touch briefly on two or three salient points of the report.

Firstly, the alleged demand made to the Anjuman by Seyyid Murteza for a guarantee of non-molestation from the British residency through the German consulate.

In my opinion the accuracy of the original report in this connection is placed beyond doubt; the statement of the residency's head muntchi, Khan Saheb Mulla Ahmed, who was himself present, being entirely borne out by three of the leading men of the local Anjuman, it was thought superfluous to ask any more. The first, Haji Mirza Ghulam Hussein Kazerani, is a Persian merchant and banker of repute, and the individual accepted by the leaders of the popular party and myself as being most fitting agency (next to the Imperial Bank, to which the Nationalists would not agree) to have the custody of the customs receipts pending settlement of the customs question with us. The second, Haji Rais-ut-Tujjar, chief of the Persian merchants, as his name implies, and agent for Messrs. Sassoon, is also a merchant whose word in such a matter is above suspicion. Thirdly, the mir penj, or commandant of the Chahar Mahal Regiment of Persian regulars, who was at the time acting in the public interests as *de facto* governor of the town.

Secondly, the question of the German war-ship asked for or expected in these waters.

In this connection I venture to explain that I had from the first had apprehensions on this score, as I think will be apparent from the tenour of the several telegrams, of which I append copies for convenience of reference. When in the course of these messages I referred to "foreign representatives," it was always Germany's consulate which was primarily in my thoughts.

From the nature of our relations with France and Russia I could be practically sure that they would do nothing without consulting His Majesty's Government fully, while I had equally reasonable grounds for believing that the situation might easily afford Germany an opportunity for asserting herself in the Gulf, which she might be loth to let slip.

Lastly, the question of the quotation of any of this material to the German legation or Government.

It is difficult for me to detach myself sufficiently from my surroundings to form a reliable and unbiassed estimate of the collective value of the material that I now submit. As far as I can do so, I can only say that it seems to me that while no one reading the papers could lay them down with any moral doubt as to the part played by employés of the German consulate and firm, there hardly appears to be satisfactory grounds for a demur to the German authorities, except possibly in regard to two points; firstly, the fact that the Seyyid evidently did ask the Anjuman for an assurance of non-molestation from the British residency guaranteed by the German consulate specifically, and would hardly have done so unless he thought he had something to go upon; and, secondly, that the alleged appeal of the German vice-consulate at Bushire for the despatch of a war-ship to Bushire, at the end of April or the beginning of May, was clearly not justified by any existing circumstances, nor compatible with the attitude of their representatives on the spot; and that such an application could not therefore have been free from ulterior motives.

But I submit, with much deference, for your consideration, the view that, in any case, no object is to be gained by our making any communication of the kind to the German authorities.

It seems to me that the *bona fides* of the German attitude is altogether compromised by the incident under reference, namely, the telegraphic description by their vice-consul of the situation at Bushire as being most alarming when, in reality, there was not the least cause for alarm, and when the use of a German ship, if wanted at all, could only have been for the encouragement of Seyyid Murteza in the belief that he need fear nothing from us as, if we attempted to coerce him, as Germany would intervene in his favour.

It is difficult to conceive any entirely innocent explanation of these inconsistencies, and if this view is admitted, then I urge that our best course is to take note of the fact and profit by the knowledge in future, while keeping our own counsel for the present

Moreover, locally, the difficult phase of the Bushire situation may be said to have passed with the exit of Seyyid Murteza from the stage, and the practical extinction of Seyyid Abdul Hussein of Lar, and it would seem convenient therefore to let the sleeping dog lie for the present, if that course is considered practicable.

My idea, should you concur, would be that we should content ourselves by endeavouring to follow up the information we have obtained regarding the connection of the German firm's broker and the mirza of the consulate with the illicit arms traffic. It is probable that further evidence will be obtainable at Muscat on this point, but to obtain it satisfactorily would entail a personal visit, whereas at present the political agent is away, and I myself see no likelihood of being able to go there for some time.

If we could obtain some uncontestable documentary evidence of the identification of these men with the arms traffic, such as we could produce to the German legation, the vice-consulate could hardly continue to employ the men any longer; in any case, we should have good reason to object to his again being left in charge of their consulate and flying the German flag, as he did in 1907, when Dr. Listemann was absent in Teheran.

With these observations I beg to leave the matter in your hands.

Owing to the extreme insecurity of the Shiraz post route at present, I hesitate to send these papers by it, and am therefore forwarding them via London, furnishing copies at the same time to His Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs as desired by you. Should I shortly be able to proceed to Tehran, as I hope, I shall bring a copy of them with me.

I have, &c.

P. Z. COX, Major, British Resident in the Persian Gulf, and His Britannic Majesty's Consul-General for Fars, &c.

Inclosure 2 in No. 222.

Telegrams connected with His Britannic Majesty's Consul-General's request for presence of British Cruiser at Bushire, March 1909.

(1.)

ON the 26th March I telegraphed to the captain of His Majesty's cruiser "Fox," then at Henjam or Bunder Abbas:—

"Your telegram of 25th.

"Object of dispatch of vessel to Bushire is to reassure foreign residents and their Governments. Presence of 'Redbreast' is hardly sufficient for this purpose. Can you change place with her? Coal has now been received."

(2.)

Captain Hunt, of His Majesty's ship "Fox," replied on the 27th March:—

"'Fox' and 'Redbreast' can exchange if it is absolutely necessary, but this would interfere with naval programme. The presence of 'Fox' out of gunshot distance from Bushire would not appear sound."

(3.)

I replied to "Fox" on the 28th March, 1909:—

"Your message of yesterday received.

"The primary question, so far as Bushire is concerned, is not one of range or armament, but of numbers, especially white crew. I apprehend that presence of 'Redbreast' will not prove sufficient to keep foreign representatives reassured. Present question is not so much one of absolute necessity, but rather of policy; but I will communicate with Government and ascertain their wishes."



(4.)

Then on the 29th March I telegraphed to His Majesty's legation and the Government of India :—

"P. . . . If, therefore, I am right in the belief that His Majesty's Government have taken it upon themselves to afford protection to foreigners, and if they desire to give no excuse to foreign representatives to apply to their own Governments to take steps to ensure their safety, then it would be advisable that a cruiser should be sent here having a white crew of between 200 and 300 bluejackets."

(A.)—Telegrams exchanged between Sir G. Barclay and Consul-General Cox, in which references are made to the attitude of the German Vice-Consulate in connection with the Disturbances at Bushire, March–May, 1909.

(1.)

Extract from Telegram (P) from Consul-General Cox to Sir G. Barclay, Tehran (No. 71), and Foreign Department, Simla, dated March 29, 1909.

Lastly, the news agents of the residency and of the Russian consulate report that the difficult attitude of the Seyyid in regard to customs is attributable to the influence of the German consulate. There is no specific evidence to this effect, but it is of course quite conceivable.

(2.)

Extract from Telegram (P) from Consul-General Cox to Sir G. Barclay, Tehran (No. 88), and Foreign Department, Simla, dated April 9, 1909.

I have to-day received urgent representations from Russian, German, and Turkish representatives, and unless we intervene sufficiently to restore order, we shall greatly lose prestige.

(3.)

Extract from Telegram (P) from Consul-General Cox to Sir G. Barclay, Tehran (No. 99), and Foreign Department, Simla, dated April 13, 1909.

Re expulsion of Seyyid Murteza.

In this matter my Russian colleague entirely agrees with me, and so I have no doubt do the representatives of France and Turkey. I prefer not to consult the German consul on this subject for the present, as there is some reason to believe he has been encouraging Seyyid Murteza.

(4.)

Consul-General Cox to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 418.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

May 1, 1909.

I report the following with regard to the Bushire situation in corroboration of previous references. Seyyid Murteza was interviewed yesterday by a deputation of four notables chosen by group of seventeen persons now representing Bushire community.

They endeavoured to induce him to render an account of customs receipts appropriated by him, and to dismiss his gang of "tufangchis." A formal reply was given by the Seyyid to the deputation that, if he received a guarantee from the resident through

the German consulate that the force on land would be withdrawn within three days he would comply.

Addressed Minister. Repeated for information to India and Admiral.\*

(5.)

Sir G. Barclay to Consul-General Cox.

(No. 111.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, May 1, 1909.

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs has directed me to request you to consult your German colleague with a view to affording any protection that he may consider necessary to German subjects.

Following is most confidential. The German consul reported the situation at Bushire as being most alarming and asked for a war-ship without delay.† The German Government are anxious to avoid anything which might arouse the susceptibilities of the British public, and are therefore not sending one. But at the same time if the German Government formally asked His Majesty's Government to protect German citizens,‡ German public opinion might take it amiss.

Therefore in full confidence that His Majesty's Government have both the means and the will to deal with the situation and to protect all foreigners, they intend to refrain from taking any steps in reply to the German consul's appeal.

(6.)

Consul-General Cox to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 419.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

May 1, 1909.

With reference to your No. 111, which has just been received. It is instructive to hear that the German consul applied for a war-ship. Seyyid Murteza's proceedings have been the entire cause of our troubles here, and there are good circumstantial grounds for believing that the German consulate has all along instigated him and given him support.

Direct indications of this have been reported by me to-day in a previous telegram.

I have from the commencement of the disturbances always consulted my German colleague re guards for German subjects, and what he asked me for I have given. I may add that during the last two or three days it has been given out by the German mirza that a German man-of-war had arrived at Muscat or was shortly about to.

\* His Excellency the naval commander-in-chief, Rear-Admiral E. J. Slade, M.V.O., had only left Bushire for Muscat on April 30, and as during his presence in Bushire the question of German intrigue in connection with passing events at Bushire had been the subject of discussion, I knew that his Excellency would be interested to receive this definite piece of news on arrival at Muscat.—P. Z. C.

† This telegram is dated May 1. If the acting vice-consul for Germany reported that the situation was most alarming and the presence of a German warship needed, that report must clearly have been urgent and telegraphic, and therefore very recent. Yet Dr. Listemann (late vice-consul), Herr Wassmuss (present acting vice-consul), and Herr Krumpeter (agent for Wouckhaus and vice-consul for Norway) had all expressed the opinion that since the landing of our bluejackets there had been no anxiety for the safety of foreigners. The German consulate had all along thought that they did not need any guard, though it was offered them; the guard that they had asked for at M. Krumpeter's house they had requested should be withdrawn, as being no longer necessary, on April 11. Bushire was considered by them so safe that Mrs. Krumpeter, who had been sent to Bussorah for safety at the end of March or first days of April, had returned with her baby to their home in Bushire town. Both in word, writing, and action, the attitude of the German representative on the spot had been such that any telegram reporting the situation "most alarming" and the need for a German ship sent after April 11 could only have been sent with a disingenuous purpose.—P. Z. C.

‡ The German Government speak of "the protection of German citizens." The responsibilities of the German vice-consulate in this direction are confined to the vice-consul himself and the Krumpeter family. M. Krumpeter himself, be it noted, is also vice-consul for Norway. The vice-consul had said he wanted no protection, and that M. Krumpeter, living next door to the customs where there were fifty bluejackets and two Maxims, needed none either. There was no other German citizen or even protégé except, perhaps, the consulate mirza, who is a Persian subject and needed no protection.—P. Z. C.



(7.)

*Sir G. Barclay to Consul-General Cox.*

(No. 113.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Tehran, May 5, 1909.*

With reference to your two telegrams Nos. 418 and 419 of the 1st May.

An emphatic denial that his consulate has interfered in political affairs has been given by the acting German consul. He does not believe that the seyyid, in making his request that a guarantee should be furnished for a promise to be given by you to re-embark bluejackets, referred to the German consulate particularly, but to another consulate.

Are you able to give me any information which I can use which will prove mirza's conduct as reported and seyyid's request for a guarantee through the German consulate, or generally any facts which would go to prove that the seyyid has an understanding with the German consulate?

(8.)

*Consul-General Cox to Sir G. Barclay.*

(No. 131/438.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*May 6, 1909.*

The following telegram to you was already in the course of being cyphered when your No. 113 reached me yesterday:—

"My telegram No. 418 dispatched on the morning of the 1st May was drafted on the 30th April. I met Wassmuss on the evening of the 1st May, and in the course of our conversation I alluded to Seyyid Murteza's statement made to the deputation. The German vice-consul said that, as far as he was concerned, the statement was without foundation. I rejoined that it was probable that Seyyid Murteza believed that he had some ground for his reference; it would be as well if he were notified by the German representative not to make unauthorized use of the name of the German consulate. I went on to ask him whether he considered his mirza altogether reliable and suggested that perhaps the latter had been intriguing unknown to him. In reply Wassmuss said he thought a communication to Seyyid Murteza in the sense suggested would be inadvisable. With regard to his mirza, he said he would make inquiries, but he had had no reason to distrust him. I did not hear further from Wassmuss till to-day (6th May), when he sent me a message saying that you had complained to the German legation of his giving Seyyid Murteza his support, and he said he would like an interview on the subject with me. In replying I asked him to wait a few hours until I had been informed by you of the terms of the complaint attributed to you. Secondly, I made no mention during the above conversation of his having telegraphed for a German war-ship, but I said I hoped he would without fail let me know at once should he consider that any further protection was needed for German subjects, incidentally reiterating that I had received instructions to take adequate steps to insure the safety of foreigners. He thanked me in reply, and said that he had informed his Government some time ago that all was quiet here, thanks to the presence of our bluejackets, and he added that the only German subjects here besides himself were his mirza and Messrs. Wöneckhaus's representative, and he thought that existing arrangements were fully sufficient for their safety, and that at present nothing further was needed."

There follows a further telegram.

(9.)

*Consul-General Cox to Sir G. Barclay.*

(No. 132/441.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*May 6, 1909.*

Wassmuss, the German acting vice-consul, has only been in office a fortnight, and that he personally has not interfered actively or ostensibly is quite possible and natural. But the request for a German war-ship was presumably made by him, and not by

Listemann, and it is absolutely inconsistent with the present outlook and with statements made to me and others here both by Listemann and himself.

Your telegram *re* German war-ship affording opportunity I was about to send you a report giving a résumé of evidence showing that the German consulate has been intriguing against us since the commencement of these troubles; this will be dispatched, and I am sure you will be convinced by it. The opinion I incline to is that it is a part of a larger policy than mere fishing in troubled waters. The German consulate mirza lives close to Seyyid Murteza in the heart of Bushire town, and the German consulate have been working through him and through Wöneckhaus's broker. The recent statement made by Seyyid Murteza was practically a public one, but without introducing the names of the parties and stirring up a good deal of dust here it would be difficult for me to provide you with material for quoting to German Legation. I am inclined to recommend that we accept Wassmuss' *dementi* for the time being in view of the fact that the appointment of the derya begi has been approved by all parties that he has left Bagdad for Bushire, and that it is practically certain that his arrival will restore the situation. You will be able to come to a final decision as to what action is necessary when you get my written report.

Incidentally I may mention that a few days ago I was informed by the French consul that the German mirza had earnestly approached him with a view to being appointed to the vacant post of mirza to the French consulate.\* He gave as his reason that he was given a great deal of delicate and difficult work by the German consulate, and that his pay was too small and his worries too great, and he wanted a more peaceful billet. The French consul said that before responding he would be glad to have my advice and to know my wishes, remarking that, as I well knew, the man was clever, but an intriguer. In replying, I said that whether the man was likely to involve the French consulate in difficulties with his meddling was a question for him to consider, but that I would much prefer his being with the French consulate to being with the German consulate.

(10.)

*Sir G. Barclay to Consul-General Cox.*

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Tehran, May 8, 1909.*

Reference your telegram No. 411.

Please post summary of evidence direct to Foreign Office.

(B.)—*Entries in the Weekly Diaries of the Persian Gulf Residency referring to German Consulate or Firm, April and May, 1909.*

*Note.*—This weekly diary or chronicle is a compilation from the weekly reports furnished by all offices affiliated to the Persian Gulf Residency, and, as far as the Bushire portion is concerned, the diary is based on news and information received during the week preceding from various sources by the resident and staff. The status of the diary is merely that of a news report intended to give the addressees a general idea of passing events. The understanding is that action is not desired or taken on diary entries only. Where action is desired the diary entry is followed up by a despatch.

(1.)

*Extract from Diary No. 14 for the week ending April 4, 1909.**Bushire, April 4, 1909.*

615. M. Krumpeter, agent for Messrs. Wöneckhaus and Co. in Bushire, who lives in town, near the customs, sent Mme. Krumpeter and their child to Bussorah at the beginning of the week as a precautionary measure.

P. Z. COX, Major,  
Political Resident, Persian Gulf.

\* See also p. 110.



(2.)

*Extracts from Diary No. 15 for the week ending April 11, 1909.**Bushire, April 8, 1909.*

650. In the course of the afternoon the Russian, German,\* and Turkish representatives called on the resident to urge the necessity of some serious steps being taken to restore order. A little later the manager of the Imperial Bank reported that the three merchants in whose names the Customs' money had been lodged for the last few days had, under threats from the seyyid, withdrawn the whole balance (about 2,500 tomans) and handed it over to the seyyid. Having done so, they intimated that they had no further connection either with the Customs' money or the so-called nationalist committee.

654. The new German consul, Herr Wassmuss, arrived by steam-ship "Kasara" on the 29th March.

P. Z. COX, Major,  
Political Resident, Persian Gulf.

(3.)

*Extracts from Diary No. 17 for the week ending April 25, 1909.**Bushire, April 25, 1909.*

During the early hours of the 11th, as the result of the residency proclamation, a considerable number of Tangistanis left, and their chiefs sent in letters to the resident, the drift of which was, that having come to Bushire to support what they had understood to be the nationalist cause, they found the leaders of the movement simply intent on lining their own pockets. This patent want of *bona fides* on the part of the leaders, combined with the resident's proclamation, had convinced them that they could no longer remain, and they were therefore returning to their homes. It will be understood that these estimable sentiments mainly arise from the fact that we have stopped supplies from the customs. Amongst the foreigners' houses to which guards were sent on the night of the 10th was that of M. Krumpeter, of the German firm of Wöneckhaus and Co., in Bushire town. Owing to the fact that a large quantity of kerosine oil was stocked on his premises, which might obviously prove a source of serious public danger in the event of promiscuous firing taking place in the neighbourhood, it was considered advisable to place a strong guard there, and accordingly ten sepoys were told off for that duty at the German consul's request.† On the following evening, however, Dr. Listemann evidently thinking, on mature deliberation, that he would have a freer hand for intrigue if, as far as the native public could see, he was not associated with the measures taken by the British for giving security, wrote that in view of the immediate proximity of M. Krumpeter's house to the customs, which was now strongly held by our men, the guard on M. Krumpeter's house seemed hardly necessary. The resident replied, reminding Dr. Listemann of the special reasons for which he had asked for the guard, but agreeing that the presence of the bluejackets at the customs next door was sufficient, and adding that the officer in charge had been given instructions to keep an eye on M. Krumpeter's house. As, however, the inmates of M. Krumpeter's house were reported‡ to be in much trepidation, now that the guard was removed, it is possible that its removal was not desired by themselves. (See also H 2 and 3.)

\* Dr. Listemann.

† I knew nothing about the kerosine oil and piece goods stocked in Messrs. Wöneckhaus's premises. It was Dr. Listemann who told me and asked for a strong guard on that account. I offered him anything in reason that he liked, and one guard of ten was decided on. Dr. Listemann said he thought his own house was too far removed from the Tangistanis's line of communications for him to need any guard, but as a matter of fact the French consul who lives near him needed one. Dr. Listemann himself has no guard of his own and in view of the apprehensions he professed to have a few days before, his not needing any protection now is difficult to explain except on the supposition that he knew he had nothing to fear from the seyyid's followers, or that his liberty of action would be prejudiced *vis-à-vis* the seyyid if he accepted protection.—P. Z. C.

‡ Reported by the naval officer in charge of party in customs premises to the captain of the "Fox" who informed me.—P. Z. C.

Other letters in the same strain were dispatched by him (the Seyyid) to various chiefs who had before come in to help him, but who had left the town on the landing of the sailors from the "Fox" and "Sphinx." Attempts to form a local Anjuman having again taken practical shape, private information was supplied to the resident that the dragoman of the German consulate, a pronounced Anglophobe, had spread the report that the resident was endeavouring to prevent its formation, and had advised the leading merchants not to join it. This is interesting in relation to other information to the effect that the German consul has been keeping in touch with Seyyid Murteza and endeavouring to convince the people that the British Government is acting against the nationalist cause.

The Hamburg-Amerika line steam-ship "Sicilia" returned from Bussorah on 20th at 6 A.M., and left for Hamburg at 10 A.M. the same day. Dr. Listemann, lately German consul, Bushire, left by her.

P. Z. COX, Major,  
Political Resident, Persian Gulf.

(4.)

*Extract from Diary No. 18 for the week ending May 2, 1909.*

According to the reports of our news agents, Mirza Hussein, the dragoman of the German consulate has been busying himself greatly during the week encouraging the seyyid and generally fishing in troubled waters. The German consul, who only took over the charge from Dr. Listemann on the 20th, is new to Bushire, and it is not known how far Mirza Hussein is or is not acting with his cognisance. The fact that he is next door neighbour to Seyyid Murteza gives the mirza facilities for communicating with him freely and unobserved when he wishes. Early in the week it was reported that he was giving out that a German man-of-war had arrived or was about to arrive at Muscat, and was coming up the Gulf. On the morning of the 30th he received at his house two members of the Anjuman, and on these persons going to the meeting of the Anjuman a little later they began to inveigh against the continued presence of the bluejackets.

On the 1st May a deputation consisting of three seyyids and merchants visited Seyyid Murteza Ahremi on behalf of the assembly and made another attempt to induce him to submit his accounts of customs money appropriated and to dismiss his tufangchis. Seyyid Murteza said he would only dismiss his tufangchis if the resident would first give him a guarantee through the German consul that he would send away the sailors within three days! When this answer was communicated to the Majlis (at which the Residency Munshi was present enquiring about the case of the sarbazes) the Mir Panj\* denounced Seyyid Murteza, saying that he had been all along believed to have been acting on the prompting of some outside influence and that he now believes that he takes his cue from the German consul. After much consultation the Anjuman decided to telegraph to the Ulema at Nejef reporting the seyyid's vagaries and asking instructions. They are all too timorous to take any responsibility.

P. Z. COX, Major,  
Political Resident, Persian Gulf.

(5.)

*Extract from Diary No. 20 for the week ending May 16, 1909.**Bushire, May 16, 1909.*

910. May 13.—It is reported that Seyyid Assadullah† mentioned in the Majlis that it had been proved to him that Seyyid Murteza had been encouraged by the "Germani." He did not specify whether the consul was meant or the mirza, but probably the latter.

A. P. TREVOR, Captain, First Assistant Resident  
(in charge current duties).

\* Commandant of Chahar Mahal Regiment and acting governor.—P. Z. C.  
† The representative of the Ulema of Nejef who accompanied the derya begi to Bushire on their behalf.—P. Z. C.



(C).—Notes on personnel of Foreign Consulates in Bushire and their Attitude in connection with recent Events in Bushire, April-May, 1909.

### I. Russian Consulate-General.

*Incumbent.*—M. Wladimir Kadloubowsky. A young man of about 30 years of age, lately dragoman in the Russian legation at Tehran, "gérant le consulat général." M. Kadloubowsky arrived from Europe in December last to relieve M. Andre Miller, and received instructions to co-operate with his English colleague. Has been most cordial and friendly. He is assisted by one Persian mirza, Haji Agha by name, through whom he gets his news. He knows Persian fairly well. He has no office in town and works at his residence about a mile out of town. His responsibilities in the direction of the protection of Russian subjects are confined to the person and establishment of the agent of the Russian line of steamers, M. Mishtolt, who lives in Bushire close to the British Residency.

M. Kadloubowsky is on intimate terms with myself and other members of the British Residency and consulate-general, and so far as I know has been at one with me in regard to all questions connected with the recent disturbances at Bushire.

### II. French Vice-Consulate.

*Incumbent.*—M. R. Chaloin, vice-consul. Is old for his rank, being about 50, and is understood to be a promoted clerk. Has been in his present appointment for about six years on and off. His vice-consulate is maintained on very niggardly lines. He has practically no establishment and cannot have any work to speak of. His residence is about 3 miles from Bushire town, over a bad road, and he is as a rule badly posted in local affairs, and seems ordinarily concerned mainly with his own family and financial cares. He is on cordial terms with myself and under considerable obligation for good offices and help in matters both official and private, and professes to be very appreciative of the fact. Has no mirza, and during the recent troubles has had little personal knowledge of what was going on; when called upon for a report by his legation on the recent disturbances he asked me privately to provide him with some material for it.

Subject to the limitations involved in the above remarks, he has apparently been entirely in accord with me in connection with questions arising out of the events of the last two months, but I cannot be sure as to what he really reports, as such information as he has he gets from one Ali "Ahremi" the "ferrash bashi" (head peon) to his consulate.

This Ali "Ahremi" lives in Bushire town with his brother Bahram Ahremi, and holds the practically sinecure French appointment in order to enjoy protection, in return for which he supplies the French vice-consulate with news, and appears on official occasions. As his sobriquet indicates, he is a Tangistani and a fellow villager of Seyyid Murteza "Ahremi," the originator of the Bushire disturbances. He and his brother Bahram live in one house next door to the seyid in Bushire town, and are members of the clique to which Mirza Hussein, the mirza of the German consulate, Haji Mohammed Hassan, the broker of the German firm of Wöneckhaus, belong, and who are believed to be all interested in the illicit importation of arms into Bushire via the small Tangistan ports.

Recently my French colleague, as reported in my telegram No. 418,\* dated the 9th May, to His Majesty's Minister, informed me that the German mirza had been approaching him with a view to obtaining a post in the French consulate, where he would have less troublesome work. I did not quite understand at the time how to account for this overture, but now think the explanation probably is that the German mirza thinks that in the French consulate he will have more leisure for his dubious trading ventures than he has in the German service, and will also be associated with his crony Ali "Ahremi." Employment in a consulate is, of course, important owing to the effective independence and protection it affords.

When the governor was taking measures a few days ago for the arrest of the seyid it appears that Ali and Bahram "Ahremi" allowed the seyid's tufangchis to occupy the roof of their house as a point of vantage for protecting approaches to the

\* *Vide A (10), p. 107.*

seyid's premises. On hearing of this from his own men his Excellency the derya begi had an intimation conveyed to Ali Ahremi that if he did not at once get rid of them he would only have himself to thank for anything untoward which might happen to him in the course of the governor's measures for the arrest of the seyid.

A little later the seyid, when about to evacuate his house, sent a box of papers to Ali Ahremi's house for safe custody, and two other boxes to the care of Haji Mohammed Hassan, the German firm's broker. His Excellency the derya begi informed Major Cox and Captain Trevor of these facts when giving them in company the details of the measures taken by him which terminated in the arrest of the seyid.

### III. Norwegian Vice-Consulate.

*Incumbent.*—Herr E. Krumpeter, local representative of Messrs. Wöneckhaus and Co.; not a vice-consul de carrière, and has doubtless simply obtained the sinecure in order to have the advantage of consular status and weight in his commercial competition with British firms. The German firm's broker, Haji Mohammed Hassan, the associate of Mirza Hussein, is M. Krumpeter's chief employé, and we believe the latter to have been the main direct channel of communication between the seyid and the German element.

### IV. Turkish Vice-Consulate.

*Incumbent.*—Mulla Hussein. A person of Bahrein extraction. An old man about 60. Very cautious and discreet, and on friendly terms with the residency. Last year, when he took two months' leave to Bagdad, he asked His Britannic Majesty's vice-consul to act for him, and Mr. Chick did so. He lives within a stone's throw of the residency, and has been supplied with a guard when needed.

### V. German Vice-Consulate.

*Incumbent.*—Dr. H. Listemann up to the 18th April and Herr W. Wassmuss from that date onwards. The former is on six or eight months' leave; the latter, lately dragoman in their consulate at Zanzibar, is acting for him. Herr Wassmuss appears to be about 30. He does not talk Persian, and is altogether new to this part of the world.

*Persian Mirza.*—Mirza Abdul Hussein, generally known as Mirza Hussein simply. Son of a Bushiri nakhoda. Received some education in Bombay, and reads and writes English fairly well. It is through the medium of English that he deals with his present chief.

In a despatch which I addressed to His Majesty's Legation on the 7th June, 1908, I drew attention to the palpable change of attitude of the German representative at Bushire (Dr. Listemann), after his return from six months' duty under Herr Richthoven in the German Legation at Tehran, it being apparent that he intended to bother us when opportunity offered. His altered attitude was remarked upon to me in private conversation by my French and Russian colleagues and by Dr. Bussiere, and the two latter said that Dr. Listemann had no doubt come with definite instructions or intentions, which he took no pains to keep secret.

In connection with the recent anarchy in Bushire, the bearing of the German consulate was all along somewhat suspicious. To begin with, although the mirza of the German consulate lives in Bushire town, within a few yards of Seyyid Murteza's house, and is on terms of close acquaintance with Mirza Ali Kazerooni, one of the two chief confederates and evil mentors of the seyid, Dr. Listemann said to me somewhat ostentatiously on the 25th March that his own means of getting information were so poor compared to mine that he would be grateful if I would keep him informed of any important or interesting developments. At the same time he asked me if I saw any danger in the present situation for M. and Mme. Krumpeter (Messrs. Wöneckhaus's agent) and their small child, who were living in the town itself near the customs. I replied that I did not think there was actual danger at present, but that if he had the Krumpeters to stay with him in the consulate for a few days, until the situation cleared, he would no doubt be saved any anxiety at all. This suggestion was followed, I believe, for a day or two, after which Mme. Krumpeter and her child were sent to stay at Bussorah as a precautionary measure, and remained there three weeks.

Dr. Listemann also at the beginning of my communications with Seyyid Murteza regarding British claims on the customs, showed himself keenly interested in this



question, assuring me that anything I told him on the subject would be treated with the utmost confidence. There being nothing to conceal I gave him the same information as, under instructions from His Majesty's Minister, I had given the seyyid and others, but that was not sufficient and he and M. Wassmuss shortly afterwards paid a visit in company to the manager of the bank, and plied him with many inquisitive questions on this subject in a barefaced manner, which irritated him not a little.

#### VI. British Residency and Consulate-General.

*Incumbent.*—Major P. Z. Cox, C.I.E.

*Assisted by*—

##### *Residency.*

First Assistant, Captain Trevor.  
Residency Surgeon, Captain T. S. B. Williams.  
Second Assistant, Lieutenant J. S. Crosthwaite.  
Extra Assistant, Mr. J. P. Sequeira.  
Two Persian Mirzas.  
One Arabic Mirza.  
One Persian clerk in English office.

##### *Consulate-General.*

One Dragoman.  
One Farrash Bashi.  
Vice-Consul H. G. Chick.

The above comprise the gazetted officers and the native staff exclusive of clerks in the English offices of both establishments. I give these details in order to make it clear that the British representative as regards the ability to obtain information and the various sources available is in quite a different position to any of his colleagues. All the gazetted officers above-mentioned are in close personal touch with the head of the office, and the native officials either directly so or through them. Thus, it is not a case of one officer, possibly one not knowing the language of the country, living some miles away from the town and depending on the information of one native mirza or dragoman from whom he receives a daily or occasional visit. In the case of the British establishment we have a large office the head of which is in touch with his public office and staff by telegraph and telephone.

Under such circumstances it must, I think, be admitted that there should be *prima facie* much less likelihood of the domination of one-sided views or personal bias in connection with any matter of local interest or report.

P. Z. COX, Major.

#### (D.)—Note on Seyyid Murteza and his Associates in Bushire.

The following are the principal members of the company:—

1. Seyyid Murteza "Ahremi."
2. Seyyid Shahriyar.
3. Mirza Ali Kazerooni.
4. Agha Mustapha, or Mustapha "Nawab."
5. Ali Ahremi.
6. Bahram Ahremi.
7. Rais Ali, of Dilwar, in Tangistan.
8. Haji Mohamed Hassan.
9. Mirza Abdul Hussein.

1. Seyyid Murteza Ahremi; aged about 40. A fanatical country mullah coming from the village of Ahrem in Tangistan. Migrated into Bushire a few years ago, but did not come into prominence until the end of 1906, when he engineered an agitation against the customs, which ended in the transfer of M. Heynssens, the then director, to Kermanshah.

2. Seyyid Shahriyar is a hinterland friend of Seyyid Murteza's. Commands forty or fifty followers, and comes in to support Seyyid Murteza when needed. On this occasion he was with him all through the disturbances until things became critical for

the seyyid during the first week in June, when Shahriyar fled to Dashti with his followers. Had no local influence except as the seyyid's lieutenant.

3. Mirza Ali Kazerooni; aged about 35. Formerly a petty merchant in Bushire, but never of any standing or repute, and now altogether discredited. Is heavily in debt, being a defaulter to the extent of some 13,000 tomans, for which he is now under detention. He and the next number on the list, Mustapha Nawab, were the two principal advisers of Seyyid Murteza in the matter of the seizure and conduct of the customs and the making away with the receipts and other kindred matters. As soon as our bluejackets had landed, and things began to get a bit uncomfortable for him, Mirza Ali absconded by a tramp steamer, but was brought back from Bunder Abbas, and is now detained for settlement of the claims against him.

4. Agha Mustapha, or Mustapha Nawab. Has been the principal "executive officer" in the various rascalities committed under the guise of nationalism during Seyyid Murteza's régime. It was he who, with the assistance of Rais Ali and his tufangchis, carried out the seizure of the customs, in the course of which he held a loaded revolver at the head of the Director M. Zwinne and threatened to shoot if he did not hand over the premises and retire. The seyyid subsequently placed him in charge of his tufangchi rabble. This man has an exceedingly bad record. He was formerly treated as a British subject on an Indian passport, and on more than one occasion narrowly escaped deportation as such. Then the Persian authorities disputed his nationality, and as there was clearly considerable doubt as to the validity of his claim, he was informed that he could not be recognised until he brought certain further proofs which were required. He has never brought them, but remained quiet for a year or so, but within the last few days, fearing some evil at the hands of the derya begi, he has begun petitioning again for British protection. He has recently been concerned, in concert or collusion with Messrs. Wöneckhaus's agent, in a case concerning a certain cargo of dates in regard to which the German consulate has quarrelled with the karguzar and demanded his dismissal.

5 and 6. These are the Ferrash Bashi of the French consulate and his brother, fellow-villagers of the seyyid. Except that he is his neighbour and fellow-villager, and intimate with the seyyid, Ali Ahremi has been careful to refrain from compromising himself or the French consulate by active identification with the seyyid or his doings during the present troubles, but his brother Bahram has been closely associated with him (the seyyid).

7. Rais Ali, of Dilwar, is a petty Tangistani khan occupying the small village and port of Dilwar, about 16 miles south of Bushire. He has been closely identified with Seyyid Murteza for a considerable time past. His port has been a great thorn in the side of the customs administration as it is one of the chief channels for the secret importation into Bushire of arms, tea, and other contraband. During the recent movement in and around Bushire Rais Ali was Seyyid Murteza's chief standby. It was his men who seized the customs for the seyyid; it was Rais Ali who endeavoured to make a diversion in favour of the seyyid by entering Bushire with a considerable force on the 5th and 6th June. Having been repulsed and expelled on that occasion, he has since been writing letters to Bushire demanding the release of Seyyid Murteza and threatening to enter Bushire again. The governor, the Derya Begi, has just started on a punitive expedition against this petty khan and others, hoping to recover the loot taken from Bushire during the disturbances, and also to seize a large store of smuggled tea and other goods believed to be concealed at Dilwar.

8. Haji Mohamed Hassan is the broker of Messrs. Wöneckhaus's agent. The papers forwarded hardly seem to leave any doubt that he has been associated with the seyyid all through. References to him appear constantly in the papers comprising this report.

9. Mirza Abdul Hussein is the German consulate mirza, who is also dealt with sufficiently elsewhere.

What I wish to direct attention to here is that, according to our information and belief in Bushire, the company of persons included in the above list and others not included have been associated long before the present disturbances arose through the common bond of the traffic in fire-arms and other highly dutiable goods. Firstly, we have a clique of persons in Bushire interested in the arms traffic from Muscat. We have Rais Ali, the headman of a petty smuggling port convenient for Bushire and for the roads into Shiraz and the interior. Then in Seyyid Murteza we have the Mullah, who, if the customs give any trouble by the seizure of the boats of his acquaintances, or the confiscation of their smuggled goods, can at once engineer a strike among the



Bunder boatmen, who are nearly all Tangistanis, or some other form of agitation meaning trouble for the customs. I would note here that the first thing Seyyid Murteza and Rais Ali did after seizing the control of the customs was to have the godown containing confiscated arms and ammunition broken open and the contents carried to his own house.

Among the others we have retailers of arms in Bushire and the leading spirits who arrange for the import of the arms from Germany to Muscat.

P. Z. COX.

(E.)—1. *Seyyid Murteza's demand for a Guarantee from Resident, through the German Consul.* 2. *Appropriation of Customs Cheques by Seyyid Murteza.*

*Report by Head Munshi, dated May 1, 1909.*

THE members of the Bushire Anjuman sent Seyyid Mohamed Ali, the late Sadr-el-Islam's son-in-law, Seyyid Mahomed Shaffi Kazerooni, his son Seyyid Mahomed Taki, and Haji Mirza Mahomed Dashti to Seyyid Murteza Ahrami yesterday to give him urgent advice and to request him to dismiss his tufangchis and render an account of his customs receipts. He replied that he would duly render an account of the receipts and expenditure and would dismiss the tufangchis on condition that the resident would withdraw the troops after three days and give him a guarantee to this effect through the German consul. On hearing this reply, the Amir Panj\* remarked to the members of the Anjuman that for a long time past he was under the impression that Seyyid Murteza's proceedings must be in accordance with the guidance of another party, and now believes that the seyid's instructions emanate from the German consul. After much consultation the members agreed to telegraph to the high priests in Mesopotamia, intimating Seyyid Murteza's proceedings and asking for instructions.

*Statement by Haji Mullah Ahmed, dated May 3, in amplification of his Report of May 1, 1909.*

The Medjliss assembled in the morning, and determined to send a deputation to Seyyid Murteza.

They selected for the purpose—

Agha Seyyid Mahomed Ali.  
Seyyid Mahomed Shaffi.  
Mahomed Taki.  
Haji Mirza Mahomed Dashti.

They went together in the evening, afterwards returning to their houses, as it was late.

The Medjliss, however, was sitting late that evening, not dispersing until 8 or 9 P.M. They were discussing the customs question, and as Agha Seyyid Mohamed Ali lives close to the Anjuman building, and was saying his prayers in a mosque close by, the members of the Medjliss sent for him. About 7.30 P.M. he came over in response to their call, and they asked him what had passed. He gave the reply stated in my previous report, and gave it in my presence; and it was then that the Amir Panj made the remarks attributed to him.

Mahomed Shaffi came the following morning, when I also happened to be present in the Anjuman. He quoted Seyyid Murteza as having said that he would not comply unless the guarantee came through some of the consulates. Haji Abdul Rasool, Haji Seyyid Mohamed Reza, and Haji Mirza Ghulam Hussein remarked that Agha Mohamed Ali had said last night that the seyid had said that the guarantee must be given through the German consulate, and asked precisely what he did say. Mahomed Shaffi replied "Bale, hamintoor" (Yes, that was it).

On the same occasion Haji Abdur Reza Mohamed Kambar, one of the members of the Medjliss, remarked, "All the seyid's actions are by the authority"—"dastoor ul

\* The commandant of the Persian regiment at present quartered in Bushire. At this time acting as governor for the popular party.—P. Z. C.

Amal"—"of Mirza Hussein." He said this to me confidentially, and added: "Some of the seyid's tufangchis are of my tribe [Dashti], and I am anxious to get them away from the seyid, as I fear he may instigate them to commit bloodshed."

The Mir Panj, Mirza Ahmed Khan, had a great deal to say on the subject. He said that all the time they (the Medjliss) had been suspecting and wondering whence the seyid's activities ("harakat") were prompted. Now that they had heard his reply, brought by Seyyid Mahomed and Seyyid Mahomed Shaffi, they knew that it was from the tutoring of Mirza Hussein.

*Note by His Britannic Majesty's Vice-Consul, dated May 4, 1909.*

I was in company with Haji Mirza Ghulam Hussein Kazerooni to-day, and in the course of conversation I asked him what had been the result of the steps taken by the Anjuman to get Seyyid Murteza to dismiss the tufangchis with him. He replied that the seyid had appeared in the Anjuman on one occasion, and made certain conditions as to being allowed to retain a certain number, &c.

On the second occasion they had sent some seyids from the Anjuman with a message to him. I asked who were the emissaries. He replied, "Seyyid Mohamed Shaffi, Seyyid Mohamed Ali, Mirza Mohamed Dashti," and he could not remember the others. I asked whether the seyid imposed any further conditions on this second occasion or wanted any guarantee. "Ah, I forgot!" said Haji Mirza Ghulam Hussein Kazerooni. "Yes; he also told the seyids to say that if he dismissed his tufangchis he wanted a guarantee through the German consulate that the residency and the derya begi would not molest him." I asked what he thought was the reason for this. He replied, "I cannot say; but people say currently that all that the seyid does is by the advice [or after taking counsel with] of Mirza Hussein Nakhoda Ali." I then went on to ask him who were the present supporters of the seyid. He replied, "Nobody, except the 'bachehai mahalle'—'boys of the quarter'—such as Mirza Hussein and Agha Shahriyar and his tufangchis."

H. G. CHICK.

*Report by Agha Khalil, dated May 6, 1909.*

Seyyid Murteza Ahremi is said to have sent a message to Haji Seyyid Mohamed Reza by Haji Mirza Mahomed Peshnamaz asking him to secure assurances for him, so that he (Seyyid Murteza) may produce the accounts. I hear from the reliable source that the German consul's munshi has informed the seyid,\* in reply, that his consul can only interfere if the seyid makes a specific request to him to act as arbitrator, not otherwise. The seyid will probably submit a false account.

MOHAMED KHALIL.

*Note by the First Assistant for the Resident, dated May 6, 1909.*

I visited the Amir Panj this afternoon in connection with the affair of the sarbazes who took bast at the residency. After telling him that I had given them a message from the resident that they must all leave the residency precincts, as their principal claims had been settled, the conversation changed to general matters. We talked about the state of the town, and the doings of the Anjuman and Seyyid Murteza. In the course of the conversation the Amir Panj said that matters were getting very difficult in regard to paying the tufangchis. He had now spent over 1,000 tomans himself, as he had paid them for the last eighteen days, before that the kalantar had done so. He said he had never seen such extraordinary people as the members of the Anjuman. They were afraid to do anything, and were in terror of Seyyid Murteza. The latter sent them (and him) threatening letters from time to time, and was a curious individual whose views altered every day. At present the seyid seemed to be *pro*

\* It will be seen that in conversation with me on the 1st May, M. Wassmuss said he saw no grounds for making such a communication as I suggested to the seyid, but would inquire from his mirza. It would appear, however, that after our interview the German vice-consul did send his mirza to visit the seyid and to make some intimation to him of the nature above reported.—P. Z. C.



darya begi. The subject of the seyyid's accounts and his maintaining numerous tufangchis came up, and in the course of conversation the Mir Panj said that the seyyid had advisers. I asked who they were, and he said the seyyid got advice from the German consulate. He said he had suspected it for a long time, but latterly several things had proved it. The style of letters the seyyid sent to the Medjliss was that of official letters, and they were evidently inspired by some one from some consulate. Again, when the Anjuman sent a deputation to ask the seyyid to reduce his tufangchis, he had told the deputation to inform the Anjuman that he would only consent to reduce his tufangchis if the resident sent him an assurance through the German consul that the British sailors would be removed immediately. The Mir Panj said that he was present when this message was delivered in the Anjuman. I asked who gave the seyyid these tips, and the Mir Panj said it was inspired by Mirza Hussein, the dragoman of the German consulate, but that this functionary did not visit the seyyid much himself; he worked through Haji Mohamed Hassan, the broker of the firm of Wöckhaus and Co. This man was constantly visiting the seyyid. Subsequently the Mir Panj said that the proclamation of the seyyid regarding the derya begi, in which he compared the latter to an "imam," was in his opinion all humbug. It was contrary to religion to compare a man like the derya begi to an imam. He did not believe that the derya begi had come to any arrangement with the ulemas at Nejef. After some further unimportant conversation the call terminated.

A. P. TREVOR.

May 6, 1909.

*Report by Agha Khalil, dated May 8, 1909.*

1. I heard that after the seyyid took possession of the money and cheques which were in the customs' safe, Nakhoda Mohamed-bin-Salman, Messrs. Wöckhaus's dubash and brother-in-law of Mirza Hussein, told the ex-kalantar, Haji Yusuf Abdul Hassan, that the seyyid had asked Mirza Hussein and Haji Mohamed Hassan to get cash for the cheques from the drawers. Haji Yusuf called on Haji Abdur Rasool\* and informed him about these cheques, and asked him to call Haji Mohamed Hassan to the Anjuman and recover the cheques through him. Haji Abdur Rasool, however, took no action.

2. Mulla Ghulam Hussein, the Seyyid's (Murtezas) munshi has leased a house belonging to the Residency Ferrash Bashi for 20 krans per month. The Ferrash Bashi receives the amount every month from Haji Mohamed Hassan, Wöckhaus's broker.

*Report by Agha Khalil, dated May 8, 1909.*

I am informed that a cheque for 900 tomans or thereabouts, which was drawn by Mirza Mahmood Kazerooni,† and which was one of those which the seyyid extracted from the customs' safe, was presented to Mirza Mahmood through the seyyid's man, who asked Mirza Mahmood to pay the amount (900 tomans) to Haji Mohamed Hassan, Messrs. Wöckhaus's broker, which Mirza Mahmood did.

MOHAMED KHALIL.

*Note for Resident by His Britannic Majesty's Vice-Consul, dated May 22, 1909.*

I had to see Messrs. Sassoon's Persian agent, Haji Rais-ut-Tujjar yesterday in connection with some of the outstanding claims of his firm. In the course of conversation I inquired what had become of the cheques which he had given in payment of customs duty in the name of Moses Khan which Seyyid Murteza had appropriated when the customs safe was broached by his men. "It was within my knowledge," he said, "that he had been approached by somebody (perhaps Haji Yusuf, the former kalantar)‡ who offered to let him keep 200 of the 1,200 tomans if he would only hand over the 1,000 tomans. He was sure from the manner of the message and the identity of the person who brought it that it came from Haji Mohamed Hassan, the broker of the German firm. Seyyid Murteza had been trying to get actual cash from the drawers of all such cheques through Haji Mohamed Hassan.‡ He, Haji Abdur Rasul, refused to have anything to do with such a transaction.

Referring subsequently to the demands made by the Anjuman some weeks ago

\* Compare p. 117, (E).

† See below.

‡ See above.

upon Seyyid Murteza that he should dismiss his armed followers, Haji Rais-ut-Tujjar said he was present, as a member of the Anjuman, when Seyyid Murteza sent his reply to the Anjuman intimating that, before dismissing his tufangchis, he wanted assurances from the residency, guaranteed through the German consulate, that the former would not take measures against him should he dismiss his armed guard.

H. G. CHICK.

May 22, 1909.

*Note by Vice-Consul, dated June 17, 1909.*

AGHA MOHSIN reports that in a Medjliss held on the afternoon of the 15th instant for final settlement of Mirza Ali Kazerooni's debts, the karguzar, Haji Mirza Ghulam Hussein Kazerooni, and Agha Mirza Mahmood Kazerooni,‡ and Agha Ali being present, Haji Mirza Ghulam Hussein Kazerooni referred to the fact of the derya begi having got back the customs cheques secreted by Seyyid Murteza. Agha Mohsin turned to Mirza Mahmood‡ and said: "I have heard that one of the cheques belonged to you, and that you have given the money." He replied: "Yes; Haji Mohamed Hassan Haji Aboul came to me and said: 'Seyyid Murteza wanted to send tufangchis to you and get the money by force, and I intervened (on your behalf), and I have now come to ask you to give the money.'" Mirza Mahmood further said that when Haji Mohamed Hassan came to him some tufangchis, or seyyid's men, were with Haji Mohamed Hassan.

H. G. CHICK.

Fakhr-ul-Islam, a mullah, brother of the Imam Juma, told Agha Mohsin some days ago that "Haji Mohamed Hassan came to my house and met me in the porch thereof and offered me 100 tomans on behalf of Seyyid Murteza, asking me to take the 100 tomans and not insist further on Seyyid Murteza rendering an account of the money taken from the custom-house." Fakhr-ul-Islam did not take the money.

H. G. CHICK.

(F.)—*Note by Resident regarding the expected Visit to the Persian Gulf of a German Man-of-war.*

IT was on or about the 25th April that news reached me of the currency of the report in the town regarding the imminent advent of a German man-of-war in these waters.

The information was first brought me by the residency surgeon, Captain T. S. B. Williams, Indian Medical Service, who, I may mention, in the course of his daily work among the indoor and outdoor patients in the Bushire Residency Hospital is brought into unofficial touch with sections of the Persian community not accessible to me. He informed me that a person whose information was usually good had informed him that morning that there was a report current in the town that a German ship was coming up the Gulf and was on the point of arriving at Muscat, if indeed it had not already done so. Captain Williams added that on his enquiring where the news originated, his informant had replied from Mirza Hussein.

Similar information heard in the coffee-shops regarding the expected arrival of a German ship was communicated to me a little later by one of the ship's interpreters on duty ashore, and later by another, and casual enquiries from my own people always elicited the reply that these reports were spread by Mirza Hussein of the German consulate.

The mirza himself is much too astute to make public assertions in such cases, and it would not be possible to get anyone who had heard him who would come and testify that he had. As a matter of fact, knowing that I should hear from Muscat at once if any German ship was coming up, I did not take action on first receiving the report, but I mentioned its currency to M. Wassmuss in conversation on the 1st May, and he said that he had heard a report of the kind, but it referred to a French ship, and went on to dilate upon the extravagance of such a report if it related to a German ship, having regard to the fact that he had all along reported to his Government as he had previously informed me that, thanks to the presence of our ships, the situation was quite quiet. This, be it noted, was a few hours after receipt of legation telegram No. 111 of the



1st May, informing me of the very confidential communication of the German Foreign Office to His Majesty's Government regarding the alarming reports of their representative at Bushire and his appeal for a war-ship. I told M. Wassmuss that I had also heard of the contemplated visit of a French ship to Muscat, but that this report was quite independent.

Independent corroboration of the currency of the report and indirectly of its origin is found in a later letter, dated the 16th May, received by me from the journalist Mr. B. Temple, of the "Civil and Military Gazette," after leaving Bushire. This letter, of which a copy is given in full elsewhere, contained the following passage:—

"Mirza Ali, one of the lieutenants of Seyyid Murteza, asked me if it were true, as reported in the bazaar, that the Germans were landing bluejackets to counterbalance and hold in check the British bluejackets, and so give the Nationalists a free hand."

This Mirza Ali and Agha Mustapha were the two good-for-nothing Bushiris who "ran" Seyyid Murteza and encouraged him in the misappropriation of the customs receipts, and they were both in closest touch with the seyyid and, it is believed, with the Mirza Hussein clique.

P. Z. COX, Major.

(G)—*The Connection of Mirza Hussein, Mirza of the German Consulate, with the Seyyid. General Items.*

*Private Memorandum from Mirza Ahmed Khan, Mir Panj, then acting as Temporary Governor for Popular Party, dated April 15, 1909, to Major Cox.*

(Private.)

MIRZA HUSSEIN, the dragoman of the German consulate, has told somebody that Major Cox has advised the merchants not to appear in the Anjuman, and not to open the bazaars. Better to send round a strong message to all the members of the Town Council to-day, your man going to their houses and getting a properly serious reply.

*Report by Agha Khalil (Residency Dragoman), dated April 21, 1909.*

I hear from a very reliable person that Mirza Hussein, the German consul's munshi, is the seyyid's adviser. The seyyid is quietly engaging any tufangchis, Tangistanis, or others, who happen to come in to Bushire to buy things from the bazaar.

MOHAMED KHALIL.

*Report by Agha Khalil, dated April 27, 1909.*

The native broker of the German firm and the German consul's mirza, are suggesting to certain individuals who were members of the former Anjuman Safa,\* which had been abandoned, to lodge a protest against the English to the German consulate, on account of their interference in the local affairs (refers to refusal of residency to allow "Persepolis" to be coaled at expense of customs, for fetching the derya begi in Shah's interest). The German consul replied that he must first consult his legation at Teheran before giving any answer. The two men above-mentioned are instigating people, and making them believe that the measures taken by the English mean the occupation of Bushire.

MOHAMED KHALIL.

\* A troublesome mushroom society of "Young Persians" which sprang into existence in the end of 1907. The German firm's broker, Haji Mohamed Hassan, was the "mutattish," or supervisor of it. Mirza Hussein was an honorary member, and took great interest in it and frequently attended its meetings, and his brother was also a member.—P. Z. C.

*Report by Agha Khalil, dated April 27, 1909.*

Mirza Mahmood Shirazi, who was formerly an employé in the custom-house, wrote a letter yesterday to the local Anjuman, stating that the Anjuman should ask the karguzar, whose duty it is to enquire from the residency, whether the residency had orders from Tehran to stop the "Persepolis," or whether the residency was acting on its own motion.† I am told that Mirza Hussein of the German consulate dictated the letter which Mirza Mahmood wrote to the Anjuman.

MOHAMED KHALIL.

*Note by His Britannic Majesty's Vice-Consul, dated May 8, 1909.*

I spent some time with M. Moses Khan this afternoon obtaining from him some detailed accounts of the customs receipts and expenditure during the time that he was in charge on behalf of Seyyid Murteza.† He began to speak of Seyyid Murteza's method of dealing with him. I ventured the remark that he (seyyid) seemed to be a very thick-headed individual. He asked, "Have you seen him?" I said: "Yes; when I went to explain to him on behalf of the resident about the British loan; he was very obstinate." "Ah," said Moses Khan, "I must tell you something about that. Seyyid Murteza sent for me the next day and told me that the vice-consul had been to see him, and had told him that the British Government claimed the customs money for their loan." "But," said the seyyid, "from the consulate, in which I have got friends, I have been assured that what they say is not well founded." The seyyid had previously asked Moses Khan what proof or knowledge he had of a British loan. Moses Khan told him that from certain facts he deduced that there was a loan, but actually he had not seen any papers in the customs referring to it. He knew, however, that on several occasions when the customs administration had instructed them to pay large cheques to Haji Mirza Ghulan Hussein (Jamshid's agent) and to others, the bank had got wind of it and protested. On one occasion the Shah had obtained a certain amount from Jamshid in Tehran and the customs in Bushire were ordered to pay Jamshid's agent here a certain sum on that account. From these facts and also because the administration had been arranging for 16,000 tomans to be set apart for the bank he deduced that there must be a loan. Seyyid Murteza, however, repeated what is written above, and Moses Khan said no more. Moses Khan, however, had heard that immediately after my departure the seyyid summoned a meeting of his confederates, Agha Mustapha and Mirza Ali, and either got Mirza Hussein there in his house or else sent one of these men to Mirza Hussein, for advice. I asked Moses Khan how he knew that Seyyid Murteza had consulted Mirza Hussein, he replied that he was quite sure; he knew so many people in the town and they were all talking of the way in which Mirza Hussein was having daily intercourse with the seyyid. Even after the seyyid's downfall Mirza Hussein continued to see him.

Moses Khan went on to describe Mirza Hussein as one of the craftiest and most subtle men he knew.

He said that it was certain that the seyyid had placed all the ready cash he had looted, with Haji Mohamed Hassan, the German broker. The seyyid only had a wooden box in his house, and fearing he might be surrounded he had placed his money with people in whom he had confidence.

Referring to Mustapha's dhow and the dates,‡ Moses Khan said that the Germans must have some particular use for Mustapha who had taken to smuggling for some time past. As to Haji Muslim he was always pushed forward by the arms gang in Bushire as he was a man with no money, so if the smuggling was detected Haji Muslim was put in prison. He himself had once caused Haji Muslim to be put in prison.

M. Krumpeter had been to the customs and talked excitedly as to how "the English were trying to ruin this man."§

\* This question was actually asked me by the three chief members of the Anjuman a few days later and the position was explained to them.—P. Z. C.

† Vide diary entry 521 for the week ending 28th March, 1909.—P. Z. C.

‡ A recent commercial case in which the German firm and Agha Mustapha, one of the seyyid's confederates, were interested.—P. Z. C.

§ Agha Mustapha.



M. Moses Khan did not himself understand why Wöneckhaus had furnished the money for Mustapha's release, but thought that there was some collusion between them.  
H. G. CHICK.

*Statement recorded by First Assistant on May 7, 1909.*

Haji Hussein, son of servant of the Khan of Bunder Rig, states:—

"About a week ago I was going to Gulzad's house one night. I was passing by Seyyid Murteza's house when I saw Mirza Hussein, the German consulate mirza, Ali Ahremi, and his son come out of the seyyid's house. They left the house just as I was passing.

"Again, four or five days ago I was in a coffee shop with one of Haji Abdur Rasul's men when Nakhoda Ali, the father of Mirza Hussein, came and sat by us. He said he had just been to his son's house and had found Seyyid Abdul Reza Hakim (a member of the Anjuman) and his son Seyyid Abdulla Behbehani (a member of the Anjuman), and the late Alem-el-Huda's son there. Nakhoda Ali stated that his son was explaining to these men that they should say in the Majlis that the British Government had no right to interfere in local affairs and further that they should suggest that if the Residency should press the seyyid, that an appeal should be made to the German consul to intervene.

A. P. TREVOR.

*Report by Residency Dragoman Aga Mohamed Khalil, dated May 18, 1909.*

1. I beg to say that Haji Reza Behbehani, who is one of the prominent members of the local Anjuman told me in the course of conversation on Monday night that his Excellency, the Derya Begi has stated in the Anjuman in the presence of all the members that as the result of the local enquiry which he has made since his arrival, he was convinced that Seyyid Murteza Ahremi, who is responsible for all the troubles in Bushire, was tutored by Mirza Hussein of the German consulate.

2. I made an incidental enquiry from Mirza Ali Kazerooni this morning (he is still at the karguzar's house) the cause of his absconding from Bushire. He stated that when he realised that the seyyid was being instigated to such an extent by Mirza Hussein of the German consulate, and was even suggesting to his tufangchis to kill the three leading merchants and saying that if the English soldiers opposed him he would not hesitate taking action against them; when he saw that the seyyid was calling in more men, and was so confident, thanks to the German Mirza's support he, Mirza Ali, feared that he would be landed in difficulties and could not do otherwise than take to flight. He mentioned later that the seyyid used to report in writing to Mirza Hussein as to what he was doing, and Mirza Hussein used to send messages to him at night by Haji Mohammed Hassan, Wöneckhaus's broker.

MOHAMED KHALIL.

*Private Letter to Major Cox from Mr. B. Temple, Correspondent of the "Civil and Military Gazette" of Lahor, travelling in Persia to study the Nationalist question, dated Ahwaz, May 16, 1909.*

I was very sorry not to have seen you before my departure from Bushire on the 5th instant. I was busily employed the day before, and, by the time I got round to your office in the evening, you had left. Since then I have been constantly on the move, and have only now leisure to write to you.

I consider that my few days in Bushire were well spent, as I was able to see a number of people of all shades of opinion, and to acquire a good basis for further investigation of the present situation and prospects in Persia.

As you know, my work was rendered the easier by my having engaged rooms for myself in the town, and by my not identifying myself with the British political authorities or any other European element in Bushire. Owing to this fact, persons with whom I came into contact regard me as a free lance, and spoke much more frankly than I am sure they would otherwise have done.

As I told you, I did not come to Persia to report on passing events, except,

perhaps, in an incidental way, but I was much struck in the course of my enquiries by the trend of intelligent Persian opinion in a certain particular direction, and I think I shall do no harm if I give you a brief outline thereof. I refer to the question of German policy, or, more correctly speaking, I think, German intrigue in Persian Gulf affairs. The opinion was expressed by several of the Persians with whom I came into contact that, speaking generally, and with a much wider outlook than that of Bushire politics, there is a good deal of wire-pulling going on at the hands of German agents for the promotion by hook or by crook of German interests in the Middle East.

Specifically and locally I heard much of what appears to me to be a deliberate and well-planned endeavour on the German part to make things difficult for us in connection with recent events in Bushire. For example, Haji Abdur Rasul, Rais-ut-Tujjar, informed me that the German consul's dragoman is in almost daily communication with Seyyid Murteza, and that in ways which are difficult to trace to their source; the impression is about that the Germans are on the side of the nationalists and the British on the side of the royalist. Mirza Ali, one of the lieutenants of Seyyid Murteza, asked me if it were true, as reported in the bazaar, that the Germans were landing bluejackets to counterbalance and hold in check the British bluejackets and so give the nationalists a free hand. Moses Khan, the customs secretary, who was impressed against his will as director of customs by Seyyid Murteza and compelled to carry on the customs collection on the seyyid's behalf, told me that he represented to the seyyid that the British claim on the customs would have to be met, and that the seyyid replied, "Oh no, I am assured by the German consulate that these British claims on the customs are not *bona fide*, and have been fabricated partly to enable the British to lay hold on the customs on behalf of the Shah and partly to justify the landing of bluejackets whose presence in Bushire would preserve the Shah's authority and break up the nationalists' power." The same individual told me that if he were free to speak he could give many other evidences of German interference, and in confidence he mentioned one or two matters which I do not at present feel that I am at liberty to communicate to you. Other people told me that they knew, actually knew that you (the British consul) had been in direct telegraphic communication with the Shah regarding Seyyid Murteza's doings, and that the Shah had asked you to land bluejackets. I did not trace this particular item to German inspiration, and I only mention it in this connection for what it may be worth.

I think it in the interests of Government to give you this information, but you will kindly understand that I do so in very strict confidence and in the full assurance that neither my name nor the names of those referred to herein will be mentioned or used in any way.

I start shortly for Ispahan, and if you have occasion to write to me you can address me there c/o Lynch's agent.

*Telegram† in handwriting of Mirza Mohamed Hassan, brother of Mirza of German Consulate, dated May 30, 1909.*

(Secret.)

May 30, 1909, 9:45 A.M.

To Jenabe Moin Tujjar, Tehran:

Khairkahi hackir be hokoomat ouham marboot be jenab auli bashad mosallam bedanid choon ishan ra be ekhtyar nemigozaarand nemishowad montmin shod megar onke beshoma emtinan bedehand ve jenabe auli hackir ra mosteckiman emtinan dehid.

(Translation of above telegram.)

To his Honour the Moin-et-Tujjar, Tehran:

You may be sure of the well wishing of this humble one towards the Government (of Bushire), especially when it is associated with your Excellency (the derya begi being the moin's nominee). But as they do not allow him to follow his own inclinations, it is not possible for me to feel reassured unless they give assurances to yourself, and you then give me direct assurances yourself.

\* Cf. p. 121. Moses Khan would hesitate to introduce the name of a foreign consulate in discussion with a member of the residency, but would often open his mouth more freely to an outsider.—P. Z. C.

† Copy obtained from telegraph superintendent in strict confidence.—P. Z. C.



*Note.*—Handwriting verified beyond doubt from other specimens of his writing, on residency records, and from two officials of the telegraph department, who are familiar with it.

I have several times been told during the recent disturbances that telegrams sent by Seyyid Murteza from time to time by the English wire, in English, were drafted and written by Mirza Hussein. It was *prima facie* unlikely that the mirza would leave such evidence of his association with the seyyid, and those telegrams which I have been able to see, were written in crude writing, probably of schoolboys, and not by the mirza.

The one above, however, was recognised directly it was received by the telegraph clerk as being in the handwriting of Mirza Hussein's brother, and the fact is made abundantly clear by comparison with documents in the same individual's writing forthcoming on the residency records.

P. Z. COX.

(H.)—*Statement made to His Majesty's Vice-Consul by Haji Ewaz Dashti, Native Agent of Messrs. Ziegler and Co.*

Deals with—

1. Visits of Mirza of German consulate to Seyyid Murteza.
2. Promise by Mirza of German consulate of support from German consulate.
3. Question of guard at Messrs. Wöneckhaus's premises.
4. Connection of Seyyid and the German Mirza with arms traffic.

*Note by His Britannic Majesty's Vice-Consul, dated May 16, 1909.*

Haji EWAZ DASHTI (Ziegler's native agent) came to see me to-day. He lives just behind Seyyid Murteza's house, and has known the seyyid intimately for some years. He told me that on one occasion, some two or three days before the looting of the bazaars, he had visited Seyyid Murteza and was advising him strongly to send away Ahmed Khan Tangistani and Ghulam Hussein Haji Khidar because of their blood enmity with Zair Khidar, saying that he, the seyyid, would surely get himself into trouble if these parties started fighting in the town.

Whilst he was talking Mirza Hussein, the German munshi, came in. The seyyid assured him that he could speak out in Haji Ewaz's presence, as he, Haji Ewaz, was a Dashti. Mirza Hussein, after smoking a kalia, said that he had been praising Seyyid Murteza to his consul ("Khaili taarif shuma kerde-am"), and went on to say that he would get his consul to protect Seyyid Murteza in the event of the seyyid getting into trouble with the English. Mirza Hussein said that "Germany is a Power like England, rather it is a stronger Power in ships of war, manufactures, &c."

On a second occasion, on or about the day after the landing of the bluejackets, Haji Ewaz, who had tried to see Seyyid Murteza for several days but could not gain access to him on account of his tufangchis and followers, managed to see him early one morning. Haji Mohammed Hassan and Mirza Hussein came in. Mirza Hussein said, "I have brought you good news (basharat)." Seyyid Murteza asked, "with reference to the nation or a Government." Mirza Hussein replied, "Dovlet" (i.e., Dovlet-i-Alman). He went on to say, "I have seen the consul, and he has removed the English soldiers from the office" (Krumpeter's).<sup>\*</sup> He was very angry at their being there and had said, "They must not be there any longer. I have spoken to the consul about you; it is not suitable for you to come to the consulate or for the consul to come and see you. But he will protect you, and he has telegraphed to his Government as well. The German Government is very great, and will have these bluejackets taken away." Haji Mohamed Hassan used also very strong expressions in the same sense, assuring the seyyid of German support.

Haji Ewaz said Seyyid Murteza and Haji Mohammed Hassan and Mirza Hussein had been in relations concerning arms traffic for some time past. The two latter are in partnership and they give the seyyid 1 toman per gun imported and 1 toman for five revolvers. The seyyid on his part was to get up a "shulugh" (riot) against the customs, if any German guns were confiscated by the customs. Seyyid Murteza also

<sup>\*</sup> Cf., p. 109 B (4) and views expressed in my note thereon.

sent instructions to tribal chiefs like Rais Ali Tangistani, of Dilwar, to assist in importation of these arms. The latter Khan had two dhows which often went to Muscat for the smuggling traffic.

H. G. CHICK.

May 16, 1909.

*Report by Persian Clerk in Residency Office, dated April 18, 1909.*

I am informed that Mirza Hussein, interpreter of the German consulate, is telling people that the British resident by misrepresenting matters to the German consul wanted the latter to co-operate with him like the Russian consul in capturing Bushire, but that the German consul refused to do so; that the British resident wanted to send British soldiers to the German consulate,<sup>\*</sup> but the German consul did not agree to receive them because the German consul is in favour of the Nationalists.

He is also trying to instigate the people to raise objection to the firing of guns indulged in by the British.

ABD-US-SAMAD.

*Alleged or Suspected Connection of Mirza Hussein, Mirza of the German Consulate, and other Persons connected with the German Firm, with the Smuggling of Arms and other Contraband.*

*Extract from the News Diary which Vice-Consul keeps for the Consul-General's information, dated April 4, 1907.*

(1.) A SERIOUS case of arms smuggling is reported. Quite lately 642 rifles were landed at Bariki, where the Khatkhuda is in partnership with a number of Bushiris in the arms traffic; 300 rifles have been brought into Bushire overland by night, and were secreted somewhere in the town or its environs. It is not known where the remaining 342 rifles have been disposed of. The following inhabitants of Bushire are known to have had these rifles smuggled and are implicated in it:—

1. Meshedi Ewaz.
2. Zair Haji.
3. Zair Abdullah.
4. Muslim Kassab.
5. Azad Khan Topchi.
6. One Ali, formerly in the employ of the bank.

These men form part of a band of about twenty persons who are always together. Further names will probably be forthcoming.

H. G. CHICK.

*Note.*—It was Zair Haji and Muslim Kassab who were recently associated with Mustapha Nawab and Messrs. Wöneckhaus in a suit regarding a cargo of dates which has caused a good deal of trouble.†—P. Z. C.

*Extract from Diary of the Persian Gulf Residency for the week ending September 29, 1907.*

2005. The arms traffic is particularly brisk in Bushire at the present moment. The principal smuggler appears to be the commander of the artillery, who is reported to be arranging a large arms store in his house outside the town. It is further alleged that the consignees of the 2,071 cases of arms and ammunition which have been landed at Muscat in the last twelve months by German steamers are a certain Abdur Rahim-bin-Jaffer, Bushiri, the agent of Mirza Hussein, the mirza of the German consulate here, and Haji Mohammed Hassan, broker to Messrs. Wöneckhaus. The greater part of the arms dealt in by the gang headed by the above-mentioned officer is said to consist of Mannlicher rifles. It is even hinted that the Hamburg-Amerika ships have been

<sup>\*</sup> Cf., p. 109 B (4).

† See also G (5).



known to discharge arms into boats out of sight of land. The real cause of the increasing intensity of illicit traffic is mainly the impotence of the customs, and the increasing apathy of the Belgian staff in the face of the difficulty and uncertainty of their present position. It is noticeable that the residency surgeon has recently treated two cases of accidental wounding by weapons of the latest make; and it is significant that a Persian servant was recently discovered by his English master poring over the price list of the Army and Navy Stores, in which he was able to distinguish by the illustrations between a Browning and a Mauser pistol.

*Extract from Diary of the Persian Gulf Residency for the week ending October 13, 1907.*

2117. Mirza Hussein Ali, till lately customs mudir at Dilwar, near Bushire,\* has stated that during the seven months of his tenure of that post, the quantity of arms, ammunition, and spices smuggled in by the sheikh of Chahkoota and the Khan of Tangistan would have brought in 7,000 tomans (1,400*l.*) to the customs.

*Extract from Diary of the Persian Gulf Residency for the week ending October 20, 1907.*

2162. With reference to paragraphs 2005 and 2117, enquiries by the vice-consul on the subject of smuggling have elicited the following additional facts. The profits of the gang referred to in the former paragraph are said to have totalled 10,000 tomans during the past year, the chief item being arms and ammunition, but spices and tea accounting for a part of the total. These two articles are largely smuggled at Rudhillah, where the smugglers are said to have a counterfeit customs stamping-machine, which enables their goods to pass the verifactor stationed inland at Khushab.

*Extract from Diary of the Persian Gulf Residency No. 5 for the week ending February 2, 1908.*

278. It is alleged that seventy-four revolvers were landed from the steam-ship "Sicilia" for Mirza Hussein, the German consulate munshi; they were brought ashore by him and others in the pilot-boat. They are selling in the bazaar for 15 tomans (3*l.*) each. The Hamal Bashi complains bitterly that the entire subordinate customs staff is as corrupt as before the tariff, and accuses Mirza Ibrahim, under whose direction the customs watchmen are, of countenancing smuggling.

*Memoranda by His Britannic Majesty's Vice-Consul, dated August 1908.*

August 2.—Last night a mashowa was discovered discharging cartridges near Bin Mane (village between the Russian and German consulates). The customs tufangchis got to hear of it, and captured one load containing some 3000 cartridges and a few revolvers. The customs authorities claim that a good deal more had already been landed, and the mashowa got up sail hurriedly and left.

August 4.—It is credibly asserted that the boat which was detected landing arms and cartridges on the shore not far from the German consulate was the pilot boat of the German steamer. The German mirza and shipping office employés are known to be engaged in the arms trade, and it is not the first time that there has been a strong suspicion of arms having been smuggled ashore from these Hamburg steamers.

*Note by Vice-Consul, dated May 9, 1909.*

Agha Muhsin (consular dragoman) reported a day or two ago hearing further from his friend the Amin-ut-Tujjar that Haji Mohamed Hassan, the broker of Wöneckhaus

\* It was Rais Ali, the chief of Dilwar, whom Seyyid Murteza called in with his men to seize the customs. One of the first things that he did was to open the godown where the confiscated arms and ammunition is stored and transfer the whole to Seyyid Murteza's house. It was Rais Ali, of Dilwar, again who made the second attempt to enter Bushire on the 6th June, but was defeated and ejected by the derya begi, and Seyyid Murteza was then captured himself.—P. Z. C.

and Co., and a former servant of the amin's, had been complaining bitterly to the Amin-ut-Tujjar some little time before the disturbances here of the bad market for rifles, of which he had a large number in stock. The amin told him that Haji Mohamed Hassan had been congratulating himself on having disposed of all his stock during the disturbances, put a stop to by the landing of our troops.

To-day Amin-ut-Tujjar was in my office, and incidentally, while speaking of the reckless way in which Persian soldiers waste their cartridges, and also about the intervention of the gun-running gang here in favour of Mustapha Nawab,\* he repeated to me the statement that Haji Mohamed Hassan, the German firm's broker, had made to him. The amin had been to Haji Mohamed Hassan to buy a gun for himself. Haji Mohamed Hassan replied that he was very sorry, but he had just disposed of all his stock in hand.

H. G. CHICK.

*Note by Vice-Consul, dated May 9, 1909.*

I had a conversation with Haji Muhammad Dallal, Gray Paul's broker, in their office this afternoon. His house is next to Seyyid Murteza's. After having discussed commercial affairs for some time, he went on to speak about Seyyid Murteza and his following. Haji Muhammad said that he saw nearly everybody who went in and out of the seyyid's house every morning and could often hear him holding a council. He remembered him holding a secret meeting after my visit to the seyyid, but did not notice all who were there. He stated that Meshedy Ali Ahremi (French vice-consul's man), his brother Bahram, Haji Mohamed Hassan (the German office's broker) and Mirza Hussein went continually to the seyyid's house; he saw them.

For this, he said, there was a reason. For the last two years these men have been carrying on the arms trade actively, and in order to avoid any chance of search by the customs, or their houses, they take the guns and ammunition smuggled by way of Dilwar† or Rubhillah to the seyyid's house, where they secrete them and can be sure of their being safe from the attentions of the customs.

*Information furnished by the Manager of the Imperial Bank of Persia, Bushire, regarding Mirza Hussein's connection with the Arms Traffic, dated May 9, 1909.*

"Abdul Majid and Brother" is the way the "firm" is styled for business purposes, although strictly speaking Abdul Majid himself is only the seven-year old son of one, Agha Mirza Abdul Hussein,‡ the dragoman at the German consulate at the present time. The real owner of the "firm" is Agha Mirza Abdul Hussein himself and the adoption of his infant son's name as a *nom-de-plume* is only one of his methods for diverting suspicion, for as you know, the "firm" is engaged merely in smuggling guns and ammunition into Persia. Some time ago, when I first arrived in Bushire and before I knew the nature of Mirza Abdul Hussein's business, I asked him if Abdul Majid was his brother and his reply was, "No, I am merely interested in him."

There are secret confederates in Bushire of whom the chief is Haji Mohamed Hassan-bin-Abul Bushiri, of whom, for your information, the bank's opinion is, "petty dealer of fair credit." "Employé of Messrs. R. Wöneckhaus and Co. He has made a considerable amount of money lately, but his business is risky. Caution required. We give him credit up to 7,000 tomans."

Besides the above there are others connected with the "firm" amongst whom I might mention Zar Haji Dashti,§ Haji Moslem Ghasab, Azad Beg Toopcheh, Agha Abdurrahim Kazerooni—all small men in business. The last named is not in Bushire at the time of writing.

The methods adopted by the "firm" in carrying on their business are somewhat after the following manner:—

Agha Mirza Abdul Hussein buys from the bank telegraphic transfers on our London office, who are asked to pay the amount, or rather its equivalent, to the Commerz und Disconto Bank, in Hamburg, by mail. A list of the various telegraphic transfers bought from us by Mirza Abdul Hussein is appended to this letter, as also a list of various drafts bought from us by the above-mentioned Haji Mohamed Hassan Bushiri.

\* In connection with cargo of dates.—P. Z. C.  
‡ Commonly called Mirza Hussein.—P. Z. C.

† Vide note on p. 124, J (3).  
§ Cf., p. 122, J (1).



Against receipt of these telegraphic transfers guns and ammunition are shipped by German steamers addressed to Muscat. According to information in our possession two firms in Germany seem to supply these goods, their names and addresses are: Imman Meffert, Gewehr-Fabrik, Suhl, Thuringen, and Gustav Genschow and Co., Aktiengesellschaft, Hamburg. The bills of lading are sent by post direct to Abdul Majid in Bushire, and of course are received by Mirza Abdul Hussein. The goods arrive in Muscat some three weeks after the bills of lading are received in Bushire, and during these three weeks the method adopted by Mirza Abdul Hussein seems to be to try and sell the whole consignment *en bloc* by means of the bills of lading, the possession of which of course means the ownership of the goods mentioned thereon.

If Mirza Abdul Hussein is unable to sell the whole consignment *en bloc* in Bushire, he sends the bills of lading to his principal agent in Muscat, Mirza Hussein Isfahani, who on receipt of the documents takes delivery of the goods from the customs, after paying the duty of 5 per cent. *ad valorem* on such goods in Muscat. Mirza Abdul Hussein then draws on his agents (there are two) in Muscat to deliver so many guns and so many rounds of ammunition to so and so, either against payment here in Bushire or against payment in Muscat.

The two agents in Muscat are—

1. Mirza Hussein Isfahani, mentioned above; and
2. Agha Aldurrahim-bin-Jaffer Bushiri.

The object of having two agents in Muscat is, I hear, because these two men make a speciality of different kinds of arms. For instance, the one is a better seller of Mausers than the other, and, *vice versa*, the one is better of another make than the other.

As far as I have been able to trace the first mention of the name of Abdul Majid and Brother in the bank's books appears to be on the 23rd April, 1908, when Mirza Abdul Hussein bought his first telegraphic transfer from us on London. Haji Mohamed Hassan, on the other hand, has been buying from us sterling drafts on London ever since the 2nd November, 1907.

I enclose the lists of the purchases of exchange of these two men.

ARTHUR L. SIMPSON.

LIST of Drafts and Telegraphic Transfers bought from the Imperial Bank of Persia, Bushire, by Mirza Abdul Hussein (in the name of Abdul Majid, or Abdul Majid and Brother), and Haji Mohamed-bin-Hassan Abul Bushiri.

Telegraphic Transfers on London by Mirza Abdul Hussein.				Drafts on London by Haji Mohamed Hassan.			
		£	s. d.			£	s. d.
1908—				1907—			
23rd April	..	480	0 0	2nd November, on demand	..	100	0 0
6th June	..	300	0 0	19th "	..	100	0 0
11th "	..	200	0 0	28th December, "	..	140	0 0
5th July*	..	25	0 0	1908—			
12th "	..	600	0 0	16th February, "	..	200	0 0
18th October	..	400	0 0	2nd April, "	..	350	0 0
23rd December	..	230	0 0	18th " three months' date	..	200	0 0
1909—				25th " "	..	199	17 9
21st February	..	140	0 0	27th June, " on demand	..	86	4 3
18th April	..	190	0 0	29th November, "	..	50	0 0
2nd May	..	150	0 0†	6th December, "	..	200	0 0
				8th " "	..	100	0 0
				12th " "	..	300	0 0
				1909—			
				17th January, "	..	800	0 0
				24th " "	..	172	19 2
				30th " "	..	200	0 0
				28th March, "	..	410	0 0
				4th May, three months' date	..	100	0 0
Total	..	2,715	0 0	Total	..	3,709	1 2

\* This telegraphic transfer was payable to Gustav, Genschow, and Co., Aktiengesellschaft, Hamburg. All the other telegraphic transfers were payable to Commerz und Disconto Bank, Hamburg.

† The German mirza's pay is only 60 toman per month, equal about 130l. per year.—P. Z. C.

Translation of an Anonymous Letter addressed to the Customs Director, Bushire, press copy of which was anonymously sent to the Imperial Bank of Persia, Bushire.

Bushire, May 31, 1909.

For some time I have wanted to give you some information, but I presumed that your administration was fully aware of all sorts of occurrences. Even now I am sure that you have full knowledge. What is the cause that you feign ignorance, since you have steamers at your disposal and you draw a large salary from the Government which belongs to the poor nation? What can a respectable merchant do when persons smuggle goods from customs? If you know, why do you not stop it? And if you do not know I will now tell you. Haji Moslem, Zar Haji Mohamed Moheb,\* Mohamed Dashti, Zar Abdullah, Meshedi Ewaz, Azad Beg, Haji Mohamed Hassan, Haji Shaban Bazaz, are the persons who smuggle every month a large quantity of tea, aniline dye, arms, &c., via Koweit—some via Tangistan to Ahmedi and Tangistan villages. May the national right (of bread you usurp) blind you! Keep a commissioner at Dalaki, between the Borasjoon and Khushab roads, and then you will see what quantities of goods are smuggled without paying any duty. Even the agent of the Bombay Persian Steam Navigation Company (Limited)† has gone into partnership with Sheikh Hussein ("Peder Sookhti"), of Chakooteh, and lands large quantities of goods.

You create expenses for the Government. Why do you not also keep a man who must not be dishonest, provided the chiefs (whose wives are disreputable) co-operate and not work as antagonists? Noor Mahomed Khan, of Dalaki, charges 1 toman per load on all smuggled goods; tea, 1 toman per case; rifles, 1 toman per gun. He has made a contract to that effect with Sheikh Hussein Chakooteh to pay and allow to pass free. Why do you not order these small steamers which are under your control to be stationed near Bahrein, to confiscate the smuggled articles for Tangistan and Koweit?

You unloyal to Government, be disgraced! You have acquired the same habit as the dishonest Persian Mussulman officers. Merchants are ruined; revenues are lost. Look what is going on. What is the matter? Has the Empire been divided into various kingdoms? If you do not take steps, then I will know how to write about you.

"WELL-WISHER."

Extract from Statement of Haji Ewaz, Messrs. Ziegler's Native Agent, regarding connection of the German Mirza and Brother with Smuggling Traffic, dated May 16, 1909.

Haji Ewaz said Seyyid Murteza and Haji Mohamed Hassan and Mirza Hussein had been in relations concerning arms traffic for some time past. The two latter are in partnership, and they give the seyid 1 toman per gun imported and 1 toman for five revolvers. The seyid, on his part, was to get up a "shulugh" (riot) against the customs if any German guns were confiscated by the customs. Seyyid Murteza also sent instructions to tribal chiefs like Rais Ali Tangistani,‡ of Dilwar, to assist in importation of these arms. The latter khan had two dhows, which often went to Muscat for the smuggling traffic.

H. G. CHICK.

\* Cf., p. 123, J (3).

† No doubt acting on this anonymous letter, the director of customs has since approached me in regard to this agent's complicity in smuggling. I asked him to try and get some concrete evidence and then write to me officially. When the late agent of the company died, and I heard from His Majesty's vice-consul that the present man was about to be appointed, I telegraphed on the 24th July, 1908, (\*) to the Government of India to beg that, if possible, the head office of the company in Bombay might be advised to appoint another man. The company refused, however, to accept our advice.—P. Z. C.

‡ Cf., p. 124, J (3).



[27219]

No. 223.

*Consul-General Cox to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 19.)*

(No. 5. Commercial. Confidential.)

Sir,

*Bushire, June 27, 1909.*

WITH reference to your telegram No. 309, dated the 22nd June, 1909, addressed to His Majesty's Minister, Tehran, I have the honour to forward copies of the under-mentioned documents:—

1. Letter from Lieutenant A. T. Wilson, commanding Indian oil guards at Ahwaz, to the Resident, No. 205, dated the 10th June.

2. Report on the Karkhah River, with special reference to its suitability for irrigation, with maps.\* By Lieutenant A. T. Wilson.

Copies are also being sent to His Majesty's Minister, Tehran, and to the Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department.

I have, &c.

P. Z. COX, Major, British Resident in the  
Persian Gulf, and His Britannic Majesty's  
Consul-General for Fars, &c.

Inclosure 1 in No. 223.

*Lieutenant Wilson to Consul-General Cox.*

(No. 205.)

Sir,

*Ahwaz, June 10, 1909.*

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a report on the River Karkhah, with special reference to its suitability for irrigation, with maps.\*

2. The conclusion which I have reached, after a careful examination of the river in the vicinity of Kut Nahr Hashim, and after full consideration of all available information bearing on the political and tribal aspects of the question, is that the scheme, adumbrated by Sheikh Khazal for the reconstruction of a dam at Kut Nahr Hashim on the Karkhah presents no practical difficulties, and is likely to be extremely remunerative. It will be recollected that Sir W. Willcocks, on information supplied to him by me in March, before I had actually visited the river, expressed the same opinion.

3. The only serious political or tribal difficulties that seem likely to arise are those which may be caused by the hostility of the Bani Turuf to any scheme of irrigation from the Karkhah, which, if carried out, will inevitably diminish the area of the marshes in which they live, and whose waters they utilise extensively for the cultivation of rice. Sheikh Khazal, however, though fully aware of this difficulty, and giving it perhaps more weight than seems to be justified by facts, has expressed to me his belief that, by a combination of threats and cajolery, and by offering the tribe land on the new canals, he will be able to secure their consent, though it will perhaps be given unwillingly.

4. The scheme involves the construction of a barrage at Kut Nahr Hashim, near the site of two previous dams, and the clearing out of the old canals, which, until twenty-five years ago, were actually in use, and have been found in practice to be effective. This barrage must be of brick and stone, and, in view of previous failures, Sheikh Khazal realises the necessity for its construction by a European expert. With the exception of the dam and headworks, however, he would require no European assistance, being fully capable of arranging for the cleaning out of the canals and the distribution of the water himself, as was done by his predecessor.

5. On my returning from visiting the river on the 2nd June, 1909, I visited Sheikh Khazal and described to him what I had seen, and my views as to the practicability of the various schemes. He seemed greatly interested, and, as regards the Sinn-ul-Abbas scheme, said that, had he known how easily it could be completed, he would have finished it long ago. As regards the Kut Nahr Hashim scheme, he said that if only the British would lend him 50,000*l.* he would undertake this scheme, spending, say, 20,000*l.* on it, and the rest on houses, pumps, forts, and other works which he had in contemplation. The interest on this sum, say, 2,500*l.*, was, he said, a small thing,

\* Not reproduced.

only one-twentieth of what he had spent on the Bani Turuf expedition last year, and he would have no difficulty in paying it out of his last year's revenue or in kind, in the form of dates, rice, &c. It could, however, be secured, if necessary, on the canal works at Nahr Hashim.

6. In reply, I reminded him of his undertaking with regard to Karkhah irrigation, and said that if he was to produce a tangible scheme for Karkhah irrigation and make definite proposals on the subject to the British Government, I had little doubt that the latter would assist him as promised.

7. He then asked what steps he should take in order to commence an examination of the question with a view to early action. He said that he was prepared to undertake the erection of a dam at Kut Nahr Hashim next year, and that he would ask the British Government for an engineer to examine the site in the cold weather and estimate the cost. He then asked me if I could undertake any preliminary work in connection with the preparation of a scheme and estimates. I replied that I should, of course, have to refer the question to Government, and could give no answer at present. He repeated this suggestion, saying that as I was his friend, known to all the Arabs, and knowing the country, I could tactfully carry out preliminary work and accustom the Arabs near Kut Nahr Hashim to European methods of investigation. He offered me every facility for the purpose, and repeated his desire to take up the question seriously, getting a European engineer out to make plans and estimate the cost, and finally arranging with the British Government for the financing of the scheme.

8. I am not yet sure how far the sheikh is in earnest, but his attitude has certainly changed since 1907, when he refused to permit Major Morton to go to Kut Nahr Hashim, on the ground that it was not safe, and that his investigations would excite the Arabs. I think there is no probability of the latter viewing my investigations unfavourably; as far as I can judge local opinion is strongly in favour of the dam being built, and I was cordially welcomed. At all events I am sure that the sheikh was in earnest in asking me to undertake a detailed examination of the site, in order to facilitate and expedite the work of the expert who would be subsequently called in to estimate and report, and I believe that he is really anxious to forward the scheme.

9. The sheikh's suggestion, which accords with my personal inclinations, seems to be good, and I beg to recommend that I be permitted to undertake a detailed examination of the Kut Nahr Hashim site as soon as possible, assisted by the two surveyors now working under me on Abbadan Island.

Such an examination as I propose would include a large-scale map of the vicinity of Kut Nahr Hashim, with river levels, depth, site of rocks, old dams, &c., and a large-scale map of the district, showing old canals proposed to be reopened, with levels, both on the lines of Major Morton's Karun scheme.

10. Such an investigation would occupy me about three months, and would be of the greatest use to any engineer who might be subsequently required to report on the scheme and estimate the cost. As long as I remain in Arabistan in charge of the Indian oil guard I can undertake this task in addition to my other duties, in the same way as my enquiries at Mohammerah, on Abbadan Island, and elsewhere in South-West Persia.

If, however, as is not unlikely, the guard be removed before I am able to complete the enquiry, it might be necessary to depute me for a month or two longer for the purpose.

11. I therefore beg to request that I may be permitted to undertake this investigation as soon as possible, in such ways and by such means as I find practicable; and I would further ask that when orders have been passed I may be informed by telegraph, in order that I may commence as soon as possible and complete the investigation before the beginning of the cold weather. This will enable the scheme to be examined during the ensuing winter by an expert and a decision arrived at by the spring of 1910.

12. In an interview on the 11th instant Sheikh Khazal affirmed his desire to arrange for a British engineer to visit Kut Nahr Hashim this winter to prepare plans and estimates.

I have, &c.

A. T. WILSON.



## Inclosure 2 in No. 223.

*Report by Lieutenant A. T. Wilson on the Karkhah River, with special reference to its suitability for Irrigation: with Maps.*

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## Chief Sources of Information.

Consular Diaries, 1892-1909 (Mohammerah).  
Administration Reports, Persian Gulf, 1890-1907.  
"Early Adventures," Layard, 1840.  
Interview with Haji Rais, 18th April, 1909.  
Interview with Sheikh Khazal, 19th April, 2nd June, and 11th June, 1909.  
Despatch from Sir W. Willecocks to Major P. Z. Cox, C.I.E., dated March 1909.  
Notes on Shaur and Shush, by Lieutenant A. T. Wilson, Christmas Day, 1908.  
Report on Karun Irrigation Scheme, by Major W. R. Morton, R.E., 1907.  
Notes on Karkhah and Kut Nahr Hashim, by Lieutenant A. T. Wilson, 31st May to 2nd June, 1909.  
Articles on Hawizeh and River Karkhah in Mr. J. G. Lorimer's "Persian Gulf Gazetteer."

## PART (A).—POLITICAL AND TRIBAL CONSIDERATIONS.

1. *Extent of Sheikh's exclusive Rights and his undisputed Boundaries.*

The jurisdiction of Sheikh Khazal over all Arabs in Arabistan who are Persian subjects is now practically undisputed, and extends from near Pa-i-Pul above Shush along the Karkhah to Hawizeh, including the whole district under the vali of the latter place, and from Ghuraibah downwards both banks of the Karkhah. Beyond the Karkhah roam nomad tribes, some like the Chanana, nominally Persian subjects and friendly to the sheikh, others such as the Bani Lam, Abdul Khan, and Khasrij, nominally Turkish subjects, but practically independent. The sheikh claims the Dawairij River as the Perso-Turkish boundary, the Turks the Karkhah. Near Nahr Hashim the west bank of the latter is occupied by Bani Turuf. The sheikh's authority over Hawizeh is undisputed, though he not infrequently finds it necessary to use force, or threats of force, to obtain the revenue from the people of Hawizeh (10,000 tomans), and from the Bani Turuf (20,000 tomans) who live west of Hawizeh near the marshes of the Karkhah, and cultivate rice extensively. The right of the Arabs of Hawizeh and Kut Nahr Hashim to construct dams and to utilise the Karkhah for irrigation purposes is unquestioned, and has been exercised constantly during the last 100 years. The three dams at Kut Nahr Hashim were made by various valis of Hawizeh and their rights can now be properly exercised by the sheikh, who since 1902 has assumed responsibility for the revenue of the district, the Persian Government being unable to recover the same by their own arrangements. Hawizeh is included theoretically in the administrative

division of Southern Arabistan, and in 1904 the Sheikh of Mohammerah by a successful expedition against the Bani Turuf, the principal tribe, succeeded in reducing the tribe to actual submission.

Similar action was contemplated by him in 1908, though on this occasion the collection of a force at Muzaffari was sufficient to bring the Bani Turuf to terms. Up to twenty-five years ago the water of the Karkhah was brought to within 4 miles of Aminivah, opposite Ahwaz by means of canals, which irrigated an area of about 250,000 acres, the whole district being admittedly in the hands of Arabs tributary to Haji Jabir, the father of the present sheikh. The lands of Kut Nahr Hashim have been occupied continuously for at least four generations by the predecessors of the present inhabitants.

## Summary.

The sheikh exercises effective jurisdiction from the Karun to the Karkhah and the old bed of the Karkhah, by virtue of his position as successor to Haji Jabir as chief of the Chaab and Muhaisin and allied tribes. By virtue of his position of overlord of Hawizeh, which he attained gradually from 1895 onwards, and formally in 1904, he exercises effective jurisdiction over all Arabs who are Persian subjects in the Hawizeh district, i.e., up to the Turco-Persian frontier.

The question as to whether he has an exclusive right to the Kut Nahr Hashim lands will now be examined.

2. *Nizam-es-Sultaneh's Claims.*

Nizam-es-Sultaneh was governor of Arabistan in 1889-90, 1894-5, and 1895-6, when he was dismissed owing to his unsatisfactory action in the Tanfield case. When in Tehran in 1895 (94?) he found that concessions in Arabistan were obtainable for the asking, and obtained a series of farmans giving him the lands at Deh Mulla on the Hindiyan River, on the Jarrahi and at Mashur, on the right (east) bank of the Karun (Anafjah land), and at Kut Nahr Hashim. No copies, or even passably accurate verbal summaries, of these farmans are available; their contents are only known by the statements of Nizam-es-Sultaneh to Haji Rais in Tehran in 1895, as reported by the latter. The farmans respecting Deh Mulla and the Jarrahi seem to have been quickly cancelled, and the sheikh's rights there are undisputed; that respecting the right bank of the Karun is said to have been rendered obsolete by a new farman obtained by Sheikh Mizal through Haji Rais, acknowledging the rights of the Chaab thereto. It is further alleged that when the Nizam-es-Sultaneh obtained this farman, a farman confirming the rights of the Chaab was already in existence. None of these farmans are available for inspection. At all events up to his death, the rights of the Nizam-es-Sultaneh to Mashur were not disputed, and the sheikh acted as his agent there. The farman relating to Kut Nahr Hashim on the Karkhah has not been disputed, although there are grounds for thinking that it is in reality cancelled by the farman of 1901, in which the Persian Government acknowledged that they had no right to grant to others land belonging to Arabs on Abbadan Island, and on the left (and right) bank of the Karun without granting compensation to the occupants; this point cannot be finally settled until the farman is produced.\* On general grounds, however, the farman, if seriously disputed, could not be upheld, for the rights of the Nizam-es-Sultaneh in Kut Nahr Hashim, if he ever possessed them, may be held to have lapsed through lack of exercise. He never took any measures to defend his property from the Bani Turuf, nor attempted to develop it in any way. On his death in 1907 his rights are stated to have passed into the hands of his nephew and heir, Sardar Mukarram, who also succeeded to the title of Nizam-es-Sultaneh. The sheikh had been in the habit of paying the nizam 500 tomans per annum for Kut Nahr Hashim and 500 tomans to Government, though as a matter of fact it is admitted that the maliyat due to Government is 1,000 tomans per annum. This arrangement was come to in order not to disturb the Arabs by asking them to pay more taxes than they did before the Nizam-es-Sultaneh purchased the land.

These payments were continued until the death of the nizam, since when no money has been paid to Government or to the present nizam (Sardar Mukarram). Sheikh Khazal states that he will never pay again to the latter, though, of course, he will resume the payment of maliyat to Government should circumstances necessitate it; he

\* It is in safe keeping at Sabiliyet, on the Turkish bank of the Shatt-al-Arab. The slave woman in charge has gone away to Kerbelah, taking the key with her.



further announces emphatically that he intends to dispute the Nizam-es-Sultaneh's farmans, and get them cancelled, and it seems probable that he will succeed. The Kut Nahr Hashim farman seems to have been obtained by the nizam in compensation for losses sustained by him at Shiraz. He took it as a speculation, intending to sell it to the sheikh at a remunerative price later on.

Sheikh Khazal is emphatic in desiring the British Government to refrain from bringing up the question of these concessions for the present, asserting that he will do what is necessary to get them cancelled himself.

#### *Summary.*

The late Nizam-es-Sultaneh's claims are based upon a farman of doubtful legality, giving him rights in land which it was not in the power of the Persian Government to give—a fact which has been admitted as far as the left bank of the Karun and Abbadan Island is concerned, which districts are on a precisely similar footing to the lands on the west bank of the Karkhah. His claims need not therefore be taken seriously, or considered to be a serious obstacle to the sheikh's schemes.

#### *3. Effect of Scheme on Inhabitants of Hawizeh District.*

The inhabitants of the Hawizeh district, governed formerly by a semi-independent chief, known as the wali, consist broadly speaking of the fixed population in and near Hawizeh town (5,000 souls) and the nomadic tribes commonly known as the Bani Turuf, whose numbers are estimated at 60,250. The former own no irrigated land, and in fact rely for their water supply solely on a canal known as Atabiyah, the head of which is in the hands of the Bani Turuf. Their condition would be no worse if irrigation works were started at Kut Nahr Hashim, and might be greatly improved if water was thereby led again to Hawizeh, as was done some forty years ago on a small scale.

The Bani Turuf and tribes attached thereto are numerous, well-to-do, and warlike; they utilise the water of the Karkhah extensively for the cultivation of rice, and would resent actively any serious diminution of their water supply, if they felt themselves strong enough to do so. At present, however, they are in the power of the sheikh, their chief men being hostages at Failya.

They are the most important factor to be reckoned with in the districts west of the Karun, and Sheikh Khazal, though he affects to scorn the idea of their being able to offer effective resistance to an irrigation scheme at Kut Nahr Hashim, is in reality not a little nervous as to their possible attitude in the matter. This nervousness, however, does not seem justified by facts, and there is little doubt that if he undertakes the scheme boldly he will receive the enthusiastic support of his subjects, who view the Kut Nahr Hashim scheme more favourably than any other, because the older generation remember the past fertility of the districts now barren which were watered by Nahr Hashim system.

The gain of irrigated land at Kut Nahr Hashim will be far greater than the loss of irrigated land in the Bani Turuf district, where the greater part of the waters of the Karkhah are lost in the marshes. It should not be impossible for the sheikh to grant irrigated lands on the new canal or elsewhere to the Bani Turuf, in order to compensate them for the reduction of the marsh water. This step would also help to bring the Bani Turuf into parts of Arabistan more accessible than their present marshes, and assist the sheikh in his task of reducing this recalcitrant tribe to submission. Some such action is, in fact, contemplated by the sheikh, who hopes, if he erects a dam at Kut Nahr Hashim, to secure their co-operation.

#### *Summary.*

The Bani Turuf would be prejudicially affected by irrigation projects on the Karkhah, and would have to be compensated by the grant of land on the new canal or elsewhere. The sheikh is nervous as to their attitude in the matter, and will do his best to satisfy their fair claims, rather than force them to have resort to arms.

#### *4. Attitude of Persian Government.*

The Persian Government might perhaps claim the right to grant a concession for irrigation on the Karkhah, as it has virtually alleged its right to do on the Karun.

It is plain that such a claim would be wholly untenable. The Karun is open to international traffic, and a diminution of its waters would involve questions with which the Central Government alone could deal. Nor has the Karun been utilised for irrigation during the last 500 years. The Karkhah, on the other hand, is not navigable, and has been dammed at one place or another near Kut Nahr Hashim from ancient times more or less continuously till about 1884, when the most recently built dam broke.

The only possible excuse that the Central Government could have for interfering in the matter would be in order to enforce the claims of the Nizam-es-Sultaneh, dealt with above. Any such interference, however, in view of the unjust nature of these claims, would probably be held to constitute an infringement of the sheikh's autonomous position, which we are pledged to safeguard, and would not be tolerated by the sheikh for a moment.

#### *Summary.*

The Persian Government cannot legitimately or effectively interfere.

#### *5. Attitude of Turkish Government.*

The Turkish Government claim the Karkhah as the Perso-Turkish border, but their jurisdiction is not, and has never been, effective or in any way admitted by the inhabitants of the tract between the Karkhah and Dawairij. The Bani Lam and Khasrij certainly graze over the lands up to the west bank of the Karkhah at certain times of the year, but so also do the Bani Turuf and allied tribes, and the Chanana who are admittedly Persian subjects.

Near Kut Nahr Hashim the west bank is at present occupied by the tribe of one Saiyid Ali of the Bani Turuf.

On the whole, the claims of the Turkish Government need not be taken seriously, as the boundary question is not likely to be pressed seriously by them for many years to come, and their claim that the Karkhah is the boundary would probably be rejected by arbitrators.

#### *Summary.*

It is improbable that the Turkish Government would attempt to interfere in any way.

### *PART (B.)—THE KARKHAH.*

The Karkhah rises some 50 miles north of Karmanshah and flows through Luristan, the greater part of which province it drains. From its source to Dizful is about 250 miles. It forms the western limit of effective Persian jurisdiction as exercised by the governor of Arabistan and the sheikh of Mohammerah. Beyond it, within the hills, is the autonomous district of Pusht-i-Kuh, and between it and the Dawairij River roam virtually independent tribes such as the Bani Lam, Abdul Khan, and Khasrij (nominally Turkish), and the Chanana (nominally Persian).

In the middle ages the Karkhah was known as the Dujail of Basinra, from an important town which was then situated near it a short day's journey to the south of Shush.

Though it drains a larger area than the Diz, the volume of its waters is much smaller, because Luristan west of the Diz has fewer snow-clad mountains than the Bakhtiari country. Only the northern slopes of the Kabir Kuh, which is the main range, are drained by the Karkhah, the southern slopes being drained by rivers debouching into Turkish Mesopotamia.

#### *1. The Course of the Karkhah.*

Near its exit from the hills the Karkhah was formerly spanned by a bridge of which the remains still exist and are known as Pa-i-Pul. About 4 miles south of Pa-i-Pul the river passes the Sassanian ruins of Aiwan-i-Karkhah, which lie half-a-mile from its western bank; 14 miles further on, Shush, the site of the ancient Susa, is left 2 miles from the eastern bank. Aiwan-i-Karkhah was still in the tenth century A.D. a small but populous town with a weekly market.

The Karkhah after this runs south-south-east to a place due west of the point at which the Shaur joins the Diz; it runs south-west for 20 miles past Ghuraibah and Kut Nahr Hashim, 4 miles below which village it runs north-west above Hawizeh to the marshes in the possession of the Bani Turuf.



Six miles above Kut Nahr Hashim it breaks through a broad gap across the low range of sandstone hills known as Minyur, which run north-west from Ahwaz, and which give rise here, as at Ahwaz, to rapids. The ledges of rock over which the river here flows with a drop of about 5 feet are known as Sinn-ul-Abbas, and are not unlike those at Ahwaz, though on a smaller scale. This site is dealt with in some detail under "Irrigation Projects" below.

At Kut Nahr Hashim the river breaks through another low range of hills, and here again are rapids caused by the descent of the river over a series of rocky ledges, the total fall being about 5 feet in a mile. The remains of two stone dams erected upon these ledges are still to be seen. This site is also dealt with in detail under "Irrigation Projects."

Four miles below Kut Nahr Hashim the river turns abruptly north-west. At this point may be seen the remains of a dam built of sticks, mud, and stones, which was constructed probably about 120 years ago in order to prevent the river from leaving its old bed and adopting its present alignment. This dam was destroyed in 1837, according to Layard, by the river changing its bed, but according to local report by the deliberate act of one Abu Salbuq, chief of the Shurfa tribe, who had been dismissed and ejected by Abd Ali Wali, of Hawizeh. From an inspection of the site, the latter explanation seems more probable than the former. The dam once broken, the Karkhah, which was in flood at the time, reverted to the north-western channel, which the dam was designed to block, and in the course of a few years cut it down to its present level, some 10 feet below the level of the old bed.

It has frequently been asserted that the Karkhah once flowed into the Karun, according to one version, from the point west of Band-i-Qir, where it turns south-west; according to another version, from the point where the old bed turns north-west to Hawizeh. There is now no trace of any such bed, and Major Morton's levels seem to indicate that the first theory is untenable, and the second unlikely. Were the Karkhah diverted from its present bed towards the Karun it would probably not join that river, but flow down a depression which exists 8 or 10 miles on west of the western bank of the Karun, and runs towards Bussorah.

At the western end of the Hawizeh district, after flowing through irrigation canals and wide marshes, the river gradually reassembles its waters, and finally, under the name of Shwaiyib, it enters the Shatt-el-Arab 4 miles below Qurnah, its waters no longer clear, but muddy and contaminated by the overflow from the marshes of the Tigris and Dawairij.

### 2. Character of the Stream.

At its entrance into Arabistan the Karkhah is a broad and rapid stream of whitish colour in autumn, but heavily laden, like the Diz, with reddish silt when in flood. Near Aiwan-i-Karkhah it is split into several branches by low islands. Further down it continues to be broad, and islands and banks in mid-stream remain frequent; at Sinn-ul-Abbas the normal water level of the river is about 10 feet, at Kut Nahr Hashim about 15 feet, below the level of the surrounding country. It is fordable from June to December at frequent points between Kut Nahr Hashim and Pa-i-Pul. The locality of these fords shifts occasionally, but the flow of water is not abnormally rapid, and there is no reason to consider the fords dangerous. Frequent rapids and lack of water in summer make the Karkhah unsuited above Nahr Hashim for navigation of any kind, but in the summer of 1841, when the stream was at its lowest, a steamer ascended the Shwaiyib section for a distance of 10 miles. The waters of the Karkhah are celebrated in history for their purity, though for what reason it is hard to say. Being for the most part not snow-fed, its waters are several degrees warmer than those of the Karun, and apparently less pure. Parallel to the Karkhah, and taking its rise a few miles above Shush from springs which are probably fed by the Karkhah, runs the Shaur, a river of clear water, which retains the same level all the year round, except for floods caused by local rain. It seems to send distributaries normally into the Karkhah, but when the latter tops its banks it overflows into the Shaur.

### 3. Character of the Banks.

The banks of the Karkhah from Buq'ah-i-Ghaib Ibn Ali above Shush to Ghuraibah, are wooded with tamarisk jungle and small trees, and lined in places with dense brakes of cane reeds and willow, forming a belt several miles in breadth. The lion and fallow deer formerly found here are now practically extinct, but wild boar, hyena, and small

game abound; wolves are not unknown, and herds of gazelle frequent the plains on both banks of the river.

### 4. Irrigation and Villages.

The waters of the Karkhah above Shush are utilised for irrigation to some extent, and the canal, Harmushi, which takes off above Shush, near Pa-i-Pul, supplies a considerable area with water.

Near Shush are the remains of great canals, down which were probably floated the great stone columns for the Sassanian palace of Susa, brought from the mountains of Luristan. In Sassanian times a dam existed at Sinn-ul-Abbas, and within the last few years Saiyid Na'amah, under orders from Sheikh Khazal, expended 3,000 tomans belonging to the latter in constructing a small canal from above Sinn-ul-Abbas to the ground of Wasailah, a distance of about 3 miles. The canal was almost finished, and only the dam across the branch of the Karkhah with which the canal connected remained to be built. But owing apparently to a quarrel between Sheikh Khazal and Saiyid Na'amah the scheme was never completed. It is, however, technically sound, and would doubtless be extremely profitable.

At Kut Nahr Hashim are the remains of two brick and stone dams. The lower of the two and the older is built on a ledge of rock running from bank to bank of the river; it is remarkably low in elevation, and appears incapable of raising water to a sufficient height. It appears to have been destroyed by the river cutting round its eastern end. It is known as the Sadd-i-Farjullah, after the wali of Hawaizeh, who constructed it. The upper and more recent dam, some 500 yards above the Sadd-i-Farjullah, is known as the Sadd-i-Nasariyah, having been constructed in the reign of Nasir-ud-Din Shah. It is described in greater detail under "Irrigation Projects" below. It was made by Maula Nasrullah, wali of Hawaizeh, apparently about 1840, and was in use till about 1884, when it was turned by the water, which cut away the bank at its western end, leaving it high and dry. Local report states that this accident was caused by a fisherman of the Bani Turuf, who stood on the bank at flood-time with his trident in his hand and cut the bank, allowing the water to overflow, with results ruinous to Kut Nahr Hashim, but profitable to the Bani Turuf. On the opposite bank are to be seen the remains of a mud fort said to have been built by Asaf-ed-Dowleh when governor of Arabistan, for the use of the detachment of troops stationed there for the protection of the dam.

The dam 4 miles below Kut Nahr Hashim, where the new and old beds diverge, has already been mentioned. It is said to have been built by Abd Ali, father of Farjullah.

Rock foundations might, perhaps, be found below the surface, but this is not very likely, and it must be admitted that this site is unfavourable for a stone dam, and difficult for a dam of wood, mud, and stones, owing to the height to which water must be raised and the considerable breadth of the stream here (300 yards from bank to bank; present channel, 140 yards).

## PART (C.)—IRRIGATION PROJECTS.

### 1. Sinn-ul-Abbas. (Vide Part (B), 4, and rough plan.)

At Sinn-ul-Abbas, 6 miles north of Kut Nahr Hashim, where the Karkhah cuts through the Minyur Hills, it flows over a ledge of rock ("A" on plan) with a fall, at high water of about 5 feet, and probably as much as 8 feet at low water. A branch of the river, avoiding "A," flows rapidly over a series of ledges, ending with a fall of from 2 feet to 5 feet at "E," a ledge of rock which continues right across the river at "D."

Some 400 yards below "D" the whole river is pent up at "C" between rocky gates, some 15 feet high and 30 yards broad. There exist at this point traces of an old dam, probably Sassanian, with cuts for water-mills and sluices. This dam supplied with water a canal running in the same direction as Saiyid Na'amah's ("g. v." on plan), as shown by the cutting through the solid rock which Saiyid Na'amah found ready to hand, and availed himself of.

The construction of a dam at "C," "D-E," or "A-B" is undoubtedly practicable, but less useful than one lower down at Kut Nahr Hashim, where the canals, &c., are all cut and only need clearing out.



The completion of a dam of stone, or of sticks and mud, at "B," in order to feed Saiyid Na'amah's canal, is, however, not only practicable, but in every way desirable. The site presents no technical difficulties, and only a small portion of the Karkhah water would be utilised, so little as not to affect the Bani Turuf in any way. The land which it would bring under cultivation would support a population of several thousand, and greatly strengthen the sheikh's hand when he desired to commence operations at Kut Nahr Hashim, a few miles distant. The canal is almost finished, and only needs to be repaired and perhaps enlarged to be of use at once. It could subsequently be greatly extended. I think that this scheme should be brought to the sheikh's notice by us on the ground that its adoption would greatly strengthen his position at Kut Nahr Hashim, whether as regards the Nizam-es-Sultaneh's claims or as regards the Bani Turuf.

[Note.—The sheikh has since told me that, in view of what I have told him, he proposes to proceed with this scheme at once.—A. T. W.]

## 2. Kut Nahr Hashim.

*Scheme X.*—A brick or stone dam on the rocky ledge across the river at "X" on the map, with a canal dependent thereon carrying the water into the old Nahr Hashim and the old channels may be considered by experts to be more advantageous than any dam lower down. The course of the river is fairly straight at this point, and the material of the present ledge seems good. Height of top of bank from normal water-level here and elsewhere is about 15 feet.

*Scheme Y.*—A brick or stone dam in the vicinity of either of the old dams, with the object of supplying water to the old canal that once flowed under the bridge at "P." The whole bottom of the river at Kut Nahr Hashim is probably rocky, though covered here and there with sand, and it should not be hard to find a good site. The ridge marked "S" is continuous, except for the 30 yards gap in the middle, and dry all the summer and autumn.

*Scheme Z.*—If it was desired to irrigate the Hawaizeh, not Kut Nahr Hashim lands, a dam might be constructed at "Z" on map, in order to divert the Karkhah once more into its old bed towards Hawaizeh. From the old bed canal could be constructed towards Kuraishan and Qajariyah on the Karun.

As there seems to be no rock near the surface at this point, the dam might have to be built of sticks and stones and mud in Arab fashion, unless highly-skilled European assistance were invoked for the construction of a solid dam without rock foundation.

It is unlikely, however, that the sheikh would desire to benefit Hawaizeh exclusively, and it may be assumed that this scheme is unsuitable.

## 3. General Remarks.

It will be seen from the foregoing remarks that, excluding the minor scheme at Sinn-ul-Abbas, the only schemes that need seriously to be considered involve the construction of a dam at some point near Kut Nahr Hashim, to feed the old canal system, which commences by the cutting at "P" through the spur on which the village stands, and which is spanned by a brick bridge.

A careful and detailed examination would be necessary before any reliable data for such a dam could be given.

Very rough estimates of certain important factors are given concisely below:—

Volume of water .. .. .	One-sixth to one-eighth that of Karun.
Normal rate of current .. .. .	2 miles per hour.
Breadth of channel .. .. .	Minimum, 30 yards.
Breadth of river bed from bank to bank ..	150 to 300 yards.
Nature of river bottom at Kut Nahr Hashim.	Apparently hard sandstone rock as at Ahwaz, but perhaps rather harder.
Nature of banks .. .. .	Soft alluvial soil lying upon rock.
Height of banks from normal water level ..	15 to 18 feet.
Irrigable area .. .. .	100,000 to 250,000 acres.

From Part B (4) it will be seen that the previous dams made of brick and stone by the Arabs both broke before long, in all probability because they were solid, and consequently unfit to stand the strain of abnormal floods. The moral seems to be that Arabs cannot make effective stone dams, that European assistance is necessary if

the dam is to be permanent, and that the dam must be provided with sluice gates or other means to permit flood-water to be dealt with safely.

Such a dam once provided by European assistance, the sheikh himself could arrange for the necessary work on the canals, which would simply consist of clearing out the old channels, which for half a century at least were in use and of proved suitability. Whether a permanent European staff at the canal head would be necessary is a point which could be decided later.

To venture on an estimate, I should say that 10,000*l.* to 15,000*l.* should be ample for the dam, if built for the sheikh with his assistance, and he himself has estimated the cost of clearing out the old canals at 3,000*l.* As it has been proved by the evidence of the old canals in use twenty-five years ago, and by local testimony, that an area 15 miles long and about 5 miles wide was irrigated, more or less completely, at one time or another, by Nahr Hashim, it seems that at least 250,000 acres would be irrigated by canals dependent on the proposed dam, giving a far greater profit than the Karun irrigation project.

## 4. Effect of Shaur Project on Karkhah Irrigation Scheme.

The sheikh has actually commenced and gone some way towards completing a dam on the Shaur below Khairabad calculated to water about 5,000 acres. The work is in charge of Saiyid Na'amah, who was also responsible for the Sinn-ul-Abbas project mentioned above. The dam in this case is of sticks and mud and stones. Its effect on the Karkhah scheme is chiefly moral. It has aroused keen interest in irrigation projects among the Arabs, showing them that Sheikh Khazal is turning his attention to such projects. It also is of value in that it involves the establishment of a settled population in a district hitherto inhabited only by nomads little under the control of the sheikh. If it succeeds, as will probably be the case, it will also afford encouragement to the sheikh and to his subjects west of Karun, who have had little experience recently of irrigation projects. A more detailed account of this project will form the subject of a separate report, it is hoped, next month.

[27017]

No. 224.

Mr. O'Beirne to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 19.)

(No. 425.)

Sir,

St. Petersburg, July 8, 1909.

HAVING received your telegrams Nos. 801 and 804 of the 1st instant, I called on the Minister for Foreign Affairs on the following day, and made a further effort to dissuade him from arranging for the dispatch of troops to Kasvin. It was, however, evident from the beginning of our conversation that M. Isvolsky's mind was already made up. He had received telegrams from the Russian chargé d'affaires in Tehran, reporting that the portion of the Cossack brigade available in the capital numbered only 800, and that the men were demoralised by revolutionary propaganda and not to be relied upon. M. Sabline had pointed out that the Shah might probably take refuge in the Russian or British Legation; and had stated that in the event of the Bakhtiariis and the Kasvin fidaïs entering Tehran the most that the brigade could accomplish was to hold their own barracks, and that they would not be equal to maintaining order in the town.

M. Sabline had accordingly asked that the troops should be sent, and M. Isvolsky was also daily receiving telegrams from Russian institutions and private individuals established in Persia, complaining of the lack of protection, and urging that steps should be taken to provide it. The Russian Bank, in particular, was pressing for an adequate guard; at that time it was defended by ten men drawn from a total of thirty-five Cossacks, all told, who composed the Russian Legation guard. Moreover, the Finance Minister, as M. Isvolsky gave me to understand, was urging that Russian commercial enterprises in Persia must either be sufficiently safeguarded or else wound up, and the Minister for Foreign Affairs was being severely criticised in the press and in other quarters for not having taken the necessary steps sooner.

Under these circumstances, I was unable to influence his Excellency by laying before him the calmer view of the situation taken by Sir G. Barclay. He said he must be guided in this matter by the reports of the Russian local agents. I asked whether M. Sabline had definitely reported that there was a danger of general massacre and pillage, for I had not noticed such a statement in the extracts from the Russian chargé



d'affaires' telegrams which had been read to me. M. Isvolsky replied certainly, he had so reported. I put it to his Excellency whether the dispatch of a Russian expedition might not provoke the very violence which was apprehended, suggesting as a sort of analogy that when a man was in the hands of brigands it was not usually a good thing to send troops after him. This consideration did not seem to cause his Excellency any real concern. He said that, on the contrary, he believed the knowledge of the impending arrival of a Russian force would have a deterrent effect; and he also remarked that the Russian troops might arrive too late, but in any case the excesses which were apprehended on the entry of the Bakhtiaris into Tehran would not be allowed to continue indefinitely.

From the latter remark, and from certain others which M. Isvolsky let drop, I derived a distinct impression that his chief anxiety was as to the safety of the Russian Bank and other industrial undertakings. Although he may not have taken the danger to foreign lives in Tehran very seriously, he was decidedly apprehensive regarding the possibility of pillage, not to speak of the certainty of commercial losses arising from prolonged disturbances in the capital. He stated to me that the sums deposited in the Russian Bank amounted to 2,000,000 fr., and spoke of the serious risk of leaving such a treasure at the mercy of a marauding tribe like the Bakhtiaris. He also referred more than once to the important Russian interests connected with the road from Enzeli to Tehran, and mentioned that owing to the disturbed conditions recently prevailing the road had ceased to yield any returns.

The observations of the Minister for Foreign Affairs, which I have reported above, refer mainly to the immediate consequences which the dispatch of a Russian force might have on the situation at Tehran. I also urged on his Excellency the considerations set forth in your telegram No. 801 as to the risk of ulterior complications involved by any military action on the part of Russia which had the effect of supporting the Shah. M. Isvolsky's reply was, generally, to the effect that while such action might have inconvenient results, the disappearance of the Shah, on the other hand, would be followed by a condition of anarchy which would certainly compel Russia to intervene on a large scale. I need not, however, report his remarks on this point at any length here, as I have recapitulated his views on the whole question of non-intervention in Persia very fully in a separate despatch of to-day's date.

I have, &c.

HUGH O'BEIRNE.

[27018]

No. 225.

Mr. O'Beirne to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 19.)

(No. 426.)

Sir,

St. Petersburg, July 8, 1909.

IN my immediately preceding despatch, I have had the honour to report the substance of a conversation which I had with the Minister for Foreign Affairs on the 2nd instant, regarding the proposed despatch of a Russian force to Kasvin. By a letter which reached me on the following morning, 3rd July, and of which a copy is enclosed, M. Isvolsky informed me that it had been decided at a Council of Ministers held shortly after our conversation to send a regiment of Cossacks, a regiment of infantry, and a battery of artillery to Enzeli immediately, with instructions not to advance beyond Kasvin, except under orders from the Russian Legation at Tehran, and in case of serious danger to foreign lives and interests. His Excellency added that the officer commanding the expedition would be given categorical instructions to abstain from all interference in the internal struggle proceeding in Persia, and to confine himself to protecting foreign interests.

On the same morning, I received a copy of your telegram, No. 325 of the 2nd July, to Sir G. Barclay, stating that you had suggested to the Russian Ambassador that the two representatives in Tehran might co-operate in urging upon the leaders of the forces threatening the capital that the only way to avoid foreign intervention was to restore order. I called on M. Isvolsky, and spoke to him of your suggestion, and knowing that the possible dethronement of the Shah was a contingency which his Excellency viewed with the greatest apprehension and dislike, I urged that the best chance of averting it lay in his authorizing M. Sabline to inform the popular leaders that the Russian expedition would be stayed if they listened to the counsels of the two representatives. I argued that if the leaders believed that the Russian troops would advance in any case, they had no inducement to refrain from taking extreme measures

with the Shah, but that the hope of the expedition being stayed would serve as a powerful argument with them which might save Mohammed Ali's throne.

M. Isvolsky promised to telegraph at once to M. Sabline on the subject of your suggestion as to empowering him to hold out hopes to the popular leaders that the Russian expedition would on certain conditions be stayed, his Excellency said that he could not decide without consulting the other Ministers. That evening he wrote to inform me of the instructions sent to M. Sabline, which were of a non-committal character. The Russian chargé d'affaires was to consult with Sir G. Barclay and to report whether, having regard to local conditions, the proposed mediation offered a prospect of preventing the Bakhtiaris and fedais from entering Tehran. The next day, the 4th July, the Minister for Foreign Affairs heard from M. Sabline that the two representatives had sent legation officials to negotiate with the leaders of the forces outside Tehran, and that they were using the dispatch of Russian troops as a menace in case their advice was not listened to. His Excellency thereupon stated to me that he could not countermand the embarkation of troops unless he was quite sure that these negotiations would prove successful; but he thought that the troops would not be ready for embarkation for about four days, so that there should be sufficient time for the intentions and dispositions of the leaders to become clear. At this time there still appeared to be a possibility that the Russian Government might be induced to suspend the departure of the expedition; but the news received here during the following days was to the effect that the leaders of the forces hostile to the Shah had shown themselves intractable, and it became plainly useless for me to make any further suggestions to the Minister for Foreign Affairs as to delaying despatch of troops.

I have, &c.

HUGH O'BEIRNE.

Inclosure in No. 225.

M. Isvolsky to Mr. O'Beirne.

Mon cher Mr. O'Beirne,

Saint-Petersbourg, le 19 juin (2 juillet), 1909.

JE m'empresse de vous informer que le conseil a décidé que notre politique en Perse continue à être basée sur le principe de la non-intervention absolue dans la lutte entre le Schah et son peuple, quelle que soit l'issue de cette lutte.

Mais, en même temps, le conseil a dû considérer que l'entrée des Bakhtiaris et des fedais de Kasvin à Téhéran pourra exposer au plus grand péril les légations, les entreprises, et les sujets russes et étrangers, aussi bien que notre route Enzeli-Téhéran, d'autant plus que, d'après nos renseignements, la seule troupe persane organisée—c'est-à-dire la brigade de Cosaques—est évidemment affaibli et pourra difficilement maintenir l'ordre à Téhéran. Tout cela nous impose l'obligation morale de prendre toutes les mesures en notre pouvoir pour que les institutions et les sujets susindiqués puissent recevoir une protection effective et pour que les communications entre Téhéran et Enzeli restent libres en toute occurrence.

Dans ce but il a été décidé d'envoyer immédiatement à Enzeli un détachement composé d'un régiment de Cosaques, d'un bataillon d'infanterie, et d'une batterie. Ce détachement ne se portera pas au delà de Kasvin et veillera à l'établissement d'une libre communication entre ce point et la mer. Son mouvement ultérieur dépendra du cours des événements et ne pourra avoir lieu que sur l'ordre de la Légation Impériale à Téhéran, en cas de grave péril dans le sens susindiqué.

Le chef de détachement sera muni d'instructions catégoriques à l'effet que nos troupes auront pour but exclusif de protéger les légations, les entreprises, et les sujets russes et étrangers, sans immixtion aucune dans les luttes politiques en Perse ou dans les affaires intérieures persanes.

Je viens de télégraphier ce qui précède au Comte Benckendorff.

Votre sincèrement dévoué,

ISVOLSKY.



[27019]

No. 226.

*Mr. O'Beirne to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 19.)*

(No. 427. Confidential.)

Sir,

*St. Petersburg, July 8, 1909.*

IN the course of conversations which I have had with M. Isvolsky during the past few days regarding affairs in Persia, I have occasionally pressed upon his Excellency, in accordance with your instructions, the views of His Majesty's Government as to the importance of refraining, as far as possible, from interference in the internal affairs of that country, urging particularly that any military action on the part of Russia which had the effect of affording support to the Shah would infallibly provoke against herself the violent hostility of the Persians, that she might thus be compelled to increase her forces in Persia indefinitely, and that she might eventually find herself in the position of maintaining Mohammed Ali on his throne by force of arms against the united opposition of the Persian people.

On these occasions the Minister for Foreign Affairs has in the first place always emphatically disclaimed any thought of giving military assistance to the Shah in the present struggle, and in regard to the recent despatch of troops to Enzeli and Kasvin, his Excellency has repeatedly said that the sole object of the Russian expedition was the protection of Russian and other foreign lives and interests. There can, indeed, I think, be not much doubt that the security of foreign interests was the consideration which in the last resort immediately determined the dispatch of the expedition. In connection with this point, however, I cannot but recall the fact that when I spoke to M. Sazonow on the 30th ultimo, at a time when the dispatch of a Russian force was first mooted, the acting Minister for Foreign Affairs laid a good deal of stress on the moral obligation resting on the two Powers to support Mohammed Ali, and the same idea was emphasised in a telegram from M. Sabline which M. Sazonow allowed me to read.

After disclaiming any thought of armed intervention on the Shah's behalf, the Minister for Foreign Affairs has usually proceeded to discuss the general question of non-interference in Persian internal affairs in terms which disclose, I think, a considerable difference between his way of looking at the matter and the point of view of His Majesty's Government. M. Isvolsky is accustomed to use two main lines of argument, of which the evident drift is that England and Russia might safely and with advantage have afforded the Shah a more active kind of support than has been the case. In the first place he denies that there exists in Persia any genuine national movement against the present ruler. Who, he asks, are the men who are at the present moment threatening Tehran? Nomad tribesmen and Caucasian revolutionaries. The real Persian people he regards as an apathetic, ignorant herd, who ask only to be protected against excessive extortion and oppression, and so far from being fired with any enthusiasm for constitutional ideals have no clear notion of what the term means. I have suggested to his Excellency that this view of the situation is scarcely borne out by the action of the principal Persian towns during the past few years; that the part played in the political movement by the capital itself, and by Meshed, Tabreez, Resht, Isfahan and other towns, seems to show that the struggle with Mohammed Ali is a national one. M. Isvolsky, however, refuses to consider the enjuments of Tehran or the provincial towns as anything but associations of noisy agitators and fanatics whose proceedings have nothing in common with a genuine national movement. It is perhaps not unnatural that this impression should have been conveyed to his Excellency by the reports of Russian officials of the type of M. de Hartwig, who would not be likely to regard the popular leaders with much sympathy or respect. However that may be, M. Isvolsky himself is strongly persuaded of the total unripeness of Persia for representative institutions.

The Minister's second main line of argument, and one which he uses with a great deal of force, is to say that while any action which affords the Shah support may involve the risk of inconvenient complications; the disappearance of the Shah, on the other hand, would involve a far greater risk, or rather a certainty, that Russia would be compelled to intervene on a large scale. For so long as Mohammed Ali reigns, he argues, we have at least a central constituted authority, however weak and shaken, around which to attempt to build up a settled order of things. But if the Shah fell we should be faced by a condition of anarchy; we should have to deal with marauders like the Bakhtiari and wild revolutionaries like the fedais, and then it would, indeed, become necessary for Russia to take military measures for the protection of her interests.

I have more than once asked his Excellency why it should not be feasible in such a contingency to confine ourselves strictly to protecting the lives and property of foreigners, and wait till the internal confusion in Persia righted itself. Russia would then, I have said, at any rate not be concentrating against herself the hatred of the Persians. In strengthening her legation guards, for instance, to the necessary extent she would be exercising her unquestionable right to safeguard the interests of her nationals and of other foreigners in Tehran. His Excellency retorts that that would be well enough if there was any practical prospect that affairs would right themselves. But he says that he sees no man likely to step into the Shah's place who would be capable of restoring order, and he particularly presses me to explain what is meant by a remark which occurs in your telegram No. 801, and which I have used in speaking to him, to the effect that whatever took the place of the present régime would probably pave the way for better things. When speaking of the want of a strong man in Persia, M. Isvolsky has once or twice touched on the possibilities connected with the return of Zil-es-Sultan, but his references to that Prince have seemed to show that Russia retains her old dislike of the Zil, and he has remarked that if His Highness ever came to power, as Regent or otherwise, he would commence operations by cutting the throats of all the most eminent constitutionalist leaders in the country.

The logical inference from M. Isvolsky's arguments, which I have here briefly summarised, would be that England and Russia ought to have guaranteed Mohammed Ali's throne, and given him the military support necessary to maintain his authority effectively; and I believe that this is the course which the Minister for Foreign Affairs, notwithstanding his anxiety to avoid being drawn into military operations of any magnitude in Persia, would have been inclined to pursue had it not been for the restraining influence of His Majesty's Government. He has refrained from active intervention of this kind on behalf of the Shah out of a strong desire to continue to co-operate with Great Britain. But he does not admit that it is possible to allow the disturbed conditions now prevailing in Northern Persia to last indefinitely, involving as they do immense losses to Russian trade. The essential thing in his Excellency's opinion is to arrive at the re-establishment of order; and I expect that he will endeavour to use the presence of the Russian troops in Persia as a means of exerting pressure on whatever Persian Government emerges from the present crisis, so as to impose the adoption of any measures which may appear likely to bring about a cessation of disturbance and anarchy. That pressure of the sort indicated would not be strictly consistent with the principle of non-intervention is a consideration by which M. Isvolsky would hardly, I think, allow himself to be hampered.

I have, &amp;c.

HUGH O'BEIRNE.

[27025]

No. 227.

*Mr. O'Beirne to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 19.)*

(No. 434.)

Sir,

*St. Petersburg, July 15, 1909.*

AFFAIRS in Persia have been much discussed in the press here during the last few days, and there has been great divergency in the views expressed by the various newspapers on the subject of the policy of the Russian Government in dispatching fresh forces to Persia.

The "Novoe Vremya" thinks it possible that the Persian revolutionaries have been encouraged rather than otherwise by the inefficient force previously sent by Russia, and has strongly urged in consequence the prompt advance of an expedition to Tehran to save the lives and property of foreigners, the responsibility for which Russia has taken upon herself exclusively. The "Russ," on the other hand, has urged that Russian troops should be immediately withdrawn from Persian territory, where there is no need for them, as there is no danger to foreigners if only Russia ceases to act as the Shah's gendarme. The "Slovo" finds that the prospect of the necessity of interference is considerably less after the receipt of the news of the correct attitude of Persian insurgents towards foreigners at Tehran, and desires that every opportunity should be taken advantage of for the purpose of withdrawing the Russian troops as soon as possible.

To-day's edition of the "Russ" calls serious attention to the report that Colonel Liakhoff had hoisted the Russian flag over the house in which he had taken up a position with his Cossacks, and states that the insurgents threaten to fire upon the

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house in question, notwithstanding the Russian flag, in order to reach the Cossacks. The writer adds that Colonel Liakhoff is in the service of Persia and has no right to use the Russian flag. The "Slovo" to-day strongly deprecates anything like further interference in the Persian civil war on the part of Russia, and strongly condemns the "Novoe Vremya" for advising Russia to take the matter into her hands at Tehran and to send troops there. If Russian diplomacy were to follow such advice the results would be serious. It adds that the chiefs of the revolutionary movement have evidently taken measures to prevent pillage.

The "Bourse Gazette," in referring to the news of attempts to boycott Russian goods, &c., in Tabreez, points out the necessity of avoiding all further cause for ill-feeling against Russia on the part of the Persian people, and, paraphrasing the famous observation of Bismarck in regard to the Balkan Peninsula, says, "The whole of the Iranian Peninsula is not worth the bones of a single Russian rifleman."

The "Novoe Vremya" to-day, in a leading article, contends that Russian troops have been sent too late. Russia, it says, procrastinated in coming to a decision, and Tehran is already in the power of the undisciplined hordes of the sipahdar.

In the "Retch" there is an account of an interview with "an authority on Persian matters." He says that there is no secret design in the action of the Bakhtiaris, whose object is simply to establish the Constitution. They will take no more assurances from the Shah. His Majesty's position is shaky but not critical, and no attempt is contemplated against his life. The leaders of the two forces that have entered Tehran are intelligent popular men, with a European education. All reports of attacks on foreigners and of looting are lies. One of the two forces—the Bakhtiaris—occupied Isfahan, where there is a large number of foreigners, for over five months, and the other force was for eight or nine months at Resht, and no cases of violence on the part of soldiers towards Europeans occurred. The personage categorically asserts that the Persians have no hostility towards foreigners, especially not towards Russians. All steps are being taken to introduce tranquillity. The Ulemas have been ordered to do nothing against the Russians. The central Persian Andjuman at Constantinople sent a letter to the sipahdar and Sirdar Assad approving of their intention not to allow the boycott of Russian goods, and to show the Russians their friendship. The person interviewed adds that "if the Russians do not care to take this into account then let the Persian insurgents sacrifice themselves to the last man, and posterity will decide who prevented the re-establishment of order in Persia. The Russians will have themselves to blame if anything untoward occurs. Peace in Persia depends upon the sound sense of the Russian authorities. The Persians will not touch the Russians, and they have nothing, I guarantee to you, against the officers, instructors or Cossacks of the brigade, but they will, of course, defend themselves."

The personage concludes by remarking, "If the Shah takes refuge in one of the Legations he will thereby only further his abdication. I do not believe in a change of dynasty. In case of the Shah's abdication I believe his successor will be his 11 year old son, Ahmed Mirza, with a regency of two or three persons—probably the Bakhtiari leader, Sipahdar, Zil-es-Sultan and Nasr-ul-Mulk. I consider this combination will be the most acceptable to Persia."

I have, &c.

HUGH O'BEIRNE.

[27026]

No. 228.

Mr. O'Beirne to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 19.)

(No. 435.)

Sir,

St. Petersburg, July 15, 1909.

I HAD the honour yesterday to receive your telegram No. 889 of the previous day, informing me of a conversation which you had had with the Russian Ambassador, in which you had referred to the reported embarkation of an additional Russian force at Baku, and had explained the objections which you saw to an increase of the number of Russian troops in Persia. You had also referred to a disposition shown by M. Sabline, as reported by Sir G. Barclay, to summon the Russian cavalry from Kasvin to Tehran and you had expressed the opinion that there seemed to be no necessity for doing so.

I called on the Minister for Foreign Affairs in the course of the day and he stated that he was not yet in possession of the complete decypher of Count Benckendorff's telegram reporting their conversation. I accordingly gave his Excellency the gist of

your telegram to me. M. Isvolsky said that it was quite untrue that any troops had been embarked at Baku beyond the number originally fixed, of which His Majesty's Government had been informed. There was no intention of increasing the force. Possibly preparations might have been made at Baku to provide a sort of reserve for the expeditionary force in case of necessity. I said that since that was so your remarks to Count Benckendorff had been made under a misapprehension.

M. Isvolsky further stated once more that the Russian troops would not proceed from Kasvin to Tehran unless M. Sabline declared that foreign lives and property were in peril. M. Sabline had not expressed such an opinion. On the contrary, M. Isvolsky read me a telegram from the Russian chargé d'affaires reporting that the situation in Tehran was not alarming, and that an official of the Russian Legation had had an interview with the leaders of the popular forces who had stated that they would be answerable for the security of foreign residents and also of the Russian officers and their families. M. Isvolsky agreed with me that this telegram was very reassuring "as far as it went." He proceeded to state very positively that even should M. Sabline be compelled to summon troops to Tehran they would not be used to lend assistance to the Shah, but simply and solely to protect foreign interests. I pointed out that the arrival of a Russian force in the capital would probably have the effect of aiding the Shah, although that was not the intention of the Russian Government.

I have, &c.

HUGH O'BEIRNE.

[27093]

No. 229.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 19.)

(No. 545.)

Sir,

Therapia, July 14, 1909.

I HAVE the honour to transmit the communications which were yesterday made by the Russian chargé d'affaires and myself on the subject of the interference of this Government in Persian affairs.

You will see that these communications, while not being identic, are drawn up in similar terms.

The subject will be discussed after Rifaat Pasha has had an opportunity of bringing the matter before the Council of Ministers.

In the reference to the Anglo-Russian Convention, I consider it advisable to adhere to the exact wording in the use of the words "respecter l'intégrité et l'indépendance de la Perse," while my Russian colleague deemed it desirable to make use of the more elastic expression, "s'étant engagés au respect de l'intégrité."

I have sent copies of these communications to Sir G. Barclay.

I have, &c.

GERARD LOWTHER.

Inclosure in No. 229.

Pro-memoriâ No. 1.

LES informations parvenant aux Cabinets de Saint-Petersbourg et de Londres concordent à représenter la situation créée dans la région d'Ourmia comme de jour en jour plus inquiétante. Le nombre des troupes turques y augmente constamment; elles étendent à la faveur du désordre de plus en plus la sphère de leur occupation sur des territoires appartenant sans contestation à la Perse, y englobant une localité après l'autre jusqu'au Lac d'Ourmia; terrorisant la population au moyen des Kurdes, elles réduisent celle-ci à prendre la nationalité ottomane. A Dilman le consul de Turquie entama dernièrement une lutte armée avec des Nationalistes persans, les contraignant de se réfugier à Tabriz, et se proclamant lui-même gouverneur de Dilman.

La série des faits énumérés ci-dessus et d'autres analogues ne permet point de douter que les agents et officiers turcs n'agissent d'après les ordres et avec l'approbation de leur Gouvernement. La contradiction entre cette manière d'agir sur place et les assurances si fréquemment réitérées de la Sublime Porte elle-même et de ses Ambassadeurs à Saint-Petersbourg et Londres au sujet du désintéressement du Gouvernement ottoman par rapport à la Perse, aussi bien qu'entre le nombre ne cessant de grossir des troupes turques en territoire persan et les chiffres minimes jusqu'à l'invraisemblance que



leur assignent les déclarations officielles de la Sublime Porte étant flagrante, les Gouvernements de Sa Majesté le Roi d'Angleterre, s'étant engagés au respect de l'intégrité de la Perse, sont d'avis qu'un pareil état de choses ne saurait se prolonger sans les plus graves inconvénients.

En vue d'y mettre un terme, le Gouvernement Impérial russe, s'étant concerté à ce sujet avec le Gouvernement britannique, a donné à son représentant à Constantinople l'instruction d'insister formellement pour que les agents consulaires ainsi que les commandants de troupes turcs reçoivent l'ordre catégorique de s'abstenir désormais de toutes ingérences et pressions illicites, soit directes, soit par l'intermédiaire d'auxiliaires kurdes et que cet ordre soit exécuté; que l'envoi de renforts de troupes ottomanes en territoire persan soit suspendu et que celles qui se trouvent actuellement dans la région d'Ourmia soient graduellement retirées, conformément aux assurances antérieures de la Sublime Porte.

*Pro-memoriâ No. 2.*

D'après les informations parvenant au Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique le nombre des troupes turques dans la région d'Ourmia aurait été dernièrement considérablement augmenté et elles occuperaient des villages dans le territoire persan même jusqu'au lac. La violence des Kurdes agissant de toute évidence à l'instigation des agents consulaires turcs est citée comme un prétexte pour réduire la population à prendre la nationalité ottomane afin de se garantir contre les agressions de ces tribus.

A Dilman le consul turc tout récemment entama une lutte armée avec les Nationalistes persans et les chassa jusqu'à Tabriz.

Ces incidents et d'autres pareils ne laissent pas en doute le fait que les agents et officiers turcs agissent sous les ordres de leur Gouvernement, et, vu les engagements pris par Sa Majesté le Roi d'Angleterre et Sa Majesté l'Empereur de Russie de respecter l'intégrité et l'indépendance de la Perse, le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique considère qu'un pareil état de choses ne saurait se prolonger sans les plus graves inconvénients.

Le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique aime à espérer que le Gouvernement ottoman enverra des instructions catégoriques à ses agents consulaires de s'abstenir de toute ingérence et pression illégale dans les affaires persanes et de ne plus accorder la nationalité turque à la population dans les régions en question, et en exigera la stricte observation.

Le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique exprime l'espoir que la Sublime Porte se rendra à cette façon de voir, vu les assurances réitérées du Gouvernement turc qu'il n'avait pas l'intention de s'immiscer dans les affaires persanes, et que les troupes Impériales seront graduellement retirées de tout territoire incontestablement persan dans lequel elles se trouvent actuellement.

[27098]

No. 230.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 19.)*

(No. 551.)

Sir,

*Therapia, July 14, 1909.*

WITH reference to my telegram No. 239 of yesterday, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith copy of the letter which was addressed to me by Ahmed Riza, the president of the Chamber, on the subject of "the intervention of the Russian Government and His Majesty's Government in the internal affairs of Persia," which he says is receiving an unfortunate interpretation in this country.

I have contented myself with sending him a simple acknowledgment of his communication, which I shall take an early opportunity of bringing to the notice of the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

I have, &c.

GERARD LOWTHER.

Inclosure in No. 230.

*Ahmed Riza to Sir G. Lowther.*

M. l'Ambassadeur,

*Constantinople, le 13 juillet, 1909.*

L'INTERVENTION des Puissances russe et britannique dans les affaires intérieures de la Perse est interprétée ici d'une façon fâcheuse; on s'imagine que ces deux Etats veulent prêter leur appui au Gouvernement despotique du Schah, et que, par conséquent, ils sont opposés à l'instauration dans le malheureux pays d'Iran du régime constitutionnel.

D'autre part, le vœu des deux Puissances de voir le consulat ottoman expulser les deux chefs nationalistes qui s'y sont réfugiés produit à Constantinople une impression aussi pénible que celle provenant d'une immixtion intérieure jugée inopportune.

Je me permets, M. l'Ambassadeur, de vous en aviser non officiellement dans l'intérêt même des excellents rapports qui unissent nos deux pays, et je prie, &c.

Le Président de la Chambre des Députés ottomane,

AHMED RIZA.

[27319]

No. 231.

*Messrs. Frank C. Strick and Co. to Foreign Office.—(Received July 19.)*

*"Baltic House," Leadenhall Street, London,*

*July 17, 1909.*

Sir,

WE beg to acknowledge receipt of your letter of the 14th instant, and thank you for the information contained therein.

We note that, in the opinion of His Majesty's Minister at Tehran, an attempt to press for the Hormuz concession at present would serve no useful purpose, while it would be likely to offend the Mouin-ut-Tujjar.

We may say that, so far as the Mouin-ut-Tujjar is concerned, having regard to the treatment which we have received from him, we should not hesitate, if we had free hands, to make things unpleasant for him, even if it cost us money.

We have, &c.

(For Frank C. Strick and Co.)

FRANK C. STRICK.

[27266]

No. 232.

*Mirza Mehdi Khan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 19.)*

Sir,

*Persian Legation, London, July 18, 1909.*

I HAVE the honour to inform your Excellency that I have received a telegram from my Government stating that on the 16th instant, at an extraordinary sitting of the representatives of the Persian nation, in the Palace of Baharestan at Tehran, it was unanimously decided to depose His Imperial Majesty Mohammad Ali Mirza from the Throne of Persia owing to his unpopularity and his opposition to the will of the nation. In accordance with articles 36 and 37 of the constitution, His Imperial Highness Sultan Ahmad Mirza, the Heir Apparent, has been proclaimed Shah.

His Highness the Azed-ol-Molk has been provisionally appointed Regent pending the definite decision of the Medjliss, in accordance with article 38 of the constitution.

I have, &c.

MEHDI.



[27016]

No. 233.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 19.)*

(No. 598.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Gulahek, July 19, 1909.*

The two Nationalist leaders have officially notified to the two legations the deposition of Mahomed Ali and the accession of the Valiahd Sultan Ahmed Mirza to the throne of Persia.

I await your instructions.

[27300]

No. 234.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 19.)*

(No. 599.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Tehran, July 19, 1909.*

MY immediately preceding telegram.

Following is text of note:—

(R.) "Whereas disturbances in relation to disorders in provinces render necessary reorganisation of Government administrations, and this has been recognised by all Persia; and whereas, in view of conditions of the time, state of the kingdom, and the dislike of the public for Mohammed Ali Mirza, it was impossible to obtain rights and security of the nation without a change of Sovereign; therefore, in the absence of senate and assembly, an extraordinary grand council was convoked on 16th July at Tehran at the Baharistan. Members of this council, who are chiefs of the fedai, clergy, princes, notables, and aristocracy, and number of previous deputies, decided by vote of the majority upon the deposition of Mohammed Ali Mirza, and, in accordance with articles 36 and 37 of the fundamental law, His Majesty Sultan Ahmed Mirza was appointed Sovereign, and the regency given temporarily to Azad-ul-Mulk. After the opening of the Parliament, in accordance with article 38 of the fundamental law, a definite arrangement will be made regarding the regency.

"We are therefore [group undecypherable: ? in] this official letter informing you of the deposition of Mohammed Ali Mirza, and the accession of Sultan Ahmed Mirza to the sovereignty of Persia."

[27334]

No. 235.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 19.)*

(No. 600.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Gulahek, July 19, 1909.*

According to reports received from His Majesty's consul at Shiraz a state of anarchy prevails in that town. The late governor refuses to leave, in spite of the announcement of the Zil-es-Sultan's appointment, on the ground that the Government responsible for his nomination was no longer in office.

Mr. Bill telegraphs that Seyyid Hussein Lari is reported to be making hasty purchases of ammunition, and that, unless the Zil's appointment is confirmed by the existing Government, and stringent orders sent to ex-governor to return at once to Tehran reinforcements must be despatched to-morrow from Bushire. Russian consul concurs in Mr. Bill's view.

Yesterday I called the attention of the Minister of the Interior to the situation, as indicated by Mr. Bill, but I could not induce him to confirm Zil-es-Sultan's appointment; he told me confidentially that he intended to give Ala-ed-Dowleh the governorship of Shiraz in the place of that of Tabreez.

I have to-day renewed my representations in concert with my Russian colleague. We informed Minister of the Interior that our consuls recommended that Zil-es-Sultan's appointment be confirmed. We also pressed him, in any case, to recall immediately the late governor-general. I am further acting upon a suggestion of Major Cox that the Persian Government should be pressed to send through His Majesty's consulate at Shiraz stringent orders to Seyyid Hussein to make no advance; and also that they should telegraph to the ulema to do their utmost to restrain him.

I have informed Sardar Assad that I shall defer ordering despatch of reinforce-

ments until to-morrow in order that I may see what steps are being taken to restore order in Shiraz.

Although the Zil's appointment would undoubtedly afford best means of remedying the situation in Fars, yet the new Government is so obviously afraid of him that I did not like to press it upon them too strongly.

[27315]

No. 236.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 19.)*

(No. 601.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Gulahek, July 19, 1909.*

IT is much to be desired that Mohamad Ali Mirza should be prevailed upon to leave the country at the earliest possible date.

The Czar has replied to His Majesty's telegram to the effect that, as he had taken refuge in His Imperial Majesty's legation orders had been given to the Russian chargé d'affaires to afford him protection and to pay him the honour due to his rank. There is good ground for thinking that the Shah's entourage encourage him to construe this telegram as a promise that Russia will restore him to his previous position. Frequent messages from the provinces now reach him promising support for his cause, and intrigue is certain to be rife in his neighbourhood so long as he remains in Persia.

He spoke, at first, of fixing his residence in the Crimea, but now he is reluctant to leave his country. M. Sabline has telegraphed to his Government recommending that he should be offered a palace in Russia and honorary rank in their army in order to hasten his departure.

[27329]

No. 237.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 19.)*

(No. 602.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Gulahek, July 19, 1909.*

I HAVE received, in reply to the enquiry contained in your telegram No. 369 of the 14th July, the following telegram No. 22 from His Majesty's consul at Kerman.

"Even if we were to leave behind us everything except the bare necessities of life we could not procure sufficient suitable transport to enable the British community, which numbers twelve men, eight women and seven children, to quit Kerman.

"We must trust to obtaining sufficient local support to help us to hold out until relief can arrive. I do not think, if the Baluchi advance be stopped by our warning, that there is any other danger to be feared."

[27301]

No. 238.

*Mr. O'Beirne to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 19.)*

(No. 363.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*St. Petersburg, July 19, 1909.*

SITUATION at Tabreez.

M. Isvolsky spoke to me last night on the state of affairs at Tabreez, which he said was most unsatisfactory. He informed me that he had sent instructions to the Russian chargé d'affaires to impress on the Persian Government that it was absolutely necessary that a governor-general with troops should proceed at once to this town. M. Sabline is instructed to intimate that the Russian Government will find itself obliged to take steps to establish order there itself in the event of the Persian Government not taking the necessary action.

In reply to my enquiries as to what had occurred at Tabreez to call for these instructions, M. Isvolsky said that there was the announcement of Sattar Khan that he was to be appointed governor-general, there was the masquerading of fedais as policemen, the extortion by them of money from the residents, and the agitation which is being fomented against the presence of the Russian troops. I did not gather, however, that Russian interests had been definitely injured in any way.

Another danger spot, M. Isvolsky added, was Ardebil, where the whole district was being pillaged by the Shahsevars.



[27330]

No. 239.

*Mr. O'Beirne to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 19.)*

(No. 364.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*St. Petersburg, July 19, 1909.*

MY telegram No. 363 of to-day's date: Situation at Tabreez.

In a further conversation which I had to-day with M. Isvolsky his Excellency stated that he had been informed by the Turkish Ambassador that the Sublime Porte had now sent instructions to the Turkish consulate-general at Tabreez on the subject of Sattar and Baghir Khan. The instructions were to the effect that it was desirable that these two persons should quit Persia, but that in any case, if they were not willing to leave the country, "bast" should no longer be accorded them in the consulate-general. This communication had given M. Isvolsky much pleasure. He appeared to view the situation generally in a less pessimistic light. While admitting that no recent cases had occurred where Russian interests had been seriously injured, he said that the arrival of a governor-general with sufficient troops to restore order was urgently necessary in view of the general condition of unrest. The Russian force, he added, could not leave until order was established.

[27955]

No. 240.

*Consul-General Cox to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 19.)*

(No. 730.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Bushire, July 19, 1909.*

ARMS traffic and disturbances at Bushire.

See my covering despatch No. 3 of the 27th June transmitting my despatch to Sir G. Barclay No. 56 of the same date.

Point was mentioned in my telegram No. 441 of the 6th May to Tehran, but it is not clear enough from my despatch referred to above that, if the names and identity of the parties, of whose information we have made use, became known at the German vice-consulate, those parties would be in an unpleasant predicament, and in one or two cases actually in danger. Moreover, if German vice-consulate got hold of their names, we should incur their resentment, and in the future be deprived of their confidence.

I have received and am investigating further evidence with regard to the part played by Mirza in arms traffic, and I trust that, if it is thought necessary to make any communication to the German Legation, it will be held in abeyance, on the chance of it being possible for us to obtain a good case against Mirza in the matter of arms traffic.

[27016]

No. 241.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.*

(No. 384.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Foreign Office, July 19 1909.*

NEW Shah of Persia.

When M. Sabline has received similar instructions from his Government, you may recognise the new Shah.

[27315]

No. 242.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.*

(No. 387. Confidential.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Foreign Office, July 19, 1909.*

DEPARTURE of Shah (see telegram No. 3 of the 3rd January, 1908, from Mr. Marling, and your telegram No. 601).

In my opinion Anglo-Russian escort should consist of guards from the two legations. A Persian Cossack force should accompany him to Kasvin, where Russian

troops would take their place. It is likely that if Russian troops came to Tehran from Kasvin to form part of escort, trouble would arise. You may make proposal on these lines to the two Governments, if you and M. Sabline agree.

I am anxious to have your views as to formation of escort.

[27456]

No. 243.

*Sir Edward Grey to Mr. O'Beirne.*

(No. 932.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Foreign Office, July 19, 1909.*

ANGLO-RUSSIAN co-operation in Persia.

Count Benckendorff is evidently delighted and relieved that intervention at Tehran has not been necessary during the change of Government. I have told him that I fully share his feelings, and that in my opinion a very favourable impression has been created both in this country and in Persia by Russia's moderation and self-restraint. Judging from my information, there would have been a violent outbreak of anti-foreign feeling throughout Persia if intervention had taken place. I told Count Benckendorff that I viewed with pleasure the good relations which had apparently been established between the new Government and the Russian officers in the Shah's service, and that I trusted that no difficulties would be created for Russia by changes in the Government prejudicial to her interests.

As regards Tabreez I told his Excellency that I would join with the Russian Minister in bringing pressure on the new Persian Government to appoint Ala-ed-Dowleh or some other capable man as governor without delay. I said that I anticipated some further trouble there and elsewhere, but that I looked to Russia to pursue the same moderate policy until the new Persian Government was firmly established.

[27008]

No. 244.

*Sir Edward Grey to Mr. O'Beirne.*

(No. 934.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Foreign Office, July 19, 1909.*

ZIL-ES-SULTAN'S return to Persia.

I have requested Count Benckendorff to ascertain M. Isvolsky's opinion as to the Zil's return, in view of the recent developments.

[27016]

No. 245.

*Sir Edward Grey to Mr. O'Beirne.*

(No. 935.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Foreign Office, July 19, 1909.*

DEPOSITION of Shah and accession of Sultan Ahmed Shah.

Telegram No. 598 of to-day from Tehran reports that official announcement has been made by Persian Government. I have informed Count Benckendorff that I consider that the ex-Shah should leave for Russia without delay, as if he remains in Persia he will become a centre of intrigue. I also said that I thought it important that new Shah should at once be recognised, but that I would await M. Isvolsky's views before acting. I have instructed His Majesty's representative at Tehran in this sense, and he will recognize new Shah when M. Sabline is similarly instructed.

[27007]

No. 246.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Cartwright.*

(No. 271.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Foreign Office, July 19, 1909.*

ZIL-ES-SULTAN may be kept informed of the progress of events in Tehran, as requested in your telegram No. 149 of the 17th July.



[25645]

No. 247.

*Foreign Office to Colonial Office.**Foreign Office, July 19, 1909.*

Sir,  
I AM directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 6th instant, relative to the case of Peter Ellow, from which it appears that the individual in question is an Ottoman subject.

The Earl of Crewe is aware that Great Britain has no extradition treaty with Persia, the country in which Ellow is at present residing, nor indeed with any State in which the King exercises extra-territorial authority, and it is therefore impossible to ask for the offender's extradition as a matter of treaty right, while, as he is not a British subject, he is not amenable to the operation of the Fugitive Offenders Act, applied to Persia by the Order in Council of 1889.

The only course by which his surrender could be obtained would therefore be to ask the Persian Government to grant it as a favour, explaining to them at the same time that His Majesty's Government would be unable to grant them reciprocal treatment should a case arise in which they might desire it, because the municipal law of these kingdoms forbids the adoption of such a course.

Sir E. Grey is, however, of opinion that such a proceeding would be impolitic, and might, moreover, involve the Persian Government in difficulties with the Sublime Porte, whose subject the offender is.

As Ellow appears to have committed some offence against Ottoman law, in consequence of which he has already been relieved of his consular functions at Urumia, there is every likelihood that he will be punished by the Turkish authorities themselves, and it appears to Sir Edward Grey that, in these circumstances, the best course to pursue is to leave those authorities to deal with him as they think best.

I am, &amp;c.

LOUIS MALLET.

[27389]

No. 248.

*India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received July 20.)*

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Viscount Morley, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, with reference to previous letter, copy of a telegram to the Viceroy, dated the 16th July, relative to the situation in Persia.

*India Office, July 19, 1909.*

Inclosure in No. 248.

*Viscount Morley to Government of India.**India Office, July 16, 1909.*

(Telegraphic.) P.

SEE telegrams Nos. 561 and 564, dated the 12th instant, from His Majesty's Minister at Tehran, repeated to Resident, Persian Gulf. Proposed instructions to Consul, Seistan, have been approved by Foreign Office, who have added that inquiry is being made of the Government of India as to whether it would be possible for similar instructions to be carried out by Political Officer, Chagai, and whether they can offer any suggestion as to what other action would be practicable. Necessary action should be taken, and your suggestions communicated by telegraph.

Threat to Baluchis that they will be held responsible for losses to British or British Indian subjects is also suggested by Foreign Office to Sir G. Barclay. Foreign Office ask that, if possible, original letter from Russian Consul may be obtained. They also ask whether consul could withdraw to Yezd, Birjand, or Bunder Abbas in the event of danger at Kerman.

[27495]

No. 249.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 20.)*

(No. 603.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Gulahek, July 20, 1909.*

I HAVE addressed the following telegram No. 52, urgent, to His Majesty's consul at Shiraz:—

"The new Government wish temporarily to retain the present Governor-General, and will not confirm the appointment of Zil-es-Sultan. They have sent telegraphic orders to Seyyid Hussein Lari to make no move on Shiraz, and have urged the ulema to telegraph identic instructions to the Seyyid. The Government appear so entirely convinced that order will be restored by these measures, that I shall await a further report from you before ordering up reinforcements.

I have urged on the Persian Government the necessity of sending immediate orders for the disbandment of the tribal levies to Asaf-ed-Dowleh.

[27497]

No. 250.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 20.)*

(No. 604.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Tehran, July 20, 1909.*

EX-SHAH. See my telegram No. 601 of the 19th July.

I am informed that the Czar has received another telegram from ex-Shah, in which latter states that he took refuge under Russian flag to secure "the maintenance of his right to the throne and the independence of his reign." Telegram went on to say that revolutionaries have taken advantage of his action to set up another Shah and to depose him. It also contained an appeal for the Czar's help and protection, and an expression of thanks to His Majesty for his reply to the previous telegram.

My Russian colleague has suggested to his Government that the Czar's reply shall be worded in a manner calculated to disillusion ex-Shah as to attitude of the Czar to him. He himself has failed to make clear to Shah the exact amount of protection which was promised to him.

[27498]

No. 251

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 20.)*

(No. 605.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Gulahek, July 20, 1909.*

"BAST" has been taken in the immediate neighbourhood of the Russian legation by Amir Bahadur Jang's regiment, which the new Government is endeavouring to disband.

[27398]

No. 252.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 20.)*

(No. 606.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Gulahek, July 20, 1909.*

IN view of the fact that the new Government will not confirm the appointment of Zil-es-Sultan as Governor-General of Fars, my Russian colleague and I am of opinion that it would be better for the present if he were not to return to Persia.

Reference is to your telegram No. 934 to Mr. O'Beirne of the 19th July.

[27506]

No. 253.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 20.)*

(No. 607.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Gulahek, July 20, 1909.*

I LEARN very confidentially that M. Sabline has had certain difficulties with Colonel Liakhov, who is acting as though under the impression that Russian protection



was extended to the Cossack brigade. My Russian colleague has clearly pointed out to him that this force is altogether a Persian one; and he is now reporting to his Government on these difficulties.

Certainly the prospect of the permanent retention as instructors of the Russian officers will not be furthered by intervention at the present moment on their behalf.

[27508]

No. 254.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 20.)*

(No. 608.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Gulahek, July 20, 1909.

I HAVE received no news confirming the Russian information as to the unsatisfactory nature of the present situation at Tabreez (referred to in St. Petersburg telegram No. 363, 19th July). I have instructed His Majesty's acting consul-general to report, and in the event of his corroborating the news, I shall support my Russian colleague's representations as far as I properly can.

Present arrangements are that Mukhter-es-Sultaneh is to be appointed Governor-General of Tabreez. He should be very popular locally, and though there may be objections to him on the score of his pro-German leanings, it should be borne in mind that these will not have the same range in Tabreez as in Tehran.

Last night M. Sabline spoke to me on the subject of the alleged anti-Russian agitation. I am seeing that a telegram is sent from the proper quarter, which ought considerably to allay this feeling.

[27499]

No. 255.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 20.)*

(No. 609.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Gulahek, July 20, 1909.

KERMANSHAH situation.

There has been a decided improvement in the state of affairs at this town since last reported on in my telegram No. 596 of the 18th July. The chief of the Kalhurs has agreed to retain only a small personal guard and dismiss the bulk of his troops.

[27509]

No. 256.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 20.)*

(No. 610.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Gulahek, July 20, 1909.

HIS Majesty's consul at Shiraz has to-day telegraphed to me as follows, No. 72:—

"Russian consul and I are fully agreed that reinforcements must immediately be dispatched if Assaf-ed-Dowleh is not removed from his post. If possible, please endeavour to prevent his retention.

"Detailed reasons for our view follow."

I am again urging the Persian Government immediately to dismiss the present Governor-General. I shall order the reinforcements to leave Bushire unless the Government have, by to-night given satisfaction to my request.

[27510]

No. 257.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 20.)*

(No. 611.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Gulahek, July 20, 1909.

I REPORTED in my telegram No. 608 of yesterday, that I was making enquiries of His Majesty's acting consul-general at Tabreez as to the facts of the alleged anti-Russian agitation there. Mr. Smart has now reported that about a week ago this agitation culminated in the convocation of a popular meeting at the chief mosque.

The preachers on this occasion urged the people to ensure the withdrawal of the Russian troops by instituting a boycott of Russian goods and by closing the bazaar. The more respectable part of the population was not represented at the meeting, which was entirely unsuccessful. It seems that since then the agitation for the moment has subsided.

His Majesty's acting consul-general has the concurrence of his Russian colleague in the view above expressed.

[27511]

No. 258.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 20.)*

(No. 612.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Gulahek, July 20, 1909.

I AM in agreement with M. Sabline that the ex-Shah should be escorted to the coast, when the moment arrives, by a combined Anglo-Russian guard consisting of three men from either legation. A guard of Persian Cossacks to accompany him as far as Kazvin should be furnished by the Persian Government; from this point onwards Russian troops might replace them.

The Russian chargé d'affaires is telegraphing in the same sense to his Government.

It is possible that the late Shah will not accept this arrangement unless a promise is made him that he will be accompanied to Kazvin by a Russian officer or even by members of the two legations.

I am afraid that his departure may be delayed to allow of the settlement of question arising from his claim to arrears of civil list, the disposal of the crown jewels, &c.

[27491]

No. 259.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.*

(No. 389.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, July 20, 1909.

YOUR action in the present crisis in Persia has my entire approval. I am certain that the prevention of the dispatch of the Russian force to Tehran is due to the confidence which you have inspired in M. Sabline and to the steady advice which you have offered. Your action has had a most beneficial effect. Considerable pressure was put upon Russian Government to induce them to send troops to Tehran, and if they had yielded the result would have been disastrous; they themselves would have encountered considerable difficulties, both they and His Majesty's Government would probably have had to face the embarrassing situation created by the probable break-up of Persia, and, moreover, the stability of Anglo-Russian *entente* would have been endangered.

The part played by your Russian colleague, and the loyal manner in which he has supported you are greatly appreciated here.

[27329]

No. 260.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.*

(No. 390.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, July 20, 1909.

BELUCHI advance on Kerman (see your telegram No. 602 of the 19th July).

His Majesty's Government will hold new Persian Government responsible for damage to lives or property of British subjects. You should warn them in this sense.



[26718]

No. 261.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.*

(No. 391.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Foreign Office, July 20, 1909.*

I APPROVE language reported to have been held by Major Cox and that held by you to the Sheikh of Mohammerah with regard to the exchange of consuls at Kerman-shah and Mohammerah.

[27562]

No. 262.

*Anglo-Persian Oil Company to Foreign Office.—(Received July 21.)**Winchester House, Old Broad Street, E.C.,**July 20, 1909.*

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to enclose copy of a telegram received to-day from our agents in Persia, Messrs. Lloyd, Scott and Co. dated Mohammerah, the 17th July.

The arrangement arrived at would appear from Messrs. Lloyd, Scott and Co.'s telegram to be a very satisfactory one, and on behalf of this company I desire to tender to you and to His Britannic Majesty's consul at Bushire the best thanks of this company.

I am now arranging for the 6,500 sovereigns to be sent to Mohammerah as requested by Messrs. Lloyd, Scott and Co., and, as I presume that part of the arrangement made by Major Cox with the Sheikh will be a loan of 10,000*l.* from the British Government to the Sheikh for which my company is to provide the funds, I expect to hear from you on the subject shortly.

I have, &amp;c.

C. W. WALLACE, *Vice-Chairman.*

Inclosure in No. 262.

*Messrs. Lloyd, Scott and Co. to the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, London.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Mohammerah, July 17, 1909.*

AGREEMENT with Sheikh has been signed and the copy posted to you to-day. The details and the wording have had to be altered to some extent, but the essentials have been maintained, and it is satisfactory on the whole. The rent on renewal has been fixed at 1,500*l.* payable annually. The agreement has to be endorsed by the tribal elders before the money is paid, but this is merely a formal matter. Please arrange to send by first mail steamer from Bombay 6,500 English sovereigns. Also telegraph your confirmation of the arrangement. In view of the political situation, the Sheikh requests you to keep the agreement secret from the Persian Government in the meantime, and also, if possible, not to commence work on Abadan Island for a little while. Major Cox approves.

In view of possible unrest, we have arranged to detain the Sepoy guard at Ahwaz for the present.

[27626]

No. 263.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 21.)*

(No. 613.)

(Telegraphic.) *En clair.**Tehran, July 21, 1909.*

NASR-UL-MULK, Foreign Affairs; Mustoufi-ul-Mamalek, Finance; Farman Farma, Justice; Samsam-es-Sultaneh, governor of Ispahan; Mukhber-es-Sultaneh, governor of Azerbaijan.

[27565]

No. 264.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 21.)*

(No. 614.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Gulahek, July 21, 1909.*

I HAVE telegraphed to Mr. Bill at Shiraz in my telegram No. 54 of to-day's date, as follows:—

Ala-ed-Dowleh has been appointed governor-general at Shiraz to replace the present holder of that office, who has been recalled.

Strict instructions have been issued to him that he is to cause his deputy immediately to take such action as the restoration of order may render necessary.

[27625]

No. 265.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 21.)*

(No. 615.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Gulahek, July 21, 1909.*

SIR F. CARTWRIGHT'S telegram No. 148 had not reached me when my telegram No. 606 of yesterday was sent.

The longer the Zil can be kept out of Persia the better it will be. Should His Imperial Highness, however, absolutely insist on returning, the danger would be less if he lived in the capital than if he went to Ispahan. At the latter place he is a large landed proprietor, and the scope for his intrigues would be far greater.

[27620]

No. 266.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 21.)*

(No. 616.)

(Telegraphic.) *En clair.**Tehran, July 21, 1909.*

TWO legations, under instructions from two Governments, have to-day notified recognition of Sultan Ahmet Shah.

[27627]

No. 267.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 21.)*

(No. 617.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Gulahek, July 21, 1909.*

I VENTURE to beg that I may be authorised to use my own discretion as to the right moment to address to the Persian Government the warning indicated in your telegram No. 390 of the 20th July.

So far the Persian Government have done everything I have asked them in regard to the situation at Kerman, and have not failed to take all possible steps to avert the threatened inroad.

If the danger becomes imminent, I shall hold Persian Government responsible for British interests.

[27628]

No. 268.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 21.)*

(No. 618.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Gulahek, July 21, 1909.*

IT appears from the reports which I have so far received, that an excellent impression has been produced in the provinces by the change of Shah.

The telegraph office at Kum reports that instructions have been sent to Samsam-es-Sultaneh to place guards along the Ispahan-Kum road. From the same source I hear that similar instructions regarding the road from Kum to Tehran have been given to the Ilbeggi, who is now at Kum.



[26670]

No. 269.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.*(No. 393.)  
(Telegraphic.) P.*Foreign Office, July 21, 1909.*

INDIA OFFICE consider that officers in Kherkha district should be cautioned to see that the sheikh does not overlook the financial and other difficulties which will arise in connection with the Kherkha irrigation scheme. The project is still in a stage of experiment, and difficulties are sure to occur.

I approve action reported in your telegram No. 507 of the 27th June, last paragraph.

[27511]

No. 270.

*Sir Edward Grey to Mr. O'Beirne.*(No. 948.)  
(Telegraphic.) P.*Foreign Office, July 21, 1909.*

YOU should ask opinion of Russian Government as to proposal for departure of ex-Shah from Persia (see Tehran telegram No. 612 of yesterday), telling them that His Majesty's Government approve the suggestion.

His Majesty's Government think that questions of civil list arrears, crown jewels, &c., can be quite well settled afterwards, and that they need not delay Shah's departure. We think that Shah should be accompanied as far as Kasvin by Russian and English military attachés, and that the Persian Cossacks who are to go with His Majesty should be under Russian officers.

[27495]

No. 271.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Cartwright.*(No. 275.)  
(Telegraphic.) P.*Foreign Office, July 21, 1909.*

YOU should inform Zil-es-Sultan that his appointment as Governor of Fars will not be confirmed by the new Persian Government, and add that therefore you consider his return at present inadvisable.

[27329]

No. 272.

*Foreign Office to India Office.**Foreign Office, July 21, 1909.*

Sir,  
WITH reference to my letter of the 13th instant relative to the serious situation at Kerman, I am directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to transmit to you herewith copy of a further telegram from His Majesty's Minister at Tehran,\* from which it appears that the British community at that place would be quite unable to leave it in case of danger.

I am to state that Sir E. Grey would be glad to receive a reply to my letter above referred to with as little delay as possible.

I am, &c.  
LOUIS MALLET.

[26998]

No. 273.

*Foreign Office to Anglo-Persian Oil Company.**Foreign Office, July 21, 1909.*

Sir,  
WITH reference to your letter of the 1st instant, relative to the proposed agreement between your company and the Sheikh of Mohammerah, I am directed by

\* No. 237.

Secretary Sir Edward Grey to inform you that he has received a telegram from His Majesty's consul-general at Bushire reporting that, after negotiations which have lasted several days, a settlement has been reached on terms which Major Cox agrees with your agent in considering reasonably satisfactory. All essential conditions have been maintained, though certain alterations have been made in the less important details.

As regards the reversion of the buildings, &c., constructed on the land leased, Major Cox states that he was obliged to give to the sheikh the separate confidential assurance suggested by His Majesty's Minister at Tehran, that if, when the time comes, the Persian Government claim these buildings, His Majesty's Government will assist the sheikh to reach a reasonable settlement.

The sheikh has undertaken to get the agreement endorsed by the tribal elders within the next few days, and it is hoped that by that time the sum of 16,050*l.* will be ready at Mohammerah. The sheikh accepts the conditions which His Majesty's Government have attached to the loan, and has asked that the amount may be paid in gold instead of by draft on a bank.

The sheikh has expressed the fear that by executing this agreement with a foreign company he may incur the hostility of the ulema and Nationalist leaders. He therefore begs that overt operations at Mohammerah may be delayed, and secrecy maintained as to the execution and details of the agreement until the present crisis at Tehran is at an end.

I am to suggest to you the advisability of complying with the request of the sheikh on this point.

I am, &c.  
LOUIS MALLET.

[27741]

No. 274.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 22.)*

(No. 620.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Gulahek, July 22, 1909.*

PLEASE see last paragraph of your telegram No. 948 to Mr. O'Beirne.

The Crown jewels constitute the chief impediment. It is believed that Mohamed Ali has these at the Russian Legation among his personal effects, and will no doubt make sure of a suitable pension from the Persian Government before surrendering them. If they should be removed from the country their ultimate recovery would be most improbable.

My Russian colleague and I are advising the Persian Government to make proposals to him, as they, although desirous that he shall leave the country as soon as possible, have a natural wish to assure the security of the Crown jewels. We shall also unofficially endeavour to bring about a compromise—in principle, at least—but I fear that any terms not including guarantees from the two legations will be unacceptable to him.

[27737]

No. 275.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 22.)*

(No. 621.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Gulahek, July 22, 1909.*

I HAVE received a telegram from His Majesty's vice-consul at Resht to the effect that 625 Cossacks and from 1,000 to 1,200 infantry in all have, he understands, passed through Resht on their way south.

On the 19th July three transports arrived at Enzeli, and 125 cavalry were landed on the following day.

I am assured by M. Sabline that he feels convinced that no addition has been made to the detachment originally ordered to proceed to Persia.

[1665]

2 S



[27746]

No. 276.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 22.)*

(No. 622.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Gulahek, July 22, 1909.*

PLEASE see my telegram No. 611 of the 20th July.

My Russian colleague had, acting on instructions from St. Petersburg, addressed two *notes verbales* to the Persian Government, dealing respectively with the anti-Russian agitation at Tabreez and the disorders in the neighbourhood of Ardebil created by Shahsevans. M. Sabline has shown me these two notes. The latter is in the form of a warning to the Persian Government to the effect that Russia will be compelled to take the necessary measures to safeguard her rights unless the Persian Government immediately take steps to restrain the tribesmen and ensure the security of traffic in the district in question.

I have supported M. Sabline's representations so far as to urge the Persian Government to do all in its power towards allaying the anti-Russian agitation recently prevalent in Tabreez, to send without delay a capable governor supported by a suitable force, and also to do their utmost to restore order in the Ardebil district.

[27738]

No. 277.

*Mr. O'Beirne to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 22.)*

(No. 365.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*St. Petersburg, July 22, 1909.*

I AM laying before the Minister for Foreign Affairs your views respecting the departure of the Shah as contained in the last paragraph of your telegram No. 948 of the 21st July. The Russian Government, as his Excellency has told me, quite agree as to the desirability of expediting the departure of the late Shah, but at the same time they fear that unless some satisfactory arrangement as to his civil list is come to with the Persian Government before he leaves, the expenses of his support would devolve on the Russian Government, and this is a contingency which they are anxious to avoid.

I imagine that the Russian Government would stipulate that some special source of revenue should be assigned as a guarantee for the payment of a pension, if the Persian Government agreed to settle one on His Majesty.

[27627]

No. 278.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.*

(No. 395.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

*Foreign Office, July 22, 1909.*

YOUR telegram No. 617 [of 21st July]: Kerman.

You may use your discretion.

(Repeated to St. Petersburg, No. 950.)

[27788]

No. 279.

*India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received July 23.)*

Sir,

*India Office, July 21, 1909.*

IN reply to your letter of the 14th instant, I am directed to say that Viscount Morley concurs in Sir E. Grey's proposal to approve the terms of the note addressed by His Majesty's Minister at Tehran on the 13th May to the Persian Government regarding the protection of Bahreinis in Persia.

I am, &amp;c.

A. GODLEY.

[27792]

No. 280.

*Anglo-Persian Oil Company to Foreign Office.—(Received July 23.)*

*Winchester House, Old Broad Street, London,  
July 21, 1909.*

Sir,

I RECEIVED a call yesterday from Sadigh-es-Sultaneh, who exhibited to me the original of a telegram which he had received from Persia addressed to him and signed Nezameddin.

The telegram was in Persian or code, and Sadigh-es-Sultaneh left with me a translation, of which the following is a copy:—

"On the authority of this telegram the Company must pay the commissioner's salary in full to yourself. Report as usual of the affairs of the company."

Sadigh-es-Sultaneh states that Nezameddin is Minister of Mines in the Persian Government as at present established, and claims that this intimation of the wishes of the Persian Government is official, and such as must be respected by the Anglo-Persian Oil Company (Limited). He will therefore claim the salary for the month of July on the 31st instant. In the circumstances I shall feel very grateful if you will be so good as to intimate to me before the end of this month whether it would be more agreeable to the Foreign Office if I paid the Sadigh the July instalment of salary when due, or if I refused to do so in view of Mr. Louis Mallet's letter of the 12th June, 1909, addressed to Mr. J. R. Preece.

I am, &amp;c.

C. W. WALLACE, *Vice-Chairman.*

[27814]

No. 281.

*Anglo-Persian Oil Company to Foreign Office.—(Received July 23.)*

*Winchester House, Old Broad Street,  
London, July 22, 1909.*

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge receipt of your letter of yesterday's date advising receipt of a telegram from His Majesty's consul-general at Bushire confirmatory of the one received by us from the company's agents, as advised to you on the 20th instant.

From what you write I understand that it is your desire that we should arrange for the payment of the whole sum of 16,500*l.* (not 16,050*l.*) in gold to the sheikh, and I have accordingly remitted the equivalent of this amount to Bombay to-day, and instructed our agents there to purchase 16,500 sovereigns and ship them by the first mail steamer to Messrs. Lloyd, Scott, and Co., Mohammerah, for payment to the sheikh. As arranged with you over the telephone to-day, I understand, however, that you will telegraph to His Majesty's consul at Bushire, requesting him to advise the sheikh that 10,000*l.* of the above amount is being paid by Messrs. Lloyd, Scott, and Co., in respect of the Government loan.

With regard to the two concluding paragraphs of your letter, we shall of course do our utmost to comply with the sheikh's request to delay overt operations until the present crisis at Tehran is at an end, but it will be difficult to do this for long, as one-half of the pipe line is due for shipment from New York in August, and will probably arrive some time in September.

His request for secrecy as to the execution and details of the agreement will of course be complied with.

I am, &amp;c.

C. GREENING, *Director.*

[27752]

No. 282.

*Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 23.)*

(No. 291. Confidential.)

Sir,

*Paris, July 22, 1909.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith copy of a letter from Nasr-ul-Mulk enclosing translations of telegrams which have been exchanged between the newly



appointed Regent in Persia and himself relative to his appointment as Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs.

I have, &c.  
FRANCIS BERTIE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 282.

*Aboul Kassem to Sir F. Bertie.*

(Private and Confidential.)

*Hôtel Splendide, Evian-les-Bains,  
Haute-Savoie, July 19, 1909.*

Dear Sir Francis,

BEING, as it were, isolated here, I have learned the important news from Tehran only through the newspapers, and cannot yet judge exactly the situation.

I received, however, to-day an official telegram from the newly appointed Regent, in which his Highness informs me of the change that has taken place, and of my appointment as Premier and Foreign Minister. In answer, after the usual compliments, I expressed my readiness to return, and to place my services at the disposal of the Government within the time necessary for making my preparation and completing the cure of my son.

I beg to send you a translation of the original, that is in Persian, and a copy of the answer for your information.

I may add that I have written the same information to his Excellency M. de Nélidow, although I do not exactly know whether he would be in Paris just now, as he had the intention of going away on a short leave.

My son is slightly better, and has, as the doctor says, three weeks more to drink water.

I remain, &c.  
ABOUL KASSEM.

Inclosure 2 in No. 282.

*Azad-ul-Mulk to Aboul Kassem.*

(Traduction.)

(Télégraphique.)

VU la situation actuelle du pays et afin de calmer l'agitation du peuple, il a été jugé nécessaire de procéder à un changement fondamental. Par conséquent, le vendredi, 27 Djamadios-Sani, 1327, de l'hadjir, une haute assemblée s'est formée au Baharistan (Palais du Parlement), composée des grands prêtres, des princes, des hauts dignitaires de l'Etat, et des députés importants de l'ancien Medjlesse, dans laquelle la déchéance de Sa Majesté Mohammed Ali Mirza a été déclarée unanimement, et, conformément aux articles 36 et 37 des lois fondamentales, Sa Majesté Impériale le Prince héritier, Soltan Ahmed Mirza, a été proclamé Schahin-Schah de Perse. Dans la même assemblée on m'a nommé provisoirement à la régence.

Votre loyauté à la couronne doit vous imposer dans cette occasion le devoir de vous empresser à servir le Gouvernement et la nation. Vous êtes nommé à la présidence du Conseil et au Ministère des Affaires Étrangères. En vous mettant en route immédiatement et vous chargeant de ces fonctions vous ne ferez qu'augmenter la liste des services que vous avez toujours rendus au Gouvernement et à la nation.

*Le 28 Djamadios-Sani.*

Inclosure 3 in No. 282.

*Aboul Kassem to Azad-ul-Mulk.*

(Télégraphique.)

SON Altesse le Régent.

M'empresse présenter humbles hommages vœux sincères. Heureux pouvoir retourner servir pays. Prépare départ. Compte être Téhéran quarantaine jours.

[27791]

No. 283.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 23.)*

(No. 623.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Gulahek, July 23, 1909.*

IN the second paragraph of my telegram No. 621 of yesterday I stated, on the authority of a report from His Majesty's vice-consul at Resht, that 125 Russian cavalry had landed. I have now received a further telegram from Mr. Rabino correcting this statement, which should read 159 men of the Commissariat corps.

[27843]

No. 284.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 23.)*

(No. 624.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Gulahek, July 23, 1909.*

HIS Imperial Majesty the Czar has replied to the ex-Shah's telegram (reported in my telegram No. 604 of the 20th July) in such terms as to remove any illusions he may have relative to the scope of the protection to be afforded to him by Russia. His Imperial Majesty assures him of a proper reception in his country and of his personal sympathy, and urges that his departure from Persia may be effected with as little delay as possible.

Proposals to be laid before Mohammed Ali Mirza in regard to the crown jewels and other analogous questions are being formulated by the Persian Government. These, I understand, are to be submitted to him to-morrow, at latest.

[27841]

No. 285.

*Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 23.)*

(No. 151.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Vienna, July 23, 1909.*

FOLLOWING is in reference to your telegram No. 275 of the 21st instant: Zil-es-Sultan.

Accompanied by the Russian Ambassador, I have just been to see Zil-es-Sultan, whom we advised not to leave Vienna yet, as the new Persian Government had not confirmed his nomination as governor of Farsistan.

His Highness repeated his request to be permitted to go either to Tehran, where our legations would be able to watch his movements, or to his home at Ispahan. He intended to pay his homage to his new ruler as soon as he arrived in the capital, and he again assured us of his absolutely peaceful intentions. He did not wish to be made a governor, nor even regent. He expressed the hope that he would not be forced by Russia and England to take an indirect route in going back to his country, to which he claimed he had the right to return. An impression might be made that he was coming back to Persia as a pretender if he did not take the direct road.

We attempted to persuade Zil-es-Sultan to stay on a little in Europe, but I infer that he means to take his departure for Persia very soon. He promised, however, on my request, to wait until an answer as to his being permitted to pass through Russian territory is received by telegraph from St. Petersburg.

[27842]

No. 286.

*Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 23.)*

(No. 152. Confidential.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Vienna, July 23, 1909.*

ZIL-ES-SULTAN. My telegram No. 151 of the 23rd July.

Anxiety regarding his future seems to be telling on Zil-es-Sultan, who is now very nervous and excited. In conversation with myself and Russian Ambassador, he said he could not continue living in hotels in Europe, and that he must be provided with an "appanage" by Persian Government if political reasons require his permanent exile from his country. There seemed to him to be no sense in asking him to prolong his stay in Europe from week to week, for a long time must elapse before the situation in



Persia, with a weak Government in power, could be expected to become satisfactory. The Prince is resolved to return, taking all the responsibility that his action may entail.

As he at present appears to recognise the utility of the joint action of England and Russia in Persia, it would be unfortunate, it seems to me, were the Russian Government to cause him offence by deciding to close to him the route through Persia.

I am informed by Russian Ambassador that M. Isvolsky instructed the Russian Embassy in Paris on the 24th June to place a visa on the Prince's passport.

In showing us the passport, the Prince enquired what objection could there be to his returning to Persia now, when Russia had not been afraid to grant him permission to go during the worst period of the Persian crisis.

[27792]

No. 287.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.*

(No. 397.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, July 23, 1909.

SALARY of oil commissioner (see your telegrams No. 456 of the 11th June and No. 554 of the 9th July).

Oil company have been shewn a telegram by Sadigh-es-Sultaneh, bearing signature Nezameddin, stating that Sadigh will claim the instalment of salary for July, and that the commissioner's salary must be paid to him.

Sadigh-es-Sultaneh explains that Nezameddin has been appointed Minister of Mines.

Oil company are anxious to know what to do about salary. Do Persian Government desire that it should still be paid to Sadigh-es-Sultaneh, until the appointment of his successor?

[27814]

No. 288.

*Sir Edward Grey to Consul-General Cox.*

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, July 23, 1909.

ANGLO-PERSIAN Oil Company have given instructions for 16,500*l.* to be shipped, in gold coin, to Messrs. Lloyd, Scott, and Co., of Mohammerah, in payment of the loan to the sheikh (see your telegram No. 305 of the 17th July). Of this amount, 10,000*l.* should, as you know, be advanced as a loan from His Majesty's Government to the sheikh.

Oil company will keep the details of the agreement and its execution secret, in compliance with the sheikh's request, and will also try to put off beginning overt operations until the present disturbed state of affairs in Tehran is at an end. But, in view of fact that half the pipe-line will probably reach Mohammerah in September, being due to leave New York in August, it will be difficult to keep matters quiet for very long.

[26837]

No. 289.

*Foreign Office to India Office.*

Sir,

Foreign Office, July 23, 1909.

I AM directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to transmit to you herewith, for any observations which the Secretary of State for India may have to offer, copy of a letter from the Anglo-Persian Oil Company relative to geological surveys in Persia.\*

Viscount Morley will observe that the company enquire, in the first place, whether this department has any record of a topographical survey of that country, such a survey being, in their opinion, a necessary preliminary to a geological survey.

On the 11th February of this year, Sir E. Grey received from Lord Morley a copy of "Memoirs of the Geological Survey of India," vol. xxxiv, Part IV, containing "The

\* No. 208.

Geology of the Persian Gulf and the adjoining portions of Persia and Arabia," by G. E. Pilgrim, B.Sc., F.G.S., Geological Survey of India.

This volume was marked "Confidential," but in the letter from Mr. Butler to Sir R. Ritchie, forwarding it from India—copy of which was sent to this department with the book itself—it was stated that a public edition of the work had appeared from which certain confidential matter had been omitted.

It has occurred to Sir E. Grey that this public edition might provide the company with all the information which they need, and he would accordingly suggest that they should, in the first place, be advised to obtain a copy of it.

I am accordingly to request that, if Lord Morley concurs in this proposal, he would be good enough to cause Sir E. Grey to be informed how the work can be obtained, in order that the necessary indications may be given to the company.

I am, &amp;c.

LOUIS MALLET.

[27877]

No. 290.

*Consul Stevens to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 24.)*

(No. 15.)

Sir,

Batoum, July 15, 1909.

ACCORDING to the latest information that reaches me, the numerical strength of the military force which the Russian Government has recently sent from Baku for the protection of Russian and foreign subjects at Tehran is, roughly speaking, as follows:—

	Men.
1 battery field artillery (8 guns) .. .. .	260
2 companies sappers .. .. .	250
Laba Cossack Regiment .. .. .	500
2 battalions infantry .. .. .	2,000
Total .. .. .	3,010

I have been unable as yet to procure the numbers of the infantry units taking part in the above expedition.

I have, &amp;c.

P. STEVENS.

[27906]

No. 291.

*India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received July 24.)*

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Viscount Morley, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, with reference to previous letter, India Office, the 16th April, 1909, copy of inclosures in a letter from the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India dated the 1st July, 1909, relative to assurances to be given to the Sheikh of Mohammerah.

*India Office, July 23, 1909.*

Inclosure 1 in No. 291.

*Major Cox to Government of India.*

Sir,

Bushire, June 12, 1909.

WITH reference to my telegram dated the 5th April, 1909, I have the honour to attach, for the information of the Government of India, copies of further correspondence on the subject of the assurances to be given to the Sheikh of Mohammerah.

I have, &amp;c.

P. Z. COX, Major,  
Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.



Inclosure 2 in No. 291.

*Sir G. Barclay to Major Cox.*

(No. 99.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

April 19, 1909.

FOREIGN OFFICE have wired as follows:—

"Cox may inform Sheikh Khazal that whatever change of Government there may be in Persia His Majesty's Government are ready to give him the same support against any encroachment on his rights as was promised him in 1902. Cox should also remind the Sheikh that the assurances of His Majesty's Government have already been extended to his successors. Those successors will presumably be his offspring. If this does not satisfy him there is no objection to extending the guarantee already given to 'his heirs and successors.'"

I have as yet received no instructions regarding the loan.

Inclosure 3 in No. 291.

*Consul McDouall to Major Cox.*

(No. 54.)

(Telegraphic.)

April 24, 1909.

YOURS of 20th about assurances to the Sheikh.

I have told Hajji Rais to tell the Sheikh the first part of the Foreign Office message, which is certainly an advance.

As to the question of successors, in my opinion it will not satisfy the Sheikh, the pointing out that successors will be presumably heirs of his body lawfully begotten, and Hajji Rais is of the same opinion. The Sheikh is particularly anxious to have his offspring ("aolad") mentioned. So in my opinion it will be advisable to give him the extension to "heirs and successors."

Inclosure 4 in No. 291.

*Major Cox to Sheikh of Mohammerah.*

(After the usual compliments.)

*Mohammerah, May 16, 1909.*

ON the 1st December, 1908, I had the honour, by the direction of His Majesty's Government, to repeat to your Excellency the assurances given you on behalf of Government by his Excellency Sir Arthur Hardinge, British Minister at Tehran, in his letter of the 7th December, 1902, to your address, and to inform you that the British Government were now prepared to extend those assurances to your successors.

I was further directed to explain to you that the British Government had engaged to respect the integrity and independence of Persia and that that undertaking in itself involved the maintenance of the *status quo* in Persia, and thus included the continuance of the same state of autonomy which your Excellency at present enjoys.

I was then to point out that it followed from the above that any external aggression upon your Excellency would constitute an act of infringement of that Persian integrity which has received recognition in the Anglo-Russian convention.

While expressing your thanks for these amplified assurances, you represented that they seemed to you only to safeguard you so long as Persia continued to exist as a sovereign State, and you pressed for a further assurance which would cover the contingency of Persia ceasing to exist as a sovereign State and the intervention or occupation by foreign Powers.

You also expressed doubt as to whether the present assurance only provided immunity against unwarrantable encroachment on your rights by the absolute government of His Majesty the Shah, or whether it also covered prevention of similar action on the part of parliamentary government. In reply to those representations, your Excellency was informed that Great Britain and Russia being pledged to respect the integrity of Persia, the British Government were not, properly speaking, able to admit even the possibility of Persia ceasing to be a sovereign State or coming under the occupation of a foreign Power, but that in the unlikely event of such a contingency the assurances already given to your Excellency would become even more binding than before.

I was further permitted to inform you that whatever change might take place in the form of government in Persia the British Government were prepared to give you the same support against any encroachment on your rights as was promised to you in 1902, and I was authorised to add that they were now prepared to extend the application of those assurances to your "heirs and successors."

Mr. McDouall and I have informed you that, in our opinion the assurances as now extended and expressed, appeared to satisfy all your requirements; but you have further requested that the words "heirs and successors" may be changed and the words "own successive male descendants" may be written instead; and you have gone on to express the hope that His Majesty's Government will be pleased to dispel the last shadow of doubt from your mind regarding their own intentions in the future, by adding after the words "male descendants" as above, the words "up to a period of 100 years" (or, if it be possible, 150 years).

I cannot give your Excellency any reply on this point without reference to Government, but I will lose no time in communicating to them your representations.

I am your Excellency's sincere friend,

P. Z. COX, Major,  
*Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.*

Inclosure 5 in No. 291.

*Major Cox to Sir G. Barclay.*

Sir,

*Bushire, June 12, 1909.*

IN continuation of the correspondence on the subject of the assurances to be given to the Sheikh of Mohammerah, ending with your telegram No. 99, dated the 19th April, 1909, I have the honour to report that at my last visit to the Sheikh on the 15th and 16th May, I discussed the question with him at length in the presence of Mr. McDouall, and finding him, as the latter anticipated, still not fully satisfied with the deduction that his successors would presumably be his offspring, I gave him the slightly extended guarantee to cover his "heirs and successors," as authorised by His Majesty's Government. In the endeavour to persuade him that he had now got all he could reasonably want, I went through the record with him once more, reading him the various assurances that had been hitherto given him, and at his desire addressed him a communication epitomising the recent fragmentary negotiations, and bringing the subject up to date in a convenient form for his information. Of this letter I enclose a copy.

The penultimate paragraph was included in order to satisfy him that his final representation was taken note of, but before parting with him, it was agreed between us that as I hoped very shortly to have the privilege of meeting your Excellency, it would be better that I should discuss his affairs with you personally, and he consequently does not expect an immediate reply to his last request.

I have, &amp;c.

P. Z. COX, Major, *British Resident in the Persian Gulf and His Britannic Majesty's Consul-General for Fars, &c.*

[28207]

No. 292.

*Count Benckendorff to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 24.)*

Dear Sir Edward,

*Russian Embassy, London, July 24, 1909.*

THE enclosed is the translation of a telegram I have received this morning. I am instructed by M. Isvolsky to ask for your opinion in this matter.

Yours sincerely,

BENCKENDORFF.

Inclosure in No. 292.

*Telegram communicated to Sir E. Grey by Count Benckendorff.*

(Traduction.)

L'AMBASSADEUR de Turquie est venu signaler à M. Isvolsky de grands désordres survenus récemment à Kermanshah. D'ordre de son Gouvernement il lui a

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proposé, vu la proximité de cette ville de la frontière turque, d'y expédier un détachement de troupes ottomanes. M. Isvolsky a dit à l'Ambassadeur qu'il ne pouvait lui donner de réponse sans avoir consulté le Cabinet de Londres.

Invité par l'Ambassadeur à lui exposer son opinion personnelle, M. Isvolsky lui a dit ce qui suit :

Il y a une différence essentielle dans les rapports entre la Perse et, d'un côté, l'Angleterre et la Russie, et de l'autre la Turquie.

Tandis que les deux premières Puissances ont fermement en vue de respecter l'intégrité de la Perse, la Turquie enlace à Urumiah des territoires incontestablement persans, les officiers turcs s'y arrogent des fonctions administratives, lèvent des impôts et, par des moyens injustifiables, induisent la population à demander la sujétion turque.

En outre cette présence de troupes ottomanes sur territoire persan a pris un caractère chronique ; elles occupent Urumiah déjà depuis plusieurs années, peut-être un peu moins nombreuses, mais malgré les réclamations à ce sujet que les Cabinets de Londres et de Saint-Petersbourg ont adressé à plusieurs reprises au Gouvernement ottoman, et malgré les constantes assurances que le Gouvernement a données en réponse à ces démarches. Dans l'opinion de M. Isvolsky la présence sur territoire persan de troupes turques non seulement n'y rétablit pas le calme, mais au contraire augmente le désordre, comme le prouvent les incidents d'Urumiah et de Dilman.

Les agents turques à Téhéran et à Tabriz ont paru munis d'instructions nullement de nature à calmer, plutôt le contraire.

Ces considérations paraissent déjà suffisantes à M. Isvolsky pour qu'un arrangement à ce sujet avec le Gouvernement ottoman ne peut être considéré comme motivé et opportun et que pour sa part il ne croit pas pouvoir consentir à la proposition du Gouvernement turc d'expédier un détachement à Kermanshah.

[27981]

No. 293.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 24.)*

(No. 625.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Gulahek, July 24, 1909.

THE new Government has as yet made no mention officially of the question of financial assistance ; nevertheless, I have received a hint of their urgent need of money.

If no help is given, forced contributions will, I think, alone enable them to carry on the administration of the country ; and any exactions of this sort would supply the Russian alarmists with an opportunity for complaint.

The two Governments cannot now, I presume, make any advance without the Assembly's sanction. Might not the two banks, however, make a temporary advance at 12 per cent., repayable when the joint loan has been made ?

Knowing the need to be urgent, I have ventured to telegraph to you on this question, although I have not yet had an opportunity of consulting my Russian colleague, who is at present indisposed, or the bank manager, who is in town.

[27980]

No. 294.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 24.)*

(No. 626.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Gulahek, July 24, 1909.

A CIRCULAR has been addressed by the Persian Government to the chief provincial assemblies, urging upon them the necessity of taking all possible steps to put an end to any anti-Russian agitation which may be prevalent in their districts.

[27989]

No. 295.

*Mr. O'Beirne to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 24.)*

(No. 366.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

St. Petersburg, July 24, 1909.

PERSIA.

I was informed by M. Isvolsky this afternoon that instructions had been sent by the Turkish Government to their representative here to make enquiries as to how the Russian Government would view the dispatch of a force of Turkish troops to Kermanshah for the protection of the lives and property of Turks and other foreigners.

His Excellency, in reply, had pointed out that every time a Turkish force had entered Persia their purpose appeared to have been, not the maintenance of order, but the occupation of Persian territory and the creation of further disturbances. He had told the Turkish Ambassador that he would consult with His Majesty's Government, but that he would not hold out hopes that a favourable answer would be returned to the Ottoman Government.

[27990]

No. 296.

*Mr. O'Beirne to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 24.)*

(No. 367.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

St. Petersburg, July 24, 1909.

RUSSIAN troops in Persia.

I was informed to-day by M. Isvolsky that the Acting Persian Foreign Minister had sent instructions to the Persian Minister here to enquire whether the Imperial Government would be ready now to withdraw the Russian forces in Persia. In reply, M. Isvolsky had stated that until it was clear that the re-establishment of order was an accomplished fact it was impossible for the Russian Government to do so.

His Excellency then proceeded to observe that further fighting was likely to take place in Tehran and other places. Since this question had been raised by M. Isvolsky himself, I said that, admitting the outlook in North Persia to be uncertain, the Russian Government could, as an alternative to keeping the force already dispatched at Kasvin, increase the guards of their legation at Tehran to any strength which possible disturbances might render necessary ; and this being done, the troops could be withdrawn from Kasvin. To this M. Isvolsky first replied that the Persian Government would be sure to object if any troops were dispatched to Tehran, and it would be said that such a step constituted intervention in Persian affairs. I suggested to his Excellency that if the Persian Government were informed that the legation guard at Tehran must be strengthened as a preliminary condition to the force being withdrawn from Kasvin this difficulty could be obviated.

Upon this M. Isvolsky said that he was unable to express an opinion on the matter immediately, and that he must think the question over. The situation could best be judged by M. Poklewsky, who has been appointed Russian Minister in Tehran, when he reached his post.

Interviews have been published in the newspapers here, pointing out that to withdraw the troops is at present inadvisable ; and it would appear that the persons interviewed are officials at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

[19457]

No. 297.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.*

(No. 110.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, July 24, 1909.

I HAVE received your despatch No. 122 of the 15th ultimo, discussing a proposal for the provision of adequate protection for trade in the roads of Southern Persia, a subject also treated in your despatch No. 13, Commercial, of the 16th May last.

I consider the proposal to be in itself an excellent one, but it is clear that, before steps can be taken to give practical effect to it, it must become the subject of an exchange of views with the Russian Government.

Before, however, submitting it to their consideration, I have thought it well to obtain the opinion of His Majesty's Ambassador at St. Petersburg, at present on leave of absence in this country, as to the attitude which they are likely to adopt towards it.



Sir A. Nicolson has now informed me that he does not anticipate that the Russian Government will raise any objections to the scheme as far as the British zone is concerned, but his Excellency considers that, before broaching the subject at St. Petersburg, it would be well to ascertain whether the Russian Government themselves maintain any guards on the Julfa-Tabreez and Resht-Tehran roads, and, if so, how they are organised and paid.

I have accordingly to request you to endeavour to obtain this information and forward it to me in due course.

As regards the neutral zone, the Russian Government would no doubt wish to be consulted, while, in Sir A. Nicolson's opinion, the Persian Government might raise objections to any scheme involving the employment of road guards under British officers.

I am, &c.

E. GREY.

[27982]

No. 298.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 25.)*

(No. 627.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Gulahek, July 25, 1909.*

YESTERDAY I received a visit from a leading member of the nationalist committee, he informed me that a loan raised from native merchants had brought in 20,000*l.* to the Government, but that this sum could not suffice for the needs of administration until the Medjliss met in some four or five weeks' time, in spite of the strict economy which they were practising. They could not apply for foreign assistance after the constant declarations that no foreign loan could be recognised without the sanction of the assembly, and they looked to those who had enriched themselves under the late régime to contribute to their needs.

There would not be much harm in this were it not for the Russian alarmist element, which professed great indignation at similar practices in Kazvin, and would probably make an exaggerated outcry if the new Government compelled persons to contribute in Tehran.

Reference is to my telegram No. 625 of the 24th July.

[27983]

No. 299.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 25.)*

(No. 628.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Gulahek, July 25, 1909.*

I HAVE received the following telegram, No. 173 of the 23rd July, from His Majesty's acting consul-general at Tabreez :—

"Last night the Turkish consul-general left. Sattar and Bagher Khans, however, remain here in their own houses and do not appear to contemplate leaving Persia.

"Could a hint be conveyed to the central Government as to the desirability of summoning these men to Tehran, or of removing them from Tabreez on any other honourable pretext? The more moderate among the nationalists here are anxious for their departure."

The Tehran nationalist committee are endeavouring to encourage the two khans to come here. They will find their own level easier here than in Tabreez, and I think it would be the best thing for them to come to the capital.

I mention the nationalist committee in the preceding paragraph. I should explain that this committee was elected by the extraordinary grand council which was convoked on the 17th ultimo and decided upon the dethronement of Mohamed Ali. The committee was elected nominally for the guidance of the Cabinet. In reality Government is in its hands.

[27984]

No. 300.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 25.)*

(No. 629.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Gulahek, July 25, 1909.*

THE nationalist committee yesterday sent a deputation to wait upon the ex-Shah, to request him to give up the crown jewels, and to state that the Government were prepared to pay him an annuity of 25,000 tomans. Mohamed Ali Mirza expressed his willingness to resign the jewels, and steps are to be taken to check them. The ex-Shah referred the deputation to M. Sabline for the discussion of the question of pension; subsequently he complained to my Russian colleague that the sum proposed was insufficient.

His late Majesty would have, in addition to the State pension, the income arising from his private estates, computed roughly at 20,000*l.* per annum by my Russian colleague. We must, however, bear in mind that considerable sums are owing to the Imperial Bank, which were counted during the late régime as Government debts, but which the assembly will possibly not look upon in the same light.

Should the assembly raise this question I do not know what attitude His Majesty's Government would adopt, but, if we fail to support the bank against the Medjliss's possible contention, the Shah's estates will be the only available security for their money.

There may be heavy charges against the Shah's property, as there are, I understand, others in the same position as the bank.

[27985]

No. 301.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 25.)*

(No. 630.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Gulahek, July 25, 1909.*

I LEARN from His Majesty's consul at Shiraz that the representative of the new governor-general has been expelled from Government House by the tribal levies, and that the telegraph office at Abadeh has reported that Sowlet-ed-Dowleh, chief of the Kashgais, with a force estimated at 10,000 men, has actually started for Shiraz. Mr. Bill begs me to authorise the immediate departure from Bushire of reinforcements.

I have felt it incumbent upon me, in view of these circumstances, to instruct Major Cox to dispatch the force of sepoys at once.

I am apprising the Persian Government and my Russian colleague of this step.

[28019]

No. 302.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 26.)*

(No. 554.)

Sir,

*Constantinople, July 15, 1909.*

WITH reference to your telegram No. 322 of the 25th May, I have the honour to forward herewith a despatch from Lieutenant-Colonel Ramsay, consul-general of Bagdad, submitting translations of letters written by him to the Ulemas of Mesopotamia, enjoining on them to do their utmost to restore peace in Persia.

I have, &c.

GERARD LOWTHER.

Inclosure 1 in No. 302.

*Consul-General Ramsay to Sir G. Lowther.*

(No. 66/615.)

Sir,

*Bagdad, June 11, 1909.*

WITH reference to your Excellency's telegram of the 10th June, 1909, I have the honour to forward, for your Excellency's information, a translation of my letter to the Mujtahids.

The Russian consul-general wished to inform the Mujtahids that the request for the use of their influence was made by our respective Governments, and he would not

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accept a draft which I proposed in which the consular representatives made the request. Finally, we compromised and accepted the enclosed form. I should not have done this, as it seemed to go rather beyond my instructions, had not the Russian Ambassador's telegram become public property owing to its having been sent *en clair*, as well as a further explanatory telegram, saying that the joint representation was required as an answer to a request made to the Czar, to the effect, I think, that Russian troops should be recalled from Persian territory.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) J. RAMSAY, Lieutenant-Colonel, Political Resident  
in Turkish Arabia, and His Britannic Majesty's  
Consul-General, Bagdad.

Inclosure 2 in No. 302.

*Consul-General Ramsay to Mujtahids of Karbala and Nedjef.*

(Translation.)

June 11, 1909.

IN sending you herewith the translation of a telegram which I have received from his Excellency the Ambassador of Great Britain at Constantinople, I beg you to do all that is in your power to restore peace in Persia.

Inclosure 3 in No. 302.

*Consul-General Ramsay to Chief Mujtahids at Samarra and Kadhimain.*

(Translation.)

June 11, 1909.

I SEND you the translation of a telegram that I have received from his Excellency the Ambassador for Great Britain at Constantinople. By his Excellency's orders, I ask the Mujtahids of Samarra and Kadhimain also to do all that lies in their power to restore peace in Persia.

[28042]

No. 303.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 26.)*

(No. 579.)

Sir,

Therapia, July 21, 1909.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith paraphrase of the telegram which, in accordance with the instructions contained in your telegram No. 404 of the 15th instant, I dispatched to His Majesty's consul-general at Bagdad, directing him to inform the Mujtahids of the objects and limitations of Russian action in Persia, but at the same time to abstain from any comments on the assurances of the Russian Government.

I have, &c.

GERARD LOWTHER.

Inclosure in No. 303.

*Sir G. Lowther to Consul-General Ramsay.*

(Telegraphic.) P.

Constantinople, July 16, 1909.

WITH reference to your telegram regarding the offer made by the Persian Mujtahids, the Russian Government stated expressly that their object in dispatching troops is to ensure that the lives and property of foreigners may be protected, and to keep open the communications between Tehran and the outside. They add that it is their attention that their forces shall leave the country immediately after effecting these objects. The fact that, somewhat before the present troubles, acting on the advice of the British and Russian Legations, not only did the Shah re-establish the constitution, but also promulgated an electoral law which was characterised as democratic by the British representative, while at the same time the Nationalist cause would have received

its death-blow in Tabreez had it not been saved by the arrival of the Russian soldiery, are enough to show that there is no intention of restoring the Shah to despotic power.

The best course for the Mujtahids to follow, if they wish to ensure the departure of the troops, is to recommend conciliatory behaviour to their compatriots.

You should give them to understand the above, while abstaining from making any comment on the assurances of the Russian Government.

[28247]

No. 304.

*Mr. O'Beirne to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 26.)*

(No. 438.)

Sir,

St. Petersburg, July 17, 1909.

I CALLED on the Minister for Foreign Affairs yesterday morning to make a communication to him respecting the situation in Shiraz, and his Excellency informed me that he had just received the news of the Shah having taken refuge in the Russian legation. M. Isvolsky, who appeared to consider this event as being as a matter of course equivalent to the abdication or dethronement of Mohammed Ali, said that the intelligence came to him as a relief. Russia had had no desire to support Mohammed Ali, but she had been suspected of such a desire, and that construction had been wrongly put on her actions. The situation would now at any rate become clearer.

His Excellency went on to speak of the attitude which the Russian Government would take up in the new condition of things. He said that they would await events, and see whether those who had now obtained control of affairs in Tehran were able to maintain order and establish an effective Government. Russia would intimate to whatever Government was set up in Persia that she would recognise them if they showed that they were capable of establishing order, but that if they proved incapable of so doing (this M. Isvolsky said with considerable emphasis), Russia would herself take the measures necessary for the protection of her interests.

I said that I thought in recognising any Government which effectively established its authority the policy of the Russian Government would be at one with that of His Majesty's Government.

As I have had the honour to report in my despatch No. 427 of the 8th instant and in other despatches, the Minister for Foreign Affairs in our previous conversations has often spoken of the disappearance of Mohammed Ali as of an eventuality which he viewed with the greatest apprehension, and has expressed the opinion that it would result in a condition of anarchy and brigandage which would in all probability necessitate Russian intervention on a serious scale. Now that the event has actually come to pass M. Isvolsky appears to view the situation with more optimism than might have been expected, which is of course due to the great moderation and good sense shown by the popular leaders in the first moment of victory.

I have, &c.

HUGH O'BEIRNE.

P.S.—Since the above was written I have received your telegram No. 919 of to-day's date, and I am addressing a note to the Minister for Foreign Affairs stating that the attitude of His Majesty's Government will be the same as that of the Russian Government, but that His Majesty's Government will consult with him before definitely recognising any Government that may be established in Persia.

H. O'B.

[28200]

No. 305.

*India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received July 26.)*

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Viscount Morley, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, with reference to previous letter from Foreign Office, 21st July, copy of a telegram to the Viceroy, dated the 22nd July, relative to the position of the British community at Kerman.

India Office, July 24, 1909.



Inclosure in No. 305.

*Viscount Morley to Government of India.*

(Telegraphic.) P.

*India Office, July 22, 1909.*

KERMAN. See my telegram dated the 16th July.

Telegram received through His Majesty's Minister at Tehran from Consul at Kerman states that no other danger is anticipated if Baluchi advance is stopped by our warning. It will otherwise be necessary for community consisting of 12 men, 8 women, and 7 infants to hold out with local help until relieved, as transport is not available. Action, if any, taken by Political Officer, Chagai, as well as suggestions as to other possible action, should be telegraphed as soon as possible.

[28269]

No. 306.

*India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received July 26.)*

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Viscount Morley, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, with reference to previous letter, India Office, of the 24th July, 1909, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 24th July, relative to the situation in Persia.

*India Office, July 26, 1909.*

Inclosure in No. 306.

*Government of India to Viscount Morley.*

(Telegraphic.) P.

*July 24, 1909.*

SITUATION at Kerman.

Your telegrams of the 16th and 22nd July, political agent, Chagai, has sent a warning, in sense of telegram of the 12th July from His Majesty's Minister at Tehran, to tribes who took part in recent Narmashir raid as well as to Sardars Bahram Khan and Syed Khan. A message has also been sent to Sardar Syed Khan by Resident, Persian Gulf, warning him against movement attributed to him, and informing him that constitutional Government has been established in Tehran. Consul at Kerman telegraphed as follows on the 22nd July:—

"Things are all safe now that a constituted authority has been re-established, and as Governor is really coming. The air is quite cleared. Unless capital is again disturbed, Kerman will be normal." . . . . .

Telegram dated the 22nd July from Resident, Persian Gulf, reported continued improvement in position at Shiraz. Reinforcement is not, therefore, a matter of immediate urgency. In light of unpopularity which action of Russians in Northern Persia has excited, it is desirable on political grounds that we should, as long as possible, defer the movement of troops. But emergency may arise in view of anarchical position in Persia. In that event, movement of small isolated detachments, such as that suggested for relief of Shiraz, is strongly deprecated by military authorities. Armed intervention, whether force be large or small, would probably involve much the same loss of popularity. It is preferable, in the circumstances, that force sufficient to guarantee success should be employed rather than that regrettable incidents, which might result in operations on a larger scale, should be risked. This view has our concurrence, and we suggest that not less than one regiment should be sent to Bushire and another to Bunder Abbas, should necessity of relieving Shiraz or Kerman again arise. It would, in any case, be impracticable to withdraw consul and European community from Kerman to Bunder Abbas, Birjand, or Yezd. There is no other possible action that we can suggest.

(Repeated to Tehran.)

No. 307.

[28209]

*Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received July 26.)*

(Confidential.)

Sir,

*Admiralty, July 26, 1909.*

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, decypher of a telegram, dated the 25th July, from His Majesty's ship "Sphinx" at Bushire respecting affairs at Shiraz.

A copy has also been sent to the India Office.

I am, &amp;c.

C. I. THOMAS.

Inclosure in No. 307.

*His Majesty's ship "Sphinx" to Admiralty.*

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Bushire, July 25, 1909.*

AT request of consul-general, acting on authority of His Majesty's Minister at Tehran, a naval detachment with Maxim gun, Lieutenant Lang in command, will leave to-night, in company with reinforcements of sepoy, for Shiraz in consequence of further disturbances there.

[28274]

No. 308.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 26.)*

(No. 631.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Gulahek, July 26, 1909.*

MAY I request instructions as to whether I should await the opportunity afforded by the presentation of my new credentials to offer the congratulations of His Majesty's Government to the new Shah, or do so now?

M. Sabline is also enquiring as to the wishes of his Government on this subject.

[27996]

No. 309.

*Consul-General Cox to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 26.)*

(No. 759.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Bushire, July 26, 1909.*

DISTURBANCES at Shiraz.

Fifty men and one Maxim gun left to reinforce troops at Shiraz last night, viz., 36 sepoy, 5 sowars, 1 native officer, 1 British naval and 1 military lieutenant, 5 Royal Marines, and an assistant surgeon.

[27985]

No. 310.

*Sir Edward Grey to Mr. O'Beirne.*

(No. 964.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Foreign Office, July 26, 1909.*

DISTURBANCES at Shiraz (see Bushire telegram No. 759 of to-day and Tehran telegram No. 630 of yesterday repeated to you).

You should explain to Minister for Foreign Affairs that reinforcements have been sent on recommendation of His Majesty's consul-general at Bushire, who considers situation likely to entail trouble.



[27989]

No. 311.

*Sir Edward Grey to Mr. O'Beirne.*

(No. 965.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Foreign Office, July 26, 1909.*

AN enquiry has been made by Turkish Ambassador here with regard to dispatch of Turkish troops to Kermanshah, similar to that reported by you in telegram No. 366 of the 24th July.

I replied that, in my opinion, the situation did not call for the sending of a foreign force, and that, besides, from what I had heard, it appeared that order had already been restored.

[27752]

No. 312.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.*

(No. 321. Confidential.)

Sir,

*Foreign Office, July 26, 1909.*

I HAVE received your Excellency's despatch No. 291, Confidential, of the 22nd instant, relative to the appointment of the Nasr-ul-Mulk as Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Persia.

I have to request your Excellency to inform the Nasr-ul-Mulk that His Majesty's Government are glad to learn that he has accepted these appointments, but that, in view of the present situation in Persia, they earnestly hope that he will hasten his departure for that country, as it is important on public grounds that he should enter on his duties without delay.

I am, &amp;c.

E. GREY

[28204]

No. 313.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.*

(No. 219.)

Sir,

*Foreign Office, July 26, 1909.*

THE Turkish Ambassador informed Sir C. Hardinge on the 21st instant that, according to information received by his Government, there were disturbances at Kermanshah, and that Rifaat Pasha had suggested the dispatch, with the consent of His Majesty's Government, of a detachment of Turkish troops across the Persian frontier to maintain order.

Sir C. Hardinge told Tewfik Pasha that, according to the information in the possession of His Majesty's Government, order had been restored at Kermanshah, and that, in any case, there was no necessity for the dispatch of foreign troops to that place.

His Excellency said that he would telegraph to his Government in that sense.

I am, &amp;c.

E. GREY.

[26684]

No. 314.

*Foreign Office to Anglo-Persian Oil Company.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, July 26, 1909.*

I AM directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 13th instant relative to the desire of your company to possess an independent translation of the Persian original of the agreement, signed on the 15th November, 1905, between Mr. W. K. D'Arcy and the concessions syndicate on the one part and the Bakhtiari Khans on the other part.

I am to inform you, in reply, that a copy of your letter will be forwarded to His Majesty's Minister at Tehran with instructions to have such a translation made, and to forward it to Sir E. Grey in due course for transmission to you.

I am, &amp;c.

LOUIS MALLET.

[27814]

No. 315.

*Foreign Office to Anglo-Persian Oil Company.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, July 26, 1909.*

I AM directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 22nd instant relative to the arrangement made between your company and the Sheikh of Mohammerah.

I am to inform you in reply that you have correctly interpreted Sir E. Grey's wishes in arranging for the payment to the sheikh of the whole sum of 16,500L. in sovereigns, and that a telegram has been addressed to His Majesty's consul-general at Bushire informing him that 10,000L. of this amount should be advanced as a loan from His Majesty's Government.

Major Cox has also been informed that your company will do their utmost to comply with the sheikh's request that overt operations may be delayed till the present crisis in Tehran is over, but that it will be difficult to do this for long on account of the expected arrival in September of one-half of the pipe line.

The telegram sent added that your company will maintain secrecy as to the execution and details of the agreement.

I am, &amp;c.

LOUIS MALLET.

[28396]

No. 316.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey. — (Received July 27.)*

(No. 632.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Gulahek, July 27, 1909.*

THE late Shah and his family, alone of the Russian bastis, are, I presume, to be considered as under Anglo-Russian protection, and that Amir Jang and others, who accompanied the Shah, must merely be regarded as ordinary bastis under Russian protection.

The Persian Government are anxious to bring some of these persons to justice, so that the question becomes one of considerable importance.

I am endeavouring to bring about a settlement similar to that obtained last year regarding the guarantees for our bastis (please see your telegram No. 145 of the 1st July, 1908), but I fear that there may be difficulties, since Russian *amour-propre* is at the moment very sensitive, and the new Persian Government are most unwilling to be dictated to by Russia.

[28405]

No. 317.

*Mr. O'Beirne to Sir Edward Grey. — (Received July 27.)*

(No. 369. Confidential.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*St. Petersburg, July 27, 1909.*

ENCROACHMENTS on Persian territory.

I was this afternoon shown by the Turkish Ambassador a telegram which he had received from his Government, according to which reports had reached the Porte to the effect that positions on the River Araxes, near Tcholdja, in Persian territory, had been occupied by Russian cavalry and infantry in considerable force.

I subsequently saw M. Sazonow, the acting Foreign Minister, who spoke as if no such movement had come to his knowledge. He told me, however, that the Imperial military authorities had received information to the effect that the Turkish forces now on Persian territory amounted to five or six battalions.



[28458]

No. 318.

*Treasury to Foreign Office.—(Received July 28.)*

(Confidential.)

Sir,

*Treasury Chambers, July 27, 1909.*

I HAVE laid before the Lords Commissioners of His Majesty's Treasury Mr. Mallet's letter of the 26th May last and the enclosed copy of correspondence with the India Office in regard to the financial arrangements involved in the proposed transfer of the Tehran-Meshed and Khaf-Nasratabad telegraph lines.

The India Office propose that any increase of charge consequent on the transfer over and above a sum of 20,000 rupees per annum to be borne, as hitherto, by India alone, should be equally divided between the Imperial and Indian exchequers; and having regard to the representations of Sir E. Grey in support of this view, my Lords sanction the proposal in principle pending the conclusion of such an agreement with Persia as will enable definite financial proposals to be made, on the understanding that the cost will be a charge upon the diplomatic and consular vote, which appears to my Lords to be the proper vote for the purpose in view of the political character of the transaction.

I am, &amp;c.

G. S. MURRAY.

[28503]

No. 319.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 28.)*

(No. 633.)

(Telegraphic.) *En clair.**Tehran, July 28, 1909.*

TEHRAN elections for assembly fixed 6th, 7th, and 8th August. Will be held under new electoral law.

[28274]

No. 320.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.*

(No. 402.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

NEW Shah.

*Foreign Office, July 28, 1909.*

You may join your Russian colleague in offering congratulations to new Shah in the sense of any instructions which he may receive from his Government.

(See your telegram No. 631 of the 26th July.)

[28396]

No. 321.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.*

(No. 403.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

REVOLUTION in Tehran.

*Foreign Office, July 28, 1909.*

You should endeavour to obtain a settlement with regard to bastis on the lines you suggest in telegram No. 632 of yesterday.

Your interpretation of our obligations in this connection is correct.

[28207]

No. 322.

*Sir Edward Grey to Count Benckendorff.*

Dear Count Benckendorff,

*Foreign Office, July 28, 1909.*

I HASTEN to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 24th July, asking my opinion on the proposal of the Turkish Government to send a detachment of troops to maintain order at Kermanshah.

Tewfik Pasha made a communication here on the 21st July similar to that made by Turkhan Pasha at St. Petersburg, and was told that, according to the information in

the possession of His Majesty's Government, order had been restored at Kermanshah, and that, in any case, there was no necessity for the dispatch of foreign troops to that place.

I may add that we concur in the observations made by M. Isvolsky on the subject.

I have, &amp;c.

E. GREY.

[28616]

No. 323.

*The Persian Transport Company to Foreign Office.—(Received July 29.)**3, Salter's Hall Court, Cannon Street, London, E.C.,**July 27, 1909.*

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to draw your attention to the situation of this company as regards the Karun-Sultanabad Road, the Burujird-Ispahan Road and the Kum-Ispahan Road, which have not yet been completed. Our road concession expires in the summer of 1912, but the grave political troubles and the generally unsettled state of the country have made it quite impossible for us to execute these works. We request that His Majesty's Legation at Tehran will inform the Persian Government in this sense, in order that when the proper time arrives an extension of the period covered by the concession may be obtained.

I have, &amp;c.

H. W. MACLEAN, *Secretary.*

[28622]

No. 324.

*India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received July 29.)*

Sir,

*India Office, July 28, 1909.*

WITH reference to your letters of the 14th and 21st July as to the situation at Kerman, I am directed to refer to the telegraphic correspondence with the Viceroy on the subject,\* of which copies have already been communicated to the Foreign Office.

It will be observed that the latest telegram received by the Government of India from the consul at Kerman indicates that danger there is over, at any rate for the present. But the Government of India consider that the withdrawal of the British community from Kerman to Yazd, Birjand, or Bunder Abbas would be impracticable. They draw attention to the risk of employing on relief operations small forces such as that which is being sent up to Shiraz.

The situation does not appear to Lord Morley to differ essentially from that of 1907, when the policy of His Majesty's Government was conveyed to the Government of India in the telegrams to the Viceroy of the 6th November and 18th December. Copies of the telegrams exchanged with the Viceroy on that occasion are enclosed for convenience of reference.† It will be seen from the Viceroy's telegrams of the 12th and 22nd December, 1907, that the Government of India had then prepared a scheme for the dispatch from India, if necessary, of columns of sufficient strength to secure order and maintain communications with the coast.

Lord Morley would enquire whether Sir E. Grey considers it desirable in existing circumstances to warn the Government of India to be ready to dispatch troops to the gulf at a very short notice should such action be required, subject to the understanding arrived at in the telegram to the Viceroy of the 18th December, 1907, and the Viceroy's reply of the 22nd idem. It is clearly desirable to avoid, if possible, the dispatch into the interior of small forces such as that which it has been found necessary to send to Shiraz.

I am, &amp;c.

(Signed) A. GODLEY.

\* To Viceroy, July 16 and 22, 1909; from ditto, July 24, 1909.

† Viceroy, January 17, December 12 and 22, 1907; to ditto, February 9 and 18, November 6, and December 18, 1907.



[28652]

No. 325.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 29.)*

(No. 634.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Gulahek, July 29, 1909.*

I HAVE received the following Private and Very Confidential telegram from His Majesty's acting consul-general at Tabreez :—

"I suspect, from conversations which I have had with Russian general and officers, that they are contemplating the possibility of making preparations for passing the winter here. Such a stay would probably necessitate the collection of considerable supplies and the acquisition of quarters in the town for the men. The occupation would thus be invested with an unpleasant appearance of permanency; and, moreover, after the protracted winter stay, the military authorities would perhaps be more reluctant to move.

"The new governor-general is expected to arrive shortly by way of Julfa, and the Persian Government should immediately dispatch a force to Tabreez. The arrival of a governor without a suitable force would, I am afraid, make no impression on the military authorities, but if they were to learn that such a force were already on its way, they might pause in their preparations.

"Winter sets in here considerably earlier than at the capital."

I shall urge upon the Persian Government the necessity for sending a large force of Cossacks to meet the new governor, but I am afraid that difficulties may be caused by lack of money. If the necessity should arise, may I advise the bank manager to advance, as a first charge on our share of the joint loan eventually to be made to the Persian Government, a sufficient sum for this purpose? It would hardly seem necessary, although I should mention the matter to M. Sabline, to consult the Russian Government on this question.

[28644]

• No. 326.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 29.)*

(No. 635.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

*Tehran, July 29, 1909.*

ZIL-ES-SULTAN.

Constantinople anjuman has telegraphed to Samsam that Zil-es-Sultan's attempt to obtain Regency must be frustrated.

28653]]

No. 327.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 29.)*

(No. 636.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Gulahek, July 29, 1909.*

WITH reference to your telegram No. 393 of the 21st July, I have received the following telegram, No. 767 of the 28th July, from His Majesty's consul-general at Bushire :—

"I have received a reply from Sir W. Willcocks to the effect that the projects should prove remunerative, and that the execution does not appear difficult. He enters fully into the details of the preliminary work which could be best taken in hand immediately by Mr. Wilson, so as to profit by the season of low water, and promises in October or November next to visit the country concerned, and to give his final opinion there, aided by the necessary surveys, which should then have been completed by Mr. Wilson.

"May I be authorised to instruct Mr. Wilson to start, with the sheikh of Mohammerah's concurrence and co-operation, as soon as an opportunity offers.

"He would remain continually in communication with Mohammerah, and, should circumstances necessitate it, would return there occasionally."

I should be glad of your instructions on this subject.

[28646]

No. 328.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 29.)*

(No. 637.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Gulahek, July 29, 1909.*

LAST night the correspondent of the "Novoe Vremya," my Russian colleague tells me, sent a most mischievous telegram to his paper, stating that Russian prestige is being undermined by the efforts of this legation.

I do not need to assure you that this allegation is entirely unfounded. Indeed, I am, with the fullest support of my staff, doing everything to discourage the new government from taking any action likely to wound Russian *amour-propre* or to weaken their prestige. Unfortunately, an idea prevails here, which no doubt owes much to foreign intriguers, that British policy has gained a victory over that of Russia by the turn of recent events. This idea I combat on every occasion, and I have also instructed His Majesty's consuls to do the same throughout Persia.

M. Sabline informs me that he has telegraphed to his Government a contradiction of this story. I fear, however, that having failed to ensure the advance of Russian troops on Tehran by alarmist reports of danger to foreign subjects, this intriguing correspondent is now endeavouring to gain this end by rousing public opinion in Russia through accentuating the diminution of Russian influence which the change of régime has of necessity brought about.

The relations between Russia and Persia require at this moment particularly delicate handling, so that, if possible, it would be well to obtain this correspondent's early removal.

[28655]

No. 329.

*Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 29.)*

(No. 154.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Vienna, July 29, 1909.*

ZIL-ES-SULTAN.

His Highness has made up his mind to return to Persia, starting to-morrow evening from Vienna. I saw him to-day, having received a message that he wished me to call upon him. I was accompanied by the Secretary of the Russian Embassy (the Ambassador being away). The latter had been instructed by his Government to tell the Prince that he was free to go through Russian territory on his journey to Persia, and that due respect would be shown to him. Zil-es-Sultan was evidently pleased at this intimation, and he gave us further assurances of his intention to conform to the advice of the British and Russian Ministers in Tehran and to do nothing to disturb the peace.

He said he was going to stay in the Regent's house at Tehran, who was closely related to his mother and an old friend of his own. He hoped to arrive within a fortnight.

[28646]

No. 330.

*Sir Edward Grey to Mr. O'Beirne.*

(No. 982.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Foreign Office, July 29, 1909.*

ANGLO-RUSSIAN co-operation in Persia.

Please point out to Russian Government that His Majesty's Government consider it most desirable that they should prevent publication of untrue and mischievous reports such as those contained in telegram No. 637 of to-day from Tehran. Substance of above telegram should be communicated to Minister for Foreign Affairs.



[28745]

No. 331.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 30.)*

(No. 638.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Gulahek, July 30, 1909.*

THE Nationalists have arrested Mufaker-ul-Mulk, who some days ago left the shelter of the Russian Legation and started in disguise for Mazanderan, presumably in order to stir up dissaffection in that province against the existing Government. He was brought to Tehran, where he was tried before a special tribunal and found guilty of several murders, including that of the refugees at Shahabdul Azim, which I reported in my despatch No. 71 of the 26th March. He was sentenced to death and executed yesterday.

It transpires, unfortunately, that he was provided with some written assurance of Russian protection. No arrangement, however, had been entered into between the Russian Legation and the Persian authorities concerning him; and the Persian Government consider that their failure to invite the Russian Legation to send a member of their staff to attend the trial was excused by this latter fact.

Although the Persian Government's interpretation is a natural one, we cannot expect Russia, in view of present circumstances, to let the matter pass without a sharp protest. I shall do my best to persuade the Persian Government to show due consideration for Russian *amour-propre* in their reply, and to assure Russian *chargé d'affaires* that, should Russian protection be afforded to the remaining bastis, they will respect these guarantees.

Yesterday, Sani Hazrat, formerly at the head of the Shah's roughs, was also executed.

[28751]

No. 332.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 30.)*

(No. 639.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Gulahek, July 30, 1909.*

I LEARN from my Russian colleague that Colonel Liakhoff has been recalled to Russia. It is highly improbable that he will resume his duties here.

[28750]

No. 333.

*Mr. O'Beirne to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 30.)*

(No. 370.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*St. Petersburg, July 30, 1909.*

CORRESPONDENT of "Novoe Vremya" at Tehran.

Please refer to your telegram No. 982 of yesterday's date.

I saw the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs to-day, and made a communication in accordance with your instructions. M. Sazonow said that great importance was not attached by the Imperial Government to the telegrams sent by the correspondent in question. The "Novoe Vremya" was a most difficult paper with which to deal, but he would see if it were possible to hint to the editor that the attitude adopted by their correspondent at Tehran was producing mischievous effects.

There is a telegram from Tehran in to-day's issue of the journal which, as no telegram from Tehran appeared in yesterday's issue, must be the one of which the Russian *chargé d'affaires* spoke to Sir G. Barclay. There is, however, no complaint in it against His Majesty's legation, and it merely states that the present Government in Tehran are hostile to Russia and friendly to Germany and England. From this it would appear that the telegrams received by the "Novoe Vremya" from their correspondent are toned down before publication.

Colonel Liakhoff, according to a current report, is relinquishing his post as commander of the Cossack brigade. This report is confirmed by M. Sazonow.

[28652]

No. 334.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.*

(No. 407.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Foreign Office, July 30, 1909.*

WITH regard to suggestion in your telegram No. 634, Very Confidential, of the 29th July, I think it better not to advise the bank manager as to an advance to the Persian Government.

Should he apply to you, however, you may say that the guarantee of the new Persian Government for a temporary advance would be quite admissible, since they have been recognised both by Great Britain and by Russia, and that it would presumably receive the sanction of the Medjliss if it were a small advance and absolutely essential to carry on the Government.

You should, however, do nothing without consulting M. Sabline, especially in regard to matters connected with Tabreez, and any advance should be made jointly by the British and Russian Banks.

[28852]

No. 335.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 2.)*

(No. 640.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Gulahek, August 2, 1909.*

THE Indo-European Telegraph Department propose dispatching repair parties on the 1st October from Bushire and Robat, and unless there is an unexpected improvement in the state of the country, either party will require an escort of fifty men.

Subject to your approval, I propose to apply to the Persian Government for escorts of Persian troops, warning them at the same time that, if these troops are not ready at the places and on the date required, guards of British-Indian soldiers will be employed.

[28853]

No. 336.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 2.)*

(No. 641.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Gulahek, August 2, 1909.*

PLEASE see your telegrams Nos. 291 and 302 of the 11th and 17th June respectively.

The newly appointed Minister of Telegraphs has requested the Indo-European Telegraph Department to undertake, in the autumn of this year, the construction of the second line to Shahrud.

In view of the necessity of postponing any mention of the proposed exchange of the Tehran-Meshed and Khaf-Nasratabad lines until the Arabistan telegraph convention has been submitted to the assembly, we shall avoid definite reply as regards the erection of the Shahrud wire, as our answer must depend on the progress of the negotiations for exchange of lines.

[28854]

No. 337.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 2.)*

(No. 642.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Gulahek, August 2, 1909.*

DURING the last fortnight little progress has, I am afraid, been made towards ensuring the departure of his late Majesty. The Persian Government is still engaged in efforts to recover certain jewels, said to be of great value, which the ex-Shah claims as his own property, but which are nevertheless asserted to belong to the Crown.

In the course of the recent trials there have been disclosures very damaging for Mohammed Ali, which, if skilfully used by the Persian Government, should induce him to come to a compromise.

[1665]

3 A



I trust that there will be no further delay when once the question of the jewels is settled. The Russian Government, I understand, contemplate an addition to Mohammed Ali's civil list, and if necessary I think that we could persuade the Persian Government to raise their original offer.

[28895]

No. 338.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 3.)*

(No. 130.)

Sir,

*Gulahek, June 28, 1909.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith a copy of a despatch which I have received from His Majesty's consul-general at Bushire in regard to the withdrawal of the force of bluejackets landed at that place from His Majesty's ship "Fox."

I venture to suggest that the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty may be requested to convey to the officers concerned the appreciation of Major Cox for the services rendered by them during a period of considerable difficulty and anxiety.

I have, &c.

G. BARCLAY.

Inclosure in No. 338.

*Consul-General Cox to Sir G. Barclay.*

(No. 51.)

Sir,

*Bushire, May 23, 1909.*

IN amplification of my telegram No. 161, dated the 19th instant, I have the honour to report that, my consular colleagues having assured me, in answer to my enquiries, that they were no longer under any apprehension as to the safety of their nationalists, and saw no objection to the withdrawal of our men, and his Excellency the Darya Begi having given me satisfactory personal and written assurances regarding the future maintenance of order and security on the island, the 100 men on shore from His Majesty's ship "Fox" were withdrawn, half on the 19th and half on the 20th.

His Majesty's ship "Fox" herself left for Bombay at dusk on the 20th.

Two subsidised vessels of the Persian Gulf Squadron—His Majesty's ship "Sphinx," Commander Litchfield (who has now resumed the duties of senior naval officer, Persian Gulf Division, from Captain A. T. Hunt, of the "Fox"), and His Majesty's ship "Lapwing"—are at present in harbour under ordinary local arrangements and will remain for the present.

I venture to take this opportunity of apprising you of my great appreciation of the hearty co-operation and judicious counsel which I received at all times from Captain Hunt, and also of the helpful part played by the officers, under his direction, in immediate charge of the two parties of bluejackets located respectively at the residency and custom-house, as well as of the excellent bearing and good-fellowship evinced by the men themselves in their close daily intercourse with the Indian sepoys and native establishment of the residency and custom-house. Their six weeks on shore was in many ways a tedious time, especially the last ten days, during which the heat and mosquitoes were particularly trying and the fact that during that period nothing but the most cordial *camaraderie* existed is much to their credit.

In this connection, I feel that special thanks are due to Lieutenant H. D. Briggs, 1st lieutenant of His Majesty's ship "Fox," in charge of the party at the residency, and Lieutenant Lang, of His Majesty's ship "Sphinx," and Lieutenant W. W. Hunt, of His Majesty's ship "Fox," in command during part and whole of the time respectively at the custom-house.

I have, &c.

P. Z. COX, Major, British Resident in the Persian Gulf, and His Britannic Majesty's Consul-General for Fars, &c.

[28896]

No. 339.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 3.)*

(No. 131.)

Sir,

*Gulahek, June 30, 1909*

I HAVE read with some surprise the letters from Ellinger and Co., copies of which reached me by last bag in your despatch No. 74.

The difficulties at Hormuz to which they refer are a thing of the past, and I do not wish to trouble you with a report on the question. I venture, however, to record my opinion that the tone of Messrs. Ellingers' letter shows a regrettable failure to recognise the debt of gratitude which Moin-ut-Tujjar owes for the steps taken by His Majesty's consul at Bunder Abbas on his behalf. These steps were followed by the cessation of interference with the mining operations, and also averted the danger at one time imminent of the seizure by the Nationalists of the oxide already mined.

I am pointing out to Moin-ut-Tujjar that his language as repeated to the Foreign Office in Messrs. Ellingers' letter of the 11th May is unwarranted, and is inconsistent with his expression of gratitude to me for what had been done for him.

I have, &c.

G. BARCLAY.

[28898]

No. 340.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 3.)*

(No. 133.)

Sir,

*Gulahek, July 8, 1909.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith copy of a telegram from the Darya Beggi to his Tehran agent in regard to the situation at Bushire, which has been communicated to me by His Majesty's consul-general.

The lamentations of the Darya Beggi over the lack of funds and the misdeeds of Seyyid Murteza and Seyyid Abdul Hussein Lari are not unworthy of note, as giving a picture from his own standpoint of the difficulties experienced by the governor of a Persian province in a time of stress.

The Darya Beggi's position is not an enviable one, but, indeed, it is difficult for anyone who has been dealing with Bushire affairs during the past three months not fervently to echo his Excellency's wishes for the confusion of the Seyyids.

I should mention that Seyyid Abdul Hussein, though he has not played any part in events at Bushire itself, has, as a Mujtehid of bogus nationalist sympathies, been unwearying in his efforts to spread disorder in the hinterland. He was recently defeated at Lar by Nasr-ed-Dowleh, the younger brother of the Kavam, and is now reported to be about to turn his attention to Shiraz.

I have, &c.

G. BARCLAY.

Inclosure in No. 340.

*Darya Beggi to Etizad-es-Sultan (Etizad Daftar), Tehran.*

(Telegraphic.)

*May 13, 1909.*

I ARRIVED two days ago. I do not know what to telegraph. Anyhow, I shall have to write everything by the post. The gist of the matter is just this, that there is nothing left of the ports. Everything that was possible has either been carried off by the revolutionaries or has gone in expenses for the guards. There is not a single quarter from which I can get in a single "pul." Force is necessary for everything. In the Customs there are English guns and sailors. Some time ago 450 Chahkutahis were brought in for the protection of the town and outskirts, and they were giving them 108 tomans a-day from the Customs. The Kalantar had 100 men got together from here and there, and the merchants were lending the Kalantar 25 tomans a-day on account of gate money. If they want to keep Bushire, orders must be given that for a little while the Director of Customs shall pay this money.

The greatest danger for the ports is [afforded] by the presence of the Ispahan soldiers and Bulvardi artillerymen. They should be recalled at once, and instead of



them either men well-affected to the State should be sent, or orders should be sent that proper servants should be obtained, with the knowledge of the Director of Customs, and for the same wages that the soldiers draw. Let orders be issued to the Customs that they should pay the wages of guards for as many days as are necessary. Let orders be issued, no matter in whose name, for a sum of 10,000 tomans to be given to me, even though it be an advance on account of expenses, so that I can turn aside from Bushire and leave at once for the other ports. The Director of Customs is also with me in the matter.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs should discuss with the legation, and arrange for the evacuation of the Customs by the foreigners. I pledge my own head for the protection of the Customs and all foreign subjects. May God curse the Ahrami Seyyid! For another ten years what he has destroyed will not be repaired. Right up till now he has kept a body round him, and does not stop intriguing.

Sheikh Hussein's exertions must not be forgotten. The State must show some signal favour towards him.

If you are able to get these several matters put through, come by "chappar" (post), if not I shall flee by "chappar." Give me your answer soon. God knows that, although the constitution has been granted, save for neglect of the south, they let everything go.

The southern towns do not know what constitution is. They want something else. Again I say, God curse the two Seyyids Abdul Hussein and Murteza.

Give my greetings to the Arbab. His congratulations have reached me. I am infinitely grateful.

[28899]

No. 341.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 3.)*

(No. 133A.)

Sir,

Gulahek, July 9, 1909.

IN my telegram No. 501 of the 25th June, repeating a telegram to His Majesty's consul-general at Bushire, I mentioned a report that the Sheikh of Mohammerah had supplied the Bakhtiari forces at Ispahan with a sum of 120,000 krans.

From information I have received from His Majesty's consul-general at Ispahan, I gather that the Bakhtiaris have, in fact, received some funds from the sheikh, but Major Cox, in his reply to my telegram, states that the money seems to have been a loan advanced on a lease of Ram Hormuz, the property of the Bakhtiari, which the sheikh has long been anxious to acquire.

I have, &amp;c.

G. BARCLAY.

[28901]

No. 342.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 3.)*

(No. 134A.)

Sir,

Gulahek, July 12, 1909.

In my despatch No. 124 I stated that the Shah's acceptance of our programme had produced a *détente*, and that the prospect of the Bakhtiari from Ispahan and the fedai from Kazvin marching on Tehran, which at one time seemed imminent, was now remote. The prompt and striking manner in which events have contradicted this statement affords a somewhat disheartening illustration of the difficulty of correctly gauging the situation in Persia. The information in my possession was to the effect that many of the Bakhtiari had left Ispahan for their homes, and that the disbandment of the remainder would be effected shortly. At Kazvin, too, so far from there being any signs of an approaching advance on Tehran, my Russian colleague's information, on which I was dependent for my knowledge of what was occurring there, was to the effect that the fedai were gradually dispersing. My opinion, therefore, that a march on Tehran on either the Bakhtiari and the revolutionaries was remote seemed sufficiently warranted. Hardly, however, had I signed my despatch above referred to when I received on the 17th ultimo a telegram from His Majesty's consul-general at Ispahan reporting that Sardar Assad had called on him to say good-bye as he was leaving for Tehran, and that rumour credited the Bakhtiari chief with the intention of taking with him 1,000 men to enforce the execution of the constitution. Ten days later we learned

that the fedai under Sipahadar had advanced from Kazvin, and were already well on their way to Tehran, and this notwithstanding that Sipahadar had only a few days before agreed to dissociate himself from his men, and visit the capital with a view to a reconciliation with the Shah, provided the Russian Legation gave him a guarantee for his personal safety, which M. Sabline had consented to do.

On receipt of Mr. Grahame's telegram I at once dispatched an urgent message, instructing him to point out to Sardar Assad that the preparatory work for the restoration of parliamentary government was proceeding without hitch, and that the demonstration which he was believed to be contemplating would only complicate and retard matters. Sardar Assad had already started, and Mr. Grahame forwarded my message to him by letter.

On the 20th I received a visit from the Minister for Foreign Affairs, who told me that the Government were about to send Amir Mufakhan, a Royalist Bakhtiari chief, with what following he could get together against Sardar Assad. I deprecated this as a resumption of civil war, and told his Excellency what I had done with a view to arresting Sardar Assad's advance, adding that should this fail I would do my best to obtain authorisation for my Russian colleague and myself to send out the two consuls-general from Ispahan to overtake Sardar Assad and give him strong advice to abandon his demonstration. His Excellency promised in that case to hold back Amir Mufakham for a few days. On the 22nd I received your telegram instructing me to send Mr. Grahame after Sardar Assad. The former had by that time received an answer to my first message. It was not satisfactory, and I accordingly directed Mr. Grahame to overtake the sardar, who was now with some 700 or 800 men well on his way to Kum, and to make it clear to him that the two legations were satisfied with the progress which had been made in the execution of the programme presented to the Shah by the two Powers, and also as Sardar Assad seemed to be under a delusion as to the nature of our programme, to deny emphatically the story in circulation that it involved any curtailment of Persia's independence, and to explain to him that our representations had merely taken the form of friendly advice to the Shah as to measures for the restoration of constitutional government. My Russian colleague sent similar instructions to his consul-general later in the day.

The joint communication from the two legations was made by the two consuls-general to Sardar Assad at Kum on the 26th. I enclose a report from Mr. Grahame of what passed at the interview. Here I need only state that Sardar Assad maintained that the restored constitution was a sham, citing as proofs of this the presence in the Cabinet of Saad-ed-Dowleh, the retention of Amir Bahadur Jang at the Palace, and the continuance in office of Mukhber-ed-Dowleh as Minister of Telegraphs, and that he promised to let the two consuls-general have by the 28th certain demands which he was formulating in concert with the various nationalist centres.

I should mention here parenthetically that Saad-ed-Dowleh, who had always been the object of considerable mistrust amongst the nationalists, has become odious in their eyes owing to the general belief that he is responsible for the continued Russian occupation of Tabreez. As regards Amir Bahadur Jang, I should state that, knowing how much his presence at the Palace was resented, I have more than once suggested to my Russian colleague that we should press for his expulsion, but finding M. Sabline lukewarm, and knowing as I did that the Amir was not interfering with the preparatory work for the meeting of the Assembly, I did not press the matter. As to Mukhber-ed-Dowleh, I should mention that when the reform Cabinet was formed, it was part of the private suggestions of the two legations that the Minister of Telegraphs under the late reactionary régime should retain his post. We knew him to be a reactionary, but the Minister of Telegraphs in Persia has no seat in the Cabinet, and, in view of Mukhber-ed-Dowleh's experience in telegraphic administration, we wished him to remain in office. I ought to add, perhaps, that I was also somewhat influenced by the fact that the Mukhber was doing his best to facilitate the negotiations in regard to the Arabistan telegraphs.

To resume my report of our efforts to check Sardar Assad's advance: my Russian colleague and I, on learning from the consuls-general what had passed at their interview with the sardar, instructed them to emphasise once more to the Bakhtiari chief the inopportune of his armed demonstration, to repeat to him that the two legations were satisfied with the progress made in the execution of our programme, and to point out the grave responsibility he incurred if he disregarded our advice. Mr. Grahame and M. Bogoiawlensky were also to tell Sardar Assad that they would wait at Kum until midday of the 29th in order to learn his demands. I transmit Mr. Grahame's account of this second interview (Enclosure No. 2). It will be seen that Sardar Assad

[1665]

3 B



asked for time, before formulating the demands, to communicate with Kazvin and Tabreez and for the free use of a telegraph wire for the purpose. We did not think it suitable to keep the two consuls-general waiting longer at Kum merely to learn the Sardar's demands, which we had good reason to believe had already been presented to the Persian Government, and which could equally well reach us through some other channel; the request, too, for the free use of the telegraph for people who could not now be regarded as other than rebels seemed to us unreasonable. We therefore instructed Mr. Grahame and M. Bogoiawlensky to inform Sardar Assad that they had no further communication to make to him, and they left Kum on the 29th.

I should not omit to mention that before leaving Mr. Grahame received a private visit from Sardar Assad at which the latter declared his intention of utterly crippling the Shah, and added that he would depose him if it were not for fear of Russian intervention. During this visit the sardar asked for an opportunity of a private conversation on the wire with me regarding Russian action in the north, and later an individual in the sardar's confidence offered to divulge his demands provided Mr. Grahame gave his word of honour not to disclose them to the Russians. Both the request and the offer were of course rejected.

Meanwhile, on the 28th, news had reached the capital that some 900 fedai from Kazvin were within 45 miles of Tehran. With the failure of the mission of the consuls-general at Kum, and with this move of the revolutionaries from Kazvin, the outlook for the Shah was a dark one indeed, and the greatest alarm prevailed at the Palace. The troops in the capital, with the exception of the 800 or 900 Persian Cossacks, were not of a kind to inspire much confidence, and to make matters worse for the Shah all chance of serious dissensions amongst the Bakhtiariis seemed to have disappeared. The Ilbeggi, Mohtesham-es-Sultaneh, had made it up with the Ilkhani, Samsam-es-Sultaneh; and Amir Mufakham, who was, and has remained up to now, loyal to the Shah, was not likely to have any considerable following. To add to the difficulties of the position the Cabinet, with the exception of Saad-ed-Dowleh, was in a state of complete demoralisation. Saad-ed-Dowleh had resigned on the 25th, his resignation being followed by that of the other Ministers, and, although the Shah commanded the Cabinet to carry on temporarily Saad-ed-Dowleh, who, whether he had resigned in a moment of fear or (as he maintains) because of the cowardice of his colleagues, was the only one who had the courage really to resume his functions. The others, while carrying on current business, absolutely declined to do anything involving responsibility.

In the critical position in which he was placed, the Shah summoned my Russian colleague and me to Sultanabad on the 2nd instant. I have so fully reported in my telegram No. 530 of the 3rd July what passed at this audience that I need here only say that His Majesty asked for our advice, and that we had to tell him that it was his delay in following our advice tendered to him so repeatedly last winter that had brought him to his present straits. We had endeavoured to dissuade Sardar Assad from marching on Tehran, but had failed, and we did not know what advice we could now give him. We were ready, however, if any opportunity offered, to use our influence for a peaceful settlement. The audience left a painful impression on M. Sabline as it did on me, and late in the evening he visited me and pressed me hard to use threatening language to the nationalists. I explained that I had already gone as far in my language to them as I felt authorised to do, and I did not feel disposed to suggest to His Majesty's Government that I should be permitted to use threats which, if not effective, might involve active intervention.

On the following day I received your telegram No. 325 of the 2nd July, in which you informed me of your suggestion to the Russian Ambassador that a joint warning might be conveyed to Sipahdar and Sardar Assad that the only way to avoid foreign intervention was to restore order and to give the constitution which had been restored a fair chance. I immediately visited M. Sabline, who had just received news that the 350 Persian Cossacks who had been posted at Kerej had had to retire to avoid being outflanked. The danger of a conflict seemed so imminent that M. Sabline, although he had not received instructions, agreed with me to send representatives of the two legations to Sipahdar and Sardar Assad to convey the warning in question. Accordingly early in the morning of the 4th Major Stokes and M. Baronowsky left to interview Sipahdar, and Mr. Churchill and M. Romanowsky to interview Sardar Assad. Major Stokes and M. Baronowsky found fighting in progress at Shahabad between the fedai and the Cossacks, who had fallen back from Kerej. They were fired on by mistake by the Cossacks, fortunately without untoward consequences, and after the conflict was over proceeded on their way to the Sipahdar. I enclose a memorandum by Major Stokes

reporting on his interview as well as a report by Mr. Churchill on his interview with Sardar Assad.

As reported by telegraph on the 5th instant, the communication made to the two sardars did not seem to make much impression. Sipahdar, however, gave to Major Stokes and M. Baronowsky a list of his demands (see Major Stokes' memorandum).

These demands seemed to my Russian colleague and myself unreasonable, and we did not see our way to recommend the Shah to negotiate on the proposed basis. The terms were rather those of a conqueror than those of a leader of insurgents who had just suffered defeat, and they were, moreover, for the most part either impractical or contrary to the constitution. There were, however, two demands which, in the circumstances, it was very desirable the Shah should accept, and which, moreover, came well within the spirit of our programme, which aimed at having persons about the Shah who inspired confidence. They were those for the expulsion of "traitors" such as Amir Bahadur Jang, Sheikh Fazlullah, Mufakher-ul-Mulk and others, and the dismissal of Mukber-ed-Dowleh from the post of Minister of Telegraphs. In our reply to Sipahdar we accordingly signified our willingness to press these, provided that he intimated to us that he would be satisfied if the Shah granted them. In his reply he ignored our offer. He repeated the old story that the constitution was a sham, and expressed the hope that in view of the Anglo-Russian agreement the nation would not meet with interference in its efforts to recover its rights.

A further opportunity was offered to the two legations of using their influence for a reconciliation on the 10th instant, when Saad-ed-Dowleh informed them that he had sent an invitation couched in conciliatory terms to the two sardars to send delegates to discuss terms for a settlement. We seized the opportunity to press upon the Shah the necessity of getting rid of his obnoxious favourites, and His Majesty having given us a secret pledge to expel them on receiving a written promise from Sipahdar and Sardar Assad, through the two legations, that they would desist from hostilities and disarm their followers, we sent a message to the two sardars (whose forces had now joined hands in the Shahria district, some 16 miles west of the capital) urging them to send their delegates to negotiate, and assuring them of our conviction that the Shah would entertain such of their demands as were in accordance with the constitution. When this message reached the sardars yesterday morning, fighting, which appears to have started on the previous day, was still in progress between the revolutionary forces (which I understand number about 2,000) and some 500 Cossacks, assisted by the loyalist Bakhtiariis under Amir Mufakham and other nondescript troops. The fighting continued until sunset, when the Cossacks, who had advanced to attack the fedai position, retreated.

The reply to our message reached us this morning; it was to the effect that the sardars could not send delegates while they were being repeatedly attacked and while the road was blocked by royalist troops. They asked that the Persian Government should send representatives to treat, and said that they would remain on the defensive till sunset. I have communicated this answer to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, but I fear that, for the moment at least, no further efforts of the two legations to bring about a reconciliation would serve any useful purpose. In this my Russian colleague agrees with me, and we intend for the present to let matters take their course.

I have reported the above fully by telegraph, but I have thought it convenient to record in consecutive form the steps taken by the two legations in the hope of preventing the revolutionary forces from entering Tehran.

It would be interesting to know something of the inner history of this movement and why it occurred just when it did. The plea that the restored constitution was a sham, whether believed or not by those who put it forward, was not true, except in so far as all concessions from this untrustworthy Shah must be open to suspicion. I see no reason to doubt that had the Bakhtiari and fedai kept quiet the Assembly would have met in due course. Apart from the agitation against the Russian occupation, things were proceeding unusually smoothly at Tehran. There was grumbling, it is true, but of grumblers and agitators Tehran has more than its share. The electoral law was on the point of being promulgated, and on the surface things seemed going so satisfactorily that people were at first disposed to make light of Sardar Assad's departure from Ispahan, and to regard his advance as a tardy attempt to save his face after the failure for so long to fulfil the oft-repeated boast that the Bakhtiariis were only awaiting his return from Paris to advance on Tehran. It was only when the revolutionaries started from Kazvin and the mission of our consuls-general at Kum was known to have failed that it was generally realised that the movement might after all be more than a mere demon-



stration. Its seriousness became more and more evident as time went on, and it was known that preparations were actively proceeding for sending reinforcements from Ispahan and Resht. Telegrams passing over the British wire to Ispahan showed, too, that the revolutionary leaders were receiving urgent advice from abroad. It is, indeed, abundantly clear that the revolutionaries have been in close touch with certain persons in London and Paris, and also of course with the Anjuman at Constantinople. Two telegrams which are known to have passed over British wires call for special mention. They were sent from persons in London and Constantinople respectively, and urged the Bakhtiari to finish the business quickly for fear of the foreigners. What the business referred to is remains to be seen.

I have, &c.  
G. BARCLAY.

Inclosure 1 in No. 342.

*Telegraphic Conversations between Consul-General Grahame and M. Bogoiavlensky at Kum.*

June 26, 1909.

WE have had a conversation of one hour and a-half with Sardar Assad, who was obviously very ill at ease. We informed him that his demonstration was entirely misplaced in the opinion of both legations and could only be injurious to the constitution. The "leit motif" of Sardar's argument was that the constitution does not exist, and that both legations are shamefully deceived. He adduces as proof the presence of Amir Bahadur Jang as in effect Minister of War, the Mustafi-ul-Mamalik having practically resigned, and that of Saad-ud-Dowleh and Mukhber-ud-Dowleh (both noted absolutists) in the Cabinet. We warned him that if he disregarded the advice of the two legations, they would consider that his object was to complicate the situation and would hold him personally responsible for the results. He protested energetically that he had no object but the establishment of a real constitution, of which, however, he gave no definition. As formerly in Ispahan, he pointed out that he had not come to fight with anyone unless they fought with him. As a proof of this, he averred he had avoided going to Kashan lest he should thus provoke an engagement with the Shah's troops there, more than half of which he had won over, while the others were ready to join him at the first signal. Urged not to put himself in opposition to the two legations, and advised to return quietly home, he replied that he could not go back without having accomplished anything.

He is, however, prepared to retire as soon as certain demands of his are granted. He could only enumerate two of these:—

1. That Amir Bahadur Jang and five or six other noted absolutists should be banished from Tehran.
2. That assurances should be given for the security of the members of the assembly when elected, as he is certain that they will never dare to assemble.

The remaining conditions he said he could not formulate till he had consulted the members of a constitutional committee summoned by him to meet him on this very date at Kum, of whom, however, only one had as yet arrived. He promises to furnish his demand in writing by the 28th June at latest. Asked what he proposed to do if his demands were refused, he quoted a couplet from Firdausi in the vein of "Death or Westminster Abbey." We pointed out that his demonstration, instead of expediting the constitution, would retard it. He replied that his action would have one of two results, either a real constitution would be established or there would be direct foreign intervention. It would be better to hasten on the *dénouement*. In further proof of his pacific intentions he stated that he had counter-ordered the advance of the reinforcements from Ispahan. At one point in the conversation he professed himself ready to wait with his forces, either at Kum or elsewhere, till Parliament assembled, adding that he was sure that it never would meet under the present pseudo-constitutional régime. He repeatedly avowed himself unwilling to place himself in opposition to the two legations to which he would be grateful if they could obtain for him his demands. These were not his only, but those of Tabreez, Meshed, Resht, and other places which he only represented. He had no personal object. This did not prevent him adducing as one proof of the absolutism now rampant in Tehran the fact that he had heard to-day that the Shah had conferred his (Sardar Assad's) lands in Bakhtiari on Amir-i-

Mufakhan. I told him that in England anyone who headed such a movement as he now did would have been punished much more severely. We are both of opinion that Sirdar Assad's intellect is clouded.

He speaks like a person possessed of an *idée fixe* and appears incapable of admitting that anyone except himself can gauge rightly the real situation at Tehran.

G. GRAHAME.  
BOGOIAVLENSKY.

June 27, 1909.

In short interview this afternoon with Sardar Assad, after reminder from me that nothing which had been said in the previous interview must be interpreted to imply any diminution of the dignity and independence of the Persian Government and people, we delivered your message of this morning almost in the exact terms thereof. It evidently created an impression. The sardar proceeded to speak of his motives and projects. He had intended to demand on his arrival at Kum the immediate dismissal of Mukhber-ud-Dowleh. This would have been at once effected had we not been here. After halting only three days at Kum to communicate with other nationalists he would have marched, not into Tehran, but up to the gates, where he would have demanded the presence of representatives of the Shah to discuss the elaboration of the constitution. He might have perhaps invited representatives from the legations to assist at the meeting. He dwelt at some length on the forbearance which he had exercised in making a detour round Kashan, whereas he could easily have seized that place and disarmed the Persian troops. After some further observations of a kindred nature he formulated two requests:—

"1. Let the two legations, through their consuls, inform me in writing that I have no right to advance a step further, and must now return empty handed, otherwise I shall find myself face to face, not with the Shah, but with the Russian and British Governments. I shall then understand that the independence of Persia has passed into their hands, and, armed with this document (the contents of which I must have facilities for communicating to my co-nationalists), I shall retire at once with my honour unsullied and with a foreign passport for Europe.

"2. Let me have a wire (not a Persian wire, but one of which I can be absolutely sure) for three or four hours to communicate with Kazvin and Tabreez, to enable me to furnish you in detail the demands of the nationalists, otherwise I could not possibly give my answer in the time limit."

We pointed out that the object of our interview was to communicate the message already delivered, the terms of which we briefly recapitulated, but consented to transmit his requests for the consideration of the two representatives.

*Note.*—The two consuls, if desired, can be ready for interview with the Ministers in half-an-hour's notice.

G. GRAHAME.  
BOGOIAVLENSKY.

Inclosure 2 in No. 342.

*Joint Communication made to Sipahdar by British and Russian Legations, July 4, 1909.*

M. BARONOWSKI and I reached Karej at 3 p.m. on the 4th July, and were immediately received by Sipahdar, to whom we had telephoned earlier in the day asking for an interview.

M. Baronowski informed Sipahdar that we had been sent to him by the representatives of the two Powers at Tehran with a message which was the outcome of discussions which had taken place at London and St. Petersburg. I added that Messrs. Churchill and Romanowski were on their way to Sardar Assad with a similar message. Sipahdar said that he had just heard from Sirdar Assad who was at Robart Kerim. M. Baronowski then read in Persian the translation of the instructions which we had received. Sipahdar listened attentively, and when M. Baronowski had finished, said he would like to read them through himself. M. Baronowski handed him the paper, which we left with him. Having read the instructions, Sipahdar proceeded to complain of the general unreliability of the Shah; that His Majesty made promises, but there was great delay amounting to non-fulfilment in carrying them out; that he



kept round him certain traitors, mischief makers and mollahs, and preferred the advice of five or six of these persons to the wishes of the rest of the people of Persia; that no confidence could be placed in the Shah or his Ministers; that the latter did not even reply to telegrams—he had sent at least ten to which no reply had been given; that some of the Ministers were traitors (he mentioned no names), and that the Ministers had refused to recognise the Tehran Nationalist Committee (this referred to the committee to which Saad-ed-Dowleh at first extended official recognition, which he, however, soon withdrew). Sipahdar then expressed a wish to consult the other nationalists leaders with his force, and withdrew for this purpose.

On his return an hour or an hour and a-half later he began by saying that the nationalists were very grateful to the two great Powers, the two leading Powers of the world, for their efforts to bring about a satisfactory settlement of affairs. He then enquired whether the Shah knew of our being sent to him with a message. I replied that I could not say for certain but I believed that His Majesty did not know of it. Sir George Barclay had received his instructions to send the message on Saturday afternoon and had, after consulting M. Sabline, sent for me and given me my instructions at 7 P.M. M. Baronowski said he also did not think the Shah knew of our coming. Sipahdar then asked what was meant by the words "to restore order" in the message. The movements of his troops were and would continue to be orderly. He said the nationalists' forces had come to obtain certain objects, these they had not yet obtained. He and Sirdar Assad would give the two legations an undertaking for the correct behaviour of themselves and their troops if the two legations would arrange that he and Sirdar Assad, each with 150 men, should be permitted to come to Tehran, or to a garden near it, whence, in consultation with the provinces, they could arrange for the firm establishment of the constitution. I asked what he meant by "establishment of the constitution." He replied that there were certain things the nationalists wanted done. I replied that if he would tell us what the nationalists wanted the two legations would, if the nature of the demands allowed of their doing so, bring them to the notice of the Shah and endeavour to obtain His Majesty's acceptance of them, in which case their execution would be guaranteed by the two legations. Sipahdar stated what some of the nationalist demands were and we requested him to give them to us in writing. He again complained of the Shah, that ever since the constitution was first granted he had continually tried to destroy it, and he referred to the events of last year. I said the matters he complained of belonged to the past and were best treated as by-gones, that quite recently the Shah had accepted the friendly advice of the two Powers, had carried out most points of the programme which he had accepted and was carrying out the rest; the electoral law was ready for promulgation and everything was going well for the elections and the convocation of the National Assembly. M. Baronowski pointed out that the National Assembly was the really important thing, when they had got that the nationalists could change all the Ministers if they wished. Sipahdar only repeated his statements that the nationalists had not yet got what they wanted. He then withdrew to have the demands written out.

An hour later Sipahdar returned with a paper containing eight demands. To prevent any chance of a misunderstanding we requested him to read the demands to us. This he did, and I enquired who were the persons whose deportation was one of the demands. He referred to a list he held in his hand, and read us the following six names: Amir Bahadur Jang, Sheikh Fazlullah, Mufakhar-ul-Mulk, Muktidar-i-Nazam, Sani Hazrat, and Mullah Muhammad, Amoli.

We said we would convey the demands to the two legations, and a reply would be sent to Sipahdar stating whether or not the legations saw their way to asking the Shah to accept them. Sipahdar asked for an early reply. We pointed out that perhaps some discussion would be necessary, and suggested that he should wait three days for a reply. He said that every day cost the nationalists a considerable sum for the payment of their forces, and he could not wait for a reply after midday on Tuesday, the 6th July. To this we agreed. He asked if we would give an undertaking that no military movement would be made against him during this period. We replied that we could not give such an undertaking, but that were he attacked he would, of course, be free to fight. We then withdrew.

From the time when we met the first nationalist outpost our reception throughout was entirely respectful, and in our progress through the camp every soldier we met saluted us. I saw no signs of despondency resulting from the morning's defeat; the few men we questioned maintained that it was an unauthorised outpost affair and of no consequence.

When passing Shahabad on our return journey to Tehran we informed Captain

Peribinoseff, who was in command of the Persian Cossacks there, of Sipahdar's intention to abstain from military action until midday on Tuesday, the 6th July, adding that we could not, of course, guarantee Sipahdar's keeping to his intention.

C. B. STOKES, Major,  
Military Attaché, Tehran.

#### Inclosure 3 in No. 342.

##### *Demands of the Nationalists.*

SIPAH DAR et Sirdar Assad, chacun avec 150 moudjahids armés, avec des garanties suffisantes, vinrent à Téhéran pour discuter les points suivants. Après être sûrs que les demandes seront exécutées, les moudjahids reviendront à leurs foyers.

2. La sortie des armées des voisins du territoire persan.
3. Les endjournements des vilayets et des ayalets choisissent les Ministres jusqu'à l'ouverture du Parlement; puis on agira d'après la loi.
4. Expulsion des personnes traîtres et malvues du peuple.
5. Désarmement des personnes qui n'ont pas jusqu'à présent appartenues à l'armée et qui ont reçu récemment les armes.
6. Le Ministre de la Guerre responsable est plein maître de toutes les forces armées de l'État et des arsenaux.
7. L'Administration des Postes et Télégraphes doit être retirée de Muhbir-ed-Dowleh.
8. La nomination de gouverneurs constitutionnels doit recevoir l'approbation des endjournements de cette province.

#### Inclosure 4 in No. 342.

*Memorandum on Joint Representations made by Mr. Churchill and M. Romanowsky on July 3, 1909.*

M. ROMANOWSKY and I left Gulahek at 1:30 A.M. yesterday, escorted by two Russian Cossacks and two Indian Sowars, as well as a Gholam of each legation.

We arrived at Hassanabad, on the Tehran-Kum road, 36 miles from Tehran, shortly after 7 A.M., where we found Amir Mufakhan, the Bakhtiari royalist chief and a Persian Cossack officer with a force of some 200 men. Amir Mufakhan, on whom we called, said he was just about to meet Sirdar Assad at a place half-way between Hassanabad and Robart Kerim, about 16 miles west of the Tehran-Kum road, where the Sirdar was then encamped, to discuss matters amicably. Each party was to go to the rendezvous with only five men. He readily agreed to us joining him, and supplied riding horses for us and our escort.

When Sirdar Assad arrived we saw him alone, and I read to him the message from the British and Russian representatives, which we had been charged to deliver to him. He listened to me patiently to the end, and then spoke as follows:—

I am informed that the granting of the constitution by the Shah is not genuine; that there is no intention of sincerely carrying out the promises which have been made. What guarantee is there that the Shah will carry into effect the promises which he has now made? I said that we had been authorised to say, if he raised this question, that the two legations were prepared to obtain such guarantees for him. He replied that foreign guarantees were exactly what they objected to. They did not want foreign guarantees in any shape or form. I hastened to assure him that no such guarantees were contemplated, but that we were prepared to obtain guarantees from the Shah. He said this would be quite a different matter and would satisfy them, but he turned the subject and seemed to have no desire to discuss the matter, but repeated that he was convinced from reports he had received from all the provinces that the people were so distrustful of the Shah's sincerity, that he knew there would be no elections for the Assembly. I said we thought the military measures taken by him and by Sipahdar were responsible for this feeling of unrest, and that he appeared to be entirely under a misapprehension as to what had been done at Tehran. We could assure him that the work done by Saad-ed-Dowleh's Government and the Electoral Law Committee was very satisfactory, and there had been every prospect, until he and Sipahdar moved on



Tehran, of a satisfactory re-establishment of the constitution. He retorted that no confidence could be felt so long as certain mischief-makers were allowed to remain at the Shah's side. Did I deny that at this moment Amir Bahadur was in supreme command of the army? I said that one of the recommendations of the recent Anglo-Russian programme of advice to the Shah was that Amir Bahadur should be deprived of office. This and the other recommendations had been followed by the Shah. I myself had been instructed to ask Saad-ed-Dowleh, who was genuinely working in the interests of the country, whether Amir Bahadur's presence was an obstacle in the way of a settlement. He had replied that he was no longer influential, that his power no longer existed, but that if there was the slightest sign of activity on his part, he would not fail immediately to say so. Under these circumstances there was no reason why we should insist on his removal as he now only commanded the Silakhoris attached to the Shah, and had no influence whatever.

Sirdar Assad then said that he had not come with the intention of fighting, but only to see that the constitution was re-established. If there was any fighting it would not be his fault. His messages to the Shah remained unanswered, and there was a ring round the Shah of persons who prevented the truth from reaching His Majesty. He had come so close to Tehran in order to be able to make his demands direct. He had a very large following, and the tribes of Fars were with him.

We said we would leave a copy in Persian text of the message we had been sent to give him, and would return to Tehran.

When we took leave of him at 1 P.M., he said, with marked emphasis: "Au revoir, à Tehran."

He was polite and cordial throughout, and we then withdrew.

G. P. CHURCHILL.

July 5, 1909.

Inclosure 5 in No. 342.

*Instructions to Major Stokes and Mr. Churchill.*

YOU will do your best to meet and communicate with Sirdar Assad and Sipahdar and tell them that the only way to avoid foreign intervention is to restore order and to give the constitution as now re-established a fair chance.

You should state to them that they are under a gross misapprehension both as to the representations made by the two friendly Powers on the 22nd April, and as to the measures taken by the Shah's Government to execute their recommendations. You should say that the representations took the form of friendly advice to the Shah to re-establish the constitution and to take certain measures to that end. These measures the Shah has already for the most part executed. A nationalist committee has, without interference from the Government, elaborated a most liberal electoral law which has been signed by the Shah. No obstruction whatever has been offered by those Ministers, who are accused of absolutism, to the carrying out of the measures recommended.

Those who desire the welfare of Persia should now wait patiently until the Assembly meets. Armed demonstrations of the kind undertaken by Sirdar Assad and Sipahdar savour of rebellion, and whatever may be their avowed intention they have served to complicate a situation which offered hope of the tranquil re-establishment of Parliamentary Government.

If Sirdar Assad and Sipahdar ask for guarantees, they should state what guarantees they demand and we will do our best to obtain them.

G. BARCLAY.

July 5, 1909.

[28902]

No. 343.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 3.)*

(No. 135.)

Sir,

*Gulahek, July 12, 1909.*

I HAVE the honour to report that the incidents recorded in Sir F. Bertie's despatch No. 198 of the 21st May, a copy of which was enclosed in your despatch No. 76 of the 3rd ultimo, were brought to my notice by His Majesty's consul-general

at Ispahan, to whom Sultan Mahmoud Mirza, a son of the Zil-es-Sultan, applied for the protection of his father's property.

I obtained from the Minister for Foreign Affairs repeated orders to the Bakhtiari khans to induce the tribes to desist from their depredations, but I do not feel that I can take any further action in His Imperial Highness's interests, especially as Sultan Mahmoud Mirza did not accept an offer of help which was made to him by Mr. Grahame and the Russian consul-general.

Our guarantees given to the Zil should not, I consider, be regarded as covering indiscriminate plundering by tribes, but are intended only to hold good in the case of deliberate spoliation by the Shah or his Government.

I have, &c.

G. BARCLAY.

[28904]

No. 344.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 3.)*

(No. 137.)

Sir,

*Gulahek, July 16, 1909.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith the usual monthly summary of events in Persia during the past four weeks.

I have, &c.

G. BARCLAY.

Inclosure in No. 344.

No. 7.—*Monthly Summary.*

*Tehran.*

ALL important events of the past month have been reported by telegraph. Press of work due to the events of the last few days has prevented the preparation of a detailed account of the events of the month.

*Tabreez.*

1. On the 19th June a detachment of Russian troops consisting of a howitzer battery and two companies of infantry left for Russia. On the 20th June the remaining Russian troops moved camp from near the Aji River to the Shah's garden. On the 28th June the Russian general was ordered to suspend the withdrawal of Russian troops. The town has remained quiet, and there have been no further incidents. Sattar Khan and Bagher Khan are still in the Turkish consulate-general, but are to leave Persia shortly with the Turkish consul-general, who is being replaced by Remzi Bey, formerly chargé d'affaires at Tehran, the Russian Government giving guarantees that they will in no way molest them. They are to remain abroad until order is restored in Persia. On the 7th July a force of 150 Russian Cossacks was dispatched to Basminch, as some Shahsavans, who were apparently fighting Rahim Khan's men in Karadagh, had appeared near that place. This force returned to Tabreez a few days later, leaving a post of observation of sixty men at Basminch.

2. The acting governor, Ijlal-ul-Mulk, has repeatedly expressed the wish to resign, but until the governor-general arrives his resignation cannot be accepted. The governor-general, Ala-ud-Dowleh, arrived at Tehran from Europe early in July, and has so far made no sign of leaving for Tabreez.

3. On the 5th July Mr. Smart took over the duties of acting consul-general from Mr. Wratislaw, who left for Europe on leave.

*Resht.*

1. On the 28th June reinforcements left Resht for the nationalist force at Kazvin.  
2. On the 8th July Russian troops landed at Enzeli and left on the 10th July for Kazvin. The force known to be coming is 500 Cossacks, 4 guns, and 1,000 infantry, but it is not known at this legation how much of this force landed on the 8th July.

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From that date the bazaars have remained closed, and on the 10th July a boycott of Russian tea and sugar was begun.

3. In spite of the movements of nationalist troops against Tehran traffic on the Resht-Tehran road has not in any way been interrupted, and the posts have gone through regularly and without delay.

#### *Meshed.*

1. On the outbreak of disorders at the end of May the Russian consuls-general sent strong messages to the local assembly through the leading priests and followed these up with a somewhat less strong letter. The bazaars were shut in protest, and the Karguzar was attacked. Strong telegrams were sent to Tehran to the effect that as Prince Dabija was insisting on Rukn-ud-Dowleh, Meshed would not accept him. To put an end to the existing anarchy Major Sykes informally persuaded the assembly to send a second telegram saying that they would accept Rukn-ud-Dowleh. Prince Dabija was much pleased at the coming of the latter, and suggested that, if necessary, a mixed Anglo-Russian force should be sent to escort him in from Nishapur. It appears that the murder of the shrine official (see last summary) was an indirect attack on Prince Dabija. In this connection, a paper was pinned to his corpse to the effect that this was his reward from the people for his friendship with the Russian consul-general. The attack on the Karguzar was also prompted by similar motives. On the 7th June this series of outrages culminated in the murder of the Begler Begi, who was forced on the town by Prince Dabija last autumn after his dismissal by Rukn-ud-Dowleh in the interests of peace. When his property was looted, a number of letters from Prince Dabija were found, proving that he was very much his servant, and this fanned the flame against the Russians. The Begler Begi, who showed fight, shot one of his assassins, who was subsequently given a royal funeral, the assembly attending to a man. A Persian friend of Major Sykes's told him that there was every chance of an attempt being made on Prince Dabija's life by his own subjects, whose hate was that of madmen. Everyone of position fled either to the ark or to distant villages or was blackmailed. A list of about twenty people was drawn up and attempts were made to kill them. Among them are Aristu Khan, the Russian attaché, the Muavin-ut-Tujjar and others. In short, a reign of terror prevailed. On two occasions, the 6th and 8th June, the defences of the British consulate were manned owing to the amount of promiscuous firing which went on. It appears that a hostile demonstration against the Russian consulate was intended. On the 8th June Major Sykes visited his colleague, who was practically blockaded. Neither Prince Dabija nor the members of his staff dared to leave the ark quarter, and the former received repeated warnings to be on his guard. As the arrival of the Rukn-ud-Dowleh was likely to be much delayed and would only excite the anarchists more, the two consuls-generals telegraphed the state of affairs to their legations. Prince Dabija asked for reinforcements and, as the state of affairs was intolerable and there seemed little hope of improvement, unless the robbers quarrelled over the rich spoils, Major Sykes agreed that some such action was called for. It is to be noted that these very serious disturbances were originated by Russian subjects whose gangs had been arriving week after week; but yet Prince Dabija made no attempt to stop them on the way. The disorders continued, and when on the 16th June, Rukn-ud-Dowleh arrived he found himself helpless, the city and telegraph office being still in the hands of the enemy. Major Sykes visited him and found him scared, while his first question to Prince Dabija was about the Russian reinforcements; the news that a second sotnia had crossed the frontier greatly pleased him. He appeared to be trying to frighten the Assembly with threats of Russian intervention, but with little success. Major Sykes reports that during June two parties of revolutionaries, each of fifty or sixty men, from Tabreez reached Meshed. The Russians were said to have detained twelve parties at Tiflis. The Assembly continued to raise volunteers and debated whether in the case of a Russian bombardment the German or the Belgian flag should be hoisted. On or about the 18th June Prince Dabija, without consulting Major Sykes, wrote to the governor-general demands to the following effect:—

1. The evacuation by "volunteers" of the telegraph office and the surrender of their arms.
2. The arrest of the murderers of the late shrine official and of the Begler Begi: (neither of these were Russian subjects).

The letter ended up by promising the governor-general the help of both consulates. It was sent to the Assembly on the 19th June and was torn up, both the governor-

general and Prince Dabija being roundly abused. The governor-general kept no copy of the letter, but the tenor of it was told to the attaché by several witnesses, and the governor-general vouched for the above being generally accurate. A body of ruffians had some weeks previously taken up their abode in the ark, which they made their head-quarters for raids into the town. Major Sykes pointed out the danger of this to Prince Dabija, and pressed the governor-general for the expulsion of these ruffians. The soldiers, however, objected to this, and Prince Dabija, though only verbally, pressed very strongly that they should be kept. As a result, the raiding continued. On the 23rd June, the reactionary Sorab quarter, under the Shuja-ut-Taulia, who is believed to have been inspired by the governor-general, attacked some "volunteers," and a skirmish followed. This led to general looting in the ark quarter, and to some desultory firing. On the 24th June there was a great deal of firing. In the evening Prince Dabija sent a patrol to the Russian bank with supplies for the post maintained there. As passage was refused, a Maxim was sent for, and opened fire. There were no casualties, but the way was promptly opened. Looting and burning increased, and Major Sykes received an appeal from the Assembly whom he advised to come to terms with the governor-general. On the 25th June a telegram was received from the Constitutionalists at Tehran advising the Assembly to avoid giving chances of complaint. This produced a good effect and negotiations were opened and disarmament by the Assembly, in return for the expulsion of the leaders of the ruffians, was agreed upon. The latter meanwhile attacked the telegraph office, but were repulsed with the loss of two men killed. On the 26th June, the governor-general took refuge under joint Anglo-Russian protection. On the 3rd July the governor-general, Prince Dabija, and two leading members of the Assembly met at the British consulate. A disarmament was agreed to, and a reconciliation was effected, and the governor-general resumed office on the Assembly ratifying the arrangement; since when Meshed has remained quiet. Major Sykes telegraphed on the 10th July that the Assembly and the governor-general were co-operating successfully for peace. The Assembly guard of twenty men was alone armed, and confidence was restored. There was no need for increasing the Russian force, the second sotnia of which reached Meshed on the 23rd June.

#### *Turbat-i-Haidari.*

On the 24th May four Russian Cossacks, who arrived from Karez a few days before, returned to that place. They travelled by Khaf. On the 30th May six Russian Cossacks arrived from Karez *en route* for Kerman. On the 4th June four arrived from Karez for Bunder Abbas and three from Seistan for Meshed.

#### *Seistan.*

1. Regarding the two Russian Cossacks (see last summary) who were said to have been robbed by Afghans, it appears that they were at first deprived of their rifles, &c. Subsequently the leader of the caravan restored everything and allowed them to proceed unmolested.
2. M. Bravine, before leaving, informed His Majesty's vice-consul that the new Russian consul is leaving Russia shortly for Birjand where he will remain during the summer and that Dr. Otto was not to have consular rank.
3. Colonel von der Flaas was back in Seistan by the end of May. He talked freely to His Majesty's vice-consul of his journey in the presence of M. Bravine and did not seem to regard it as the escapade it was said to have been.
4. During May 2,560 cases were treated and twenty-six operations performed in the consular hospital.
5. Hissam-ud-Dowleh summoned the principal people of Birjand to meet him on the May 21st and the Shah's proclamation was read and the members of the late local assembly were informed that, pending reorganisation, they would be considered to represent the local assembly. The Meshed assembly subsequently declined to order fresh elections so the former members retain their seats. The Meshed assembly has informed Hissam-ud-Dowleh that he will be held responsible for all revenues collected by him. This is said to have caused him some uneasiness.
6. On return from short leave Major Kennion entered his consular district on the 14th June. He arrived at Birjand on the 5th May.



*Ispahan.*

The movements of the Bakhtiari forces have been reported in telegrams and despatches. The town has, generally speaking, remained quiet, though in some cases the tribesmen have been guilty of offences against order.

*Sultanabad.*

Writing on the 1st July His Majesty's acting vice-consul stated that in the province of Iraq lawlessness was rapidly increasing and robberies were reported daily. The Lurs had driven off the cattle of many villages and several villages had been pillaged. The peasants dared not leave their homes, the roads were unsafe and communication would soon be at a standstill. As soon as the Bakhtiaris reached Kum a local assembly was started here. Its members had repeatedly asked the governor to give them an account of the revenue and then leave the place. The greater part of the assembly was composed of fanatical and troublesome people. The chief priest had invited the Bakhtiari to Sultanabad.

*Yezd.*

Numerous robberies are reported on the various roads leading to Yezd. The Kerman road is frequented by bands of Arab tribesmen, numbering in two instances 130 and 200 men, who pillage caravans. A large number of camels have been carried off, and attempts to ransom the animals have only resulted in the ransom offered being seized as well as the animals. In one case yarn to the value of 1,500*l.* has been taken by robbers. One Khusru Khan, who some time ago attempted to raid Yezd from the direction of Taft, is said to be planning a raid, but has not been encouraged by the Taftis. The escort of the Governor of Nain recently deserted and left for Tehran, robbing the villages they passed through. The Parsee reported stabbed in the last summary is recovering. The robberies and extortion to which the Parsees are exposed continue, and their appeals to the local authorities are without result.

*Kerman.*

Nizam-es-Sultaneh has not yet left Tehran to take up the governorship of Kerman. Bashir-i-Khakan was appointed deputy governor early in June, and has done what little he can to carry on the administration; but as there is no revenue coming in, no salaries can be paid. The soldiers on duty at the consulates and at the houses of Europeans deserted at the end of May. Kerman itself remains quiet because in the face of the common danger all the respectable people have sunk their differences and are eager to show an united front to lawlessness and plunder. Outside the town, from all sides the story is the same; there is robbery with or without murder, according as resistance is offered or not. At Rafsinjan the Governor, Rifat-ed-Dowleh, after making a spirited and successful attack on some Arab robbers, fled leaving the town open to certain reprisals. The Baluchis have been raiding in Narmashir, and up to the 10th June eighteen persons had been killed. The fort of Mirabad had been captured. A village not many miles west of Kerman, was looted by Arab robbers and three or four villagers were killed. The Afshar tribe is split into factions, but His Majesty's consul anticipates that they may combine to raid Kerman. A telegram from His Majesty's consul received at Tehran on the 11th July, stated that news had been received that the Baluchi tribe intended moving shortly on Bam and Kerman. The news was telegraphed to Kerman from Dehanneh, to which it had been brought by the headman of a Baluchi village. This man stated that the unrest in Baluchistan was due to the intrigues of the Russian consul in Seistan, and he said he could produce the original of a letter to the Baluchi chiefs offering them money, and inviting them to make an agreement with him.

*Kermanshah.*

1. Zahir-ed-Dowleh arrived on the 13th June and assumed the governorship.
2. Captain Haworth handed over charge of the consulate to Captain Crossle, I.M.S., on the 23rd June, and left the next day for Europe via Resht.
3. A telegram was received in the town about the 20th June from the local assembly at Hamadan forwarding copy of a telegram received by them from Tabreez. The purport of the telegram was that the Russians had entered Tabreez, and intended

taking the whole of North-Western Persia. The Tabreezis, being hard pressed, asked the Hamadanis to help them. The Hamadanis replied that they sympathised with them, and were ready to give them any help that might be necessary. In turn the Hamadanis asked the people of Kermanshah to help in the general cause. On the receipt of this telegram the local assembly was summoned, and representatives of all classes collected to discuss what ought to be done. It was decided to inform the surrounding tribes that it was their duty to march to the assistance of Tabreez. On hearing this, Captain Howarth and M. Nicolsky, acting in concert, telegraphed for instructions to Tehran, and, in the meanwhile, sent their Persian clerks to the governor, unofficially, to inform him that it was untrue that the Russians were taking North-West Persia, and that the two Powers had agreed to recognise the integrity of Persia. The Persian clerks were also sent to the leading priests to advise them in the same sense. The priests said that they accepted the assurances of the consulates that the news was untrue, and would give the people the messages sent by the two consuls. As a result the town quieted down. There is a good deal of local feeling against the Russians owing to the prolonged occupation of Tabreez. Several people have openly stated that they have no faith in the Russians, but trust the English, owing to the way they left Bushire after the troubles there had ceased. The supposed Russian danger has caused the nationalist and royalist parties to sink their differences and combine.

*Shiraz.*

1. The early part of June was marked by a violent development of the quarrel between the Qawami brothers and the governor-general. With this in view the quarrel between Ata-ed-Dowleh and the Qawami was composed, and the demand for the former's resignation was dropped. Nasr-ed-Dowleh arrived on the 31st May. He claimed to have been ambushed by a strong force of Kashgais some miles from Shiraz, and to have driven them off with heavy loss. On the 25th June, the Qawam informed Mr. Bill that if Zil-es-Sultan were appointed governor-general of Fars, he and his brother would gladly leave for Europe immediately His Highness arrived. On the 29th June, Mr. Bill reported that Nasr-ed-Dowleh had been appointed Russian consular agent at Shiraz. The appointment is likely, as the result of the exchange of telegrams between His Majesty's Government and the Russian Government, to be cancelled. On the 30th June, the Qawam informed Mr. Bill that he strongly disapproved of his brother's action, that he would like his own son to be made British consular agent, and that he would in no circumstances abandon British friendship; his request was refused. Early in July the situation became threatening owing to the governor-general inviting Soulat-ed-Dowleh and the Lari Seyyid to Shiraz to help him against the Qawamis. In the opinion of both consuls the immediate dismissal of the governor-general was necessary to preserve order. The difficulty was to find a suitable successor. Finally, His Majesty's Minister and the Russian chargé d'affaires arranged for the announcement of the appointment of Zil-es-Sultan as governor-general, although his Highness is still in Europe. This announcement has had a calming effect, and it is believed that a dangerous situation has thus been averted. Should the situation again become dangerous, part of the Bushire residency guard of Indian infantry, with a naval Maxim gun section, may be sent to reinforce the consulate guard.

## PERSIAN GULF.

*Bushire.*

1. On the 4th July His Majesty's consul-general reported that he was informed that orders for the boycott of all Russian goods at all trade centres had been issued for Najaf. Further, that the chief priests at Najaf were believed to be organising a *bond fide* nationalist movement in the Persian Gulf and the south of Persia, the leading features of which were the boycott of Russian goods and the recognition of British claims on the customs. On the 5th July Major Cox received a letter from the local assembly, in which that body announced its intention, in view of untoward incidents occurring elsewhere, of assuming control of the administration, including the customs, the receipts of which would be deposited in the Imperial Bank of Persia in the name of the nation. The assembly undertook to recognise His Majesty's Government's claim on the customs on the production of documents, and to pay such interest and principal as were due from Bushire and Bunder Abbas customs receipts. It also undertook that all obligations to the British, such as honourable treatment of consular



officials and protection of British subjects would be scrupulously observed. In conclusion, the assembly asked for the co-operation of the British authorities in the preservation of the rights of the Persian nation, and particularly concurrence in the above arrangement. It appeared that the assembly's action was the result of orders from Najaf and Tabreez. Darya Begi called on Major Cox and informed him confidentially that an absolute boycott of Russian goods and subjects was intended, but he had dissuaded the assembly from mentioning it in their letter. The main object was to prevent the Shah getting the customs receipts. In reply to a request for his views, Major Cox said he would have to communicate with His Majesty's Minister before giving an official reply. His personal view was that the intended action of the Assembly was precipitate and uncalled for, and likely to bring about the very state of things everyone wished to avoid. There was no reactionary element in the Gulf ports, so the Assembly could well afford to wait and see what happened at Tehran. Major Cox sent the Assembly a verbal reply to this effect. Major Cox's language to the assembly was approved by His Majesty's Government, and he was instructed to add, if occasion offered, that the advance on Tehran of the Bakhtiari and the Kazvin revolutionaries at the moment when the constitution was re-established had brought about the present crisis. On the 7th July Major Cox reported that it was believed that a telegram on behalf of the Assembly had been sent the previous evening to Tehran for communication to the Cabinet, to the effect that the people of the Gulf ports would assume control of the administration as an independent people, no longer recognising the central Government, if a single Russian soldier remained on Persian soil.

#### *Bunder Abbas.*

1. The state of unrest recently prevailing here seems to have subsided during May, owing to Seyyid Abdul Hussain Lari's attention being occupied elsewhere. The seyyid had ceased to threaten the town, and confined himself to sending orders to his agents at Bunder Abbas to buy arms and ammunition for him, to be sent to Lar. The governor-general of the Gulf ports having announced his intention to send 200 soldiers to protect the town against the seyyid, the deputy governor replied that they were not required.

2. A German, by name Roever, arrived from Lingah on the 11th May, and was living with M. Aratoon, an Armenian.

#### *Lingah.*

1. Seyyid Abdul Hussain Lari being occupied in resisting Nasr-ed-Douleh in Lar, his men were withdrawn from the vicinity of Lingah, where tranquillity prevailed during May. The deputy governor, considering the presence of a Lari, Haji Ali, detrimental to the public peace, expelled him from the town.

#### *Mohammerah.*

1. Early in May Mr. Carstein, agent for Messrs. Wöneckhaus, took rooms temporarily over the store leased by the Customs and belonging to Moin-ut-Tujjar. At the end of the month Messrs. Wöneckhaus had begun to build an upper story to the room in one corner of the yard hired by them, but work was stopped by order of the sheikh or his representative.

2. Mr. Smith, of the Indo-European Telegraph Department, arrived by land from Nasiri on the 18th May, having completed the survey of the telegraph line to Mohammerah. He left for Bushire on the 20th May.

3. His Highness Seif-ed-Douleh left Mohammerah for Ispahan on the 26th May. He left the sheikh in charge of the province, and the latter proposes sending his nephew Hanzal, now in charge of Nasiri, to Dizful to govern, and Abd Seyyid to Shustar.

4. The Indian surveyors under Lieutenant Wilson have completed the survey of the upper part of Abbadan Island and of Mohammerah to the Turkish frontier. They were at the end of May starting on the southern part of Abbadan to the sea.

C. B. STOKES, Major,  
Military Attaché.

[28907]

No. 345.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 3.)*

(No. 140.)

Sir,

Gulahek, July 16, 1909.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copy of an interesting memorandum by Major Stokes in regard to recent movements of the Bakhtiari khans and their attitude towards the constitution.

I have, &amp;c.

G. BARCLAY.

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Inclosure in No. 345.

*Memorandum by Major Stokes respecting the Bakhtiari and the Constitution,  
May-July 1909.*

May 5.—Dissensions broke out among the khans, and Samsam-es-Sultaneh was reported to be endeavouring to seize all positions of vantage along the Ahwaz-Ispahan road, and hostilities in the Bakhtiari country seemed possible. The chief factor was the defection of Sirdar-i-Muhtasham from the nationalist cause. The khans were divided as follows:—

#### *Nationalist.*

Samsam-es-Sultaneh.  
Sirdar-i-Assad.  
Salar-i-Hishmat.  
Sirdar-i-Zaffar.  
Zargham-es-Sultaneh.

#### *Royalist.*

Amir-i-Mufakham.  
Sirdar-i-Muhtasham.  
Sirdar-i-Ashraf.  
Salar-i-Jung.  
Shahab-es-Sultaneh.  
Shuja-es-Sultan.

May 6.—Sirdar-i-Assad arrived at Ispahan.

May 7.—Sirdar-i-Assad asked His Majesty's consul-general what would be the attitude of His Majesty's Government towards the Bakhtiari khans if, in spite of the Shah's concessions, they advanced on Tehran.

May 8.—Sirdar-i-Assad complained bitterly to Mr. Grahame of Sirdar-i-Muhtasham's defection, a piece of perfidy unequalled in the annals of the tribe. He spoke in strong terms of the way in which the Russians had supported, and continued to support, the Shah's cause, averring that detailed news of Bakhtiari movements telegraphed by the Russian consul-general were daily reported to the Shah. He dwelt on the absolute faithlessness and bestiality of the Shah, who, he asserted, had declared that he would sooner see Persia in the hands of the Russians than in those of the constitutionalists. He enquired eagerly if there was any truth in the report of a loan of 100,000*l.* to the Shah by the British and Russian Governments when the constitution had been granted. If that meant as soon as the Shah had signed a piece of paper and before the national assembly was actually assembled, it would be equivalent to providing the Shah with arms to crush the constitution. Bad though the Shah was, and execrated by fully two-thirds of his subjects, he (Sirdar-i-Assad) was one of those who held that His Majesty's maintenance in power was preferable to the situation which would in all probability be created by his removal.

Sirdar-i-Assad called on the Russian consul-general on the same day.

On the same day, in reply to representations made by Mr. Grahame, Samsam-es-Sultaneh wrote that he had no reason to believe hostilities among the Bakhtiari possible. He and his party would not begin them; if others did, he declined responsibility.

Sirdar-i-Assad, on another occasion, said that he could not draw back; he intended to cripple the Shah utterly, and only fear of Russian intervention would prevent his dethroning him. Kerbela was encouraging him, and urged that no foreign assurances for the security of the national assembly should be accepted.

May 21.—Sirdar-i-Assad warned Mr. Grahame that a settlement of the differences between the Shah and the nationalists might be only the prelude to hostilities between the khans. He explained that for many years past he and his brothers, whose faction was much more numerous and powerful than that of their cousins, the sons of Imam



Kuli Khan, had kept down the number of their followers so as to effect a balance of power. Recent events had caused a number of Bakhtiari to abandon their allegiance to the Imam Kuli branch and join the Husain Kuli party. These men neither could nor would return to their former allegiance. Besides this, there was the question of the Reza Kuli branch, Zargham-es-Sultaneh and family, which most unfairly Amir-i-Mufakham and his brothers sought to oust from all share in tribal matters.

Samsam said that he hoped matters might still be arranged among the khans.

May 29.—Murteza Kuli Khan with 100 horsemen arrived at Ispahan from the Bakhtiari country. He was reproved by his father, Samsam, as the Bakhtiari forces were being reduced.

May 30.—The Ispahan local assembly requested the khans to recall their forces, probably owing to the false report that the Shah's force at Kashan was coming to Ispahan. Two hundred Bakhtiari horsemen were recalled to Ispahan.

The local assembly telegraphed to the nationalist committee at Tehran pointing out that the Bakhtiari had disbanded the major part of their forces, handed over the telegraph office, accepted the deputy governor, &c., and demanding to be informed before the evening of the 1st June: Why was the Shah's force still at Kashan? Why was Tehran under martial law? Why were the Russians still in Tabreez? Why was the electoral law delayed? To this telegram a sarcastic reply was received from Saad-ed-Dowleh on the 2nd June expressing surprise that out of 200,000 people in Ispahan not one had the sense to perceive that things could not be hurried on at this crisis, and stating that any constitutional Government in Europe would declare martial law under similar conditions. The khans deduced from the Saad-ed-Dowleh's signature that the nationalist committee at Tehran had resigned.

Between the 31st May and the 5th June 200 to 300 of Amir-i-Mufakham's men straggled into Ispahan.

June 5.—Amir-i-Mufakham disbanded 200 Bakhtiari at Kashan. They started for Ispahan, he for Tehran. At this date there were 1,000 Bakhtiari at Ispahan.

June 8.—It was reported that Sheikh Khazal of Mohammerah had remitted 12,000 tomans to the Bakhtiari khans.

June 9.—The local assembly of Ispahan telegraphed to the diplomatic corps at Tehran protesting against any agreement being made by Persia with the Powers while the Persian Parliament was not sitting. This was due to a report from Tabreez that the Shah had accepted European control of the country; the internal administration to be under the supervision of England and Russia; the Shah's authority to be maintained by the two Powers; no concession to be granted by Persia without their consent.

June 9.—Two hundred Bakhtiari horsemen reached Kum. They were said to have left Kashan without leave and to intend joining Amir-i-Mufakham at Tehran.

June 14.—Sirdar-i-Muhtasham dismissed fifty of his men from Ardistan.

June 16.—Sirdar-i-Assad and about 700 men left Ispahan for Kum by the Naizar route. A message from the British Minister to stop them was sent after him on the 19th.

June 20.—Sirdar-i-Assad's reply was received that he was going to Tehran for constitutional purposes, and his forces were only to guarantee his personal safety.

June 22.—The British and Russian consuls-general were ordered to overtake Sirdar-i-Assad and tell him that his demonstration was very inopportune, that the reported agreement between Persia and the Powers was untrue, and that, if he disregarded their advice to stop, he would be considered to be deliberately intending to complicate matters.

June 23.—Both consuls-general left Ispahan for Kum to see Sirdar-i-Assad. Salar-i-Jung and twelve men arrived at Kashan from Tehran. Sirdar-i-Muhtasham and 100 horsemen arrived at Kashan from Ardistan. Mutamid-i-Khakan called on Mr. Vice-Consul Aganoor at Ispahan and complained of British interference and the Shah's unreliability. Samsam complained of Colonel Liakhoff's action at Tehran and of the long stay of Russian troops on Persian soil.

June 25.—Mr. Grahame arrived at Kum. There were 500 Bakhtiari encamped there, and Sirdar-i-Assad was expected the next day.

June 26.—Sirdar-i-Assad reached Kum with 700 horsemen and one mountain gun. The consuls conveyed the warning to him. Samsam telegraphed to Sirdar-i-Assad that the royalist Bakhtiari were wavering, and that the promise of a share of the Bakhtiari country would win them over.

June 27.—The Kum bazaars were closed by order of Sirdar-i-Assad, and there was a holiday in honour of his arrival. Samsam stated that the Bakhtiari were now united.

June 28.—Sirdar-i-Assad called on Mr. Grahame at Kum and said that Sipahdar had telegraphed that he was advancing, and a letter from Samsam said that Sirdar-i-Muhtasham had been won over and was sending a contingent. At Tehran a secret society had organised a body of 4,000 men, supplied with bombs and arms, to seize the town on the approach of the Bakhtiari. Members of this organisation would guard foreign subjects and legations, as they knew that the Shah had arranged for the murder of foreign subjects to bring about Russian intervention.

June 29.—Sirdar-i-Muhtasham and Sirdar-i-Ashraf telegraphed to Saham-es-Sultaneh and Shahab-es-Sultaneh at Kashan that they had been delayed by illness, but were now joining Sirdar-i-Zaffar and Sirdar Bahadur at Ispahan with a number of horsemen, and would come on to Kum. The Bakhtiari at Kashan were to await orders and do nothing against the family interest.

On the same day Sirdar-i-Muhtasham telegraphed to Sipahdar at Kazvin that after agreeing with Sirdar-i-Assad at Malamir to serve his country he fell ill, but was now ready with a strong force, and was starting for Ispahan to assist in this sacred duty. Thence he would move to Kum, and Sirdar Bahadur would accompany him. A third telegram from Sirdar-i-Muhtasham on this day was addressed to Sirdar-i-Assad at Kum that he had always been in favour of family unity, but could not come earlier because of illness; that he was now well, and had seen Sirdar Bahadur, and that family unity on the specified terms had been renewed and strengthened. "You on your side will have seen Amir-i-Mufakham and arranged matters with him also, and will have strengthened the family understanding with him. I will come to Ispahan with Sirdar Bahadur and a force of horsemen, and will ask for instructions by telegraph."

A fourth telegram, from Sirdar-i-Muhtasham and Sirdar-i-Ashraf to Amir-i-Mufakham, was as follows:—

"I have received your telegrams in which you urged Sirdar-i-Assad to come to a family arrangement. I have to-day seen Sirdar-i-Zaffar and Sirdar Bahadur and have arranged a family understanding. You will of course enter into this arrangement. Sirdar Bahadur and I start for Ispahan at once."

Telegrams from Meshed describing the firing on the crowd by Russians caused an outburst of anti-foreign, especially anti-Russian, feeling at Ispahan. Sirdar-i-Assad protested against the Russian action at Meshed in support of Rukn-ed-Dowleh against the popular party.

The two consuls-general were authorised to return to Ispahan from Kum.

Bahadur-ed-Dowleh left Chahar Mahal to join Sirdar-i-Assad, and further levies were being raised.

A telegram signed "Ismail"—possibly the Zil-es-Sultan's son of that name—was sent from London to Sirdar-i-Assad as follows:—

"For fear of the foreigners, finish the business."

Sipahdar's force left Kazvin for Tehran.

June 30.—An unsigned telegram was sent from Sultanabad, the Shah's present residence, to Sirdar-i-Muhtasham, commanding the Shah's force at Kashan, ordering him to bring troops to Tehran at once, and to tell Sirdar-i-Ashraf and Salar-i-Ashraf and other Bakhtiari at Kashan to come with him.

A telegram was sent by Murteza Kuli Khan from Kum to Mumtaz-ed-Dowleh in Paris:—

"Kum force has started for Tehran."

Murteza Kuli Khan and 300 men, the advanced guard of Sirdar-i-Assad's force, left Kum for Tehran.

July 1.—Sirdar-i-Assad, with 600 horsemen, 80 mule-loads of ammunition and food, 20 waggons of other material, and 1 gun, left Kum for Tehran. Ghias-i-Lashkar was left in command at Kum.

July 2.—Sirdar-i-Assad, in a carriage, reached Aliabad. The advanced guard also reached this place.

Of the Shah's troops at Kashan, 1,200 infantry and 300 horsemen, with three field and three mountain guns, left for Tehran. The Khalaj regiment (800 men), with fifty horsemen, remained at Kashan waiting for transport.

Three hundred Bakhtiari and one mountain gun left Ispahan for Tehran.

A quarrel between Samsam and Zargham led to the latter, with 250 men, with-



drawing to some 5 miles from Ispahan. Later, Zargham received 5,000 tomans and started for Tehran with 450 to 500 men.

The Bakhtiari raised 5,000 tomans in taxes in Ispahan.

July 3.—Sirdar-i-Assad, with the advanced guard, left for Kaleh-i-Muhammad Ali Khan, 10 miles from Aliabad.

The Bakhtiari collected 15,000 tomans in Kum.

July 4.—Sirdar-i-Muhtasham and Sirdar Bahadur arrived at Ispahan with 700 men from the Bakhtiari country.

The Shah's troops forcibly opened the bazaars at Kum.

Joint warnings from the British and Russian Legations were sent to Sirdar-i-Assad at Robat-i-Kerim and to Sipahdar at Karej. Amir-i-Mufakham had a meeting with Sirdar-i-Assad near Robat-i-Kerim. The object of this meeting was said to be a reconciliation. This did not take place, and the former has since been fighting on the Shah's side.

An advanced party of Sipahdar's force, 350 strong, attacked 350 of the Persian Cossack brigade at Shahabad, 16 miles west of Tehran, and was defeated.

C. B. S.

[28923]

No. 346.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 3.)*

(No. 592.)  
Sir,

*Constantinople, July 26, 1909.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 554, and your telegram No. 322, I have the honour to forward herewith a despatch from Lieutenant-Colonel Ramsay, consul-general at Bagdad, enclosing translation of reply received from the Mujtahids to the consul-general's letter, requesting them to endeavour to restore peace in Persia.

I have, &c.

GERARD LOWTHER.

Inclosure 1 in No. 346.

*Consul-General Ramsay to Sir G. Lowther.*

(No. 75.)  
Sir,

*Bagdad, June 28, 1909.*

I HAVE the honour to inform your Excellency that the letter, of which I forwarded translations with my despatch No. 66, dated the 11th June, 1909, were sent to the following Mujtahids:—

- |  |               |
|--|---------------|
| (1.) Akhund Mulla Muhammad Kadhimi Khorassani, | } at Nejef.   |
| (2.) Seyyid Abdulla Mazandarani,               |               |
| (3.) Seyyid Kadhimi Yezdi,                     |               |
| (4.) Agha Ismail Sadar-ud-Din,                 | } at Karbala. |
| (5.) Seyyid Muhammad Bakar Tabatabayi,         |               |
| (6.) Sheikh Hussein Mazandarani,               |               |
| (7.) Mirza Muhammad Taki, at Samarra.          |               |
| (8.) Sheikh Muhammad Taki, at Kadhimain.       |               |

2. I now enclose, for your Excellency's information, a translation of a reply signed by Nos. 1 and 2. The replies from Nos. 5 and 6 are practically identical. Seyyid Abdulla Mazandarani, in addition to signing the joint letter, has written me a separate letter, in which he says that the Shah and his people would be able to settle their differences if there was no further foreign interference, and that the present disturbed and excited state of Persia is far more due to the presence of Russian troops on Persian soil than to any delay in settling details about constitutional reforms.

Owing to the absence of No. 4 from Karbala my letter could not be delivered to him, and the others have not yet answered.

3. The letters addressed to Nejef and Karbala were delivered by the vice-consul, whom I had told to say that, as far as his information went, the Russian troops had come to Tabreez in consequence of the direct action of the people of Tabreez, who found themselves starving, and who threatened to attack the foreigners with the express object of forcing foreign interference, which would mean the opening of the roads leading to Tabreez.

The vice-consul reports that at Nejef Mulla Muhammad Kadhimi was very bitter against the Russians, and while he did not deny the correctness of the vice-consul's explanation of their presence at Tabreez, he added that much was also due to their natural habits of aggression. It is curious that none of the Mujtahids said anything about Turkish aggression on Persian territory. Seyyid Kadhimi Yezdi at first said that he would send me no reply, but afterwards said he would send one later. The vice-consul says that the day before his arrival Seyyid Kadhimi had, at the earnest request of Mulla Muhammad Kadhimi Khorassani, written a telegram to the Shah saying that he should get the Russians out of Persia by whatever means he thinks necessary, but after seeing the vice-consul Seyyid Kadhimi managed to get back his telegram, and seemed inclined to be less bellicose.

At Karbala the vice-consul found the Mujtahids inclined to follow the lead of Nejef, which they have eventually done. Sheikh Hussein Mazandarani was strongly in favour of acting in accordance with the wishes expressed in your Excellency's telegram, and he told the vice-consul that, in his opinion, the telegram should be considered as a foreign ultimatum, after which the Shah, with the help of England and Russia, would hold the Mujtahids responsible, and perhaps try them by court-martial. The vice-consul reports that there is an intense hatred of Russia and an inclination to admit that England had been friendly and honest in its dealings with Persia.

I have, &c.

J. RAMSAY, Lieutenant-Colonel, Political Resident  
in Turkish Arabia, and His Britannic Majesty's  
Consul-General, Bagdad.

Inclosure 2 in No. 346.

*Mulla Muhammad Kadhimi-el-Khorassani and Sheikh Abdulla-el-Mazandarani to  
Consul-General Ramsay.*

(Translation.)

*3rd Jamadi-us-Sani, 1327 (June 22, 1909).*

IN reply to the telegram of the British Ambassador at Constantinople, the certified translation of which was enclosed by the consul-general, Bagdad, in his letter dated the 25th Jamadi-ul-Awal, 1327 (to our address).

We are exceedingly grateful that through the kind and well-meaning advice of the two Governments of England and Russia to the Shah the constitution has been restored, which is the orbit of the kingdom's peace. Of course the preservation of the friendly relations between the three countries, the observance of neighbourly duties and the disinterested brotherly love of the Kings demanded (the adoption of) this very course; and we always wish the perfection and consolidation of these feelings.

With regard to the unrest in Persia, to which you refer, it is well known to all those who have studied the circumstances that the revolutions in Persia are exactly of the nature of those revolutions which in all countries have originated with the efforts of the people for securing constitutional and national rights, and the selfish eagerness of the people of the court to usurp them. The most loyal nation of Persia, with perfect loyalty to the Crown, and with due sense of recognition of the preservation of the rights and life of the foreigners, only demanded the consolidation of the foundation of constitution, removal of the agitators of disturbances, a guarantee against the renewal of breach of promises, and an assurance that it will be impossible for the court circle to act dishonestly in future. With the earnest co-operation of the King in securing the objects of the nation the original causes of differences will naturally be removed, and peace will have been perfectly obtained, and (then) we shall also not fail to co-operate in every way.

This is also well known to the civilised nations, and also to those who are aware of the feelings of the Persian nation, that the defence of the independence of the motherland is one of the greatest religious obligations of Moslems, and the interference of all (other) Powers in the internal affairs of Persia and the dispatch of troops into the kingdom is the chief cause of unrest and revolution, and stultifies the advice of the two Governments with regard to the peace of Persia. More especially at such a stage when the cause of disturbance is nearly removed and preliminaries of friendship and unity have been secured. We therefore appeal to the sense of justice and neighbourly duties of the two Governments that they will not allow the awakened feelings of the Persian nation to be trampled upon, and as the British Government has recalled its marine troops from Bushire, and thereby caused the spiritual leaders, as well as all



the Moslems, to admire its justice, in the same way the Russian Government too should recall its troops, and thus bring about the removal of the disturbances which they really cause.

For this all will be grateful.

*Note.*—The letters from Seyyid Muhammad Bakar Tabatabayi and Sheikh Hussein of Karbala are similar to the above.

[28889]

No. 347.

*Mr. O'Beirne to Sir Edward Grey.*—(Received August 3.)

(No. 446.)

Sir,

*St. Petersburg, July 27, 1909.*

WHEN I called on the Minister for Foreign Affairs on the 24th instant I had not intended, in the absence of instructions from you, to raise the question of the withdrawal of the Russian troops from Kazvin, as I presumed that this would form one of the subjects of your conversations with his Excellency at Cowes. M. Isvolsky, however, himself referred to the matter, informing me that the Persian Minister had come to see him by instruction of the Acting Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs, and had asked whether Russia did not now see her way to removing her troops from Persian territory. M. Isvolsky had replied to the effect that, until it was clear, which as yet it was not, that order had been definitely re-established in North Persia, Russia could not recall her forces. I asked what observations Isaak Khan had offered on that statement. The Minister replied that, as Isaak Khan himself fully anticipated further disorders in Persia, he had not found very much to say.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs then went on to speak to me of the likelihood that there would be of renewed fighting in Tehran and other parts of Persia, and remarked that Russia could not withdraw her troops with the prospect of having to send them back again. As I did not wish to appear to acquiesce in the desirability of the Russian expedition remaining at Kazvin, I said that it seemed to me, admitting the uncertainty of the outlook in North Persia, that Russia had two courses open to her. One was to keep her force at Kazvin, with the attendant risk of the occupation becoming prolonged indefinitely. The other was to bring her legation guard at Tehran up to whatever strength was deemed to be amply sufficient, in the event of disturbances, for the protection of foreign interests—100 or 200, or even 300 men if necessary—and then to recall her expeditionary force and let events take their course.

M. Isvolsky first objected that the Persian Government would dislike to see any men dispatched into Tehran, and that this course would be interpreted as an act of intervention. I pointed out that if the Government at Tehran understood that the strengthening of the legation guard was the condition upon which the Kazvin force would be forthwith recalled, they would not be likely to raise any difficulties; and his Excellency seemed to admit that this was the case. He then said evasively that the matter was one which must be considered and discussed, that he could not express any opinion upon it at once, and finally that when M. Poklewski reached Tehran he could form a judgment as to the measures that could be taken with safety.

M. Isvolsky does not seem to me seriously to doubt but that the legation guards, if reinforced to the necessary extent, would amply provide for the protection of foreign interests should fresh disturbances occur at Tehran. He is also, I think, quite conscious of the logical difficulty, in view of all Russia's recent declarations, of defending the retention of a force at Kazvin once the possibility of danger to foreign lives and property has been guarded against. At the same time it is evident from his Excellency's language to me that he is not much inclined to recommend the Council of Ministers to proceed promptly with the withdrawal of the force; and certain interviews, apparently with an official of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, have been published by the press during the last two or three days, which seem to point to the same conclusion. The official in question has explained that, in view of the uncertainty of the situation in Persia, it would not for the present be desirable to recall the Russian troops; that their presence is in reality not resented by the inhabitants, and that rumours which have been put about of an intended boycott of Russian goods are without serious foundation.

M. Isvolsky's way of looking at the matter, so far as I can judge, is that now the troops are in the neighbourhood of the Persian capital it would seem a pity to recall them until it is quite plain that their presence cannot be turned in some way to account. He sees no particular objection to leaving them for a while at Kazvin, where, as he

remarked to me with satisfaction, they had been very amiably received. The outlook in Persia his Excellency considers exceedingly obscure, and circumstances may easily arise in which the presence of a military force would enable Russia to insist with more weight than she could otherwise have done on measures being taken which she judged necessary for the protection of her interests. There is also the consideration that so long as the Russian force is established on the road to Tehran there is no danger of interruption of traffic such as has on recent occasions caused such heavy losses to Russian trade. Then again this is a question in which M. Isvolsky has to count with the views of the military authorities. I have no doubt that the general staff is most anxious not to be drawn into operations of any magnitude in Persia. Still I should imagine that the military element in this country is on general principles always reluctant to withdraw Russian troops from any foreign territory upon which they happen to have established themselves, and it is quite likely that the military attitude in the present matter will not be altogether uninfluenced by sentiments of that kind.

I have, &c.

HUGH O'BEIRNE.

[28890]

No. 348.

*Mr. O'Beirne to Sir Edward Grey.*—(Received August 3.)

(No. 447.)

Sir,

*St. Petersburg, July 28, 1909.*

THE Minister for Foreign Affairs has spoken to me several times during the last ten days regarding the situation in Tabreez and in the adjoining region. On the 18th instant his Excellency stated that the condition of affairs in Tabreez was most unsatisfactory, and that he had instructed the Russian chargé d'affaires at Tehran to impress on the Persian Government the necessity of immediately sending a governor-general to the town, with the force necessary to establish his authority, failing which, Russia would be compelled herself to take the steps necessary for the protection of her interests. On my enquiring what had occurred to call for these instructions, M. Isvolsky referred to Sattar Khan having announced that he was to be appointed governor-general, a thing which the Russian Government would no doubt have considered intolerable; and he also spoke of extortion being practised on the residents by fedais masquerading as policemen, and of an agitation being fomented against the presence of the Russian troops. He gave me to understand that if the Persian Government failed to establish law and order without delay, it would become necessary for Russia to take the measures required.

On the following day his Excellency again spoke to me on the same subject, but he now seemed to take a less unfavourable view of the situation. He had been informed by the Turkish Ambassador of instructions having been sent to the Turkish consulate-general to the effect that it was desirable that Sattar and Baghir Khans should leave Persia, but that if they were unwilling to do so, they should no longer be permitted to remain in the consulate-general; and he seemed satisfied with the action taken by the Ottoman Government on this point. I said to his Excellency that I had not gathered from what he had told me on the previous day that there had been any cases of definite injury to Russian persons or property, and this he admitted to be the case; but he added that there was a general condition of unrest at Tabreez which made it urgently necessary that a governor should proceed to the spot without delay. M. Sazonoff, the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, mentioned to me yesterday that he had no news of the departure for Tabreez of the newly appointed Governor-General Mukhbir-es-Sultaneh, who for the rest, he said, was according to the information of the Russian Government a man of no great worth. M. Sazonoff stated that he had received no news of a disquieting character from Tabreez during the last two or three days.

M. Isvolsky has also more than once spoken to me of Ardebil as a possible source of danger, owing to the intolerable depredations committed in the vicinity by the Shahsevan tribe. Here again M. Isvolsky recognised that there had been no recent cases of direct injury inflicted on the persons or property of Russians; but M. Sazonoff, who referred to the same subject yesterday, stated that Russian goods to the value of 50,000*l.* were held up in the town owing to the danger of attempting to distribute them in the interior. The Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs informed me that the Russian Government intended to organise a punitive expedition against the Shahsevans next September. The expedition sent against the tribe in April and May of last year

[1665]

3 G



as to which I had the honour to report to you at the time (my despatch No. 210 of the 30th April, and my telegram No. 84 of the 22nd May, 1908) had not proved altogether successful, as the tribesmen had escaped into the hills, and the fines imposed on them could not be collected. In the month of September they would be obliged to bring their flocks down into the plains, and it would then be practicable to deal with them more effectually.

The Turkish Ambassador yesterday sent me a message expressing anxiety to see me, and I called upon him the same afternoon. The veteran diplomatist conversed for some time on indifferent matters, and then, passing easily to the subject of Tabreez, set himself to ascertain what I knew as to the numbers of the Russian troops in that region, and what probability there was of their being withdrawn. In regard to the latter point, I said that I felt quite sure that they would not be withdrawn until the same was done with the Turkish troops, and I asked his Excellency whether, after a governor-general had arrived at Tabreez and restored order, Turkey would be prepared to recall her forces from the neighbourhood. To this question his Excellency replied by earnestly assuring me that Turkey's sole desire was to see the prosperity of Persia and the triumph of liberal principles in that country.

After these preliminaries Turkhan Pasha came abruptly to the matter in hand, not, I think, without the secret hope of surprising some special information of which he thought that I might be in possession. He thrust into my hands a telegram which he had just received from the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs, stating that the Russians were reported to have occupied all the positions near a place called Tcholdja, on the Araxes, with a considerable force of infantry and cavalry. His Excellency and I were not able to identify Tcholdja on the map, but as it is described as being on the Araxes, the positions said to be occupied would seem to be practically on the frontier. Turkhan Pasha was instructed to ascertain what truth there was in the report, and seemed greatly at a loss as to how to proceed, since he considered that it would be useless to question M. Sazonoff. He also begged me not to mention to M. Sazonoff that he had spoken to me.

I saw the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs later in the same afternoon, and though I asked no questions as to the movements of Russian troops in Azerbaijan, he spoke at considerable length about the numbers of the Russian forces in that province, without giving a hint that any special movements were contemplated beyond the punitive expedition against the Shahsevens to which reference is made above. He stated that according to the Russian military authorities there were no less than five or six Turkish battalions at present in Persian territory, adding that, personally, he thought this estimate was probably exaggerated.

I have, &c.  
HUGH O'BEIRNE.

[28877]

No. 349.

*Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received August 3.)*

(Confidential.)

Sir,

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, copy of a telegram, dated the 2nd August, from the commander-in-chief, East Indies.

A copy has also been sent to the India Office.

I am, &c.  
C. I. THOMAS.

Inclosure in No. 349.

*Commander-in-Chief, East Indies, to Admiralty.*

(Telegraphic.) P.

THE "Sphinx," Persian Gulf, telegraphs that the naval force landed for service at Shiraz arrived there on the morning of the 2nd August.

[29031]

No. 350.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 3.)*

(No. 643.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Gulahek, August 3, 1909.

MY Russian colleague, on instructions from his Government, is again making strong representations to the Persian Government with regard to the disorders created by the Shahsevan tribes at Ardebil, on which I reported in my telegram No. 622 of the 22nd July.

He has now presented to the Persian Government a note, warning them that Russia will herself send a detachment of troops into this district unless within two days a capable and energetic Governor, accompanied by a suitable force, has actually started for Ardebil.

I am giving my support to M. Sabline's demand concerning the Governor and the escort to accompany him.

[29231]

No. 351.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 3.)*

(No. 644.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Gulahek, August 3, 1909.

HORMUZ oxide.

Please see my telegram No. 553 of the 9th July.

I understand that, in the event of the new Government cancelling Moin's concession—a possibility which must now be contemplated—Strick would wish to obtain it. His Majesty's Government are, I know, desirous to assist Strick in this, but Moin could not fail to apply for our protection on the score of his contract with Weir. If we could be certain that Weir's interests were safeguarded—that is to say if Moin's successor were to undertake to respect the original concessionaire's obligations in that quarter—I presume that we should be obliged to oppose the Persian Government in this matter, but I should be somewhat reluctant to refuse Moin our support in view of the damage which might result from his hostility to our interests in the south. It might be worth while to run this risk, if we were certain that Strick would obtain the concession, but the next concession will cost a very heavy sum, and Strick might not care to take it up if he realises that the maintenance of Weir's contract must in any case be ensured, covering, as I believe it does, the world's supply of oxide for three years.

Moin, I admit, is at present passively obstructive to us, but before taking action we should well consider the contingency of his actively opposing us, for instance, by accepting German overtures.

I am by no means certain that the Government contemplate revoking the concession, but I feel that it is a matter which may come up at any moment, and I should like to be in a position to act quickly, either in the interests of Moin or Strick, if the occasion arise.

[29211]

No. 352.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 3.)*

(No. 645.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Gulahek, August 3, 1909.

I HAVE small hope of our succeeding in inducing the ex-Shah and the present Government to come to terms on the question of the jewels, &c., unless we bring strong pressure to bear, and my Russian colleague and I are now pressing upon both parties a compromise by which the Persian Government would increase His late Majesty's civil list to 50,000 tomans, and the latter surrender the jewels now in dispute.

Mohammed Ali Mirza's personal property is, it transpires, almost entirely hypothecated to the Banque d'Escompte.

Reference is to my telegram No. 642 of the 2nd August.



[29123]

No. 353.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 3.)*

(No. 646.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Gulahek, August 3, 1909.*

I HAVE received the following telegram No. 174 from His Majesty's acting consul-general at Tabreez:—

"No news of Russian troops on the Araxes has reached me, but it is unlikely that, with the present disorganisation of local communications, I could obtain any up-to-date information except through Russian consul-general, who appears ignorant of the movements in question.

"No doubt there is considerable exaggeration in the military authorities estimate of number of Turkish troops. M. Miller tells me that they do not exceed 700 at most."

Please see St. Petersburg telegram No. 369.

[29232]

No. 354.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 3.)*

(No. 647.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Gulahek, August 3, 1909.*

I LEARN from the Telegraph Department that the reinforcements dispatched from Bushire arrived yesterday at Shiraz.

Twelve miles outside the town Sowlet-ed-Dowleh's force of at least 2,000 men is encamped. I instructed His Majesty's consul to endeavour to persuade him not to advance. He has consented to delay three days before occupying the town. He insists, however, that Ala-ed-Dowleh's appointment be cancelled. I am bringing this to the notice of the Persian Government.

[29333]

No. 355.

*The Manchester Chamber of Commerce to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 4.)*

Sir,

*Manchester, August 3, 1909.*

THE president desires me to forward to you the enclosed copy of a letter which he has received from firms connected with this Chamber who are interested in trade with Persia.

The security of transit by the roads in that country is a matter of common concern to all classes of traders and commercial men, and the president commends this communication to you, feeling assured that you will take such action as you properly can.

I am, &amp;c.

WALTER SPEAKMAN, *Secretary.*

Inclosure in No. 355.

*The Manchester and Liverpool Banking Company and other Firms to the Manchester Chamber of Commerce.*

Sir,

*Manchester, July 30, 1909.*

THE undersigned bankers, merchants, shippers, and manufacturers engaged in the Persian trade would be greatly obliged by your drawing the attention of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the deplorable condition of things prevailing in Mid and Southern Persia. For very many months past the main trade routes have been in the hands of robber bands, and trade completely paralysed, and there can be no question of the urgent need for prompt and energetic measures for their suppression and punishment.

The constitutional Government is well disposed towards His Majesty's Government, and the Bakhtiari chiefs, including the new Minister of the Interior (Sardar Assad), have expressed themselves as being under a deep sense of obligation to Great Britain. We understand that Major Cox, His Majesty's resident in Bushire, is, or will shortly

be, in Tehran to consult with Sir George Barclay on the state of affairs in Southern Persia, and we believe that Major Cox and Mr. George Grahame, His Majesty's consul-general in Ispahan, are both in favour of a system of road patrols, and also that Sir George Barclay is inclined to press this question upon the immediate attention of the Persian Government.

Under these circumstances we feel that the present time is most opportune for bringing the matter to the notice of the Persian Government, and we would ask you to most strongly urge that a telegram be sent to His Majesty's Minister in Tehran desiring him to impress upon the new Government the necessity for prompt and energetic measures for securing the safety of the main caravan routes by the establishment of a system of paid road patrols (the present road guards are not paid, and are themselves guilty of enforcing heavy levies from the muleteers). We feel strongly that if His Majesty's Minister in Tehran is authorised to assist and advise the Persian Government in this matter very much can be done for the advantage of British commerce in Persia, and, incidentally, for the increase of the Persian customs revenues. We are, moreover, convinced that any representations on the subject would be met by the new Persian Minister of the Interior in a most friendly and sympathetic spirit.

We trust that you will put this matter very fully before Sir Edward Grey, and trust that prompt and energetic measures will be taken by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

We are, &amp;c.

(Per pro the Manchester and Liverpool  
District Banking Company),DRUMMOND FRASER, *Manager.*  
(And twenty other firms.)

[29348]

No. 356.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 4.)*

(No. 648.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

*Tehran, August 4, 1909.*

MY telegram No. 643 of the 3rd August.

Russian chargé d'affaires tells me that he is promised a note from the Persian Government by this evening, announcing departure of a strong governor for Ardebil with a strong escort.

(Repeated to St. Petersburg.)

[29349]

No. 357.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 4.)*

(No. 649.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Gulahek, August 4, 1909.*

PLEASE see my telegram No. 638 of the 30th July, relative to the execution of the former deputy governor of Tehran, till recently a Russian basti.

The Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs has visited M. Sabline to tender an apology, and the incident is now closed.

[29350]

No. 358.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 4.)*

(No. 650.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Gulahek, August 4, 1909.*

THE further despatch, as to which you enquire in your telegram No. 408 of the 3rd August, should reach you about the 17th August by post.

It was on a letter from Preece asserting that the khans' interests have not been neglected that I based my private telegram of the 28th May. I am now forwarding to you a further despatch which I have received from His Majesty's consul at Ahwaz. It would seem that a letter which the manager has addressed to the khans has left them under a misconception as to the shares they are entitled to in the various companies.



[29351]

No. 359.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 4.)*

(No. 651.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Gulahek, August 4, 1909.*

I LEARN from my Russian colleague that his Government have enquired of him whether the rumour that Dr. Lindley is to replace M. Smirnow as the Shah's tutor (reported in my two private telegrams of the 1st August) is true. The impression made at St. Petersburg by this story is, he says, very bad.

Dr. Lindley has not as yet received any proposal, and I have assured M. Sabline that if any be made I will consider it together with him in friendly consultation.

[29354]

No. 360.

*Mr. O'Beirne to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 4.)*

(No. 372.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*St. Petersburg, August 4, 1909.*

I AM informed by Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs that no preparations have as yet been made for the dispatch of a Russian expedition to Ardebil, and that the question is not an immediate one. As yet all that has been done is to decide in principle that an expedition must be sent in the event of the Persian Government failing to restore tranquillity in that region. The matter will come up for discussion again in four or five days (see Sir G. Barclay's telegram No. 643).

[29232]

No. 361.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.*

(No. 409.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Foreign Office, August 4, 1909.*

GOVERNORSHIP of Tabreez.

See your telegram No. 647 of the 3rd August.

In view of report in above telegram, it may still be worth considering whether the appointment of Ala-ed-Dowleh could be arranged. Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs told me that he is disappointed that Ala-ed-Dowleh has not gone to Tabreez as governor.

[28616]

No. 362.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.*

(No. 117.)

Sir,

*Foreign Office, August 4, 1909.*

I TRANSMIT to you herewith copy of a letter from the Persian Transport Company (Limited),\* requesting that the Persian Government may be informed that the unsettled condition of Persia has prevented them from completing the necessary work on the roads with respect to which they hold a concession.

I have accordingly to request you, should you see no objection, to address a communication to the Persian Government in the sense desired by the company, omitting, however, at any rate for the present, all reference to the possible future demand for a renewal of the company's concession alluded to in the last sentence of their letter.

Copy of the reply which I have caused to be returned to the company is also enclosed.†

I am, &c.  
(Signed) E. GREY.

\* No. 323.

† See No. 364.

[28622]

No. 363.

*Foreign Office to India Office.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, August 4, 1909.*

I AM directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 28th ultimo on the question of the protection of British lives and property in Persia during disturbances, with special reference to the danger which has recently threatened Kerman.

I am to inform you, in reply to the enquiry contained in the last paragraph of your letter, that Sir E. Grey is of opinion that it would be desirable in existing circumstances to act on the suggestion of Viscount Morley to warn the Government of India to be ready to dispatch troops to the Gulf at very short notice should such action be required, subject to the understanding that no definite step in this direction should be taken without express instructions from his Lordship.

I am to add that though, as a precautionary measure, it is well to be prepared for the contemplated eventuality, there is, in Sir E. Grey's opinion, every reason to hope that no necessity for the dispatch of this force will actually arise.

I am, &amp;c.

LOUIS MALLET.

[28616]

No. 364.

*Foreign Office to Persian Transport Company.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, August 4, 1909.*

I AM directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 27th ultimo on the subject of the concession held by your company for the construction of certain roads in Persia.

I am to inform you in reply that, in accordance with the wish expressed by you, Sir E. Grey has instructed His Majesty's Minister at Tehran, should he see no objection, to address a communication to the Persian Government to the effect that, owing to the unsettled condition of the country, your company have been unable to complete the necessary work on these roads.

I am, &amp;c.

LOUIS MALLET.

[29475]

No. 365.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 5.)*

(No. 652.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Gulahek, August 5, 1909.*

I HAVE received very confidential information to the effect that the Persian Government are about to cancel Moin's concession for Hormuz oxide. A certain Persian subject is, I am assured, willing to serve the Government an annuity of 80,000 tomans in return for this concession.

Please see my telegram No. 644 of the 3rd August.

[29476]

No. 366.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 5.)*

(No. 653.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Gulahek, August 5, 1909.*

INDIAN guard for oil company.

I have received a report from His Majesty's consul-general at Bushire to the effect that the company's agent has agreed to the withdrawal of the guard, which is now awaiting final orders at Ahwaz.

Major Cox has submitted to the Indian Government a proposal for the retention of a part of this force to act as escort for Mr. Wilson on the tour which he will probably



undertake for the Kerkha irrigation surveys referred to in Bushire telegram, repeated in my telegram No. 636 of the 29th July. If Mr. Wilson's journey is sanctioned, he will need a sufficient mounted escort to keep constantly in touch with Mohammerah in order that his consular duties may not be interfered with by his survey work.

[29477]

No. 367.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 5.)*

(No. 654.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Gulahek, August 5, 1909.

THE negotiations conducted by the two legations with the ex-Shah and representatives of the Nationalist committee, to which I referred in my telegram No. 645 of the 3rd August, have resulted in the signing of a protocol by the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, some members of the committee, and the dragomans of the two legations; it is to the following effect:—

(R.) Article 1. All jewels in His Majesty's possession which are found after an investigation conducted before representatives of the two legations to belong to the Crown to be given up.

Art. 2. His Majesty will also give up all documents relating to jewels which have been pawned. Persian Government may, if it chooses, redeem these.

Art. 3. Persian Government will give His Majesty 75,000 tomans a-year, payable half-yearly in advance through the Russian bank.

Art. 4. A list of missing jewels will be presented to the two legations, who will obtain all possible information from His Majesty as to their whereabouts, and if they are still in His Majesty's possession or that of his *entourage* legations will do their utmost to recover them.

Art. 5. If any jewels are sold by His Majesty after the 3rd August, their value will be deducted from His Majesty's civil list.

Art. 6. His Majesty will leave Tehran not later than the 17th August.

Yesterday the investigation laid down in article 1 was held, and after considerable pressure had been brought to bear, the ex-Shah handed over a great number of jewels which, he had hitherto maintained, belonged to him personally.

It was not without great pressure also that the committee gave their provisional consent to the increased pension, and the two representatives will, no doubt, have difficulty in extracting the ratification of this agreement from the Persian Government when the Medjliss has met. For the moment, however, the removal of His Majesty, who is still a centre of intrigue, is our chief concern.

In communicating the above to his Government, my Russian colleague begs that an invitation may be sent to him to convey to His Majesty, couched in such terms that he cannot ignore it. He suggests that it should bid His Majesty to start on the 17th August, and promise that a ship will await him at Enzeli to take him to Petrovsk, where he will be provided with a special train.

I venture to submit that Mr. O'Beirne be instructed to put forward a similar suggestion. His Majesty will doubtless do all in his power to delay departure. Consequently, the invitation should be of as peremptory a character as possible.

My Russian colleague has asked me very confidentially to endeavour to obtain for his proposal the support of His Majesty's Government with the Russian Government.

[29471]

No. 368.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.*

(No. 410.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, August 5, 1909.

IN conversation with Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs I drew attention to the possibility that the Russian officers of the Cossack brigade might be removed and officers of some other nationality put in their place, and to the likelihood of Zil-es-Sultan intriguing to become Shah. I said that I was ready to help Russia to prevent either of these events occurring. I also showed him your first private telegram of the 1st August relating to a tutor for the Shah, and said that we were ready to co-operate

with Russian representative at Tehran in preventing any changes disadvantageous to Russia in this or other matters.

On the question of the Russian troops in Persia, I said that I strongly deprecated their staying long in the country, as their continued presence both weakened the force of our complaints against encroachments of Turkish troops and increased the chances of anti-Russian agitation. M. Isvolsky replied that the Viceroy of the Caucasus and himself were both extremely anxious to effect the withdrawal of the Russian force, but that in the case of the troops at Tabreez it was very difficult to remove them till security was guaranteed by the appointment of a strong Persian governor, while, as regards the Kazvin force, he considered that the uncertainty of affairs at Tehran was too great to permit of their immediate withdrawal. He mentioned the appointment as head of police at Tehran of a Russian Caucasian guilty of crimes committed in Russia as an instance of the unsatisfactory state of affairs. I said that it was for the Russian Government to decide what measures taken by the Persian Government in Northern Persia would inspire such confidence that the Russian Government would withdraw their troops. We would then co-operate in urging on the Persian Government the adoption of those measures.

Both His Majesty and M. Isvolsky remarked upon the manner in which the Anglo-Russian agreement had weathered the recent storm, and expressed great satisfaction at it.

[28852]

No. 369.

*Foreign Office to India Office.*

Sir,

Foreign Office, August 5, 1909.

I AM directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to transmit to you herewith copy of a telegram from His Majesty's Minister at Tehran,\* proposing to ask the Persian Government for escorts for the repairing parties which the Indo-European Telegraph Department will send out in October next, and to state that if these parties are not ready at the proper time and place, Indian troops will be employed instead.

I am to state that Sir E. Grey is disposed, with the concurrence of Viscount Morley, to approve the terms of Sir G. Barclay's suggested communication to the Persian Government.

I am, &amp;c.

LOUIS MALLET.

[28458]

No. 370.

*Foreign Office to India Office.*

(Confidential.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, August 5, 1909.

WITH reference to your letter of the 12th May relative to the financial arrangements involved in the proposed transfer of the Tehran-Meshed and Khaf-Nasratabad telegraph lines, I am directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to transmit to you herewith copy of a letter which, in accordance with the wish expressed by you, he caused to be addressed to the Treasury,\* proposing that any increase of charge consequent on this transaction beyond a sum of 20,000 rupees a-year to be borne, as hitherto, by Indian revenues alone, should be equally divided between the Imperial and Indian exchequers.

I am also to transmit copy of the reply returned to this communication,† from which Viscount Morley will perceive that the Lords Commissioners of His Majesty's Treasury sanction the proposal in principle pending the conclusion of such an agreement with Persia as will enable definite financial proposals to be made.

I am, &amp;c.

LOUIS MALLET.

\* No. 335.

[1665]

† See Part XVIII, No. 535.

‡ No. 318.



[29598]

No. 371.

*India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received August 6.)*

Sir,

*India Office, August 5, 1909.*

IN reply to your letter, dated the 23rd July, 1909, as to an enquiry received from the Anglo-Persian Oil Company regarding geological surveys in Persia, I am directed to say that Viscount Morley agrees that the company should be advised to procure through Messrs. Kegan, Paul, and Co. a copy of the published edition of the "Memoirs of the Geological Survey of India," vol. xxxiv, part 4.

I am to add that, in view of the terms of the company's letter of the 15th July, Lord Morley would suggest that they might be warned that no financial assistance can be expected towards the cost of the survey contemplated, but he sees no objection to their being supplied with any technical information which the Government of India may be able to furnish for the use of their surveyors.

I am, &c.  
A. GODLEY.

[29610]

No. 372.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 6.)*

(No. 655.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Gulahek, August 6, 1909.*

PLEASE see my telegram No. 638 of the 30th July.

Nationalists have now dispensed with the special tribunal referred to.

Four executions in all have taken place.

[29614]

No. 373.

*Mr. O'Beirne to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 6.)*

(No. 376.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*St. Petersburg, August 6, 1909.*

DEPARTURE of ex-Shah of Persia from Tehran. Please refer to telegram No. 654 from Tehran of yesterday's date.

As regards the invitation to be sent to His Majesty, I spoke this afternoon to M. Sazonow in the sense which Sir G. Barclay suggested to you. I explained, however, to his Excellency that I was not yet in receipt of instructions to do so, and only mentioned the matter in anticipation of receiving them.

His Excellency observed that the immediate departure of Mohammed Ali was much desired by the Imperial Government, but he had some apprehension lest after His Majesty had left ratification might be refused by the Medjliss to the arrangement arrived at respecting His Majesty's pension; he assumed that the sanction of the legislature would be necessary for this arrangement. The ex-Shah also owed a large debt to the Russian bank in Tehran, and this was a further source of difficulty. These points are to be discussed by M. Sazonow with the Minister of Finance.

[29475]

No. 374.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.*

(No. 412.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Foreign Office, August 6, 1909.*

OXIDE concessions.

You should do all that can be done in support of Moin, if, in your opinion, it is any use obtaining concession for him. If you think it no use, you should try to secure concession for Strick. He would, I think, be prepared to give more than 80,000 tomans, and undertakes to continue Andrew Weir's contract. For details, however, you should communicate with his agent.

With regard to Weir's contract, you should impress upon Persian Government that, whoever receives the concession, his contract must be maintained.

[29477]

No. 375.

*Sir Edward Grey to Mr. O'Beirne.*

(No. 1021.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Foreign Office, August 6, 1909.*

DEPARTURE of ex-Shah for Russia (see Tehran telegram No. 654 of yesterday).

Communicate arrangements reported to Russian Government, and press them to invite the ex-Shah to start for Russia on the 17th instant in such terms that His Majesty will not be able to ignore their invitation.

[24792]

No. 376.

*Sir Edward Grey to Mr. O'Beirne.*

(No. 1030.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Foreign Office, August 6, 1909.*

ASCERTAIN when Russian Government will be ready to reply to matter in my telegram No. 805 of the 1st July regarding loan of Mr. New.

[30951]

No. 377.

*Sir Edward Grey to Mr. O'Beirne.*

(No. 233. Confidential.)

Sir,

*Foreign Office, August 6, 1909.*

M. ISVOLSKY and Count Benckendorff came to luncheon on board the Admiralty yacht at Cowes on August 3rd, and afterwards a conversation took place between them and the Prime Minister, Sir A. Nicolson, and myself.

In regard to the Persian question, I told M. Isvolsky that we had had some difficulty with a section of opinion here, composed of people who had made up their minds that Russia was determined to establish a military occupation, or at least some sort of protectorate, in the north of Persia. The fact that no Russian troops had been sent to Tehran, thus allowing things to take their own course there, had silenced this section for the present. I was, however, afraid that a corresponding section of Russian opinion might be apprehensive that what had been happening in Persia might lead to changes unfavourable to Russia. As instances, I mentioned three things which might lead to a feeling of this kind: (1) the displacement of the Russian officers now in Persia; (2) a successful intrigue by the Zil to make himself Shah; and (3) the dismissal of the present Russian tutor of the young Shah and his replacement by an Englishman, such as Dr. Lindley. I said I assumed that the Russian Government could not agree to the replacement of Russian officers in Persia by officers of another nationality, and I added that in this matter, and in the other matters I had mentioned, and on such further occasions as might arise in future, we should be willing to co-operate with the Russian Government in order to prevent changes in Persia which would be to the disadvantage of Russia: for we did not regard the Anglo-Russian convention as disturbing the position which Russia had acquired in Persia before the convention was made. We considered that the convention was intended to secure that that position would not be used to weaken us on the Indian frontier, or to our disadvantage in other ways; while, at the same time, it secured that we should not use any influence we might have in Persia to the disadvantage of Russia.

I added that it was very desirable that the Russian troops should be withdrawn from Persia as soon as possible. The longer they stayed the greater was the risk of an anti-Russian agitation in Persia, and, if such an agitation did spring up, it would be more difficult than ever to withdraw the troops. Also, as long as the Russian troops remained in Persia, our position was very weak with regard to the presence of Turkish troops in Persia.

M. Isvolsky said that both he and the Viceroy of the Caucasus were most anxious to withdraw the troops. The Viceroy complained that while they remained in Persia they could not go on with their proper training, and the expense was very great. But the Russians must have some guarantee that their road, which was their trade route, would be kept open. They had wished the Ala-ed-Dowleh to be Governor at Tabreez, but the Persian Government refused to send him, and instead had appointed someone else who was not so good.



I said that, as Tabreez was near the Russian frontier, it was for the Russian Government to say what measures the Persian Government must take in order to inspire confidence and enable the Russian troops to be withdrawn. We should certainly co-operate with the Russian Government in urging these measures upon the Persian Government.

As to the Russian troops at Kazvin, M. Isvolsky held that their presence there had, by its moral effect, prevented the Nationalists from committing excesses in Tehran.

I demurred to this. I thought that the fact impressed by both of us upon the Nationalists, that attacks on foreigners would certainly lead to Russian intervention, would by itself have been sufficient.

M. Isvolsky said that he was anxious to withdraw the troops from Kazvin, but before doing this there must be some guarantee that affairs in Tehran would not become worse than ever. At present there was no guarantee of this kind. It was very difficult for the Persians to deal with the Russian Caucasian revolutionaries, who had been the real fighting people in the recent disturbances. It appeared, also, that the new chief of police in Tehran was a Russian revolutionary who had committed terrorist outrages in Russia, and had fled from the Russian police. As it took some time to send troops to Kazvin, if the troops which were there now were withdrawn and then had to be sent back again it would be much more difficult to withdraw them a second time.

I again said that we would co-operate at Tehran in promoting any measures the Russian Government thought necessary to restore confidence. I hoped that a beginning might be made in the withdrawal of the Russian troops. I thought that perhaps stronger guards might be kept at the legations and consulates for some time, if this was considered desirable.

M. Isvolsky spoke with great emphasis about the Turkish encroachments upon Persia. They had begun long before the present troubles in Persia. The Turks had seized strategic positions—a thing which the Russians had not done. They had brought in the Kurds with them; they had taken possession of land; they exercised administrative functions; and they turned Persians into Turkish subjects.

I said that I was quite ready to join in pointing out these things to the Turks at Constantinople. I did not think the Turks were likely to withdraw until they felt sure that the Russian troops were withdrawn too. But when this withdrawal had been made, I agreed that we must bring very strong pressure to bear upon the Turks to withdraw at least to their own side of the outer line of the neutral zone, within which it had been decided years ago that the true frontier must be found. It would also be desirable that we should press the Turkish Government to agree to mediation for the final settlement of the frontier.

Generally, M. Isvolsky expressed great satisfaction with the way in which the Anglo-Russian convention had stood the test of the disturbances in Persia. He thanked me for what I had said with regard to the Russian officers, the Zil, and the young Shah's tutor. Finally, he said that it was evident we were in complete agreement.

I am, &c.  
E. GREY.

[29715] No. 378.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 7.)*

(No. 656.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

CHIEF of Tehran police.

*Gulahek, August 7, 1909.*

Individual referred to in your telegram No. 410 of the 5th August was the leading spirit of Sipahdar's revolutionary forces, their nominal chief being merely a none too willing figure-head. I think that nationalists here would deny his bad record in Russia, and would not even admit his Russian nationality. One of the difficulties ahead of the Persian Government is the question how ultimately to dispose of him and other supposed Caucasians, who are thought to number about eighty; but I am of opinion that any interference by Russia at the present juncture would only aggravate it.

So far M. Sabline has wisely refrained from raising the question, understanding how difficult it would be for the Persian Government to remove them at present. There is, however, a danger that the alarmist element among the Russians here may by

asserting that the presence of these Caucasians in Tehran constitutes a menace to the safety of foreigners, and by other such methods, so work upon the Russian Government as to induce them to precipitate matters.

Excellent order has up to now been maintained in Tehran by the present chief of police, and great embarrassment for the new Government would be caused by a demand for his removal, from which disorders would not improbably result—developments which certain Russian alarmists would no doubt welcome.

[29734]

No. 379.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 7.)*

(No. 657.)

(Telegraphic.) *En clair.*

*Tehran, August 7, 1909.*

ZIL-ES-SULTAN left Resht for Tehran 5th.

[29756]

No. 380.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 7.)*

(No. 658.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Gulahek, August 7, 1909.*

PLEASE see your telegram to Mr. O'Beirne No. 1030 of the 6th August: loan of Mr. New.

Some time ago my Russian colleague informed me that Russian Government understood that the post gave the holder control over all messages passing over the Persian wires, and they thought therefore that it should be in other than British or Russian hands. I decided, after consultation with my Russian colleague and Mr. Barker, not to approach the new Minister of Telegraphs on the subject. He is unlikely to revert to it of his own accord. The Director of the Indo-European Department thinks that a Persian had better fill the post if it cannot be given to one of his employés.

A despatch reporting the above has been sent by post.

[29757]

No. 381.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 7.)*

(No. 659.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Gulahek, August 7, 1909.*

I HAVE received the following telegram No. 175 from His Majesty's acting consul-general at Tabreez:—

"It is probable, although not as yet definitely decided, that one battery of artillery and two companies of infantry—some 700 men in all—will shortly be withdrawn from the Russian force in Azerbaijan."

[29758]

No. 382.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 7.)*

(No. 660.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Gulahek, August 7, 1909.*

HIS Majesty's acting consul-general at Tabreez has telegraphed as follows, No. 178:—

"Several villages in the Urumia district have been evacuated by the Turkish troops, who have withdrawn slightly nearer to the limits of Persian territory."



[29759]

No. 383.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 8.)*

(No. 661.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Gulahek, August 8, 1909.*

THE Persian Government have appointed Ain-ed-Dowleh as Governor-General of Shiraz.

A portion of the reinforcement for His Majesty's consulate at that town can now be withdrawn without danger. I have given my authorisation for the departure of this portion, and trust that after the arrival of the new governor-general the remainder will be able to leave.

Reference is to my telegram No. 647 of the 3rd August.

[29754]

No. 384.

*Mr. O'Beirne to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 8.)*

(No. 382.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

*St. Petersburg, August 8, 1909.*

DEPARTURE of the ex-Shah. My telegram No. 379 [of 7th August].

Letter received from Acting Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs states that no decision can be taken as to His Majesty's future place of residence until the next Council of Ministers, which will probably be on 11th August. Whilst fully agreeing in necessity of inviting His Majesty to leave as early as possible, his Excellency cannot give me definite reply before the date mentioned.

(Sent to Tehran.)

[29933]

No. 385.

*Consul-General Cox to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 9.)*

(No. 7. Commercial.)

Sir,

*Bushire, July 18, 1909.*

I HAVE the honour to place before you a memorandum on the prevailing condition of the trade routes within the sphere of my post, more especially of the Bushire-Shiraz route, drawn up for me by His Majesty's vice-consul.

I am well aware that His Majesty's Government are generally cognisant of the deplorable condition of insecurity into which all the main arteries of traffic in Southern Persia have been thrown by the chronic state of chaos and anarchy under which the country has been labouring for the past three years. The subject was one of those specially commended to attention in my letter to the address of the Government of India and His Majesty's Minister dated the 6th June, 1908; since then we have taken the opportunity afforded by the visit of Mr. Charles Akers to the Persian Gulf, to report upon commercial matters to the Foreign Office and the Board of Trade, to urge him to represent at Tehran, and if possible in London, how fundamentally the prospects of our commerce in this region are bound up with and depend upon the question of security on the main caravan routes leading from the coast of the Persian Gulf to the chief trading centres of the interior.

The situation in the capital has now reached a well-marked stage, at which it seems possible that an opening may at any time offer itself for some definite action or form of co-operation on our part with the central Government, in whatever form it may now be, for the restoration of order or the financing of reforms. I trust, therefore, that the present moment may not prove inopportune for the submission of the present note on the commercial outlook.

It may, I think, be taken for granted, from the variety of suggestions and schemes which have been put forward by different officers of Government for policing the trade routes, that there are several methods by which a reasonable measure of security could be provided; but it is difficult to offer useful comment in regard to the details or relative advantages of individual schemes, until His Majesty's Government feel in a position to give their representatives some idea of the extent and general lines of co-operation or disguised intervention which their present policy renders feasible.

Pending that time I can do little more than urge upon them the pressing necessity

which appears to me, from the local point of view, to exist for the inauguration of some reasonably effective measure for rescuing the several important British firms engaged in the trade to Southern Persia, via the Gulf ports, from the veritable slough of despond into which they are slowly sinking.

Failing some early step on the part of Government in this direction, one cannot but feel convinced that they will be forced to resign themselves to retirement from the field—an ominous contingency, which I should witness with great regret and dismay.

A copy of this despatch is being submitted to His Majesty's Minister.

I have, &c.

P. Z. COX, Major,

*British Resident in the Persian Gulf, and  
His Britannic Majesty's Consul-General for Fars, &c.*

Inclosure in No. 385.

*Memorandum respecting the Disorders on the Trade Routes of Southern Persia.*

THE state of trade in Southern Persia is at the present time most seriously affecting British interests. This is especially true of Fars. The result of two years' fighting amongst the Kashgai, Lur, and Arab tribes, in the neighbourhood of Shiraz, and along the caravan routes leading to that trade centre was, in the first place, to render the dispatch of goods into the districts normally fed by Shiraz quite unsafe; and, in consequence, to cause an overflowing and congestion of goods in Shiraz itself.

This market, like that of Bushire, has subsisted for years almost entirely on British credit; during the current period of unrest bills have had to be met, and to find money goods have had to be disposed of, usually at a heavy loss. On the other hand, the British firms have found outstandings ever harder and harder to get in, and at the best their accounts are often only partially settled.

In addition to the insecurity prevailing round Shiraz and along the Ispahan road, and the outlying buying centres, bad harvests and the political troubles have further undermined the position of all trade in Southern Persia.

Two-and-a-half years of this state of affairs have damaged the stability of most Persian traders; there has been no chance of making losses good; many bankruptcies have occurred in Bushire, and enquiries at which I have been present have brought home to me the heavy losses incurred by some British firms, and the jeopardy into which the capital, which all firms have outstanding, is already thrown.

A British Indian firm of Bombay, established for more than fifty years in Bussorah and Bushire, is closing up its Bushire branch.

Messrs. David Sassoon and Co. (Limited) had, so I understood, some time ago more than 50,000*l.* outstanding from their Bushire office, though this has since been considerably reduced; and we were informed at one time that this very old house in Persia were threatening to withdraw altogether unless something was done to help British trade over the Shiraz route.

Messrs. Dixon and Co. have large sums outstanding due to their Bushire office alone, and their affairs in Ispahan are said to be in an unsatisfactory position.

Messrs. Livingstone, Zeytoon, and Co. (Limited), a new firm, have found their venture so far quite unprofitable. Messrs. Gray, Paul, and Co. have practically ceased dealing in merchandise, and confine themselves to the work of a shipping agency.

Piece-goods have not been coming forward in any quantity for the past three months. The year March 1908-9 has seen the import of Manchester goods alone into Bushire reduced from 439,937*l.* to 318,375*l.*; the year 1909-10 promises to be infinitely worse, the first quarter's figures being only 41,585*l.*

It cannot be denied that the commercial supremacy of Great Britain in Southern Persia and the districts bordering the Gulf has gained greatly in importance owing to recent developments of the political situation. It therefore seems all the more necessary for us to come to the assistance of existing British commercial institutions, and enable them to tide over the present critical period of anarchy in Southern Persia.

This cannot be done, unless some definite commercial policy is adopted by the British authorities, and early action taken to give effect to it.

The question on which everything primarily hinges is the safety of the caravan routes. The importance of this has been repeatedly pressed by one officer after another even when the province of Fars was in relatively good order, and the matter is far more urgent now.



The proclamation, or even the inception, of a constitution does not in itself offer any probability of the slightest improvement in the safety of the Bushire-Shiraz and the Bunder Abbas-Kerman routes. It must take years to bring Fars back to a condition of reasonable security and prosperity.

#### *Danger of Encroachment by Russian Trade.*

It is evident that the continuance of disturbance along those arteries of trade, while diminishing trade in goods of British origin, tends to open markets like Yezd, Shiraz, Kerman, and Ispahan to the descent of Russian trade from the north; and His Majesty's consul at Kerman has recently complained that Russian cotton-goods have been displacing British because of the insecurity on the Bunder Abbas route.

#### *Extortion by Khans along Roads.*

The local chieftains along the 180 miles of the Bushire-Shiraz road have become independent of the governor-general of Fars, and are in a constant state of warfare with each other. The posts are tampered with and robbed every few weeks.

Despite the specific engagement entered into by the Persian Government in the commercial convention of 1903, article 4, rahdari is extorted by armed tribesmen along the route in ever-increasing amounts. A statement of these exactions is appended. A sum of 1 kran is even extracted by the Kalantar at the gate of Bushire, and when protest was made in 1907 the local governor simply replied that he was powerless, as the Minister of Finance still included this item in the schedule of revenue which the governors of Bushire have to make good; if the Persian Government would erase the item from the schedule, he, the governor, would cause the levy to be discontinued.

Caravans are liable to be molested at all points and on every route leading from Bushire.

The deviation from Shief, situated 9 miles from Bushire by sea, has been alluded to in all recent trade reports. It is shunned by all British and the principal Persian merchants on account of its many inconveniences and reputation for pilferages. The khan of Angoli, desirous of the caravan route passing through his territory—the exclusive right of which he has for three years past tried to obtain by large bribes offered to local governors—loses no opportunity which fortune or a weak governor may place in his way of coercing muleteers, by imposts or by detention of mules, into using the Shief-Daliki road. Only lately he exacted a fine of 50 tomans (approximately 10*l.*) besides “rahdari” dues from an unprotected caravan of 70 mules, which was approaching Bushire by the main route, which borders on his land.

#### *State of the Main Route.*

The “Imperial” road, passing through Borazjun, Daliki, and up the mountains to Kazerun, now in use for many years past, has been blocked for the last two months by the great feud which has joined the khan of Kumarij and the headman of Daliki and the khan of Borazjun. Report says that disputes about the passage of caravans have been the origin of the feud. Fighting has been heavy, and the narrow passes in the hands of the combatants. The dangers of the present situation are shown by the recent firing on the Russian acting consul-general, although he was travelling with an escort of Cossacks. The telegraph office at Konar Takhte has been a centre for operations. In 1908 the unrest was focussed a little further on, between Kumarij and Kazerun; 1907 was marked by troubles in the Kashgai tribe between Kazerun and Shiraz and by a series of postal robberies.

The main route being so hampered for traffic, native merchants in Shiraz have been of late endeavouring to arrange with the Kashgai Ilkhani for the transport of caravans by the Firuzabad route, which, in its course to Bushire, traverses Dashti territory, a district inhabited by a very lawless population, and Tangistan. The absence of the telegraph on this route and the likelihood of robbery occurring without the slightest chance of compensation being obtained, and other difficulties in the shape of dearth of forage, provisions, and caravan accommodation make British merchants very chary of trusting their goods to it.

#### *Dearth of Transport.*

Another serious feature has been the dearth of mule transport which has arisen. Muleteers have been so ill-treated and so plagued by robbers and “roadguards” during the past two years that a very large number have forsaken the route altogether and gone to the Yezd road or even more north still, to the Resht road. The result is that even when a short spell of comparative tranquillity does occur, merchants cannot depend upon being able to get transport.

Whereas in 1905 from 5,000 to 7,000 mules are stated to have been constantly engaged between Bushire and Shiraz, now in 1909 a British forwarding agency and Persian mule-brokers estimate them at between 2,000 and 3,000. Some 1,500 Shiraz mules are stated to have forsaken the Bushire road for the Resht and Kermanshah routes (which are not in the British sphere of influence). No large caravan had come down from Shiraz to Bushire from March to June 1909, and then only via Firuzabad.

#### *Price of Transport.*

The price of transport has risen to such an extent that it has become a burden on trade.

The following figures show clearly the rise from the normal since the period of anarchy commenced:—

					Krans.
1900	..	..	per 737 lb., 185 miles	..	90, 80, 60
1901	..	..	..	..	95-80-100-110
1902	..	..	..	..	80
1904	..	..	..	..	80-90
1905	..	..	..	..	85-95-75-95-110
March 1906-7	..	..	..	..	150-220-140-150
.. 1907-8	..	..	..	..	160-120-110-90-140
.. 1908-9	..	..	..	..	140-160-170-220
.. 1909-10	..	..	..	..	200-250-300

(Or a rise from, approximately, 1*l.* 9*s.* to 5*l.* 3*s.*)

#### *Insurance.*

A further proof of the straits to which commerce has been reduced along the Shiraz road is shown in the premium rates of insurance companies in England.

Formerly 15*s.* per 100*l.* was accepted by most underwriters for cotton bales from Manchester to Shiraz and Ispahan, and included risk of robbery. In 1907 the rate was 30*s.*, I think; while in 1908 the long list of robberies had sent the rate up to 40*s.*, and very few companies could be found to accept the risk. By April 1909 practically all insurance to Shiraz was refused in England, war risks being asked, which means 5*l.* to 10*l.* per 100*l.*

The result is that the risk of robbery between Bushire and Shiraz falls on the British exporter, not on the insurance company as hitherto, nor on the Persian buyer.

#### *Recovery of Claims.*

Recovery of claims was, up till 1906, frequently effected from the Fars Government, but during the last eighteen months claims for British merchandise stolen on the Bushire-Shiraz road, with a value of 3,810 tomans (approximately 620*l.*), have been left unsettled and unattended to by the Persian authorities. These claims were advanced by British agencies alone.

#### *Prospects of Order being restored.*

Lawlessness is so far advanced on the Bushire-Shiraz route that it is doubtful if any governor-general of Fars will have the necessary influence and troops to restore order.

Persians concerned in the forwarding business to the interior appear to look to the British authorities alone for the necessary power to replace the road on a secure footing and repress illegal exactions.

A seyyid, one of the two principal Persian merchants in Bushire, told me a few



days ago that, in his belief, matters would become even worse to what they were, and that possibly, besides entailing grave political results, would certainly mean the ruination of Persian traders on a large scale, with the resultant effects on the British capital employed.

Further, the prevailing disorders on the two southern roads have had the effect of depreciating the receipts of the southern customs to an amount which quite fails to suffice for the interest due towards the British loan and the interest pledged on the customs to the Imperial Bank of Persia.

It is proposed to draw attention elsewhere to the disastrous effect which wholesale smuggling is having on the stability of many traders, but it is indirectly connected with the road question.

#### *Policing of the Road.*

The first stage towards restoring security for trade in the South is the proper policing of the roads, and every European who knows Southern Persia at the present time despairs of this, unless it is done under foreign supervision.

Several suggestions have been put forward, such as the formation of a transport company, which would furnish its own guards; the enlistment of a corps of Persian guards controlled by officers, with a leaven of non-commissioned officers and men of the Indian army, or the temporary employment of an Indian pioneer regiment on the road, who would busy themselves with removing the physical difficulties of the road and fixing upon a possible alignment for a future route for railed traffic, while guarding the transport of caravans.

#### *Interest and Importance attached to Bushire Road.*

Finally, in emphasising the especial interest which British commerce and British policy have in the Bushire-Shiraz route, one point deserves mention.

There appears to be some apprehension that it is desired to promote the diversion of traffic from the Gulf to Ispahan to the Ahwaz-Ispahan route (Lynch's concession) in preference to the Bushire road, as more important to British interests. It is true that a certain amount of cargo destined for transport via Shiraz has, owing to the recent perilous condition of the latter road, had to be reshipped to Ahwaz, but, on the whole, the relative importance of the two routes for the transport of British goods and the spread of British trade is not to be compared. The Ahwaz-Ispahan route is hampered by snow for a considerable period during the winter season, it possesses no caravanserais nor telegraph facilities, and, more particularly, it passes through no large trading centres or trading populations on its course to Ispahan. The Bushire road, on the other hand, traverses Borazjun and Kazerun, an agricultural centre, on its way to Shiraz, and north of Shiraz it proceeds via Abadeh and Kumesah to Ispahan. To some extent the Yezd market is also dependent on this route.

For some generations past the trading instincts along this road have been encouraged, and there are now flourishing native commercial communities, with great interdependence of interests, in Bushire, Shiraz, and Ispahan, of which the forwarding system is not the least.

But the basis of the prosperity of all three towns is largely British credit, with which business is carried on, and, were the normal transport of merchandise to Ispahan by the Bushire road to be transferred permanently, or for any length of time, to the Ahwaz route, British trade and capital in Shiraz and Bushire must, in my judgment, inevitably suffer.

H. G. CHICK.

#### STATEMENT of Sums exacted by Tufangchis, &c., on Merchandise transported between Bushire and Kazerun.

	June 1907.		June 1909.
Bushire—	Krs. shahis.		Krs. shahis.
At gate .. .. per mule	0 18	Per mule .. ..	1 3
Outside gate .. ..	0 1	Per 25 mules .. ..	1 0
Chogadak .. ..	0 4	" (khan) .. ..	10 0
		" (tufangchi) .. ..	5 0
Ahmedi .. ..	0 2	Per mule .. ..	0 10
Isavand .. ..	0 3	Per 25 mules .. ..	6 0
Chah-i-khani .. ..	0 2	" .. ..	2 0
Khushab .. ..	0 3	Per mule .. ..	1 10
Borazjun .. ..	0 4	" (khan) .. ..	0 10
		Per 25 mules .. ..	0 10
Tul-i-Borazjun .. ..	0 3	" .. ..	1 0
Jatta .. ..	0 3	" .. ..	5 0
Karoul-Khane .. .. per mule	0 3	" .. ..	4 0
Ab-Gandeh .. ..	0 3	" .. ..	4 0
Daliki .. ..	0 3	Per mule .. ..	2 5
		" (tufangchi) .. ..	0 10
Borji-Namazgah .. ..	0 2	Per 25 mules .. ..	4 0
Pul-i-Daliki .. ..	0 2	Per mule .. ..	0 10
		Per 25 mules (18 lb. sugar) .. ..	10 0
Darya Kuli .. ..	0 2	Per mule .. ..	4 0
Kotal-i-Malu .. .. per mule	0 2	" .. ..	0 5
		" (khan) .. ..	1 0
Banaki .. ..	0 2	Per 25 mules (7 lb. sugar) .. ..	0 10
Konar Takhte .. .. per mule	0 3	Per mule .. ..	0 10
Jafferjin .. ..	0 2	" .. ..	0 5
Takhteki .. ..	0 3	" .. ..	0 2
Cheroon .. ..	0 3	" .. ..	0 8
Kotal-i-Kumarij .. ..	0 3	" .. ..	0 15
Tang-i-Turkan .. ..	0 3	" .. ..	0 8
		Per 25 mules (14 lb. sugar) .. ..	0 4
Caravanserai .. ..	0 2	Per mule .. ..	0 18
Diris .. ..	0 2	" .. ..	0 10
Kawa-Khane .. ..	0 2	" .. ..	11 0
Kazerun .. ..	0 2	" .. ..	
Total .. ..	3 14	Per mule .. ..	12 3
		Per 25 mules .. ..	67 10

= approximately 15 krs. per mule.

The above points to an increase of 11-30 kran per mule since 1907, and it may be noted that it shows rahdari and other illegal taxes exacted as far as Kazerun only, i.e., 100 miles of the journey.

The sum of 15 kran per mule over this distance is equivalent to 5s. 3d. for considerably less than 3 cwt. A further system of robbery resorted to by the village chieftains along the route is to prohibit muleteers from buying fodder for any one else than themselves, and then to charge them double the market price.

The specific engagements of the Persian Government which are being thus flagrantly broken every day by the levy of these illegal dues with that Government's own knowledge are:—

1. Article 4 of the firman of His Imperial Majesty the Shah, dated the 28th February, 1903, abolishing the taxes of octroi, khanat, meidan, kapundari, rahdari, and other analogous taxes.
2. Article 3 of the Customs Regulations.
3. Article 4 of the Anglo-Persian Commercial Convention of 1903, in which the Persian Government undertook to suppress all rahdari taxes, and not to allow the establishment of fresh road or barrier taxes.

H. G. C.



[29934]

No. 386.

*Consul-General Cox to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 9.)*

(No. 8. Commercial.)

Sir,

*Bushire, July 18, 1909.*

IN continuation of my telegram from Fao dated the 17th instant, I have the honour to submit a copy of the agreement concluded on the 16th July, 1909, between the Anglo-Persian Oil Company (Limited) and the Sheikh of Mohammerah.

Urgencies which I find awaiting disposal on my return to head-quarters to-day prevent my submitting with it, as I had intended, a memorandum of comment which I have recorded in rough, together with a copy of my letter of assurance to the sheikh in connection with the question of reversion. I shall do so by next post, and request that you will be pleased to await my further communication before the terms of the agreement are critically examined.

I have, &amp;c.

P. Z. COX, Major,  
British Resident in the Persian Gulf, and His  
Britannic Majesty's Consul-General for Fars, &c.

Inclosure in No. 386.

*Agreement entered into between the Anglo-Persian Oil Company (Limited) and the Sheikh of Mohammerah, dated Ahwaz, the 16th July, 1909.*

AGREEMENT entered into between the Sardar Arfa, Amir Nuyan, Sheikh Khaza'l Khan ibn Haji Jabir Khan, Sheikh of Mohammerah, on behalf of himself, heirs and successors, and his tribesmen, on the one part, hereinafter called "the sheikh," and Messrs. Anglo-Persian Oil Company (Limited), of London, on the other part, hereinafter called "the company," in respect of lands required by the said company in the territories of the former, for the purposes of their business, under the exclusive privileges of the concession granted to Mr. W. K. D'Arcy by His Majesty the Shah of Persia on the 28th May, 1901.

Whereby it is agreed that:—

1. The sheikh undertakes to hire to the said company an area free of date trees of 650 jaribs, of 4,669 square yards per jarib, on Abbadan Island, situated between the village of Baraim on the north-west and Buwardeh on the south-east, having a frontage of about 2,000 yards on the Shatt-al-Arab; and also a strip of land, not less than 30 yards in breadth, for a right of way connecting the land above-mentioned with the Bahmanshir River, but the public rights of way must remain.

2. Should the said company find the ground selected as above, after further examination, not suitable for their requirements, they should have the right to select other sites of the same area and same description.

Should the company require more land, free of date trees, adjacent to the lands leased to them, the sheikh undertakes, in case the company asks for such land within a space of two years from the date of this agreement, to grant them land not exceeding 100 jaribs in area at the same moderate rate. If the said company ask for more land after two years from the date of this agreement, they shall pay rental at the fair current rate of the time for similar land in those localities.

3. The sheikh further undertakes to grant, free of charge to the company, a strip of land for the laying of such pipe-lines as may be necessary, above or below ground, situated in his lands or in those lands for the time being under his jurisdiction, or leased or purchased by him from others, with access thereto; and also to grant free, in connection with the said pipe-line, such uncultivated land as may be needed by them for telegraph or telephone stations or pumping stations, or quarters for line inspectors and staff, having an area of 3 jaribs for each pumping station and 1½ jaribs for each of the other stations.

It is to be understood that at the expiration of the concession, or of any extension or renewal thereof, the company shall relinquish every pumping or other station that

may be erected on these lands, and shall not be entitled to demand any refund of expenses in this connection.

It is agreed that in places where the pipe-line is exposed guards shall be appointed. Further, that the sheikh will exert himself to the utmost to prevent the wilful setting fire to the oil in the pipe. In the event of such a contingency occurring, he will endeavour, to the utmost of his power to trace and punish the offenders and, if they possess anything, to recover compensation, but the sheikh does not accept personally any pecuniary liability for loss which may accrue to the company from this cause, and will not pay compensation.

4. The sheikh further undertakes to hire to the company an area or areas, aggregating 10 jaribs, at Ahwaz and Nasiri, having frontage on the eastern bank (edge) of the River Karun, for the storage of material and building of storehouses and such other buildings as are needed for the company's business, at a rate of 1l. per jarib per annum; i.e., that the yearly amount of the rent thereof will be 10l.

The company have power to select a site or sites on the eastern edge of the Karun, located opposite the island in the river, upstream from the garden adjacent to the landing place used by steamers plying on the Upper Karun. Should the company find the ground selected as above, after further examination, not suitable for their requirements, they shall have the right to select other sites of the same area and description, and whatever buildings there shall be on these areas shall be left by the company on the expiry of the lease or of any extension or renewal thereof, and they are not entitled to demand any refund of expenses in this connection.

5. In order that the company may be satisfied that it has received from the sheikh good and sufficient title to these lands, and that no one in future can put forward any claim in regard to the lands, the sheikh undertakes, for the complete validity thereof, to cause this document to be signed and sealed by the elders of his tribes.

6. The sheikh further undertakes to appoint watchmen for the efficient guarding of the property of the company in each district situate within his territories through which the pipes may be laid, or in which the company's property may be exposed to possible loss, the salary of such watchmen to be paid by the company themselves. He will furnish the representative of the company with the names of his own representatives, so that on the representative of the company on the spot preferring a request the sheikh will instruct his representatives to detail trustworthy men for the work.

Any changes in the personnel of the representatives of the sheikh will be intimated to the representative of the company in due course.

7. So long as the sheikh guarantees the guards employed by the company, he undertakes to recover any property stolen by the said guards themselves, or by reason of their connivance, and in the event of non-recovery to compensate the company for the loss sustained. In the case of theft under other circumstances, or of any wilful damage being done to the pipe-line or tanks thereof, or any other property belonging to the company, the sheikh undertakes to do his utmost to trace the offenders, and, in the event of their being identified, should they prove to belong to his jurisdiction, or should they be found therein, to inflict upon them such punishment as will be an example and deterrent to others against the perpetration of such acts, and also a means of making the company's property respected in his territory. That is to say—if it should be ascertained that the culprit or robber is not in the Shah's limits, and does not belong to his jurisdiction, the sheikh should not be held responsible.

8. The sheikh further grants the right to the company to make all burnt and unburnt bricks and tiles required by them in the lands for the time being in the hands of the company, and also to erect on the lands occupied by them in accordance with the articles of this agreement, all buildings, structures, and machinery as may be needed by them for the proper execution of their business.

The company undertakes that, on the expiry of the concession or of the period of the extension or renewal thereof, all these lands which have been acquired from the sheikh on lease or free of charge shall be abandoned, and shall be given back into the hands of the sheikh, and the said company will have no further rights in them.

9. This lease of land and all the conditions pertaining thereto shall remain in force for the full period of the concession granted to Mr. W. K. D'Arcy by His Imperial Majesty the Shah of Persia dated the 28th May, 1901, and of any extension or renewal thereof. But on the expiration of the original period, in the event of there being an extension or renewal of the concession, the rent shall be fixed at 1,500l. per annum, payable annually in advance, and the sheikh shall have no right to demand any further increase. If, in consideration of the exigencies of their business, the company should wish to curtail the period of the lease, in that case 12 calendar (Christian) months'

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notice of their intention must be given in writing to the sheikh prior to the termination of the lease—such notice will be sent to the sheikh through His Britannic Majesty's consul at Mohammerah. If the lease should be thus curtailed, the company shall make no claim for refund of money that has been paid in advance on account of rent, and the sheikh likewise shall make no claim for rent for the unexpired period of the lease.

10. If at any time the company desire to acquire land on the Karun or Shatt-el-Arab at Mohammerah or Ahwaz, or any other point anywhere in the country under the sheikh's jurisdiction, for wharves or warehouses for the purposes of their business, the sheikh undertakes as far as possible to assist the said company in procuring the said land at favourable rates of lease. It is to be understood that such rent will be paid by the company themselves.

11. In consideration of the lease of the lands mentioned in paragraph 1, the company undertake to pay rent at a rate of 650*l.* per annum, such rent to be paid in advance every ten years, namely, the amount due to be paid to the sheikh by drafts of the company, such payment to be made through His Britannic Majesty's consul at Mohammerah in exchange for the receipt of the sheikh.

The first payment shall be made by the company within three days of notice being received by the directors of the completion of this agreement.

12. The company on their own part agree not to engage without the cognizance of the sheikh, tribesmen for their work, or in any way to interfere in tribal matters.

13. The company, as lessees of these lands, agree that all treasure-trove throughout the lands leased to the company, and other lands given under this agreement, belong to the sheikh alone. By "treasure-trove" is meant coins, jewellery, and objects of antiquity.

14. The company bind themselves to take into their employ as guards and watchmen only such persons as the sheikh or his representatives in the various localities may state to be trustworthy, and the company agree that on receipt from the sheikh of the expression of a wish for the dismissal of any such guard or watchman, they will act in accordance with his request, but only so long as support to the enforcement of their authority over the company's employes is received from the sheikh, and so long as his assistance in the detection of thieves and punishment of them when detected, if subject to his jurisdiction, shall be real and effective.

15. The payments to unmounted guards and watchmen engaged from among the sheikh's men will be made by the company on the following scale: 50 krans per month of the Christian calendar without food, or any higher sum that the company may think necessary, and this sum will be paid by them 15 days subsequent to the end of the month during which it was earned. If the said guards and watchmen do not agree to work for 50 krans per month or the further sum above indicated, then the company shall have the right to bring guards and watchmen from some other place, but they shall not import them from localities at enmity with the sheikh, and only so long as the pay of such men shall not be greater than the sum offered to the sheikh's men.

16. In the event of a watchman or any employe leaving without giving due notice of one month, it is the rule of the company that 15 days' pay be forfeited, and without exception all native employes are engaged on these terms.

17. The said company reserve to themselves the right to punish their employes by inflicting fines to the extent of half month's pay as a maximum, and in the event of the behaviour of the said employes warranting a heavier punishment, they will be handed over to the representative of the sheikh at the nearest place, and the latter, under the sheikh's instructions, will use his utmost endeavours to uphold the authority of the company over their employes and the respect of their property among the people of the district, so avoiding unnecessary trouble to both parties of this agreement.

18. This agreement and all the articles therein are accepted by the sheikh, and admitted to be binding on himself, and heirs, and successors, and on his tribesmen, whoever they may be.

19. This agreement is considered to be in force from the date on which it is signed, from which date the company become liable for the above-named rental.

20. Whenever differences arise between the sheikh or his representatives and the company or their representatives, such cases shall be adjusted in a friendly and unofficial manner between the parties concerned. Should settlement not be achieved by this means, the matter in question shall be referred to His Britannic Majesty's consul at Mohammerah, and the latter shall endeavour to settle the matter in dispute personally and informally with the sheikh, and in the event of their not being able to arrive at a settlement they will refer the case in the same manner to the resident in the Persian Gulf, whose settlement shall be considered final.

This agreement of lease has been written, signed, and sealed at Ahwaz this 16th July, 1909, corresponding to 27th Jamad-us-Sani, 1327, in duplicate. It is correct.

KHAZA'L BIN JABIR.

For and on behalf of  
ANGLO-PERSIAN OIL COMPANY, LIMITED.

Witnessed—

Seal of MAHOMED ALI  
(Haji Rais-ut-Tujjar).

Witness to signature of

Lloyd, Scott, & Co.,

A. T. WILSON, Lt. I.A.

LLOYD, SCOTT, & CO.  
Agents,  
by the hand of  
J. B. LLOYD.

[29789]

No. 387.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 9.)*

(No. 626. Confidential.)

Sir,

*Constantinople, August 4, 1909.*

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a memorandum from His Majesty's consul-general at Bagdad giving what he considers to be the views of the Mujteheds with regard to the British and Russian troops in Persia. Emphasis is laid on the unpopularity of the latter.

I have, &c.

GERARD LOWTHER.

*Inclosure in No. 387.*

*Memorandum by Consul-General Ramsay respecting foreign Troops in Persia.*

(No. 21. Confidential.)

I THINK I should add confidentially something to my official report of this date about the views of the Mujteheds in regard to foreign interference in Persia.

It is difficult for me to cultivate very close relations with the Russian consul-general, because, though we were very good friends as long as he had his sister living with him, his domestic arrangements are now such that few English or other European ladies go to his house. Still, when we meet at official or social functions we ignore this little difficulty and meet as friends.

When the letters to the Mujteheds were being prepared M. Maschkow arranged a meeting with me, and he informed me that Mullah Mahommed Kadhemi Khorassani, had great influence in Baku, which he described as a most turbulent place, and a centre for revolutionary propaganda. He said that outside Baku the man who had the most influence with the Mahommedans of the Caucasus was Seyyid Kadhemi Yezidi, and it is therefore important, I think, to note that up to the present time Seyyid Kadhemi Yezidi has held aloof from politics, but that now he is inclined to use his influence to get the Russians out of Persia. Seyyid Kadhemi Yezidi is very much respected, and he must be a man of great strength of character to have resisted all the pressure that has been applied to make him join the nationalist movement. If, therefore, he should think it right to take a share in political affairs, he may be able to cause the Russian Government considerable embarrassment by stirring up trouble in the Caucasus.

The telegram and the letters to the Mujteheds were translated in my office, and copies of the Arabic were sent to M. Maschkow, yet it appears that the copies sent by him and by me do not exactly agree. The difference is not in any way material, but when my dragoman presented my letter to Sheikh Mahommed Taki at Kadhemi he quoted a verse from the Koran to the effect that Christians can never agree with each other. Sheikh Mahommed Taki said that he could not understand how we had been so blind as to act in unison with the Russians, whose methods are notorious.

A man who was present when the Mujteheds' reply was given to M. Maschkow says that his remark on reading the portion which refers to the withdrawal of the bluejackets from Bushire was, "Of course the English only did this to show that the Russians and not they are the aggressors."

A certain Mirza Asad Ullah Khan, who speaks French fluently, has been to see



me twice lately, and he brought letters of introduction from Mullah Mahommed Kadhem Khorassani and from Seyyid Abdullah Bebahani. He said that the Mujtehedes were anxious to send a deputation to call on me, and asked if I would receive it. I said that I was always glad to receive people who wished to see me, but that, as regards Persian affairs, I was not authorised to enter into any negotiations. I would, however, hear what was said, and it was naturally my business to keep my Government informed of all matters that interested it. Apparently Mirza Asad Ullah Khan misunderstood what I said, for on his second visit he said that he had been directed to ask me to get special permission to receive a deputation. I repeated that I needed no special permission to receive a deputation, but it was out of the question for me to suggest that I should be authorised to conduct any kind of negotiations concerning Persia, because His Majesty's Minister at Tehran could alone do this, and any division of authority could not fail to lead to misunderstandings and trouble. I repeated that I would receive a deputation and listen to all they had to say, but that I should probably not be able to give them an answer.

Asad Ullah Khan also insisted that we were throwing away the popularity gained by years of honest effort, and he said that it was the universal idea that Persia should be for the Persians, yet there was this difference, that the Russians were hated and mistrusted, while the English were looked upon as friendly and honest.

Mirza Asad Ullah hinted at some plan which the Mujtehedes wanted to lay before me, but I could not get him to outline what it was likely to be. Putting together what he said, what M. Maschkow said, and what I hear from the vice-consul at Kerbela, I should not be surprised if the plan of the Mujtehedes is to bring pressure on Russia to withdraw her troops by causing disturbances in the Caucasus. It would of course be impossible for me to pretend that such a course would be approved by the British Government.

As far as I am in a position to judge, it seems clear to me that as long as Russian troops remain in Persia the whole influence of Kerbela and Nejef will be used to make their position untenable, and there will be continued danger of the most awkward incidents arising.

So far there seems to be no serious spirit of fanaticism against the English, but it is difficult to guess how long we can appear to support the retention of Russian troops in Persia without forfeiting the good opinions we have earned. M. Maschkow is a Caucasian himself and is an autocrat to the backbone. I do not for a moment believe that his sympathies are with the liberal party, and I doubt if his official training has been so strict as to force him in all circumstances to appear to see eye to eye with us. I doubt if he could resist the temptation of showing England in an unfavourable light. I write this, of course, in the strictest confidence, and I offer it merely as my personal opinion.

[29982]

No. 388.

*Manchester Chamber of Commerce to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 9.)*

Sir,

*Manchester, August 7, 1909.*

THE President of this Chamber had the honour of forwarding to you, on the 3rd instant, a letter which he had received from firms connected with this Chamber who are interested in trade with Mid and Southern Persia. He now desires me to enclose a communication received from Messrs. E. S. Davids Sons and Co., and others who have commercial relations with Northern Persia.

The President commends these further representations to you, feeling assured that you will take such action as you properly can.

I am, &amp;c.

WALTER SPEAKMAN, *Secretary.*

*Inclosure in No. 388.*

*Messrs. Davids Sons and Co. and others to the Manchester Chamber of Commerce.*

Sir,

*Manchester, August 5, 1909.*

WE, the undersigned shippers, interested in the trade of Persia, beg to draw the attention of your Board to serious complaints received by cable from our houses and

agents abroad concerning the unsafe condition of the caravan routes in Persia especially between Kermanshah and Hamadan, which, for some weeks, have been infested by robber bands who made the passage of caravans most risky and caused the trade to be completely paralyzed. We further understand that, at the present time, a large quantity of goods is held up *en route* and in serious danger of being looted. It appears to us that, since the advent of the new Government in Persia, the authorities seem to have less control over the tribes; consequently they have latterly been more daring in their attack on the caravans. We need hardly point out what a disastrous effect this state of affairs is having and likely to have on British trade in Persia. May we suggest that you would kindly communicate with His Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, with a view to telegraphic instructions being sent to His Majesty's Minister at Tehran, requesting him to bring before the notice of the Persian Government the need for a prompt action to secure the safety of the roads so as to enable goods to travel between the trade centres without the risk of looting or molestation. Hoping you will give this communication favourable consideration and forward same to the Right Honourable Sir Edward Grey, requesting him to take what action he may deem necessary to protect our interests.

We are, &amp;c.

E. S. DAVIDS SONS AND CO.  
(and others).

[29983]

No. 389.

*Imperial Bank of Persia to Foreign Office.—(Received August 9.)*

Sir,

*25, Abchurch Lane, London, August 7, 1909.*

I AM requested by the Board of Directors to forward for your information an extract from a confidential letter addressed to this office by the chief manager of the bank in Tehran, dated the 21st July, 1909.

I have, &amp;c.

G. NEWELL, *Manager.*

*Inclosure 1 in No. 389.*

*Imperial Bank of Persia, Tehran, to Imperial Bank of Persia, London.*

(Confidential.)

(Extract.)

*Tehran, July 21, 1909.*

ALL is quiet here again, but for this no thanks are due to the numerous foreigners (other than British), who did all in their power to bring in the Russian troops from Kazvin. M. Sabline was hard pressed from all sides, but at the most critical moment both his and Sir George Barclay's most valuable asset was the British colony, who remained in Tehran throughout the trouble and never uttered a word of complaint. In this connection I enclose Sir George Barclay's telegram to me of the 18th instant, together with copy of my reply.

Now that the people have worked their will, it remains to be seen with what moderation and good sense they will conduct a situation which is fraught with many difficulties, not the least of which is the presence of a large and very undesirable element of Caucasian freebooters.

The German view here is that M. Sabline lost his opportunity, and, of course, theirs at the same time. I don't think they feel quite so happy with Mahomed Ali off the throne and the prospect of dealing with a constitution which promises to be anti-German. The Board's message has been communicated to the new Shah, who came to town yesterday for the purpose of being crowned to-day.

It appears that the Imperial crown was pawned with the Banque d'Escompte last December, and has not yet been redeemed.

[1665]



Inclosure 2 in No. 389.

*Sir G. Barclay to Mr. Wood.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Gulahek, July 19, 1909.*

OWING to press of business, I have not been able before to express my high appreciation of the courage, coolness, and good sense shown by the British community during the very trying conditions of the last week. I beg you to convey this message to the members of your staff, and to express to them my gratitude for their conduct.

Inclosure 3 in No. 389.

*Mr. Wood to Sir G. Barclay.*

Sir,

*Tehran, July 20, 1909.*

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge receipt of your telegram of yesterday, which has been communicated to my staff, and I hasten now to join them in thanking you for the kind expressions conveyed in your message.

I have, &amp;c.

A. O. WOOD.

Inclosure 4 in No. 389.

*Imperial Bank of Persia, London, to Imperial Bank of Persia, Tehran.*

(Translation.)

(Telegraphic.)

*July 19, 1909.*

COMMUNICATE following through the Regent:—

The Chairman Imperial Bank of Persia and Board offer their congratulations, with respectful and sincere wishes for the happiness and prosperity of Persia under His Imperial Majesty Sultan Ahmad Shah and the Regent, his Highness Azad-ul-Mulk.

[29956]

No. 390.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 9.)*

(No. 662.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Gulahek, August 9, 1909.*

HIS Majesty's acting consul-general at Tabreez telegraphed to me yesterday as follows, No. 176:—

"I learn from Russian consul-general that a relative of the Maku khans has sought refuge in Russian vice-consulate at Bayazid, with the object of obtaining Russian protection for the khanate, which he declares the nationalists are threatening. Russian vice-consul fears that the khan may call in the Turks if the Russian Government do not accord him their protection. My Russian colleague, in reply to his Government's request for his views on this matter, has stated that the dispatch of a small force to Maku ostensibly for the protection of Russian subjects was in his opinion the only way to save the khanate."

M. Sabline is recommending to his Government that he be authorized, in concert with me, to urge upon the Persian Government the advisability of proclaiming a general amnesty. By this means the disorders entailed by such movements as that directed against Maku, which the nationalists appear to have in view, would be avoided; and the constant applications for protection from nervous reactionaries with which my Russian colleague is being plagued would no longer trouble the two legations. I fully concur in M. Sabline's recommendation, and think that we might suggest that the amnesty should take the same lines as that put forward in the programme of reforms which we submitted to the late Shah.

(Confidential.)

The number of undesirables who have been granted Russian protection in the past is causing my colleague some embarrassment.

[29767]

No. 391.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 9.)*

(No. 663.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Gulahek, August 9, 1909.*

THE Persian Government have arrested Zil-es-Sultan's further progress towards Tehran near Menjil on the Resht road. I have received a communication from his sons begging for my intervention, but I declined to act in the matter.

[30026]

No. 392.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 9.)*

(No. 664.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Gulahek, August 9, 1909.*

PLEASE see St. Petersburg telegrams Nos. 376 and 382 of the 6th August and the 8th August respectively.

The stipulations regarding the departure of the ex-Shah are an essential part of the protocol recently concluded between the Persian Government and the two legations. The negotiations which led to the agreement will, in great part, have to be resumed if these stipulations are not carried out.

The importance of adhering to the date fixed cannot be exaggerated, and we ought now to be making preparations for the journey if His Majesty is to start on the 17th August. We might for the present postpone the question of his future place of residence.

The protocol, as stated in the preamble of that document, is an agreement between the representatives of the two legations and of the Persian Government, which must be subsequently ratified by the representatives of the two Powers and the Persian Government.

If we can get the whole Cabinet to sign this arrangement in return for our own signatures, the difficulty I anticipated in getting the assembly to ratify it later (see my telegram No. 654) should not arise.

[30017]

No. 393.

*Mr. O'Beirne to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 9.)*

(No. 383.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*St. Petersburg, August 9, 1909.*

PLEASE refer to your telegram No. 1030 of the 6th instant: Loan of Mr. New to Persian Telegraph Administration.

Owing to the circumstances reported in telegram No. 658 of the 7th instant, from Tehran, I am taking no further action in the matter.

[28653]

No. 394.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.*

(No. 414.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Foreign Office, August 9, 1909.*

KERKHA irrigation scheme. See your telegram No. 636 of the 29th July. Suggestion is being made to India Office to sanction Wilson's survey.

[29767]

No. 395.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.*

(No. 415.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

*Foreign Office, August 9, 1909.*

YOUR telegram No. 663 [of 9th August: Zil-es-Sultan]. Action approved.



[30627]

No. 396.

*Sir Edward Grey to Mr. O'Beirne.*

(No. 230.)

Sir,

*Foreign Office, August 9, 1909.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 229 of the 6th instant, M. Isvolsky called upon me at the Foreign Office to-day and we had some further conversation on various subjects. He expressed pleasure at finding that we were so much in agreement, and showed no anxiety to discuss matters in detail.

I gave him our latest information from Persia as to the desirability of getting the Shah to depart as soon as possible, and as to the alleged Russian subject who has been appointed chief of police.

M. Isvolsky said it would be a good thing that M. Poklewski should reach Tehran as soon as possible and discuss the situation with Sir G. Barclay, as this would be the best way of dealing with the details of outstanding questions.

I am, &amp;c.

E. GREY.

[29476]

No. 397.

*Foreign Office to India Office.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, August 9, 1909.*

WITH reference to your letter of the 14th ultimo relative to the proposed scheme of irrigation from the Kerkha, I am directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to transmit to you herewith copy of a despatch from His Majesty's consul-general at Bushire,\* forwarding Lieutenant Wilson's report on the suitability of that river for the execution of such a project, as well as a letter from the same officer, reporting a conversation which he had with the Sheikh of Mohammerah, in the course of which the latter asked him to make a preliminary examination of the site. Mr. Wilson asks that he may receive permission to undertake this work with the least possible delay.

I am also to transmit to you copy of a telegram from His Majesty's Minister at Tehran on the same subject,† from which it will be observed that he awaits instructions as to the reply which he should return to Major Cox's request for authority to sanction Mr. Wilson's compliance with the sheikh's desire.

It will further be seen that Sir W. Willcocks considers that the scheme will be easy to carry out, and in view of this opinion and of the tenure of Mr. Wilson's report, Sir E. Grey is disposed, with Viscount Morley's concurrence, to address a telegram to Sir G. Barclay, instructing him to authorise Major Cox to allow Mr. Wilson to proceed as proposed.

I am to transmit to you at the same time copy of a further telegram from Sir G. Barclay,‡ reporting that the Indian guard, which it has been decided to remove from the scene of the operations of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, since its services are no longer required there, is at Ahwaz awaiting definite orders to withdraw. In this telegram Sir G. Barclay also reports a suggestion made by Major Cox to the Government of India, that a portion of the guard should be retained for Mr. Wilson's use if he is authorised to make the proposed investigation.

I am to state that Sir E. Grey has no objection to urge to the suggested arrangement if Mr. Wilson's investigation is sanctioned, provided that the question of the payment of the portion of the guard thus retained receives a satisfactory solution.

Lord Morley is aware that the cost of paying and maintaining the guard has hitherto been met by the Oil Company, but it is clearly unreasonable to expect them to continue to defray it when once the guard has passed out of their control, and has ceased to be employed for the protection of their interests.

Sir E. Grey, on his part, is willing to approach the Lords Commissioners of His Majesty's Treasury with a request that they will sanction the charge to Imperial funds of half the expense involved in this matter, which would probably not be considerable, if Lord Morley can see his way to permit the remaining half to be defrayed by the Government of India.

Before, however, addressing their Lordships on the subject, it is necessary to

\* No. 223.

† No. 327.

‡ No. 366.

ascertain as accurately as possible the monthly sum required, and the approximate length of the time for which the services of these sowars are likely to be needed, and I am accordingly to transmit to you herewith draft of a telegram which, if Lord Morley sees no objection, Sir E. Grey proposes to address to Sir G. Barclay, making enquiry on these points.\*

I am to add that Sir E. Grey would be glad to receive, at Lord Morley's early convenience, replies on both the points raised in this letter—(1) as to whether Mr. Wilson's survey may be sanctioned, and (2) as to whether, if the answer to the first enquiry is in the affirmative, the Government of India will bear half the expense involved in the retention of a portion of the guard.

I am, &amp;c.

LOUIS MALLET.

[26837]

No. 398.

*Foreign Office to India Office.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, August 9, 1909.*

WITH reference to my letter of the 23rd ultimo relative to the desire of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company to undertake, with the co-operation of the Imperial or Indian Government, a topographical survey of the oil-producing regions of Persia, as a preliminary to a geological survey of the same districts, I am directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to inform you that Mr. E. W. Wallace, vice-president of the company, in the course of a visit to this Office on the 30th ultimo, enquired what action had been taken on the letter in which the company made the proposal in question.

Mr. Wallace was informed that a letter had been addressed to you, suggesting that the company might be recommended to consult the public edition of the work referred to in my letter above quoted, in case it should contain all the information which they needed; but he replied that the company were already familiar with that publication, and that it did not serve their purpose, as the survey, the results of which it recorded, did not provide all the particulars which they required to know.

In these circumstances, it becomes necessary to consider what reply should be returned to the company's original proposal for a joint survey.

As regards this question, Sir E. Grey is of opinion that the interest of this department in the results of such a survey is not sufficiently direct to justify an application to the Treasury for authority to incur expense under this head. It appears to him that the matter is one which more nearly concerns the Government of India, and I am to enquire whether Viscount Morley would see his way to sanction the participation of that Government in a work of this nature, either by the loan of a surveyor to undertake it or by sharing the expense involved in its accomplishment, or in both of these ways.

Should Lord Morley's reply be favourable to the proposal in principle, Sir E. Grey will approach the company with the request that they will submit, at their early convenience, a more definite scheme for carrying it on.

I am, &amp;c.

LOUIS MALLET.

[30094]

No. 399.

*Mr. F. C. Strick to Foreign Office.—(Received August 10.)**Baltic House, Leadenhall Street, London,  
August 9, 1909.*

Sir,

REFERRING to the interview I had with you on Wednesday, the 4th instant, when I showed you a copy of telegram received by my firm from Mr. David Brown, Tehran, on the subject of the Hormuz red oxide of iron, I regret I did not, as I had intended, leave a copy of the message with you, but I now hand you a copy herewith.

I thank you for the promise you gave me at our interview to communicate with me directly you heard from the British Minister at Tehran, and as I am anxious to

\* See No. 468.



cable as soon as possible to Mr. Brown, as requested by him, I hope you will soon hear from Sir George Barclay on the subject.

I have, &c.  
FRANK C. STRICK.

Inclosure in No. 399.

*Mr. Brown to Messrs. F. C. Strick and Co.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Tehran, August 4, 1909.*

MOUINUTOJAR has contract with Andrew Weir for 15,000 tons of oxide, 30,000L., for shipment up to 1912. 1,000 tons already shipped.

According to contract Mouinutojar must not sell in Europe or United States America, but he can sell to Russia India.

Contract made through Ellinger and Co., Manchester.

Ascertain to what extent they are interested.

It is very likely Persian Government will bring pressure to bear Mouinutojar for money and endeavour to cancel Hormuz concession, but British Minister will support Mouinutojar during term Weir contract.

There is some possibility obtain Mouinutojar concessions for you now, and, in such event, if you will accede to Weir contract, Foreign Office may withhold support from Mouinutojar.

Telegraph immediately what sum you could pay cash for Hormuz, also Hormuz and all Persian Gulf, for ten twenty years.

[30159]

No. 400.

*Akbar Mirza to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 10.)*

(Telegraphic.) *En clair.*

*Tehran, August 10, 1909.*

ZIL-ES-SULTAN instructs me to say that he understands latest assurances regarding property during absence are annulled by his return, but anterior ones assuring him of support for life, honour and family should he remain loyal to Shah he hopes still hold good; if so, please instruct Minister help him return Europe safely.

[30156]

No. 401.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 10.)*

(No. 665.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Gulahek, August 10, 1909.*

GOVERNORSHIP of Fars.

In my telegram No. 66 of the 8th August I reported the appointment of Ain-ed-Dowleh to this post. It now transpires that the Persian Government, at the instigation of Teki Jadeh, who has recently arrived from Tabreez, have in view the revocation of the appointment. As a result of this unfortunate uncertainty, the situation is again somewhat disquieting at Shiraz.

I am pressing the Persian Government to decide without delay upon the definite appointment of a strong governor, and preferably to confirm that of Ain-ed-Dowleh.

[30154]

No. 402.

*Mr. O'Beirne to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 10.)*

(No. 386.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*St. Petersburg, August 10, 1909.*

SIR G. BARCLAY'S telegram No. 664 of yesterday.

I spoke to the acting Minister for Foreign Affairs to-day on the subject of the departure of the ex-Shah, in anticipation of instructions from you. I suggested to his Excellency that until his place of residence was definitely decided on His Majesty might live at Tiflis.

M. Sazonow said that although he did not intend to delay the settlement of the question till the Medjliss should have sanctioned the pension to be given to His Majesty, the whole matter would have, of necessity, to be submitted to the Council of Ministers and to the Emperor, who is still abroad; a final answer, therefore, could not possibly be given till next Friday the 13th. At the same time I gather that M. Sabline may be expected to receive his instructions on Saturday the 14th, as M. Sazonow does not think there will be any serious difficulties in the way.

[29956]

No. 403.

*Sir Edward Grey to Mr. O'Beirne.*

(No. 1069.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Foreign Office, August 10, 1909.*

ASCERTAIN views of Russian Government as to suggestion in telegram No. 662 of the 9th August from Tehran.

Inform Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs that, if they will similarly instruct their representative at Tehran, His Majesty's Government will instruct Sir G. Barclay to press on Persian Government adoption of this suggestion as to the granting of an amnesty. I consider the suggestion to be a good one.

[25889]

No. 404.

*Foreign Office to Admiralty.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, August 10, 1909.*

WITH reference to your letter of the 13th May relative to the disembarkation of a force of bluejackets from His Majesty's ship "Fox" at Bushire, I am directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to transmit to you herewith copy of a despatch from His Majesty's Minister at Tehran,\* relative to the withdrawal of this force after the accomplishment of the object with which they had been landed.

I am to express the hope that the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty may see their way to comply with the wish expressed by Sir G. Barclay and by His Majesty's consul-general at Bushire that the officers concerned should be thanked for their services.

I am, &c.

LOUIS MALLET.

[30266]

No. 405.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 11.)*

(No. 666.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Gulahek, August 11, 1909.*

THE Nationalists have taken Zil-es-Sultan back to Resht, where he is being kept in confinement. I have again received an application for my intervention from his son, who is afraid that the Persian Government may attempt to extort money from His Imperial Highness. Bahram Mirza, at the same time, showed me a telegram addressed to the Foreign Office, in which he invokes the fulfilment of assurances of British protection anterior to those which Mr. Marling gave to His Imperial Highness last year. The validity of the former was in no way dependent on his absence from Persia. (Please see Sir Cecil Spring Rice's despatch No. 59 of the 27th March, 1907, containing the assurances given in 1901 by Sir A. Hardinge, which were in April 1907 confirmed by Sir C. Spring Rice.)

Although, in my opinion, the Zil cannot reasonably base any claim to our protection on our assurances after his complete neglect of our advice, I, nevertheless, propose to inform the Persian Government that I hope that His Imperial Highness will be allowed to leave Persia in safety. In making this recommendation, I propose to ask for the support of my Russian colleague.



[30256]

No. 406.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 11.)*

(No. 667.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Gulahek, August 11, 1909.*

SOME of the bastis at the Russian legation referred to in my telegram No. 632 of the 27th July would naturally leave the country together with the ex-Shah. Consequently, during the journey, these persons would *ipso facto* share the joint protection accorded to His late Majesty. Provided that these persons do not enjoy British protection beyond the actual duration of the journey, I presume that there is no objection to my granting it.

The Persian Government may possibly be opposed to their travelling with Mohamed Ali Mirza, but if they leave with him, the risk of occurrences, which might bring about complications, will not be so great; and I shall, if the necessity arise, advise the Persian Government to put no obstacles in the way of their departure.

[30251]

No. 407.

*Mr. O'Beirne to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 11.)*

(No. 388.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*St. Petersburg, August 11, 1909.*

PROPOSED general amnesty in Persia.

Please refer to your telegram No. 1069 of the 11th August.

M. Sazonow promises me that the suggestion will be considered.

[30159]

No. 408.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.*

(No. 418.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Foreign Office, August 11, 1909.*

AKBAR MIRZA'S telegram of the 10th August repeated to you in my telegram No. 417 of to-day.

I intend answering that, when Zil-es-Sultan went back to Persia against advice of His Majesty's Government, latter considered themselves released from all their guarantees, but that they will do all they can to make his departure from Persia easy.

Telegraph your views, and report whether you consider it likely that Persian Government will try to prevent the Zil's departure.

[30017]

No. 409.

*Foreign Office to India Office.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, August 11, 1909.*

I AM directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to transmit to you herewith copies of telegrams from His Majesty's Minister at Tehran and chargé d'affaires at St. Petersburg,\* relative to the proposal recently made to lend to the Persian Ministry of Telegraphs the services of Mr. New, of the Indo-European Telegraph Department, pending the consideration of the substantive appointment of an official to take the place of the Armenian who was charged with the work of correspondence with foreign telegraph administrations and with the International Telegraph Bureau at Berne, of keeping accounts and regulating traffic, &c.

I am to state that, in view of the objections of the Russian Government to the occupation of this post by a person of British or Russian nationality and of Sir G. Barclay's decision not to raise the question with the new Persian Minister of Telegraphs, Sir E. Grey proposes, with the concurrence of Viscount Morley, to authorise Mr. O'Beirne to abstain from approaching the Russian Government again on the subject.

I am, &amp;c.

LOUIS MALLET.

\* Nos. 380 and 393.

[30377]

No. 410.

*Mirza Mehdi Khan to Foreign Office.—(Received August 12.)*

Dear Mr. Mallet,

*Persian Legation, London, August 11, 1909.*

AS promised, I enclose herewith translations of the chief points of the telegrams I read to you yesterday afternoon. I told you how anxiously my Government look upon the present situation, and how much they are handicapped, in putting the affairs in order, by the presence and the action of the Russian troops. As you will readily agree the continued presence of the troops, their attitude towards the people, and, lastly, their contemplated move towards Tehran may be looked upon with equanimity by the Persian Government, who have confidence in the assurances given by the Government of His Imperial Majesty the Czar; but it is impossible to dispel the suspicion and fear which it creates in the mind of the public at large—especially when they see that all cause for their presence has been removed. As I had the honour of telling you yesterday, my Government have instructed me to draw the attention of His Britannic Majesty's Government to these facts, and to invite them to take friendly action.

You will see from the telegrams that my Government strongly deprecate any move towards Tehran. They think if a change of quarters is needed this could be made in the direction of Resht. Further, for the reasons stated, they consider that if the Russian troops are not withdrawn from Kazvin and Guilan without further delay, complications, which may have disastrous results, will arise.

I shall feel much obliged if you will very kindly put these facts before Sir Edward Grey; and I shall be glad if I could have an interview with his Excellency, so as to ascertain his views in accordance with the instructions of my Government.

Yours, &amp;c.

MEHDI.

Inclosure 1 in No. 410.

*Summary Translation of a Telegram received by the Persian Minister, August 9, 1909.*

IT is reported from Kazvin that the Russian troops there daily enter the city with their band, and march along the boulevards. It is evident what consternation this daily demonstration produces among the inhabitants, and if continued will cause commotion. Moreover, the refugees at the Russian Consulate daily bring forward baseless claims, and the Russian consul puts pressure regarding their execution. The Russian troops even interfere with mosques and other sacred places. Within the last few days, on the plea that two Russian soldiers have deserted, they wish to search (? all\*) the houses in the city; this will add to the agitation of the inhabitants. Further, notwithstanding the fact that there is perfect security in Resht, Kazvin, and Tehran, fifty more Russian soldiers with one officer have arrived at Enzeli. It is clear that the protracted stay of the former troops, and the arrival of the fresh contingent, and the behaviour of the troops will have detrimental results.

Inclosure 2 in No. 410.

*Summary Translation of a Telegram received by the Persian Minister, August 10, 1909.*

ACCORDING to reports received at the Ministry of the Interior, the Russian troops at Kazvin have decided to advance two farsakhas (8 miles) towards Tehran, the reason, they mention, for doing so being that their present quarters have become dirty. You know yourself that after the changes that have taken place the Cabinet has, day and night, devoted the whole of its attention to the restoration of order and security in the country, and has done its utmost to remove the bad impression and the agitation which the arrival of Russian troops at Kazvin and the non-withdrawal of the troops from Tabreez and other districts had produced. The Imperial Govern-



ment has, moreover, taken infinite trouble in the satisfactory settlement of the question of the boycotting of Russian goods in Guilan. The Imperial Russian Government instead of fulfilling their promise to withdraw their troops (especially when they clearly realise that order and security reigns in Tehran, in Kazvin, and in Guilan) they now desire to advance them two farsakhs towards Tehran. This action will again disturb and agitate the mind of the whole people, and the present state of security and quietness might entirely change; if any change of quarters is necessary, the troops could move towards Resht and not Tehran. But with the present order and security of the country the troops should be withdrawn altogether. But if they make this move towards Tehran this fact added to their continued stay in Persia will shake the confidence of the Cabinet in its own ability to keep the people quiet and to preserve order and security, and it is likely that, under the circumstances, the Cabinet will resign, and this may create various troubles. If it is really desired that order and security should be maintained in Persia these obstacles should at once be removed, so that the Government may be able to attend to affairs and to reforms without having their hands tied.

[30302]

No. 411.

*India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received August 12.)*

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Viscount Morley, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, with reference to previous letter, copy of enclosures in a letter from the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, dated the 1st July, relative to the withdrawal of sepoys from Jask.

*India Office, August 11, 1909.*

Inclosure 1 in No. 411.

*Major Cox to Government of India.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Bushire, June 17, 1909.*

CAN extra fifty sepoys at Jask, under Captain Heath, now return to India? British Minister at Tehran and I do not see any further need for their detention.

Inclosure 2 in No. 411.

*Major Cox to Government of India.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Bushire, June 26, 1909.*

MY telegram dated the 17th June.

Please expedite reply about Heath's return to India. Fortnightly mail steamer leaves Jask 29th June.

Inclosure 3 in No. 411.

*Government of India to Major Cox.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Simla, June 28, 1909.*

YOUR telegrams of the 17th and 26th June. Instructions have been issued for withdrawal of extra sepoys at Jask under Heath.

[30386]

No. 412.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 12.)*

(No. 668.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Gulahek, August 12, 1909.*

AS foreshadowed in my telegram No. 665 of the 10th August, the Persian Government have revoked Ain-ed-Dowleh's appointment to the governorship-general of

Fars, and have appointed in his place Saham-ed-Dowleh, who has as yet only held unimportant governorships.

There is now a noticeable tendency, coinciding with Taki Zadeh's return to Tehran, to give governorships to men who are new to provincial administration rather than to those who have had large experience of it in the past. In this way it is hoped that the corrupt methods which have hitherto distinguished local government in Persia may the more easily be abolished.

[30379]

No. 413.

*Mr. O'Beirne to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 12.)*

(No. 390.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*St. Petersburg, August 12, 1909.*

I AM informed by the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs that the assent of the Emperor to the ex-Shah's residing at Kieff will, he hopes, be obtained to-morrow.

The Russian Government cannot consent to His Majesty's departure until the Persian Government guarantee the debt of 3,000,000 roubles which His Majesty owes to the Russian Bank on the ex-Shah's estates in Azerbaijan. If the Persian Government recognise the arrears of civil list to the amount of 2,000,000 roubles which His Majesty declares are due to him, and agree to pay in that sum to the Russian Bank, the estates would only have to produce the other million. This question is the only difficulty now in the way of His Majesty's departure on the 17th instant.

The Russian Government will defray the cost of His Majesty's journey, and a ship will be in readiness to convey him to Petrovsk.

M. Sabline has been instructed in the sense of the above.

[30380]

No. 414.

*Mr. O'Beirne to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 12.)*

(No. 391.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*St. Petersburg, August 12, 1909.*

APPOINTMENT of an English tutor to the Shah. Your telegram No. 410 of the 5th instant to Sir G. Barclay.

I had a conversation with M. Sazonow this morning on the subject of Dr. Lindley's proposed appointment. His Excellency said that M. Smirnow was a man who engaged in no intrigues, and that he gave the Russian Government information which was of use to them, and that they desired that he should remain in his present post. M. Sazonow said that his Government did not consider that there was place for two "gouverneurs," but they had no objection to the Shah's receiving lessons in English from Dr. Lindley.

Sir G. Barclay, I assured his Excellency, would use his influence to prevent Dr. Lindley from taking any step which would not meet with the approval of the Russian Government; but I pointed out that the difficulty lay with the Persian Government. He suggested that the Persian Government might be induced to give up the idea of dismissing M. Smirnow if Sir G. Barclay discouraged it.

[30384]

No. 415.

*Mr. O'Beirne to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 12.)*

(No. 394.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

*St. Petersburg, August 12, 1909.*

PERSIA. General amnesty.

My telegram No. 388 [of 11th August].

Russian Government have sent instructions as proposed by you to Russian chargé d'affaires, and they hope you will similarly instruct British Minister at Tehran.

(Sent to Tehran.)



[30266]

No. 416.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.*

(No. 419.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

*Foreign Office, August 12, 1909.*

YOUR telegram No. 666 [of 11th August: Zil-es-Sultan]: Last paragraph.

I approve.

(Repeated to St. Petersburg, No. 1092.)

[30380]

No. 417.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.*

(No. 420.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Foreign Office, August 12, 1909.*

QUESTION of tutor for Shah.

St. Petersburg telegram No. 391 of to-day.

You should do what you can to prevent M. Smirnoff being removed, and to see that the solution of this matter is one which is satisfactory to your colleague.

[30356]

No. 418.

*Foreign Office to Messrs. Andrew Weir and Co.*

Gentlemen,

*Foreign Office, August 12, 1909.*

I AM directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to state that he has for some time been under the impression, derived from information communicated to him last December, that you signed on the 4th of that month a three years' contract with Messrs. Ellinger and Co., of Manchester (acting as the agents of the Moin-ut-Tujjar), for the purchase of all the red oxide extracted from the mines on the island of Hormuz.

I am to ask you to be good enough to inform Sir E. Grey confidentially whether this statement is accurate.

I am, &amp;c.

LOUIS MALLET

[30507]

No. 419.

*India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received August 13.)*

Sir,

*India Office, August 12, 1909.*

IN reply to your letter of the 5th instant, I am directed to say that Viscount Morley sees no objection to the communication which His Majesty's Minister proposes to address to the Persian Government as to escorts for the repairing parties which the Indo-European Telegraph Department should send out in October next. But the action to be taken, if the Persian Government prove unable to afford the necessary protection, will require careful consideration.

Copy of a memorandum by the director-in-chief of the Indo-European Telegraph Department on the subject is enclosed.

I have, &amp;c.

A. GODLEY.

Inclosure in No. 419.

*Memorandum by the Director-in-Chief, Indo-European Telegraph Department.*

THE telegraph lines from Bushire to Tehran and from Tehran to Robat are divided into seven sections. Every cold weather, in the autumn and in the spring, seven repair parties go out over these sections, each in charge of a European inspector. The section from Bushire extends to Shiraz, 156 miles, and the section from Robat extends to Bam, 221 miles. These two sections appear to be the only two considered sufficiently disturbed for the repair parties to require special escorts. I do not

recommend that the tours of the working parties should be curtailed, but possibly the Bushire-Shiraz tour might be started later in the season. The tours might also be shortened if orders were issued that only repairs urgently necessary were to be carried out. The Robat-Bam section would be the more dangerous of the two until the Afghan gun-running parties had passed back into Afghanistan or down to the coast. These parties go back to Afghanistan mainly between April to June each year. This year they do not appear to have damaged the telegraph lines on their way back. As a rule on their way to the coast they do no damage. On this section it would be well for the working party to go out as soon after the 1st October as possible. Perhaps instead of employing Indian troops it would be preferable to supply escorts from the Mekran Levy Corps, as was done for Mr. New in the Jask sub-division.

August 5, 1909.

[30384]

No. 420.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.*

(No. 421.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Foreign Office, August 13, 1909.*

YOU may concert with your Russian colleague as regards procuring of general amnesty. See St. Petersburg telegram No. 394 of yesterday and my telegram to St. Petersburg No. 1069 of the 10th August.

[30507]

No. 421.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.*

(No. 422.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Foreign Office, August 13, 1909.*

ESCORTS for repairing parties of Indo-European Telegraph Department.

I approve the communication to Persian Government suggested in your telegram No. 640 of the 2nd August, but the line of action which we shall have to adopt will have to be seriously considered if the Persian Government cannot afford the protection necessary.

An escort from the Mekran levy corps was supplied to Mr. New on the Jask subdivision, and it might perhaps be better to resort to the same procedure in this case than to employ Indian troops on the Robat-Bam section.

[30608]

No. 422.

*Messrs. Andrew Weir and Co. to Foreign Office.—(Received August 14.)*

Sir,

6, Lloyd's Avenue, London, August 13, 1909.

WE have to acknowledge receipt of your favour of yesterday's date, with reference to the red oxide extracted from the mines at Hormuz, and we beg to advise the Secretary, Sir Edward Grey, that he has been correctly informed as to our contract for the purchase of same.

We are, &amp;c.

A. WEIR AND Co.

[30663]

No. 423.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 14.)*

(No. 669.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Gulahek, August 14, 1909.*

PLEASE see Mr. O'Beirne's telegram No. 390 of the 12th August.

(Confidential.)

My Russian colleague is endeavouring to obtain a settlement by the Persian Government of Mohamed Ali's debt to the Banque d'Escompte on the lines indicated

[1665]

3 Q



in the above telegram. He does not, however, in the light of the instructions which he has so far received, consider that His late Majesty's departure need necessarily be postponed by the question of this settlement. Consequently we are notifying the Persian Government that His Majesty will leave on the 18th August, and are asking that the necessary transport arrangements be made. (The limit granted to the ex-Shah was "quinze jours" from the date of signature of the protocol, i.e., the 3rd August, and as the Shah regards the 17th August an unlucky day, we shall construe "quinze jours" as fifteen days, and not as a fortnight.)

[30664]

No. 424.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 14.)*

(No. 670.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Gulahek, August 14, 1909.*

I HAVE received the following telegram, No. 179, Confidential, from His Majesty's acting consul-general at Tabreez:—

"Karadagh villages within 20 miles of Khodaferin, which belong to a Russian subject, are being pillaged by a relative of Rahim Khan, and the inhabitants, of whom a great part are Christians, make the inevitable accusations of murder and rape, and appeal for help. My Russian colleague has replied to a telegram from his Government requesting his opinion on this affair, suggesting that they should send to the district in question a frontier commissioner with an escort of 100 Cossacks. His arrival would probably be enough to put an end to the disorders, and if it could be arranged that a Persian frontier commissioner be at the same time dispatched, they could seize the opportunity to discuss outstanding frontier questions. It appears, however, that the general staff at Tiflis are not willing to send either the commissioner or his escort."

[30649]

No. 425.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 14.)*

(No. 671.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Tehran, August 14, 1909.*

TEHRAN—Shahrud telegraph line (see my telegram No. 641 of the 2nd August). We cannot delay any longer to reply to Persian Government concerning erection of line without offending them. Indo-European Telegraph Department is being pressed to erect the second wire. It will be necessary to give a reason if we refuse to comply, and if we mention the question of exchange of lines now, assembly will be certain to regard Arabistan convention unfavourably. Russia, however, will presumably raise question of exchange, which has dropped for the time, when she hears that we intend to comply with request for erection of second wire.

In any case I think it will be advisable to wait until Persia is better disposed to Russia before entering upon exchange negotiations, whatever the effect of this will be upon attitude of assembly to Arabistan convention. The most favourable opportunity for pressing exchange question will perhaps be when Russian troops are withdrawn from Kazvin.

With reference to Sir A. Nicolson's telegram No. 29 of the 12th June last, I understand fully his objection to again urging postponement of exchange solely for the purpose of benefiting the Arabistan convention; but would it not be possible to explain to Russian Government that we propose to comply with request of Persian Government and erect the second line (which would take six weeks, more or less), in view of the fact that present moment is unfavourable for entering upon exchange negotiations?

I am anxious to know what language you will use to Russian Government, and shall not speak to M. Sabline until I am informed of this.

[30697]

No. 426.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 16.)*

(No. 141.)

Sir,

*Gulahek, July 19, 1909.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 126 of the 17th June, I have the honour to transmit herewith a translation of the new Electoral Law, dated the 1st July, as finally promulgated.

I have, &c.

G. BARCLAY.

Inclosure in No. 426.

*Electoral Regulations for the National Assembly.*

*Preface.*

WHEREAS, in accordance with the exigencies of the time, it became necessary to alter some of the articles of the National Assembly's Electoral Regulations, in pursuance of the commands of His Imperial Majesty Mohammed Ali Shah (may God immortalize his reign!) a number of well-wishers of the nation, in conjunction with the members of the Council of State, formed a committee of twenty persons by a vote of the majority, to prepare a new Regulation.

As reference was made to four articles of the fundamental laws concerning the matter of elections, and the alteration of these articles was in contravention of those principles, in order to overcome this objection the above-mentioned committee submitted the important articles of the amended Regulation to the consideration of the well-wishers in the more important provinces of Persia.

The important provincial centres transferred rights of supervision to the Azerbaijan capital. The learned of that centre approved in principle the modification of the four articles, and submitted their observations on the other principal articles. Therefore, taking into consideration the observations of the Azerbaijan capital, the present regulations have been drawn up and written, on condition that the National Assembly, after its opening, shall be at liberty to exercise the right, according to the powers conferred upon it by the fundamental laws, to ratify or modify any one of its articles as may be deemed advisable.

*The Electoral Law, dated July 1, 1909.*

CHAPTER I.—*Number of Representatives of the People and their Distribution in the Provinces and Districts.*

Article 1. The number of deputies of the people for the National Assembly in the provinces of Persia is fixed at 120 persons.

Art. 2. The distribution of the people's representatives is in relation to the approximate population of the provinces and the importance of the locality in accordance with a separate list annexed at the end of these regulations.

Art. 3. In view of the absence of the required conditions, the places where elections will take place will only be the large and small towns. Therefore most of the districts and tribal settlements where the central authority does not reside in a town are not mentioned in this regulation, though the inhabitants of the districts and tribal settlements of every province may, if they enjoy the prescribed qualifications, assemble in one of the towns of the province and take part in the elections.



CHAPTER II.—*Qualifications of Electorate.*

Art. 4. The electors will be persons possessing the following qualifications:—

1. They must be Persian subjects.
2. They must be 20 years of age at least.
3. They must be well known locally, and, if not natives or inhabitants of the electoral district, must have resided at least six months in the electoral district or its surroundings before the elections.
4. They must at least own property of the value of 250 tomans (50*l.*), or pay at least 10 tomans (2*l.*) taxes, or have a revenue of 50 tomans (10*l.*) a-year, or have studied.

Art. 5. Persons who are entirely deprived of electoral rights are as follows:—

1. Women.
2. Persons not within years of discretion, and those who stand in need of a legal guardian.
3. Foreign subjects.
4. Persons whose departure from the true faith of Islam has been proved before one of the qualified doctors of theology.
5. Persons under 20 years of age.
6. Fraudulent bankrupts.
7. Murderers, thieves, and criminals who have undergone punishment according to Islamic law, and persons notorious as murderers and robbers and the like who have not legally exculpated themselves.
8. Persons actually serving in the land or sea forces.

Art. 6. Persons who are conditionally deprived of electoral rights:—

1. Governors and vice-governors within the area of their own government.
2. Those employed in the military and police, within the area of their appointment.

CHAPTER III.—*Those to be Elected must possess the following Qualifications.*

Art. 7.—

1. They must be true Moslems; with the exception of the representatives of the Christians, Parsees, and Jews, who, however, must also be true believers of their own religion.
2. They must be Persian subjects.
3. They must at least be able to read and write Persian to the necessary extent.
4. They must be well known locally.
5. They must have a knowledge of the affairs of the country.
6. They must be well known to be honest and straightforward.
7. They must not be under 30 and not over 70 years of age.

Art. 8. Persons who are debarred from being elected:—

1. Princes of the blood, *i.e.*, sons, brothers, and uncles of the Sovereign.
2. Women.
3. Foreign subjects.
4. Persons actually serving in the land and sea forces.
5. Persons in Government service, unless they resign their posts during the term they are deputies.
6. Fraudulent bankrupts.
7. Murderers, thieves, and criminals who have undergone punishment according to Islamic law, and persons notorious as murderers and robbers and the like, who have not legally exculpated themselves.
8. Persons under 20 or over 70 years of age.
9. Persons whose departure from the true faith of Islam has been proved before one of the qualified doctors of theology; or who are open heretics.

CHAPTER IV.—*Regarding the Formation of the Superintending Committee.*

Arts. 9 to 14. Provide for a temporary committee to supervise elections, under the local governor, and some members of the local Assembly.

CHAPTER V.—*Electoral System.*

Art. 15. The elections in the whole of Persia will be by two degrees.

*Explanation (A).*—The meaning of "election by two degrees" is that, first, in the quarters of a town or in the towns of an electoral district a particular number (of persons) are chosen—who are called "the elected"—and afterwards, these (persons) elected in the first degree meet at the centre of the electoral district and elect from among themselves the desired number; and these persons so elected in the second degree are called "representatives."

*Explanation (B).*—The meaning of "electoral district" is that portion of the kingdom which, in accordance with the regulations, elects one or more persons collectively to be members of the National Assembly; if even that portion (of the kingdom) should be under one or more governors. The centre of a district is that spot where the elections in the second degree for that district take place.

Art. 16. The elections in the first and second degree will in general be conducted on the plural vote system, excepting in such places where, in accordance with the distribution provided by the regulations, they have not the right to vote for more than one person, in which case the elections will be conducted on the single vote system.

*Explanation.*—The meaning of "plural voting" is that every voter will inscribe on his voting paper the names of all the persons to be elected for that district; the single vote system is that every voter will inscribe on his voting paper the name of one person.

Art. 17. The elections in the first degree will be by a relative majority; and the elections in the second degree will be by a full majority.

*Explanation.*—The meaning of a "full majority" is that more than half the electors give their votes in favour of an individual.

Art. 18. Those persons who obtain a full majority of votes from the total number of electors of the electoral district will be accepted as members of the National Assembly, independently of the second degree election.

Art. 19. In the elections of the second degree, if on the first and second occasion a full majority is not acquired by a candidate, the same person can be elected on the third occasion by a relative majority.

Art. 20. In case of equal votes being given to two or more persons, and should it be necessary to choose one from among them, that person shall be chosen by lot.

Art. 21. In the elections of the first degree the number of persons to be elected for each division will be three times the number for that division stipulated in Art. 2.

Art. 22. In the Tehran electoral district the elections in the first degree will be conducted in five quarters of the town, each of which, under the direction of a Mayor, in accordance with the arrangements to be made by the supervising committee.

Art. 23. In the provincial electoral districts the election in each town of that district will be on a relative majority basis. Afterwards these persons elected in the first degree will meet in the centre of the district on the date fixed by the central supervising committee, and they will all together elect from among themselves by a vote of the majority the number of deputies provided for in Art. 2.

Art. 24. The five principal tribes—Shahseven of Azerbaijan, Bakhtiari, Kashgai, the Khamseh tribes of Fars, and the Turcomans—will, in accordance with the stipulations of the regulations, each send a deputy direct to the National Assembly. The electoral system for the tribes is also of two degrees. The number of electors in the first degree for each tribe, however, and the electoral centre in the first degree, will be fixed by the Ministry of the Interior. In this case the elections of the second degree will be by lot.

Art. 25. In case the persons elected in the small towns should not present themselves in the electoral centre of their districts at the time fixed for their meeting by the central supervising committee their right to vote for that session will be forfeited, and those persons who were present at the time fixed will elect from among themselves.

Art. 26. Each elector has not the right to give more than one vote, excepting in case a second election is necessary.

Art. 27. In the first degree the electors are not necessarily to be obliged to elect a member who is a resident in their district.

CHAPTER VI.—*The Supply of Electoral Vouchers to entitle the Electors to vote.*

Art. 28. The supervising committee will prepare a notice, and in accordance with the importance of the locality will give from five to fifteen days' notice before the date fixed for the elections.



Art. 29. The above-mentioned notice will contain the following matters :—

1. Qualifications for electors and candidates.
2. The place and time where the supervising committee or its branches will issue electoral vouchers.
3. The place where, and time when, the supervising committee will be ready to receive the votes.
4. The number of representatives whom the possessors of electoral vouchers must elect.

Art. 30. If the persons who are qualified to vote do not obtain electoral vouchers during the days specified for that purpose, they will forfeit the right to vote for that session.

Art. 31. The electoral vouchers given to the electors will contain the following matters :—

1. Number and date.
2. The name of the holder of the voucher and his father's name.
3. His profession and address.
4. The time and place where the holder of the voucher must give his vote.
5. The hour of opening and closing of the elections.
6. The seal or signature of the members of the supervising committee.

Art. 32. The supervising committee or its branches will enter all the electoral vouchers, with their numbers, in a special register.

CHAPTER VII.—*Regarding the Collection and Verification of Votes, and the Certification of those Elected.*

Arts. 33 to 51.

CHAPTER VIII.—*Regarding Complaints concerning the Elections.*

Arts. 52 to 56.

CHAPTER IX.—*Miscellaneous.*

Art. 57. As soon as one person over and above half the deputies, i.e., 61 persons, are ready in Tehran, the Assembly will open. And their decisions, by a vote of the majority, will be valid and in force.

Art. 58. The beginning of the two years' session will be on the day the National Assembly opens.

Art. 59. After the expiration of the term of two years deputies must again be elected, and the people are at liberty to re-elect any of the previous deputies they wish.

Art. 60. The pay of the deputies depends on the decision and approval of the Assembly.

Art. 61. The travelling expenses of the deputies, both of the first and second degree, both coming and going, will be paid to them by the local governor with the knowledge of the supervising committee, at the rate of 5 krans per farsakh (4 miles), plus 5 tomans for the expenses of five days' stay at the centre of the electoral district.

Art. 62. If ever a member of the National Assembly should resign or die, and more than three months remain of the session, the National Assembly will elect another person to take his place by a vote of the majority.

Art. 63. Elections will begin in Tehran ten days after these regulations have received the Imperial signature; and in the provinces the supervising committee will be formed, and begin elections five days after the receipt of the regulations.

Here follows the annex to the electoral law, see Art. 2.

Then comes Thursday, 12th Jemadi-ul-Sani, 1327, Takhagouil (1st July, 1909).

Signature of members of the committee for the elaboration of the electoral regulations :—

FARMAN FARMA, MUSHIR-ED-DOWLEH, MOTAMIN-UL-MULK, MUSTAUFU-UL-MAMALEK, SANI-ED-DOWLEH, MUKHBER-UL-MULK, MUIN-ED-DOWLEH, MOHANDIS-UL-MAMALEK, MUSHTASHAR-ED-DOWLEH, HAJI SEYYID NASRULLAH, ASSADULLAH, MIRZA, HUSSEIN, KULI KHAN NAWAB, MUSHTASHAR-ES-SULTAN, KASHIF-ES-SULTANEH, NAZM-ED-DOWLEH, AMIN-I-DURBAR.

In the name of God, the Blessed and the Exalted.

His Excellency Saad-ed-Dowleh, President of the (Council of) Ministers.

The regulations for the election of deputies which, in accordance with our exalted command, has been elaborated by a special committee and is composed of sixty-three articles, are correct.

Have them printed and distributed immediately; the Minister of the Interior will also, without delay, proceed to make the necessary arrangements for elections in Tehran and the provinces.

MOHAMMED ALI SHAH KAJAR.

12 Jemadi-ul-Akher, 1327 (July 1, 1909).

ANNEX to Electoral Law (see Article 2).

Electoral District.	Centre of District.	Number of Deputies.	Persons elected, 1st Degree.	Place of Election, 1st Degree.	Number of Persons to be elected (1st Degree) in each District.
Tehran and surroundings	Tehran	15	45	Dowlet Sengelej and Shahr No Oudlajan Chalemeidan Bazar	As fixed by Superintending Committee.
Azerbaijan	Tabreez	19	57	Tabreez	23
				Urumia	5
				Khoi	4
				Dilmeghan	1
				Maku	1
				Maragha	2
				Bonab	1
				Miandoab	1
				Soujboulak	2
				Dehkargan	1
				Marand	1
				Ahar	2
				Arbebil	4
				Mishkin	1
				Astara	1
				Khalkhal	1
				Serab	1
				Mianeh	1
				Saien Kaleh	1
Shahseven of Azer-n (tribe)	To be fixed by Ministry of Interior	1	..	To be fixed by Ministry of Interior	..
Khorassan	Meshed	11	33	Meshed	12
				Kuchan	8
				Bujnurd	2
				Derejez	1
				Jam and Bakherz	1
				Nishapur	3
				Sabzevar	4
				Khaf	1
				Turshiz	1
				Turbat Haydari	3
				Tun	1
				Tabas	1
Kum	Kum	1	3	Kum	3
Kashan	Kashan	2	6	Kashan	4
				Josheghan	1
				Natanz	1
Kurdistan	Senneh	3	9	Senneh	4
				Sakkis	2
				Baneh	1
				Ourenian	1
				Merivan	1



Electoral District.	Centre of District.	Number of Deputies.	Persons elected, 1st Degree.	Place of Election, 1st Degree.	Number of Persons to be elected (1st Degree) in each District.
Kermanshah ..	Kermanshah ..	3	9	Kermanshah .. Sanger .. Kengaver ..	6 2 1
Gerrus ..	Bijar ..	1	3	Bijar ..	3
Gulpaigan Khonsar Kemereh Mahallat	Gulpaigan ..	2	6	Gulpaigan .. Khonsar .. Kemereh .. Mahallat and other districts	2 1 1 2
Gilan and Talish ..	Resht..	5	15	Resht.. .. Enzeli .. Lahijan .. Rudbar and Dilman .. Lengerood .. Fomen .. Kerganrood .. Talish Dulab ..	6 2 3 1 1 1 1 1
Luristan ..	Khorremabad ..	2	6	Khorremabad .. Poshtekuh ..	4 2
Mazanderan ..	Sari ..	4	12	Sari .. .. Barfrush .. Amol .. .. Tenekabun .. Savadkuh .. Ashref .. .. Meshedisser .. Nur district ..	2 3 1 2 1 1 1 1
Seistan and Kainat..	Birjand ..	1	3	Nosretabad and Seistan .. Birjand ..	1 2
Fars ..	Shiraz ..	8	24	Shiraz .. .. Kazeroon .. Behbahan .. Neiriz .. .. Abadeh .. .. Lah .. .. .. Fassa .. .. Jahrum .. .. Keledar .. .. Darabgird ..	10 2 3 1 1 3 1 1 1 1
Kashgai (tribe) ..	To be fixed by Ministry of Interior	1	To be fixed by Ministry of Interior	To be fixed by Ministry of Interior	To be fixed by Ministry of Interior.
Khamseh (tribes) ..	Fixed by Ministry of Interior	1	Fixed by Ministry of Interior	Fixed by Ministry of Interior	Fixed by Ministry of Interior.
Ports and isles ..	Bushire ..	2	6	Bushire .. .. Borazjan .. Dashti and Dashtistan .. Bunder Abbas .. Bunder Khamir and isles .. Lingah ..	2 1 1 1 1 1
Kerman ..	Kerman ..	5	15	Kerman .. .. Rafsinjam .. Sirjan and Saidabad .. Khabis .. .. Raver .. .. Zarand .. .. Aghta and Afsha ..	8 2 1 1 1 1 1

Electoral District.	Centre of District.	Number of Deputies.	Persons elected, 1st Degree.	Place of Election, 1st Degree.	Number of Person to be elected (1st Degree) in each District.
Baluchistan, Bam, and Narmashir	Bam ..	1	3	Bam .. .. Baluchistan ..	2 1
Astrabad..	Astrabad ..	1	3	Astrabad ..	3
Turcomans (tribes)..	Fixed by Ministry of Interior	1	Fixed by Ministry of Interior	Fixed by Ministry of Interior	Fixed by Ministry of Interior.
Ispahan ..	Ispahan ..	3	9	Ispahan .. .. Kumishah .. Nejefabad .. Kapaye .. .. Ardistan ..	5 1 1 1 1
Bakhtiari (tribe) ..	Fixed by Ministry of Interior	1	To be fixed by Ministry of Interior	To be fixed by Ministry of Interior	To be fixed by Ministry of Interior.
Burujird ..	Burujird ..	2	6	Fixed by Ministry of Interior	Fixed by Ministry of Interior.
Khamseh and Tarim	Zenjan ..	2	6	Zenjan .. .. Abhar .. .. Tarim .. ..	4 1 1
Saveh and Zarand ..	Saveh ..	1	3	Saveh .. .. Zarand .. ..	2 1
Semnan and Damghan	Semnan ..	1	3	Semnan .. .. Damghan ..	2 1
Shahrud and Bastam	Shahrud ..	1	3	Shahrud .. .. Bastam .. ..	2 1
Irak ..	Sultanabad ..	2	6	Sultanabad .. Ashtian .. .. Tafrish .. ..	4 1 1
Arabistan ..	Shuster ..	3	9	Shuster .. .. Dizful .. .. Mohammerah and tribes .. Nasiri (Ahwaz)..	2 3 3 1
Firuzkuh..	Demavend ..	1	3	Demavend .. .. Firuzkuh .. ..	2 1
Kazvin ..	Kazvin ..	2	6	Kazvin .. .. Tarum .. .. Kharakan .. .. Talekan .. ..	3 1 1 1
Malayir ..	Dowletabad ..	2	6	Dowletabad .. Nahavend .. .. Toserkkan ..	3 2 1
Hamadan and Assadabad	Hamadan ..	2	6	Hamadan .. .. Assadabad ..	5 1
Yezd and district ..	Yezd ..	3	9	Yezd .. .. Nain .. .. Babek .. .. Ardekan .. .. Akda .. ..	5 2 1 1 1

Non-Moslems—such as Armenians, Chaldeans, Parsees, and Jews—4 deputies.



[30698]

No. 427.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 16.)*

(No. 142.)

Sir,

Gulahek, July 23, 1909.

IN continuation of my despatch No. 134A, I have the honour to report that the nationalist forces entered Tehran at 6 o'clock in the morning of the 13th instant. The enclosed memorandum by Mr. Churchill gives an account of the circumstances of their entry and the fighting that ensued.

On learning by telephone what had happened, I sent Major Stokes and Mr. Churchill to town, the former to control the admission of refugees to the legation, and the latter to watch the course of events and report. Both were, if possible, to get into touch with Sipahdar and Sardar Assad, and enjoin upon them the necessity of maintaining order. The news which reached me by telephone just before it was cut was to the effect that the nationalist forces were in possession of the town, and that good order reigned. It transpired later that this was not accurate; only a portion of the capital was in their possession, and street fighting was in progress in other parts of the town. My Russian colleague's first information was of a very alarmist nature, so much so that he asked whether I did not think it would be well to bring on the Russian cavalry which was already in the neighbourhood of Kazvin. I told him that the reports which had reached me showed that there was at present no danger to foreigners. Fortunately my colleague's later intelligence convinced him that foreigners were only exposed to risks from stray bullets. Indeed, Mr. Churchill and M. Evreinow, whom M. Sabline had sent to town, were able later to report that Sipahdar and Sardar Assad had given them the most satisfactory assurances as regards the safety of foreign interests at the hands of the nationalists. Throughout the fighting there was of course danger from stray bullets; but, so far as I know, only one foreigner, an Austrian, was hit, and his wound was slight. There was absolutely no looting on the part of the nationalists, though one British house was cleared of everything by some of the armed roughs who fought on the royalist side. These scoundrels were the only persons who did any looting. The assurances given by the nationalist leaders to the representatives of the two legations were thus justified, and I may here mention that after the first news of the entry of the nationalist forces into the town my Russian colleague, until the end of the crisis, never again wavered in his resolve to keep the Russian troops at Kazvin, and this notwithstanding the strong pressure to which he was subjected from Colonel Liakhov and M. Exemplarow, the director of the Russian bank, and despite much unfair criticism from the mischievous correspondent of the "Novoe Vremya."

Soon after the fighting began in town, a report reached me that the Shah was about to bombard Tehran, and M. Sabline and I agreed to send in a joint protest to His Majesty. I drafted a stiff note, which we afterwards toned down, as in the meantime my colleague had received from the Shah a private assurance that the bombardment would not take place.

Early next morning, however, we heard the boom of guns in the direction of Kasr Kajar, and it was clear that the Shah had broken his promise. A little later His Majesty sent us word that he had intended not to bombard Tehran without giving twenty-four hours' notice so as to give time to foreigners to leave the town, but that the revolutionaries were attacking his palace in the capital and he therefore had been compelled to begin the bombardment at once. My colleague and I immediately proceeded to Sultanabad and begged His Majesty to desist and to proclaim a truce for negotiations. In reply he proceeded to complain that we had repeatedly tied his hands by dissuading him from attacking the revolutionaries. These had now entered Tehran and were attacking his palace. We could not expect him not to do his utmost to oppose them. Finally he declared that he would only grant a truce if the revolutionaries laid down their arms. Except for the rescue of Tabreez, it is not the case that the Shah has ever been restrained in his plans against the revolutionaries, but I did not think it worth while entering upon a discussion on this point. I therefore merely reminded His Majesty that the rôle of the two legations, since he had restored the constitution, had been to urge conciliation upon both sides; unfortunately our advice had not been followed by the revolutionaries. It was urgent now to consider what could be done to save the situation, and, in the opinion of the two representatives, the only hope lay in His Majesty proclaiming a truce. He said it would be impossible, as he could not communicate with his troops, who were surrounded and were being constantly attacked.

In these circumstances an indispensable preliminary was that the revolutionaries should lay down their arms. We replied that it was useless to expect the victors to consent to this, but if His Majesty would proclaim a truce for negotiations we thought we could arrange that the message should reach both revolutionaries and royalists. His Majesty, however, would not hear of this and repeated that the revolutionaries must first surrender.

On leaving the palace we met Saad-ed-Dowleh, who, on learning the barren results of our representations, asked us to defer informing Sipahdar and Sardar Assad, whom we had apprised of our audience, until he had seen His Majesty. Meanwhile, Mr. Churchill and M. Baranowsky, who had been sent early in the morning, at the request of the Shah, to try to induce the nationalist leaders to negotiate, had had to turn back because of the fighting, which was then at its hottest. Saad-ed-Dowleh's conversation with His Majesty, it may here be said, led to the appointment of a deputation with the object of opening negotiations, but there was delay in getting some of the members to accept the task, and after the deputation was finally formed a first attempt to enter the town failed. When it eventually succeeded in getting into the capital two days later, the Shah had already taken bast in the Russian Legation and Colonel Liakhov had made terms.

Some hours after our audience, M. Sabline heard from Colonel Liakhov, who was defending the Cossack barracks, that he could not hold out much longer. My colleague hoped that before it came to this point the Shah would have taken bast, in which case Colonel Liakhov, whose mission would then *ipso facto* have terminated, would have been able to make terms without actually surrendering; and, indeed, M. Sabline, when I saw him in the afternoon, believed that the Shah would arrive that evening. He told me that he had sent M. Evreinow to discuss terms for Colonel Liakhov's surrender with the two Sardars.

M. Evreinow proceeded to Baharistan, the nationalist head-quarters, and requested the two Sardars to desist from attacking the Cossack barracks. He asked what would be done with the officers and men if they delivered up their arms—whether they would be allowed to continue their service under the future Persian Government, and whether the Nationalist leaders could guarantee that as far as possible they would run no danger. To this the Sardars replied that the nationalists had always acted on the defensive, and that after the officers and men of the Cossack brigade had handed over their arms there would be no necessity for the nationalists to defend themselves any longer. The Cossacks would be free to go to their homes or remain in their barracks as non-combatants. The Sardars added that the constitutional Government would be in need of well-organised troops, and therefore the Cossacks would be used and would continue to receive their usual pay. Their safety after laying down their arms would be guaranteed as far as possible. M. Evreinow returned to Zergandeh with this answer, but, owing to the bombardment from Kasr Kajar, he could not get into Tehran the following day, the 15th, to continue the negotiations, and the fighting in parts of the town continued, although Colonel Liakhov is believed to have at one time ordered the royalist troops to cease firing.

M. Sabline was not satisfied with the terms offered by the nationalists to the brigade, as they did not make it clear that the Russian officers would be retained by the new Government. He asked me to join with him in pressing this point. I consented, and we agreed that Mr. Churchill and M. Baranowsky should early the following morning, the 16th, make the best of their way to Baharistan and endeavour to obtain a satisfactory undertaking in writing. By the time they started, the Shah, his family, and a number of his entourage, including Naib-es-Saltaneh, Amir Bahadur Jang, Mufakher-ul-Mulk, and Mujallah-es-Sultan, had taken bast in the Russian legation.

We at once informed Sipahdar and Sardar Assad by telegraph, and took steps to make it known as widely as possible. Colonel Liakhov's mission had now ended, and he could surrender with honour. Mr. Churchill and M. Baranowsky succeeded in making their way to Baharistan, and obtained from the nationalist leaders a written undertaking that the Russian officers and the Cossack brigade should continue for the present to serve the new Government under the orders of the Minister of War.

Mr. Churchill and M. Baranowsky were able to inform Colonel Liakhov of this undertaking, and he was asked to come to the Imperial Bank, whither a Bakhtiari chief would be sent to escort him to Baharistan. The bank was conveniently situated for this purpose, being between the opposing forces. Colonel Liakhov reached the bank with an escort of Cossacks, which he afterwards dismissed, and on the arrival of Yusuf Khan, Sardar Assad's brother, he proceeded in the carriage with him, under Bakhtiari



and fedai escort, accompanied by the two dragomans, to Baharistan, where he placed himself and his brigade at the service of the new Government. It is perhaps worth mentioning that in his drive to Baharistan Colonel Liakhov was cheered all along the route.

Desultory firing continued for a while in certain parts of the capital, but by the evening the town was perfectly quiet. A meeting of nationalist notables—an extraordinary grand council, as it was styled—was held in the afternoon at Baharistan, and decided to proclaim the abdication of Muhammad Ali and the appointment of the Vali Ahd, Sultan Ahmad, as his successor, with Azad-ul-Mulk as temporary Regent. The council also elected Sipahdar as Minister of War and Sardar Assad as Minister of the Interior, and appointed a committee of twenty-five leading nationalists for the guidance of the Ministers. The proclamation of the change of Sovereigns was not at once issued, the committee desiring first to announce it to Muhammad Ali by a deputation. The dispatch of this deputation was contemplated for the following day, and a telegram from Sipahdar and Sardar Assad was received by the two legations on the following morning announcing the committee's intention, and asking us to ascertain when Prince Muhammad Ali would receive the deputation. My Russian colleague waited upon the ex-Shah with this message, to which His Majesty replied that, "having left Sultanabad he had already abdicated. It was therefore unnecessary for him to receive any deputation." This reply we telegraphed to the nationalist leaders.

Although the Shah's successor was not named in the Sardar's telegram, Muhammad Ali knew that the Vali Ahd had been selected, and a painful scene ensued after His Majesty had directed M. Sabline as to the reply to the nationalist leaders. His Majesty declared to my Russian colleague that he would not allow his favourite son to be separated from his parents, and for a time, indeed, it seemed that he would stand firm on this point. The Vali Ahd's mother, who kept appearing from time to time in the doorway, quite broke down. Finally, however, the Shah asked M. Sabline to arrange that if the Vali Ahd was placed on the throne he should be allowed to travel abroad with his mother for a time, or, failing this, that his second son might be made Shah. M. Sabline left His Majesty under the impression that we would endeavour to obtain the consent of the committee to one of these alternatives, but on talking it over together we thought that the proposed step might jeopardise the chances of the dynasty. We had reason to fear that the nationalists might snatch at the opportunity offered by Muhammad Ali's hesitation to allow his eldest son to accept the throne, to look elsewhere for a candidate. We felt, too, that the first proposal was one which would certainly not be entertained, as we knew the nationalists to be eager to get the boy away from his surroundings; and as regards the second alternative, even if the nationalists agreed, we felt that the Vali Ahd would later regret the action taken by his parents, in which case he might perhaps come forward as a pretender in later years. We accordingly decided not to put forward Muhammad Ali's proposals, and it was soon evident that it was well that we had done so, for the Shah very shortly let M. Sabline know that we were in no case to run any risk of losing the throne for the dynasty.

The proclamation announcing the change of Sovereign appeared in the afternoon, and the official notification was received by the legations on the following day, the 18th July. I enclose copies of both documents. It will be noticed that in the latter Muhammad Ali is declared to have been deposed, whereas in the proclamation he is stated to have abdicated spontaneously. On the same day, the 18th July, the little Shah left the Russian Legation and proceeded under an escort from the two legations to the Palace of Sultanabad, where he received a deputation from the grand council, who formally announced to him his elevation to the throne. I enclose an account of this ceremony by Major Stokes, who was present.

Three days later, on the 21st instant, my Russian colleague and I officially notified the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that the two Governments recognised Sultan Ahmad as Shah of Persia.

The country has thus succeeded in ridding the throne of Muhammad Ali. Although, for reasons of *amour-propre*, some slight feeling of regret is natural that our programme of reforms failed of its object, one cannot but recognise that a constitutional régime established independently of the two Powers, and inaugurated by the dethronement of a detested and worthless Sovereign, stands a very different chance from one obtained for the country by outside pressure which stopped short of demanding the thing most needed, a change of Sovereign. The resolution shown by the nationalist forces, who persisted to the end, notwithstanding the fear of foreign intervention, as well as the moderation of which they have given proof by refraining

from all unnecessary bloodshed, and by merely transferring the throne to the next in succession, have surprised many with long experience of Persia, and were it not that the chaotic condition of most of the provinces forbids one to hope, one might even say that they are of good augury for the future.

On the whole, then, and putting aside considerations of *amour-propre*, I am disposed to rejoice at the failure of our programme. There was a time when it seemed assured of such measure of success as would have been involved by the meeting of an assembly under Muhammad Ali, but there was never but a very faint hope that, with so false and intriguing a Sovereign, a constitutional régime could have worked more satisfactorily than that upset by the *coup d'État* of last year. All that could reasonably be hoped of it was that it would be better than Muhammad Ali's unfettered rule. Muhammad Ali is now deposed, and the field lies open for a second and more promising experiment in parliamentary government.

Before closing this despatch I should like to record my appreciation of the services during the recent crisis of Major Stokes, Mr. Churchill, and Major O'Connor, His Majesty's consul in Seistan, who was staying in Tehran at the time and who placed himself at my disposal. All three did most useful work in town in circumstances of considerable danger. I should also like to mention the work of Dr. Scott, of the Indo-European Telegraph Department, who, having removed into the legation because his house was in the line of fire, did admirable service in attending the wounded brought into the legation. I did not allow Dr. Neligan to go to his assistance, as the approaches to the legation were dangerous and I did not wish anyone to run unnecessary risks, so that Dr. Scott did his work single-handed. Lastly, I should wish to record my recognition of the good sense and calm shown by the British community, which was in marked contrast with the attitude of certain other foreign subjects. Not a single alarmist report reached me from a British source during the whole of the three days' fighting, and this notwithstanding that several British houses, being in the line of fire, suffered considerably. I fear that my Russian colleague was very differently treated by his compatriots.

I have, &c.  
G. BARCLAY.

Inclosure 1 in No. 427.

Memorandum by Mr. Churchill, July 16th, 1909.

ON the 9th July the forces under Sipahdar left Kerej, about 1,000 strong, in a south-easterly direction toward Robat Kerim, where Sardar Assad was encamped with about 1,200 Bakhtiari.

Amir Mufakham, the royalist Bakhtiari chief, with about 200 men, advanced at the same time to meet the Sipahdar; and the following morning when the Sipahdar's mixed force of Caucasians and Persians, which I will call "fedai" for lack of a better term, met these Bakhtiari they took them for Sardar Assad's men. The royalists, who used the red flag of the nationalists, tried to take the fedai by surprise and to disarm them; but the ruse was soon discovered and a sharp engagement took place, and the royalists withdrew. Later in the day Sardar Assad arrived on the scene, but the fedai, not distinguishing them from the royalists, fired upon them, killing five men and wounding many others. The mistake was discovered in time, and the two nationalist forces joined hands at Badumek, where on the 11th and 12th they repulsed repeated attacks delivered on their position by a force of some 400 Cossacks under Captain Zapolsky, supported by the Shah's irregulars and the royalist Bakhtiari with several guns, and maintained their position in the face of severe artillery fire.

On the night of the 12th July the combined nationalist force marched between the opposing Cossacks and irregulars, who were posted at Shahabad, Ahmedabad, and Yaftabad, between them and Tehran. Owing to what appears to have been gross mismanagement on the part of Captain Zapolsky, they succeeded in getting through unnoticed, and at 6 A.M. on the 13th July the whole nationalist force entered Tehran by the north or Yussufabad Gate, which was not held against them. They rode three abreast past the British Legation, and shortly afterwards, dividing into three columns, proceeded to the Baharistan or assembly building, which they reached practically without opposition. The soldiers on duty at the various guard-houses were disarmed without difficulty, though two or three men were killed and wounded at the guard-house opposite the main gate of the legation. A column which descended the Legation



Street towards the Artillery Square was fired upon by soldiers posted in the square, the various gates of which were immediately closed.

The three northern and the three eastern gates of the town were immediately taken possession of by the Bakhtiari, but three western gates remained in the hands of the Cossacks. During the course of the morning Captain Zapolsky with the 400 Cossacks under him entered the town by one of these gates and joined Colonel Liakhoff, who was throughout at the Cossack barracks in the western part of the town with 400 men. The remaining 300 Cossacks under Captain Peribinoszeff remained at Sultan-atabad with the Shah, who had besides some 2,000 men under Amir Bahadur who have taken no part whatever in the hostilities.

Throughout the three days on which hostilities lasted, viz., the 13th, 14th, and 15th July, the Cossacks remained on the defensive in and around their barracks, while an irregular force of some 300 absolutely undisciplined men held the Gun Square; the main forces, under Sipahdar and Sardar Assad, held the rest of the town with their headquarters at the Baharistan, whilst a determined body of fedai crept gradually as close to the barracks as possible, using their Mausers with great effect and throwing bombs at night.

On the 14th the Shah declared that he intended to stake his all on a determined combined attack on the town by all the forces at his disposal, and take refuge at the Russian Legation if it failed. The attack proved a complete failure. Captain Peribinoszeff shelled the Baharistan quarter from the hills near Kasr-i-Kajar, which covered an attack by some of the irregulars in the Dotchantupeh Gate. The Bakhtiaris, however, appeared in such force to defend that approach that the attacking party fled in confusion, while the bombardment produced no impression whatever. Colonel Liakhoff endeavoured to shell the Baharistan at the same time, but the range must have been most inaccurate, as a number of the shells exploded above the Imperial Bank, and one actually crashed through one of the rooms while I was there, without doing much harm.

I spent the night at the Imperial Bank, and realised from experience the demoralising effect of the use by the fedai of bombs at night, when they were able to creep right up to the royalists' positions and throw them. The most severe engagement occurred in the direction of Mr. Barker's house, which has suffered considerably from shell fire. In this quarter the fedai occupied houses and crept very close up to the Cossack barracks.

It was perfectly clear to anyone who could see what was actually going on at Tehran that, though it might be possible to keep up the fight for a considerable time, by avoiding big engagements, it was quite impossible for the Shah's forces to dislodge the nationalists, now strongly reinforced by their sympathisers in the town. But the Shah was assured by his Persian officers that victory might still be his. Consequently, the following day, the 15th July, further attempts were made by his irregulars to attack the gates, but the Cossacks remained entirely on the defensive. Every attack was, however, repulsed with enormous loss for the royalists. During the day a small number of the royalist Bakhtiaris contrived to reach a house near the British Legation, and a great deal of firing went on between them and the "fedai." The head of the legation gholams, who was standing at the main gate of the legation, was struck in the thigh by a bullet, but the wound is fortunately not dangerous, and he is progressing favourably. About 150 Armenians who live in the quarter, finding themselves in danger, took refuge in the legation, where at first Major Stokes, and later Major O'Connor, His Majesty's consul for Seistan, who was in Tehran on his way to his post, was placed in charge.

Dr. Scott and Mr. Baggaley, with their wives and Dr. Scott's children, also came to the legation, as their houses were in the zone of fire and they were in some danger.

The casualties in this part of the town were considerable, and wounded men were constantly being brought into the legation, where Dr. Scott formed a temporary hospital. I went over it on the 15th, when he had about ten patients, who had increased to fifteen by the following day, though several had died in the meantime. The wounds in some cases were of a shocking character, and I venture to say that Dr. Scott deserves the highest praise for the admirable way in which he has devoted himself to the wounded, and spared no pains single-handed to alleviate the sufferings of these poor men.

On the 15th a number of shells exploded over the legation garden, and one, which failed to explode, actually fell in the garden. No damage has been done to the buildings.

On the 16th the Shah took refuge at the Russian Legation and fighting ceased.

I should also like to state that the British colony at Tehran has shown remarkable calmness throughout the three very trying days that these hostilities lasted. The staffs of the Imperial Bank and the Indo-European Telegraph Department and Company remained in town the whole time, and many of them went to their offices as usual through the quarters where fighting was going on, but I have not heard of a single murmur of complaint from any one of them.

The correspondents—Mr. Fraser, of the "Times," and Mr. Maloney, of Reuter—were in town throughout, and even took their places in the trenches, from which they saw the fighting.

On the other hand, I believe that the manager of the Russian bank was so alarmed that he left his post and actually telegraphed that Russian troops should be sent to protect foreigners, as they were in imminent danger.

I venture, however, to state my absolute conviction that at no time have any foreigners been in any danger, excepting, of course, from stray bullets, provided they took normal precautions.

The "fedai" and the Bakhtiaris show remarkable respect towards foreigners, and on my way from the bank to the legation I walked down a street occupied at one end by royalists and at the other by revolutionaries without the slightest danger of being shot at.

On the three occasions on which I have driven to the Baharistan I have found the "fedai" there most respectful, and the crowds assembled at the gates of the Medjliss always cheered the legation sowars and gholams.

G. P. CHURCHILL.

Inclosure 2 in No. 427.

*Proclamation.*

AS the circumstances of the country of Persia show that the restoration of order and security in the country and the establishment of rights and confidence in the heart of the nation could not be restored without the change of Sovereign, and as the former Sovereign is perfectly aware of the great displeasure which the people entertain towards him, he therefore has taken refuge in the Russian Legation under the protection of Great Britain and Russia. His Majesty has spontaneously (or naturally) abdicated from the crown and throne of Persia. Therefore in the absence of the Senate and the National Assembly an extraordinary Grand Council, in view of the necessities of the case, was convoked at once on Friday, the 27th Jamadi II, 1327 (16th July, 1909), in the Palace of Baharistan in Tehran. His Imperial Majesty, Sultan Ahmad Mirza, the Heir Apparent of Persia, has been appointed the Shah-in-Shah of Persia. For the present the regency has been confided to his Excellency Azad-ul-Mulk, so that after the convocation of Parliament, in accordance with article 38 of the constitutional law respecting the regency, and in accordance with the exigencies of the time, a definite arrangement will be made.

SIPAH DAR AZAM,  
Minister of War.  
ALI KULI,  
Minister of Interior.

Inclosure 3 in No. 427.

*Official Notification by the Persian Government.*

WHEREAS the disturbances in Persia and the disorders in the provinces render necessary a reorganisation of the Government administrations and this has been recognised by all Persians, and whereas, in view of the conditions of the time, the state of the kingdom and the dislike of the public for Muhammad Ali Mirza, it was impossible to obtain the rights and security of the nation without a change of Sovereign, therefore in the absence of the Senate and Assembly an extraordinary Grand Council was convoked on the 16th July at Tehran, at the Baharistan. Members of this Council, who are the chiefs of the fedai, the clergy, princes, notables, and aristocracy, and a number of previous deputies, decided, by vote of the majority, upon the deposition of Mohammad Ali Mirza, and, in accordance with articles 36 and 37 of the fundamental



law, His Majesty Sultan Ahmad Mirza was appointed Sovereign, and the regency was given temporarily to Azad-ul-Mulk. After the opening of Parliament, in accordance with article 38 of the fundamental law, a definite arrangement will be made regarding the regency.

We therefore address this official letter informing you of the deposition of Mohammad Ali Mirza and the accession of Sultan Ahmad Mirza to the sovereignty of Persia.

Inclosure 4 in No. 427.

*Memorandum by Major Stokes respecting the reception of Sultan Ahmad Shah by a Deputation from the Provisional Government.*

MUHAMMAD ALI having taken refuge in the Russian Legation, and having refused to receive a deputation which was to announce to him the accession of his son Sultan Ahmad to the throne of Persia, the latter was proclaimed Shah on the 17th July.

At 10 A.M. on the 18th July a deputation from the provisional Government awaited Sultan Ahmad Shah at the palace of Sultanabad. The deputation consisted of the Regent, Azad-ul-Mulk, and the following priests and notables:—

Agha Behbehani (son of Seyyid Abdullah, Mujtehed).

Agha Imamzadeh (son of the late and brother of the present Imam Juma, of Tehran).

Nizam-ul-Mulk.

Muwassaq-ed-Dowleh (formerly comptroller of the household to Muzaffar-ed-Din Shah).

Ala-ed-Dowleh.

Ala-ul-Mulk.

Sultan Ahmad Shah drove from the Russian Legation under an escort of Russian Cossacks and Indian sowars. In a second carriage were seated Muwassaq-ul-Mulk, comptroller of the heir-apparent's household, Zil-es-Sultaneh, cousin of Muhammad Ali, and two other Kajar Princes. M. Smirnoff, who for two or three years has been the new Shah's tutor, followed the procession in his own carriage in order to tell the escort when it was no longer required. On arrival at Sultanabad the combined escort withdrew. His Majesty alighted and walked from the gate of the garden to the palace. Some 30 yards from the building His Majesty was received by Azad-ul-Mulk, the venerable head of the Kajar tribe, who, in a kind but deferential manner, addressed a few words to him and invited him to enter the palace. The young Shah's manner was dignified, but just at first he seemed a little nervous. The deputation awaited His Majesty in the palace, to which only Persians were admitted, where the following address was read to him:—

"To His Majesty Sultan Ahmad Shah. Long may his kingdom and rule endure.

"As your Royal Sire, His Royal Highness Prince Muhammad Ali, has been excused from the important duty of Sovereign, in accordance with articles 36 and 37 of the fundamental laws, at an extraordinary council held on the 27th of Jamadi-us-Sani (16th July) in the Baharistan building, the sovereignty was conferred on your Imperial Majesty, and a proclamation was issued and the regency was temporarily entrusted to his Excellency Azad-ul-Mulk until, after the meeting of Parliament, according to article 38 of the fundamental laws, a final decision in the matter of the regency is given.

"The above communication is on behalf of the Extraordinary Grand Council by the agency of the delegates of that Grand Council officially conveyed to the foot of your Imperial Majesty's throne, and we who are here present on behalf of the whole body of your people offer your Majesty our sincere congratulations, and we pray God that the constitutional rule of your Majesty may be adorned with every kind of blessing and prosperity for the children of Persia, and that the progress and happiness of this kingdom may, under the shadow of your auspicious regard, increase and become perfected."

The reception was a very simple affair, and no one present was in uniform. In all there were not more than thirty people present, and it was remarked that, apart from

the two priests, the persons selected to be present were either members of the Kajar tribe or persons who belong to Court circles. No militant nationalist or prominent leader in recent events was present.

After the reception the Shah remained at Sultanabad, whence His Majesty a day or two later moved to Tehran.

C. B. S.

[30893]

No. 428.

*Consul-General Cox to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 16.)*

(No. 9. Commercial.)

Sir,

*Bushire, July 25, 1909.*

IN continuation of my despatch No. 8, Commercial, dated the 18th instant, I have the honour to submit a duplicate copy of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company's agreement with the Sheikh of Mohammerah,\* together with a memorandum for your information, containing notes in comment or elucidation of various points in the agreement which were the subject of special discussion in the course of our negotiations with the sheikh.

My proceedings in connection with the said negotiations were as follows:—

I left for Mohammerah on the 7th instant, immediately on receipt of the draft agreement and instructions received with Foreign Office despatch No. 1 of the 12th June.

Mr. McDouall, after so many years in Mohammerah, not having yet been able to complete his preparations for departure, and consequently not having handed over charge of the duties of His Majesty's Consulate, and being, moreover, anxious to avail himself of the present opportunity to bid farewell to Sheikh Khazal, accompanied me to Ahwaz, as also did Lieutenant Wilson and Mr. J. B. Lloyd, the agent of the Oil Company. We arrived there by steam launch on Sunday the 11th instant, and the negotiations occupied the ensuing five days.

This being the first important agreement which the sheikh had ever entered into with a European company, it was not surprising that he should feel that he was breaking new ground in which innumerable pit-falls might be awaiting him. He was, consequently, extremely nervous and apprehensive, with the result that every petty detail of the agreement had to be dissected, and discussed, and re-discussed *ad nauseam*. It was owing to this fact that it had to be entirely altered in form.

By Thursday evening, after four sittings, everything regarding which Mr. Lloyd and he could be brought to an understanding on business lines had been adjusted, and there remained only the three cardinal points about which the joint arguments of Mr. Lloyd and myself, as on behalf of the company, were unavailing. At this stage Mr. Lloyd retired from the discussion, in order to mark the fact that as far as the Oil Company were concerned he had gone as far as he could, and to let the sheikh see that he must either come to an understanding, on such advice on behalf of Government as I might give him, or else adjourn the negotiations pending further correspondence with London.

The three points of difference alluded to were:—

(i.) The question of the concurrency of the present agreement with the parent concession, on which the company insisted.

(ii.) The sheikh's demand for the substitution of the words "sons and lineal descendants," for the words "heirs and successors," both in the preamble and in article 18.

(iii.) The question of the reversion of the existing buildings to the sheikh on the expiry of the concession.

They are most convenient to handle in the above order.

As regards (i.) The sheikh pressed perseveringly for the retention of the stipulation inserted by him in his preliminary agreement, to the effect that at the expiry of the original period of the company's concession the possession of the land and buildings should lapse to himself or his heirs, and should, in the event of a renewal or extension, be leased by the company from him. That stipulation, it will be remembered, was rejected altogether by the company, and the joint negotiations of Mr. Lloyd and myself had reached a stage at which the sheikh had consented *prima facie* to drop the question of lease and to let the agreement be concurrent, in con-



sideration of a substantial advance in the figure of the rental for the second or any subsequent period.

In negotiating this latter point Mr. Lloyd had risen in conversation from 1,000*l.* to 1,300*l.* and informed the sheikh that he could not go beyond that. On retiring from the deliberations, however, he gave me authority, should I see fit, to use it in order to ensure completion of the agreement without recourse to further reference home, to raise the figure to 1,500*l.*

This I had to do by gradual stages and the point was eventually settled at that figure.

As regards (ii.) I beg to refer to the penultimate paragraph of my letter of the 16th May to the sheikh, enclosed with my despatch of the 12th June to His Majesty's Minister, which will doubtless have reached the Foreign Office before this communication. It will be seen that the sheikh then pressed for the substitution of these words, or their equivalent, in our assurances to him; and he evidently saw his opportunity in the negotiating of this agreement between himself and the oil company, under our auspices, to get us indirectly committed to a dynastic guarantee. I had discussed the point repeatedly with him in the presence of Mr. Lloyd, endeavouring to make the sheikh understand that the point was purely a political one already under correspondence and that he had no reasonable excuse for attempting to introduce a controversial political question of this nature into a purely commercial agreement with the oil company, who were simply concerned to be assured that their agreement would hold good both for his time and his successors. Who those successors might be was no concern of the oil company, and they could not be expected to make any pronouncement upon the question in their agreement; much less could they commit Government to father it.

I reminded the sheikh that I had undertaken to discuss this and other representations of his with the Minister and that I would do so, but that it was useless and unreasonable for him to expect to dispose of the question in the way he now sought to do.

As regards (iii.) Sheikh Khazal from the first assumed the attitude which I feared he would, and insisted on the assertion of a clear undertaking that the buildings should revert "to the sheikh or his lineal heirs" or words to that effect. He was extremely heated on this point and argued it excitedly for a very long time. It proved useless telling him that the buildings would be evacuated and left, and that he knew whether the Persian Government would be in a position to take them or not; or, that the present agreement would probably be seen at some time by the Persian Government and that, apart from the fact that the company were quite unable to insert the clause he wanted, even if they were able, it would be extremely shortsighted on his part to insert in the agreement a clause like that suggested, to which the Persian Government would at once take exception. The sheikh would not be persuaded and said that sooner than leave the matter in doubt he would much prefer to insert the clause and let the Persian Government see it now and do their worst. I did not, however, take him at his word and said that if he could not alter that view we would reserve the point for a private discussion.

He dropped the demand in his final interview with me on my undertaking to give him the separate assurance, in terms of which I attach a copy, backed by the threat to which I shall presently allude. He would not be put off with any ambiguous language and his ultimate argument was that unless he could be reasonably assured he would not consent to the company erecting any buildings at all but would erect them himself. This latter arrangement would not be satisfactory for the company and Mr. Lloyd had informed me that he could not accept it in any case on his own authority. But it would appear that the existence of this obvious alternative, whether employed or not, would afford a sufficient answer to any claim on the part of the Persian Government to the buildings. Moreover, should any question arise within the near future, resulting from the inception of a constitutional government at Tehran, it would be a simple matter to revise the agreement accordingly.

To have done so now would have held up the conclusion of the agreement indefinitely.

The ultimate lever which seemed to turn the scale in all these matters was the observation, or threat, that it was clear to me from the terms of their instructions that His Majesty's Government were anxious to help the company in this matter, and intended that the agreement should be put through without fail at the present meeting, and that they would be extremely displeased if I had to report that the sheikh had proved unreasonable. I added on my own account that if after the concessions already made by the company he did not complete the agreement the company would think it

hopeless to get fair terms from him, and would take their chance with the Persian Government direct, simply informing the latter that they needed a tract of uncultivated land on Abadan under the terms of their concession, and requesting that the Central Government would either assign it to them or instruct their Governor at Mohammerah to do so.

I imbibed this useful hint in the course of conversation with Haji Rais, who, I may mention, was most helpful throughout, and well deserved the honorarium which I understand the company decided to give him on the conclusion of the agreement.

I have, &c.

P. Z. COX, Major, British Resident in the Persian Gulf, and His Britannic Majesty's Consul-General for Fars, &c.

Inclosure 1 in No. 428.

*Consul-General Cox to the Sheikh of Mohammerah.*

(Translation.)

(After compliments.)

Ahwaz, July 16, 1909.

I HAVE the honour to state, with reference to article 8 of the agreement which has this day, the 16th July, 1909, been entered into between your Excellency and the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, that I am authorized to assure you that when the concession expires, should the Persian Government claim the buildings erected by the company on the lands held by the said company from yourself, the British Government will afford you assistance towards the realization of an adjustment which may leave the said buildings in your own possession.

(Usual complimentary ending.)

P. Z. COX, Major, Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, and His Britannic Majesty's Consul-General for Fars, &c.

Inclosure 2 in No. 428.

*Notes on the details of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company's Agreement with the Sheikh of Mohammerah, dated July 16, 1909.*

PREAMBLE.—"On behalf of himself, heirs, and successors," &c. This passage contains one of the three fundamental points on which the sheikh held out to the last minute. He insisted on the oil company substituting for "heirs and successors" the words "sons and lineal descendants." The manner of disposal of it is explained in the covering letter to this memorandum.

(ii.) It was considered important to insert at the outset the reference to the principal concession from the Persian Government and its exclusive character, as evidence of the sheikh's cognizance and recognition of it.

Article 1.—A right of way 30 yards wide, independent of the ground taken up for the pipeline, is a very liberal allowance.

Art. 2.—"Free of date trees." The sheikh feared that "uncultivated" might not be sufficient to protect ground bearing date trees, and therefore wished for this change.

(ii.) In the sheikh's skeleton agreement with me, he only gave the company option to purchase at the same rate up to one year; the company in their draft altered the period to three years, and the sheikh after discussion agreed to split the difference.

Art. 3.—(i.) The question of the reversion of the buildings arises in this article. It was as I anticipated the chief difficulty, and was got over eventually in the way explained in my covering letter.

(ii.) In connection with this article the sheikh was possessed with the fear that tribal enemies might, in order to do him injury, bore a hole in the pipe at any point where it was exposed, and by applying a match create an enormous conflagration, and that the company would come down on him for the damage.

I gather that it would be practically impossible to cause a serious fire in this way. Moreover, the company's buildings, oil, &c., will presumably be covered by insurance. The sheikh was greatly exercised as to his possible liability.



Art. 4.—(i.) In the wording of this article the word “lab” in the Persian meaning “lip” or “edge” has been designedly used in preference to “side” or “bank” which the sheikh used. This course was taken in order to preclude the possibility of the sheikh saying afterwards that the terms of this article would be fulfilled by his giving land some distance back from the river without frontage actually on it. This has occurred in a previous case.

(ii.) The sheikh expressed his objection to giving any land at all on the right bank. He argued that the right bank was not so secure in the first place, and that in the second place no land had ever been given on that bank, and if he gave any now much undesirable gossip would result; and that as he could not understand, and Mr. Lloyd could not explain, the object of the company in wanting land on the right bank he must decide not to give it. Mr. Lloyd saw no need to press the point, none of us present being able to see precisely what the company's reasons were for the request.

The sheikh's terms for this land are exceedingly accommodating and liberal, thanks to Haji Rais's good offices.

(iii.) It will be noted that the question of the reversion of buildings occurs again in this article.

Art. 5.—The endorsement of the deed by the tribal sheikhs of the sheikh's tribe was provided for as likely to be a valuable cachet to the agreement.

Art. 7.—The question of territorial responsibility.

The Bakhtyaris who accepted responsibility with alacrity compared to Sheikh Khazal have never fulfilled their obligations satisfactorily. Sheikh Khazal has never fulfilled their obligations satisfactorily. Sheikh Khazal is very apprehensive for himself in this connection and naturally anxious to protect himself as far as possible; but though less ready to commit himself on paper there is good reason to hope that in practice he will act up to his obligations more fully than they have. He admits that even should he become personally exempt from responsibility under the wording of this article, by reason of the company electing to supply their own guards, he will still, as governor of the district on behalf of the Central Government, be administratively responsible for the maintenance of order in the ordinary way.

Art. 8. This is the article in which the question of reversion is chiefly raised. As before mentioned, it is dealt with in the body of my covering letter.

Art. 9. This article was one of the three chief difficulties of the negotiations. The sheikh refused to concede to the company's desire that the agreement with him should in every respect run parallel, in point of renewal or extension, with the parent concession with the Persian Government.

It was one of the three questions which we were unable to get him to settle with the company as a matter of business, but which was eventually got over otherwise.

Art. 10. This article differs somewhat from the company's draft. It was thought best to specify only what “treasure-trove” did cover, and not to put ideas into the sheikh's head by stating what it did not cover. He himself raised the question of the possible finding of oil in his limits. The rights of the company in this eventuality were explained to him, but he was given to understand verbally by the company's agent, that in the event of separate springs of oil being tapped within his limits, the company would be inclined to come to some friendly arrangement with him.

Art. 15. It is not apparent to me why the company expected to get men from the Sheikh of Mohammerah for 5 tomans per month, when they were paying 6 and more in the Bakhtyari country. The sheikh gave a good deal of trouble over this section, but it was eventually arranged as stated.

Art. 18. The same question regarding substitution of “sons and lineal descendants” arose here as in the case of the preamble.

Art. 20. The subject of this article was one regarding which the sheikh was not unnaturally a little apprehensive. He has of course heard from time to time of the friction which there has been between Messrs. Lynch and the Bakhtyaris, and trusts that his relations with the oil company are not going to be conducted on similar lines, with frequent recourse to consular intervention or arbitration. It will be greatly in the interests of the company, and I am sure their desire is also to deal as far as possible directly with the sheikh in a friendly give and take way, in regard to the settlement of the innumerable petty questions which must inevitably arise, they refraining as far as practicable from recourse to consular assistance or official correspondence. Similarly, when reference to consular authorities does become necessary, it will be to the interests of all to let communications be informal up to a certain point. The sheikh is likely to be much more amenable to this method of negotiation—it being

of course understood on both sides that the ultimate discretion to become official when driven to it, lies with either party.

Art. 21. We had originally prepared a 21st article containing a proviso that, in the event of any dispute as to interpretation, the English version should prevail, but the sheikh refused to agree to this as he knows no English and keeps no English knowing secretary. He also wanted the articles kept down to 20 for luck. No. 21 was consequently dropped, but the agreement was drawn up in English and Persian on the same paper, and the sheikh signed under the Persian and the oil company's agent under the English.

P. Z. COX, Major.

July 24, 1909.

[30725]

No. 429.

Mr. O'Beirne to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 16.)

(No. 453.)

Sir,

St. Petersburg, August 1, 1909.

AS I had the honour to inform you by my telegram No. 370 of the 30th ultimo I called on that day on the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs and informed him of the substance of Sir G. Barclay's telegram No. 637 of the 29th ultimo, referring to a mischievous telegram dispatched, according to M. Sabline, by the “Novoe Vremya” correspondent in Tehran, in which it was alleged that the British legation was working to destroy Russian prestige in Persia. I stated in accordance with your instructions that it seemed to you very desirable to prevent the continued propagation of such statements. M. Sazonow appeared fully to agree with Sir G. Barclay as to the mischievous activity of the correspondent in question—one M. Yanchevetsky—but he allowed me to perceive that he did not see his way to take any very drastic steps in the matter. His Excellency said that the Russian Government took no great notice of any statements made by M. Yanchevetsky; that he would see whether a hint could be conveyed to the “Novoe Vremya,” but that the paper was exceedingly difficult to deal with, and that he could not promise me anything.

A telegram from the “Novoe Vremya” Tehran correspondent which appeared in the issue of the 17th (30th) ultimo, and is evidently that as to which M. Sabline had spoken to Sir G. Barclay, states that many members of the new Persian Government are partizans of England or Germany, but that the Government are openly unfriendly to Russia; that the Cossack brigade is shortly to be disbanded, and that the concession for the export of lambskins held by a Russian syndicate is to be annulled. It does not, however, allege that the British legation is working against the Russian Mission, so that if M. Sabline was correctly informed as to the tenour of the telegram as originally dispatched, it would seem to have been materially edited by the paper itself before publication.

Yesterday's “Russkoe Slovo” published a telegram from its own correspondent in Tehran stating that the Persian Government had asked the Russian legation to expel M. Yanchevetsky on the ground that he was giving false and alarming information as to the dispositions of the Persian Government towards Russia; and to-day's papers print an apparently inspired telegram received from Tehran by the Agence de Saint-Petersbourg to the effect that certain biased reports that had made their way into the Russian press were without foundation, that the Persian Government were not inimical to Russia, and that instructions had been sent to all the provincial Anjumans to cease the anti-Russian agitation. It may perhaps be hoped that the wide and unflattering attention which M. Yanchevetsky's reports have attracted may serve to make that gentleman a little more careful for the future.

I have, &c.

HUGH O'BEIRNE.

[30742]

No. 430.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 16.)

(No. 628.)

Sir,

Constantinople, August 5, 1909.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 592 of the 26th July, 1909, I have the honour to forward herewith a despatch from Lieutenant-Colonel Ramsay, consul-

[1665]

3 X



general at Bagdad, concerning the disturbances in Persia, stating that he has received replies from two other Mujtahids.

I have, &c.  
GERARD LOWTHER.

Inclosure in No. 430.

*Consul-General Ramsay to Sir G. Lowther.*

(No. 77.)

Sir,

*Bagdad, July 3, 1909.*

IN continuation of my despatch dated the 28th June, 1909, I have the honour to report that Seyyid Kadhim, Yezdi, who is also sometimes called Seyyid Kadhim, Tabatabayi, has sent me a formal acknowledgment of my letter forwarding to him a translation of your Excellency's telegram.

Sheikh Muhammad Taki, of Kadhimain, has sent me a reply similar to the reply received from Mulla Muhammad Kadhim, Khorassani. At the same time he sent a verbal message to say that he took no part in political affairs.

I have, &c.

J. RAMSAY, Lieutenant-Colonel,  
Political Resident in Turkish Arabia and His  
Britannic Majesty's Consul-General, Bagdad.

[30746]

No. 431.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 16.)*

(No. 633.)

Sir,

*Constantinople, August 8, 1909.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 628 of the 5th instant, I have the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's consul-general at Bagdad, forwarding translation of a further joint letter from the Ulema of Nedjef and Karbala respecting future concessions to foreigners in Persia, and requesting His Majesty's Government to urge the Russian Government to withdraw their troops.

I have, &c.

GERARD LOWTHER.

Inclosure 1 in No. 431.

*Consul-General Ramsay to Sir G. Lowther.*

(No. 744/81.)

Sir,

*Bagdad, July 12, 1909.*

IN continuation of my despatch No. 712/77 dated the 3rd July, 1909, I have the honour to submit, for your Excellency's information, the translation of a letter to my address, dated the 6th July, 1909, from the leading mujtahids at Nedjef and Karbala.

I have, &c.

J. RAMSAY, Lieutenant-Colonel, Political Resident  
in Turkish Arabia and His Britannic Majesty's  
Consul-General, Bagdad.

Inclosure 2 in No. 431.

*Mujtahids of Karbala and Nedjef to Consul-General Ramsay.*

(Translation.)

*Jamadi-us-Sani 17, 1327 H. (July 6, 1909).*

ON 14th Jamadi-us-Sani, 1324 (5th August, 1906), the Persian Government declared the constitution and promised to act up to the constitutional law. After that date any treaty, concession, or loan negotiated with a foreign Power without the signature and approval of the National Assembly, being contrary to the constitutional law, will be considered null and void. We, in our capacity of spiritual leaders of the Persian nation generally, inform you of this in your capacity of British representative in Bagdad, and we request you to transmit this information to your Government.

[With regard to] the advent of the Russian troops in Persia on the pretext of stopping disturbances and unrest, it is very clear that the stay of the above-mentioned troops in Persia will result in widespread unrest, disturbances of different kinds, and will end in great bloodshed. We therefore expect the British Government to earnestly request the Russian Government to remove its troops from Persian territory, in the same way as the British Government has recalled its troops from Bushire.

[31019]

No. 432.

*India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received August 17.)*

Sir,

*India Office, August 14, 1909.*

IN reply to your letter of the 11th instant, I am directed to say that Viscount Morley concurs in Sir E. Grey's proposal not to press the question of the loan of the services of Mr. New of the Indo-European Telegraph Department to the Persian Ministry of Telegraphs, and to instruct His Majesty's chargé d'affaires at St. Petersburg accordingly.

I am, &c.

(Signed) A. GODLEY.

[31067]

No. 433.

*India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received August 17.)*

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Viscount Morley, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram to the Viceroy, dated the 7th August, relative to the situation in Persia.

*India Office, August 17, 1909.*

Inclosure in No. 433.

*Viscount Morley to Government of India.*

(Telegraphic.) P.

*August 7, 1909.*

SITUATION at Kerman. Please see your telegram of the 24th ultimo.

It is considered desirable by His Majesty's Government that your Excellency's Government should be in readiness, as a purely precautionary measure in case of necessity, which, however, they have every reason to hope will not actually arise, to send troops to the Persian Gulf at very short notice, subject to understanding that, without definite orders from here, no action shall be taken. See your telegram of the 22nd December, 1907, and letter to Foreign Office of the 28th ultimo, copy of which was enclosed in Secretary's letter of the 30th idem. Please cause necessary preparations to be made.

[31086]

No. 434.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 17.)*

(No. 672.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Gulahek, August 17, 1909.*

TWO further questions concerning the ex-Shah's departure, in addition to those connected with pension and crown jewels and dealt with in our protocol, have recently arisen, namely His Majesty's debt to the Russian bank and the claims and charges against persons in his suite.

The latter question was finally settled at meetings between the two representatives and delegates of the Persian Government which took place on the 15th and 16th August. The delegates agreed to a settlement of the former question on the following lines: His Majesty to make over his properties to the Persian Government, who would,



in return, make a small addition to the pension already assigned to him and take on themselves his liabilities to the Banque d'Escompte.

Unfortunately, however, a difficulty has arisen which will necessitate reference to our Governments, and my Russian colleague and I have reluctantly agreed with the delegates that His Majesty's departure be temporarily postponed. We have been asked by the Persian Government to enter into an undertaking to the effect that, if it ever be proved to the satisfaction of the two Governments that the exiled Shah is engaged in intrigues in Persia, the Persian Government will be released from every obligation on the score of pension.

It is natural, in view of Mohamed Ali's character, that the Persian Government should endeavour to safeguard themselves against such an eventuality, but the question is a difficult one, and I do not think that the Russian Government could agree to this proposal, involving as it does the possibility of the ex-Shah being left in destitution on Russia's hands, besides being open to interpretation as a reflection on Russian good faith. Moreover, there will be great temptation for the Persian Government to trump up charges of intrigue if they know that by proving these they can avoid the payment of the pension.

Russia might to a certain extent be safeguarded from the first eventuality by an arrangement by which the Persian Government would reduce the pension to the 25,000 tomans originally offered should the event which they apprehend occur. By this means Mohamed Ali would no longer have sufficient means to conduct any important intrigue, and at the same time he would be able to live in comparative ease independent of Russian support.

[31091]

No. 435.

*Consul-General Cox to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 17.)*

(No. 834.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Bushire, August 17, 1909.

ANGLO-PERSIAN Oil Company.

Tribal elders have ratified Mohammerah agreement, and amount of Company's rent and of Government loan have been paid to Sheikh.

[31086]

No. 436.

*Sir Edward Grey to Mr. O'Beirne.*

(No. 1172.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, August 17, 1909.

ARRANGEMENTS for ex-Shah's departure (see your telegram No. 672 of to-day).

Ex-Shah may still intrigue successfully against existing Government, in spite of all Russia's precautions to render him harmless.

You should suggest to the Russian Government that it should be made clear to the ex-Shah by the two Governments that, if satisfactory proof is given to them of his having intrigued, they will do nothing to oppose any decision by the Persian Government for reducing his pension to the original sum which Persian Government intended to allow him.

[31581]

No. 437.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.*

(No. 127.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, August 17, 1909.

THE Persian Minister came to see me to-day. He emphasised again the feeling which was aroused in Persia by the continued presence of Russian troops, especially at Kazvin. He complained that the troops at the latter place had given rise to the suspicion that they might advance on Tehran, owing to the arrangements they had made to move to a camp 8 miles nearer Tehran, when it would have been just as easy, for sanitary reasons, for them to move to a camp on the other side of Kazvin, towards Resht. He also complained of the conduct of the Russian troops. In one case, a Russian officer had forced himself into a meeting of women, which was not in

accordance with Moslem customs, and in another case they had arrested or shot several persons at Tabreez.

I told the Persian Minister that these were matters which should be discussed between the Persian and Russian Governments, but I might tell him that when M. Isvolsky was here he had expressed a desire to withdraw the Russian troops from Persia, and had explained that the difficulty in doing so was that no one could be sure that order was yet firmly established. M. Isvolsky thought it would be a very bad thing if the troops were withdrawn and then had to be sent back again, and he did not wish this to happen. Though many Russian subjects in Persia had expressed great apprehension and had urged that Russian troops should be sent to Tehran the Russian Government had not yielded to these fears, and their restraint had been justified. But there was still a great deal of disorder in Persia. For instance, I was receiving great complaints from the south of Persia as to the damage to British trade and the insecurity of the roads. If the Russians were receiving similar complaints from the north, it would be difficult for them to withdraw their troops.

The Persian Minister said it was difficult to get the Russian Government to state definitely what steps on the part of the Persian Government would enable the Russian troops to be withdrawn.

I suggested the dispatch of the Ala-ed-Dowleh to Tabreez as a possible step, but the Persian Minister seemed to think that he would not be acceptable to the people of Tabreez.

I told him that his Government should discuss the necessary steps with the Russian Government, though I thought it was possible that, after all the disturbances which had taken place, the Russian Government might be reluctant to take a decision in the matter until they heard from M. Poklewski, whom they expected to report on the situation after his arrival at Tabreez.

The Persian Minister dwelt very strongly on the complete order which, he said, now existed in Tehran and Kazvin.

I said I had no doubt that with the situation as it was at present the Russian Government could not have sent troops. But as their troops were already on the spot, they were afraid to withdraw them until they felt sure that the situation would go on improving.

I have, &amp;c.

E. GREY.

[30649]

No. 438.

*Foreign Office to India Office.*

Sir,

Foreign Office, August 17, 1909.

WITH reference to the Foreign Office letter of the 5th instant relative to the erection of a second wire on the Tehran-Shahrud telegraph line and the connection of that question with that of the exchange of telegraph lines in Persia between His Majesty's and the Russian Governments, I am directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to transmit to you herewith copy of a telegram from His Majesty's Minister at Tehran, emphasising the necessity of returning a reply to the Persian Government without delay on the former question, while deprecating immediate negotiations for the settlement of the latter.

I am to state that, in view of the considerations adduced by Sir G. Barclay, and of the fact that the interests of His Majesty's Government in connection with the Arabistan convention no longer form the only motive for their wish to postpone negotiations on the question of the exchange of telegraph lines, Sir E. Grey is disposed, in the absence of objection on the part of Viscount Morley, to address a telegram to His Majesty's chargé d'affaires at St. Petersburg in the sense of the penultimate paragraph of Sir G. Barclay's telegram, adding that the reason for his opinion is the state of public feeling in Persia with regard to the presence of foreign troops in that country.

I am, &amp;c.

LOUIS MALLET.



[31162]

No. 439.

*Messrs. Ellinger and Co. to Foreign Office.—(Received August 18.)*

Sir,

28, Oxford Street, Manchester, August 17, 1909.

WE beg to inform you that we purpose shipping on behalf of Messrs. Andrew Weir and Co., from the Island of Ormuz, about 1,500 tons to 2,500 tons of red oxide of iron, by the steam-ship "Edenhall," belonging to the West Hartlepool Steam Navigation Company, loading to commence about the 26th instant. We give you this information in view of a paragraph in Mr. Norman's letter to our Mr. Ellinger, of the 3rd May last, which says that if the Nationalists, or anyone else but Messrs. Andrew Weir and Co., attempt to remove any of the oxide Sir G. Barclay will at once hear of it and take the necessary action. You may therefore think it desirable to inform the authorities at Bunder Abbas of the intended shipment.

We take the liberty of drawing your attention to our Mr. Ellinger's letter to you of the 4th December, 1908, informing you of the signature of a contract with Messrs. Andrew Weir and Co., and pointing out to you the necessity, in the interests of all concerned, of the fact not being disclosed, that a contract had been made between Messrs. Andrew Weir and Co., and the Mouin-ut-Tujjar. This is still of importance to the parties, and we shall therefore be glad, if you find it necessary to cable informing the authorities of the shipment, if you will at the same time advise them that Messrs. Andrew Weir and Co.'s name must not be disclosed in connection with this business to the captain or officers of the steamer.

We are, &amp;c.

ELLINGER AND CO.

[31212]

No. 440.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 18.)*

(No. 673.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Gulahek, August 18, 1909.

MOHAMED ALI MIRZA refuses to give up his property on the lines of the arrangement referred to in my immediately preceding telegram. The substance of that arrangement was briefly as follows:—

Persian Government to take over His Majesty's liabilities to the extent of some 1,400,000 tomans at 12 per cent., at the same time to increase his pension to 90,000 tomans per annum; His Majesty, on the other hand, to make over to the Government his estates, which bring in an estimated income of 50,000–100,000 tomans.

From a financial point of view the arrangement is nothing if not advantageous for the ex-Shah, and the inducements for the Persian Government to grant such terms were the fear that His Majesty might use his position as a landed proprietor for purposes of intrigue and their strong objection to giving foreigners a hold over this property. In this way the ex-Shah's legitimate interests are safeguarded, while the Persian Government have a substantial moral and political return for their financial loss. The Russian bank also will gain by securing the Government's guarantee for a loan which, as far as one can see, the security of His Majesty's estates would not have covered satisfactorily, and, further, they are relieved from the many embarrassments which such a security would inevitably entail.

His Majesty still refuses to yield, in spite of our endeavours to make clear the personal advantage accruing to him from such an arrangement. There must be either some sinister motive behind his obstinacy or else a firm belief that the Russian bank will forgo this claim.

My Russian colleague and I hope that we may be instructed by our Governments to oblige His Majesty to give his consent.

M. Sabline, who agrees fully with the above, is telegraphing to St. Petersburg for authorisation in this sense.

The joint protection accorded to His Majesty, it will be remembered, referred only to his person, and we might consequently explain to him that if he continues to reject this arrangement he will not only lose the increase to his pension, but also, in the

event of the Persian Government making themselves responsible, as they are willing to do on certain conditions, for His Majesty's debt to the Russian bank, the Persian Government will be allowed to confiscate his estates without protest from the two legations.

[31263]

No. 441.

*Mr. O'Beirne to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 18.)*

(No. 407.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

St. Petersburg, August 18, 1909.

I WAS unable to induce the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs to agree to the suggestion contained in your telegram No. 1172. His Excellency is of opinion that any declaration such as you propose would be utilised by the Persian Government as a pretext for reducing the ex-Shah's pension without any valid cause.

I persuaded him after some discussion to telegraph to M. Sabline that the Russian Government would do all in their power to prevent His Majesty from intriguing against the present régime in Persia with the pension which was settled upon him.

[29933]

No. 442.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.*

(No. 424.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, August 18, 1909.

YOU should, unless you see any objection, insist that the exaction of rahdari should at once be put an end to (see despatch No. 7, Commercial, of the 18th ultimo, from His Majesty's consul-general at Bushire).

I will take no action until I hear the result of your discussion with His Majesty's consul-general; but the whole matter is one of considerable importance.

[29333]

No. 443.

*Foreign Office to Manchester Chamber of Commerce.*

Sir

Foreign Office, August 18, 1909.

I AM directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to acknowledge with thanks the receipt of your letters of the 3rd and 7th instant, relative to the insecurity of the roads in Southern Persia and the consequent damage to British trade in that region.

I am to inform you, in reply, that this question has for some time occupied the most serious attention of His Majesty's Government, who have been, and still are, in frequent communication with the diplomatic and consular officers in Persia on the subject, and that they are fully alive to the good dispositions of the new Persian Government towards Great Britain and to the importance of taking advantage of them to effect an improvement in the present unsatisfactory state of affairs.

I am to state that Sir E. Grey fully shares the view put forward by the firms who have addressed your Chamber that the greatest benefit would accrue to British trade in Southern Persia by the establishment of a system of paid road guards; but I am to point out that there are grave difficulties in the way of the immediate application of such a system, the principal objection to which is its great expense, in the present impoverished condition of the Persian Government.

I am to assure you, however, that the matter will not be lost sight of, and that it will be one of the questions discussed by His Majesty's Minister at Tehran with His Majesty's consul-general at Bushire during the approaching visit of the latter to the capital.

I am, &amp;c.

LOUIS MALLET.



[31341]

No. 444.

*India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received August 19.)*

Sir, *India Office, August 18, 1909.*  
 IN reply to your letter of the 9th instant as to the desire of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company to undertake, as a preliminary to an exhaustive geological examination, a topographical survey of the oil-producing regions of Persia, I am directed to say that, as indicated in my letter of the 5th instant, Viscount Morley sees no sufficient reason for the grant of any financial assistance from Indian revenues to the work. But if Sir E. Grey is satisfied that there are no objections on political grounds to the proposed survey, Lord Morley is willing to ask the Government of India whether they can spare the services of an officer for the purposes of the company's survey, on the understanding that the whole of the cost connected with his deputation is defrayed by the company.

It appears from the company's letter of the 15th July last that their immediate wish is to proceed with a survey of the country in the neighbourhood of Shuster during the coming cold weather.

I have, &c.  
 A. GODLEY.

[31322]

No. 445.

*India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received August 19.)*

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Viscount Morley, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, with reference to previous letter, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 15th August, on the question of the establishment of wireless telegraphy between Bahrein and Bushire.

*India Office, August 18, 1909.*

Inclosure in No. 445.

*Government of India to Viscount Morley.*

(Telegraphic.) P. *August 15, 1909.*

THE following is the purport of a telegram, dated the 12th instant, from the political resident in the Persian Gulf regarding Bahrein:—

It is reported by political officer that he has been informed by Wöneckhaus's agent that his company are desirous to effect the establishment of a system of wireless telegraphy between Bushire and Bahrein, and that agent had asked as to the probable attitude of the sheikh of Bahrein towards such a project. In reply, the political officer said that, as a rule, the sheikh was opposed to innovations, but that, as a matter of fact, the Government of India had under their consideration certain proposals in this connection which had been made to them by the resident. Wöneckhaus's overtures may, I think, be regarded as a *ballon d'essai*, but it seems advisable to telegraph report. I may add that a wish to set up a system of telephone has also been expressed by Wöneckhaus's company.

[31348]

No. 446.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 19.)*

(No. 675.)  
 (Telegraphic.) P. *Gulahek, September 19, 1909.*

OIL guard.  
 Please see my telegram No. 653 of the 5th August, and your telegram No. 414 of the 9th August.

His Majesty's consul-general at Bushire telegraphs as follows, No. 839:—

"I trust that we may soon receive orders regarding the final disposition of the oil guard."

[31162]

No. 447.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.*

(No. 426.)  
 (Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, August 19, 1909.*

FOLLOWING refers to my telegram No. 412 of the 6th August: Hormuz oxide. A shipment of between 1,800 and 2,500 tons of oxide will be undertaken about the 26th August by Messrs. Ellinger on behalf of Messrs. Andrew Weir and Co. The oxide will be loaded on the West Hartlepool Steam Navigation Company's ship "Edenhall."

Messrs. Ellinger think that you may wish to notify this to the authorities at Bunder Abbas, and further request that no mention be made to the master and officers of the "Edenhall" of the name of Messrs. Andrew Weir and Co.

[31212]

No. 448.

*Sir Edward Grey to Mr. O'Beirne.*

(No. 1190.)  
 (Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, August 19, 1909.*

HIS Majesty's Government fully share views expressed by Sir G. Barclay in his telegram No. 673 of the 18th August, concerning the ex-Shah's property.

You may inform Russian Government of this, and ask them to authorise their chargé d'affaires to join, as soon as possible, in communication to His Majesty in the sense proposed in last paragraph of above telegram.

[31437]

No. 449.

*Anglo-Persian Oil Company to Foreign Office.—(Received August 20.)*

*Winchester House, Old Broad Street, London,*  
*August 19, 1909.*

Sir, REFERRING to the vice-chairman's letter to you dated the 21st ultimo, I shall be glad to know if any information has yet been received from His Majesty's Minister at Tehran with reference to the payment of the Imperial Commissioner's salary.

In the absence of any definite instructions to the contrary, and in view of the telegram received by the commissioner from Nezammedin, I have felt compelled to pay the salary due for the month of July, since the commissioner was pressing for its payment. But when doing so, I addressed the letter as per enclosed copy to the commissioner, urging him to get his Government to officially notify to His Majesty's Minister at Tehran the removal of the embargo on its payment.

In reply I have received a letter from the commissioner, as per enclosed copy, from which you will see that he states that Saad-ed-Dowleh had no authority to place an embargo on the payment of his salary, and that since the Cabinet, of which he was a member, is no longer in existence, there is no justification for our requiring a confirmation through the Foreign Office of the removal of the embargo.

As the present position of uncertainty is very unsatisfactory, I shall be much obliged if you can obtain through His Majesty's Minister at Tehran definite authorisation from the Persian Government for the continuance of the payment of the commissioner's salary, in confirmation of the telegram purporting to come from Nezammedin, as quoted in the vice-chairman's letter to you of the 21st ultimo.

I am, &amp;c.

C. GREENWAY, Director.

Inclosure 1 in No. 449.

*Anglo-Persian Oil Company to Sadigh-es-Saltaneh.*

Sir, *August 12, 1909.*  
 YOUR letter of the 10th instant to Mr. C. W. Wallace addressed to his private house has, in his absence on a touring journey round England, been forwarded to me for attention.

[1665]

3 Z



Your salary for July has not yet been paid because we have been waiting a confirmation through the Foreign Office of the removal by your Government of the embargo placed by them upon its payment. This confirmation has not yet come, but in anticipation of its receipt I enclose a cheque for the usual amount, 83l. 6s. 8d., which kindly acknowledge on the accompanying receipt form.

It would, however, be more satisfactory if you could get the removal of the embargo officially notified by Sir George Barclay in accordance with Mr. Wallace's letter of the 23rd ultimo, and I hope you will give this your attention.

The same settlement of this company's shares for the London Stock Exchange has been fixed for the 18th instant. The date for the Glasgow Stock Exchange has not yet been arranged, but it will probably be the same.

In Mr. Wallace's absence I shall be glad to see you at any time it may be convenient for you to call should you wish to discuss any questions.

I am, &c.

C. GREENWAY, *Director.*

Inclosure 2 in No. 449.

*Sadigh-es-Saltaneh to Anglo-Persian Oil Company.*

Sir, *The Royal Palace Hotel, Kensington, August 17, 1909.*

I BEG to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 12th instant.

With regard to the embargo on my salary, I must draw your attention to the fact that the so-called embargo was not placed on my salary by the late Government, nor by the Ministry of Mines, but by Saad-ed-Dowleh, who, even in doing that on his own responsibility, took an unusual step in executing it. If the late Cabinet were in existence, there might have been some justification for your expectation for a confirmation of the removal of the embargo through the Foreign Office, but with the change of the old régime everything is changed, and the new Government has, by telegram, authorised me to get my salary in full (which I have communicated to you on the 20th ultimo). It would be a very strange thing should I apply to my Government for another confirmation through an unusual channel.

I hope you will fully realise the inexpediency of such a step on my part.

Concluding with my thanks for your kind expressions, I am, &c.

SADIGH-ES-SALTANEH.

[31484]

No. 450.

*Mr. O'Beirne to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 20.)*

(No. 415.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*St. Petersburg, August 20, 1909.*

PROPERTY of the ex-Shah. Please refer to your telegram No. 1190 of yesterday.

The arrangement which Sir G. Barclay and M. Sabline propose would be readily accepted by the Russian Government so far as their own interests are concerned. They have been informed, however, by M. Chapchal, who is at present in St. Petersburg, that a revenue of at least 300,000 tomans per annum comes in from the estates of the ex-Shah in Azerbaijan, and that only a portion of the estates can have been taken into account in forming the estimate of a maximum revenue of 100,000 tomans only. M. Chapchal is intimately acquainted with the affairs of the ex-Shah. A grave injustice to His Majesty would be involved, if his information is correct, by the arrangement proposed; and M. Sazonow suspects that the Persian Government have been guilty of some sharp practice in the matter, and thinks that Russia and Great Britain should not be parties to any such thing.

The subject will be discussed by M. Sazonow with the Minister of Finance to-morrow. He is apparently disposed, if it is proved that his suspicions are well founded, to suggest that the estates of the ex-Shah should be administered by a person to be appointed by His Majesty. This person should devote the revenues of the estates to paying off His Majesty's debts, and the estates would be restored to Mohammed Ali or his family as soon as the debts were extinguished. The administrator would be supervised in his work by the Russian consul-general at Tabreez.

[31552]

No. 451.

*India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received August 21.)*

Sir,

*India Office, August 19, 1909.*

I AM directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 9th instant, regarding the proposal that Lieutenant Wilson should be authorised to make a preliminary survey of the Kherka irrigation scheme projected by the sheikh of Mohammerah.

Viscount Morley concurs in Sir E. Grey's proposal to instruct His Majesty's Minister at Tehran by telegraph to authorise the consul-general at Bushire to allow Lieutenant Wilson to undertake the survey. The officers concerned will doubtless bear in mind the need for caution inculcated in Sir E. Grey's telegrams Nos. 309 of 22nd June and 393 of 21st July to Sir G. Barclay.

Lord Morley also concurs in Sir E. Grey's proposal that, on the understanding that the cost will be equally divided between the British and Indian Exchequers, a portion of the oil guard should be retained for Lieutenant Wilson's use. He will submit to the Council of India, on the receipt of the reply to the draft telegram to Sir G. Barclay enclosed with your letter, that a moiety of the expense of retaining such a portion of the guard as may be considered necessary should be borne by Indian revenues.

I am, &c.

A. GODLEY.

[31543]

No. 452.

*India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received August 21.)*

Sir,

*India Office, August 19, 1909.*

IN reply to your letter, dated the 17th instant, as to the erection of a second wire on the Tehran-Shahrud telegraph line, and the exchange of telegraph lines in Persia between His Majesty's and the Russian Governments, I am directed to say that Viscount Morley concurs in the terms of the telegram which Secretary Sir E. Grey proposes to address to His Majesty's chargé d'affaires at St. Petersburg on the subject.

I am, &c.

(Signed) A. GODLEY.

[31601]

No. 453.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 21.)*

(No. 677.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Gulahek, August 21, 1909.*

FIVE hundred Arabs posted near Kemalabad, some 60 miles west of Kerman, are blocking the road between the latter town and Yezd.

At a spot a few miles south-east of Kemalabad they recently captured Mr. Wright, of the Imperial Bank, and are holding him in captivity at Nasirieh.

I am warning the Persian Government that I shall hold them responsible for any harm which may occur to him, and pressing them to take steps to secure his release.

At the same time I am endeavouring to get a message through to the robbers demanding the immediate liberation of that gentleman.

It appears that His Majesty's consul at Kerman warned Mr. Wright of the risk he would run in undertaking his journey at that moment.

[31437]

No. 454.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.*

(No. 428.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Foreign Office, August 21, 1909.*

WITH reference to my telegram No. 397 of the 23rd July. Can you persuade Persian Government to hasten their reply?

Considerable delay has already taken place with regard to the question of the



payment of the oil commissioner's salary, and, in consequence, the July portion of it was paid on the 12th August by the oil company to Sadigh-es-Sultaneh. Oil company gave as their reason for doing this that they anticipated a confirmation from the Foreign Office of the removal of the embargo.

[31543]

No. 455.

*Sir Edward Grey to Mr. O'Beirne.*

(No. 1219.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Foreign Office, August 21, 1909.*

TEHRAN-SHAHRUD telegraph line (See Tehran telegram No. 671 of the 14th August).

Renewed pressure is being put upon Indo-European Telegraph Department to erect Shahrud line, and any further delay in replying will cause annoyance to Persian Government. His Majesty's Government therefore suggest that erection of line, which will take about six weeks, should at once be undertaken.

You should inform Russian Government of this, adding that, in view of present disturbed state of feeling in Persia caused by presence of foreign troops, Sir G. Barclay considers present moment inopportune for entering upon negotiations with Persian Government for the exchange of telegraph lines.

[31348]

No. 456.

*Foreign Office to India Office.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, August 21, 1909.*

WITH reference to my letter of the 9th instant, relative to Lieutenant Wilson's proposed survey in connection with the scheme of irrigation from the River Kerkha which it is hoped to carry out, and the suggested retention of a portion of the Indian guard, now employed for the protection of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company's works, to assist him in that task, I am directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to transmit to you herewith copy of a further telegram from His Majesty's Minister at Tehran,\* expressing the hope that final orders regarding the withdrawal of the guard from their present employment will not long be delayed.

I am accordingly to state that Sir E. Grey would be glad to receive a reply to my letter above referred to at Viscount Morley's earliest convenience.

I am, &amp;c.

LOUIS MALLET.

[31341]

No. 457.

*Foreign Office to Anglo-Persian Oil Company.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, August 21, 1909.*

I AM directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 15th ultimo, relative to a proposed topographical survey of that part of Persia which is believed to contain oil.

I am to inform you in reply that Sir E. Grey would not feel justified in approaching the Lords Commissioners of His Majesty's Treasury with a request for authority to incur the expense which would necessarily fall on Imperial revenues by the participation of His Majesty's Government in such a scheme, and that the Secretary of State for India, to whom your proposal has been referred, sees no sufficient reason for the grant of any financial assistance from Indian revenues for the work.

Viscount Morley has, however, expressed his willingness to ask the Government of India whether they can spare the services of an officer for the purposes of the proposed survey, on the understanding that the whole of the cost connected with his deputation is defrayed by your company.

I am, &amp;c.

LOUIS MALLET.

\* No. 446.

[31602]

No. 458.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 22.)*

(No. 678.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Gulahek, August 22, 1909.*

THE new governor-general, Mukhber-es-Sultaneh, has arrived at Tabreez.

I did everything in my power to secure the appointment of Ala-ed-Dowleh to this post in his place, but the Persian Government insisted on Mukhber-es-Sultaneh.

Moreover, Ala-ed-Dowleh, I am given to understand, would have declined this appointment on grounds of ill-health if it had been offered to him.

Reference is to your telegram No. 409 of the 4th August.

[31603]

No. 459.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 22.)*

(No. 679.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Gulahek, August 22, 1909.*

PLEASE see St. Petersburg telegram No. 415 of the 20th August.

There is a great exaggeration in Chapchal's estimate of 300,000 tomans per annum, and my Russian colleague, in reply to a telegram from his Government, in which this estimate was given at 400,000, has pointed this out to them. He makes the charitable suggestion that Chapchal has inadvertently added a nought.

His late Majesty stated to my Russian colleague and myself at a recent audience, with the intention of impressing us as much as possible with the value of his estate, that an offer for them of 75,000 tomans a-year had been recently made to him.

There is, as far as I can see, no reason whatever to suspect that the Persian Government have in this matter any ulterior object in view beyond their very natural wish to ensure the estates remaining free of Russian control. For all those who are anxious to avoid intervention, any solution on the basis of such control would be fraught with embarrassment.

I cannot understand that reliance should be placed on the word of such a person as Chapchal rather than on that of Russian chargé d'affaires.

In his telegram to Russian Government reporting our proposed arrangement, M. Sabline estimated at 75,000 tomans per annum the value of the estates.

[31604]

No. 460.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 22.)*

(No. 680.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Gulahek, August 22, 1909.*

IT appears from a report to the Indian Government by Major Kennion, who is now at Birjand, that the Russian consul for Seistan asked permission to remain at Birjand for the winter, and is hopeful that his Government will sanction this.

Should the Russian Government approve this proposal, Major Kennion is of opinion that an accredited British consular representative at Birjand will be necessary, and suggests that vice-consular status, together with vice-consular and pamphuary allowance should be given "pending further developments" to Mr. Howson, the local telegraph officer.

Major Kennion's proposal meets with my approval, but I would venture to suggest that we should see how this arrangement works before considering the "further developments."

[31605]

No. 461.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 22.)*

(No. 681.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Gulahek, August 22, 1909.*

MY Russian colleague has received a telegram from the Russian Government stating the value of the ex-Shah's properties in Azerbaijan as 400,000 tomans a-year, on the authority not of Chapchal alone, but of others cognizant with His Majesty's

[1665]

4 A



affairs. We are asking the two consuls at Tabreez to give us their joint opinion. I do not know what better authority we could have than that on which we gave our original estimate, i.e., the authority of the Shah himself, of the Russian Bank, and of the Persian Government.

(Confidential.)

I suspect the Russian Government of having consulted Hartwig and Ostrogradsky in addition to Chapchal; that Russia, with the control of the properties, should abandon in Azerbaijan a stake which could be exploited politically with such advantage would probably be opposed by both.

[31606]

No. 462.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 22.)*

(No. 682.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

MY telegram No. 677.

Wright has been released.

*Tehran, August 22, 1909.*

[31717]

No. 463.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 22.)*

(No. 683.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Gulahek, August 22, 1909.*

WITH reference to Mr. Marling's telegram No. 250 of the 27th July, 1908, and to my despatch No. 306 of the 1st December, 1908, regarding the murder of Abu Thabi subjects by inhabitants of Taoona and the proposed course of action for the capture and trial of the murderers, I have the honour to report that His Majesty's ship "Redbreast," whilst cruising on the pearl banks, captured one of the culprits, who, whilst efforts were being made to capture the remaining two offenders, was conveyed with my approval to Abu Thabi, and there temporarily incarcerated. The sheikh of Abu Thabi, however, for fear that the victims' relations at present in Abu Thabi might, unless the prisoner were handed over to them, become troublesome, refused to become responsible for his safe keeping; consequently, the political agent at Bahrein was entrusted with the safe custody of the murderer.

His Majesty's consul-general at Bushire is of the opinion that if this prisoner be placed in charge of the Persian local authorities, it is likely that they will connive at his escape.

In the event of prisoner not being tried in Abu Thabi, I presume that he must undergo his trial on Persian soil; but before I ask for the undertaking which you mention in your telegram referred to, I shall consult with His Majesty's consul-general in Bushire as to what place in Persia he considers most suitable for the culprit's trial. The latter will be kept in Bahrein pending the result of this consultation.

[31628]

No. 464.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 23.)*

(No. 670.)

Sir,

*Constantinople, August 17, 1909.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 633 of the 4th August, 1909, I have the honour to forward herewith a despatch from Lieutenant-Colonel Ramsay, consul-general at Bagdad, submitting memorandum of conversations with the representatives of the leading Mujtahids of Nejef on the subject of Russian troops in Persia.

I have, &c.

GERARD LOWTHER.

Inclosure 1 in No. 464.

*Consul-General Ramsay to Sir G. Lowther.*

(No. 84.)

Sir,

*Bagdad, July 14, 1909.*

IN continuation of my telegram dated the 13th July, 1909, I have the honour to enclose, for your Excellency's information, a copy of a memorandum drawn up by me after my interview with the representatives of the Ulema of Nejef.

I have, &c.

J. RAMSAY, Lieutenant-Colonel,  
Political Resident in Turkish Arabia, and His Britannic  
Majesty's Consul-General, Bagdad.

Inclosure 2 in No. 464.

*Memorandum by Consul-General Ramsay.*

ON the 13th July, 1909, I received a visit from Mirza Mehdi Agha, son of Akhund Mulla Muhammad Kadhém Khorassani, and Mirza Mohsin, the son-in-law of Seyyid Abdulla Bebehani. They were accompanied by Mirza Ibrahim, late dragoman of the Persian consulate-general, and Mirza Muhammad, clerk to Akhund Mulla Muhammad.

They said that the matters which they had come to discuss had been fully debated by the Mujtahids at Nejef, and that, though they only came to see me with a private and friendly request for advice, they were authorized to speak on behalf of the leaders of religious thought in Nejef, and they said that they were anxious to have my advice.

Their complaint was that the presence of the Russian troops at various places in Persia was unjustifiable, as foreigners had suffered no injury, and the presence of the troops made it impossible for the country to have rest. They admitted that they were under obligations to Great Britain for the help that it had given to the popular movement, but said that they did not understand why England now adopted a purely passive attitude.

I said that, as far as I was aware, the policy of England had not changed, that we were as anxious as they could be to see Persia at peace and free of foreign troops, but that I had no information that would enable me to form a judgment as to the need for the retention of Russian troops in Persia. I explained the object of the Anglo-Russian arrangement, and said that the recent occasion was probably the only one on which the British Government had volunteered any advice to the Mujtahids, and I thought that it was a pity that they had not acted upon it. I pointed out that the more the Mujtahids excited the people against the Russian troops the more difficult it was for the Russians to withdraw with any safety.

After much discussion my visitors said that they were willing to guarantee that peace would be restored in Persia, and that foreigners would be quite safe as soon as the Russians withdrew their troops. My visitors said they could not ensure peace as long as the troops were in Persia because the troops ill-treated the people, arrested the well-wishers of the popular party, searched houses, and did other things that excited the populace. Finally, I said that it was difficult for us, with the most friendly intentions, to discuss measures because we were not sufficiently well informed as to facts. I pointed out that His Britannic Majesty's Minister at Tehran was much better informed, and I assured them that his object was to see Persia prosperous and peaceful. I said that I would report what had been said, and if I received any communication for them in reply I would let them know.

In reply to the question whether the Russian troops were also protecting British subjects in Northern Persia, I said that they had no doubt considered this part of their duty, as our troops, while they were in Bushire, considered it their duty to protect all foreigners.

My visitors said that the Mujtahids were receiving many complaints and demands for advice and assistance. They had not sanctioned any violent methods, but had replied that they were striving to get the Russian troops withdrawn, and that if everything else failed they were willing to be martyrs for the cause of their religion and nation.



I cannot help thinking that if the withdrawal of the troops is much longer delayed sentiment and fanaticism may get the better of reason and judgment and so bring about most regrettable complications.

Up to the present time the Persians seem to bear no ill-will towards England, but it is difficult to say how much longer this desirable frame of mind will exist.

J. RAMSAY, *Lieutenant-Colonel,  
Political Resident in Turkish Arabia, and His Britannic  
Majesty's Consul-General, Bagdad.*

[31854]

No. 465.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 23.)*

(No. 684.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Gulahek, August 23, 1909.

SITUATION at Tabreez.

I have received information from His Majesty's acting consul-general of the advance to the Karadagh district from Tabreez of three detachments of Russian troops, each numbering eighty men. Two of these forces, attached to which are the chief of the staff and officers of the general staff, are intended to map the country, the third is to afford protection to villages that are being pillaged by a relative of Rahim Khan.

With one of the former is a member of the Russian consulate-general, who is to negotiate certain claims Russians have against Rahim Khan. Officers have received strict orders not to provoke inhabitants, and to take no administrative action.

Mr. Smart has pointed out that unpleasant incidents may arise as the result of the dispatch of these troops into disturbed regions, and has expressed the hope to his Russian colleague that he may use his influence to dissuade the military authorities from undertaking in the future similar expeditions for the purpose of map-making.

My Russian colleague not having, I gather, taken any steps in the matter, I have refrained from urging this point with him, as it is too late to prevent the dispatch of these troops. I concur, however, with the acting consul-general.

[31851]

No. 466.

*Mr. O'Beirne to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 23.)*

(No. 417.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

St. Petersburg, August 23, 1909.

PERSIA.

Persian Government have instructed their representative here to make a protest against the intended departure of the following bastis now being sheltered by the Russian Legation: Ameer Bahadur, Mojalla Sultan, and three other reactionaries, from the capital. The Persian Government state that these persons are accused of non-political crimes, in addition to the civil actions which are pending against them.

The Russian Government are instructing M. Sabline to intimate that the sanctity of bast will be strictly maintained, and that if the persons in question are legally represented by attorneys after they have left Tehran that will be sufficient. The Russian Government are of opinion that the suggestion of the Persian Government is merely an excuse for the exercise of political vengeance.

Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs requests me to ask whether instructions may be sent to His Majesty's Minister to support Sabline.

[31852]

No. 467.

*Mr. O'Beirne to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 23.)*

(No. 418.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

St. Petersburg, August 23, 1909.

PERSIA.

Please see telegrams Nos. 679 and 681 of the 21st and 22nd instant from His Majesty's Minister at Tehran.

Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs tells me that a further report from Russian chargé d'affaires is being awaited. He repeated to me this afternoon that the arrangement proposed by the two representatives would be acceptable both to himself and the Finance Minister if it proved to be not financially unfair to the ex-Shah.

[31604]

No. 467\*.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.*

(No. 431.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Foreign Office, August 23, 1909.

YOUR telegram No. 680 [of the 22nd August: British vice-consul at Birjand].

I agree.

[1665]

4 A\*



[29476]

No. 468.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.*

(No. 432.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Foreign Office, August 23, 1909.*

RETENTION of oil guard. Please see your telegram No. 653 of the 8th August.

The portion of the guard retained will no longer have any connection with the operations of the company, and therefore we cannot ask the latter to continue to pay the guard, as they have done up till now. The British and Indian Exchequers would therefore have to share the cost of maintaining the guard retained.

Ascertain from His Majesty's consul-general the number of men he wishes to be retained, the length of time for which they would be required, and pay the sum which would be needed monthly to defray the cost of their pay.

The Treasury will be requested to sanction the halving with the Government of India of the cost of the portion of the guard retained. This arrangement would date from the departure of the rest of the guard. You should retain the number required, sending the rest back to India.

[31552]

No. 469.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.*

(No. 433.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Foreign Office, August 23, 1909.*

PLEASE instruct Major Cox to authorise the undertaking of the survey which it is proposed that Lieutenant Wilson should carry out in connection with the Kherkha irrigation scheme (see your telegram No. 636 of the 29th July).

[30698]

No. 470.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.*

(No. 128.)

Sir,

*Foreign Office, August 23, 1909.*

I HAVE received your despatches Nos. 134A of the 12th and 142 of the 21st ultimo, reporting on recent events in Persia from the acceptance by the late Shah of the programme of reforms presented to His Imperial Majesty by Great Britain and Russia to his deposition.

I have to express to you my warm thanks for these reports, which I have read with deep interest, as well as my appreciation of the high qualities which you have shown throughout the time occupied by the events described.

I have learnt with gratification of the excellent services rendered by the gentlemen mentioned in the latter of your two despatches, which, as most of them are servants of the Government of India, I have brought to the notice of Viscount Morley of Blackburn.

I may add that the manly and sensible attitude maintained by the British colony at Tehran throughout a trying time has made a deep impression on His Majesty's Government.

I am, &amp;c.

E. GREY.

[30698]

No. 471.

*Foreign Office to India Office.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, August 23, 1909.*

I AM directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to transmit to you herewith copies of two despatches from His Majesty's Minister at Tehran,\* reporting on recent events in Persia from the acceptance by the late Shah of the programme of reforms presented to His Imperial Majesty by Great Britain and Russia to his deposition.

\* Nos. 342 and 427.



I am to request you to draw Viscount Morley's particular attention to the last paragraph of the latter of these two despatches, expressing appreciation of the services rendered during these events by certain members of the staff of His Majesty's Legation and other gentlemen, and I am to state that Sir E. Grey has read this portion of Sir G. Barclay's report with special gratification.

Lord Morley will observe that most of the gentlemen mentioned in this paragraph are servants of the Government of India, and his Lordship will doubtless consider the propriety of calling attention to their services in the proper quarter.

I am, &c.

LOUIS MALLET.

[31963]

No. 472.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 24.)*

(No. 685.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Gulahek, August 24, 1909.*

SITUATION at Kerman.

Your telegram No. 369 of the 14th August.

Delegate sent to Baluchi Khan Sirdar Said by Vice-Consul at Kuh-Malik-Siah has brought back assurances that all will be quiet.

No confirmation of letter from Russian consul at Seistan could be obtained by agent.

The tribal chiefs have returned home.

[31967]

No. 473.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 24.)*

(No. 686.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Gulahek, August 24, 1909.*

EX-SHAH'S properties.

With reference to my telegram No. 681 of the 22nd August, I am informed by the Russian chargé d'affaires that Shah's properties in Azerbaijan are not worth more than 40,000 tomans per annum in the opinion of the Russian consul-general at Tabreez. His Majesty's consul-general has not yet replied, but I understand that he will corroborate this estimate. Pending his reply, I telegraph at once that the occasion may not be lost of again pressing the Russian Government to instruct M. Sabline to act with me in compelling the ex-Shah to hand over his estates.

This step would open the way for the early departure of His Majesty, for we should then have a means of exerting pressure on the Persian Government to make them relinquish their claims for the restoration of sundry properties, such as jewels, rifles, horses, donkeys, mules and saddles enumerated in a list which they have laid before us.

As an alteration of this arrangement, I suggest that Russian chargé d'affaires be authorised to allow the question of the debt to the Russian bank to be settled in the future.

[31968]

No. 474.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 24.)*

(No. 687.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Gulahek, August 24, 1909.*

SITUATION at Kerman.

With reference to my telegram No. 682 of the 22nd August, I am informed that 800 Arabs are attacking Kamalabad, where James, of the Indo-European Telegraph Company, and Wright, of the Imperial Bank, have taken up quarters. Their position is dangerous.

I have received a further telegram from His Majesty's consul at Kerman, reporting that the situation is most serious, as the tribesmen are reckless and the local authorities powerless.



[31019]

No. 476\*.

*Sir Edward Grey to Mr. O'Beirne.*

(No. 1231.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

YOUR telegram No. 383: Loan of Mr. New.

I approve.

*Foreign Office, August 24, 1909.*

[1665]

4 B\*

[31969]

No. 475.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 24.)*

(No. 688.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Gulahek, August 24, 1909.*

THE Manager of the Imperial Bank has received an application for a loan of 100,000*l.*, and asked my advice on the matter. I have replied in accordance with the instructions contained in your telegram No. 407 of the 30th July, adding that any advance must be made in connection with the Russian Bank.

I have also been approached on this subject by a member of committee, to whom I pointed out that I could not encourage the Imperial Bank to make any loan in which the two banks did not participate.

M. Sabline gives me to understand that the Russian Bank will decline if applied to, but anti-Russian feeling is at present so pronounced that it is quite possible that, in spite of the pressing need of money with which the present Government is hampered, they will not apply to Russia.

[31851]

No. 476.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.*

(No. 437.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Foreign Office, August 24, 1909.*

YOU should ascertain the facts connected with the claims of the Persian Government against the reactionaries in bast at the Russian Legation (see telegram No. 417 from St. Petersburg of yesterday's date), and let me know your views on the matter.

[31322]

No. 477.

*Foreign Office to India Office.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, August 24, 1909.*

I AM directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 18th instant, forwarding copy of a telegram from the Government of India relative to the desire of Messrs. Wöckhaus to establish wireless telegraphy between Bahrein and Bushire.

In this connection I am to enquire, with reference to my letter of the 23rd March, whether any further steps have recently been taken with a view to the extension of telegraphic communication in the Persian Gulf.

I am, &amp;c.

LOUIS MALLET.

[31437]

No. 478.

*Foreign Office to Anglo-Persian Oil Company.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, August 24, 1909.*

I AM directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 19th instant, relative to the payment of the salary due by your Company to the commissioner appointed by the Persian Government.

I am to inform you in reply that, on the receipt of your letter, Sir E. Grey addressed a telegram to His Majesty's Minister at Tehran, informing him that, in view of the delay in making this payment which had already taken place, your Company had, on the 12th instant, handed over to Sadigh-es-Sultaneh the amount due for the month of July, and had at the same time informed him that they took this step in anticipation of the confirmation through this Office of the statement that the embargo placed on Sadigh-es-Sultaneh's salary by Saad-ed-Dowleh had been removed by the Persian Government. Sir E. Grey instructed Sir G. Barclay at the same time to endeavour to expedite the reply of the Persian Government to the question asked of them as to who was entitled to receive the salary due to the Imperial commissioner.

I am, &amp;c.

LOUIS MALLET.



[32064]

No. 479.

*Mr. F. C. Strick to Foreign Office.—(Received August 25.)**Baltic House, Leadenhall Street, London,  
August 24, 1909.*

Sir,  
I SEND you herewith copies of cables exchanged with my agent at Tehran,  
Mr. David Brown.

Should you wish to see me on this subject, I shall be pleased to call on you any  
time convenient to you.

I have, &c.  
FRANK C. STRICK.

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Inclosure 1 in No. 479.

*Messrs. F. C. Strick and Co. to Mr. D. Brown.*

(Telegraphic.)

*London, August 16, 1909.*

IN the event of our obtaining the concession we shall be prepared to carry out  
the contract provided it exists. Difficult to form an opinion as to value of concession  
until we know its terms. If we made an offer would concession include oxide mined  
Ormuz waiting shipment, and would it give us right work all other minerals Ormuz  
and other islands, when would concession come into force? Cannot you form rough  
opinion as to sum required? Would you advise us offer a round sum cash for twenty  
years for Ormuz and other Persian islands, or part in cash, part in royalties? We  
repeat we are exceedingly anxious secure concession, and are prepared close  
immediately on reasonable terms, subject, of course, to approval of British Minister.

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Inclosure 2 in No. 479.

*Mr. D. Brown to Messrs. F. C. Strick and Co.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Tehran, August 23, 1909.*

REFERRING to your telegram of 17th August, in our opinion 40,000*l.* cash,  
2,000*l.* per annum royalty should obtain concession Ormuz and all other Persian  
islands in Persian Gulf sixty years, including all oxide mined Ormuz, and right to  
work all other minerals, telegraph as soon as possible your views regarding it, is  
important.

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Inclosure 3 in No. 479.

*Messrs. F. C. Strick and Co. to Mr. D. Brown.*

(Telegraphic.)

*London, August 24, 1909.*

AT figures named, namely 40,000*l.* cash and 2,000*l.* annual royalty sixty years,  
do your utmost include minerals salt Persian littoral, of course without interfering  
Anglo-Persian Oil Company's concessions. Failing this do utmost secure mainland  
concessions now held by Moin, which understand include Minab, Namakdam, Khamir,  
Kong, Mamasani. If this impossible, close on terms your cable, of course understand  
all mined minerals and salt on concessions obtained for us belong us immediately,  
including 2,000 tons about of Ormuz oxide, for which Ellinger, and, or Weir sending  
"Edenhall" Ormuz within few days from Bussorah, and which, if concession obtained  
we naturally deliver on account Weir contract, if it exists. We are prepared open  
credit Imperial Bank Persia.

[32087]

No. 480.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 25.)*

(No. 689.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

GENERAL amnesty.

*Gulahek, August 25, 1909.*

With reference to your telegram No. 421 of the 13th August, our joint note has  
elicited a long and unsatisfactory reply from the Persian Government. They state that  
they recognise the importance of an amnesty, and that they will proclaim it when the  
moment arises.

In order that offences other than political might be ensured an impartial trial, we  
asked the Persian Government, following the precedent of the British legation in the  
case of the June bastis when this point was insisted on, to allow a representative of  
the legation concerned to be present at the trial in cases where its bastis were to  
figure.

In reply the Persian Government declare that they will be aided if the two  
Governments "display perfect confidence" in them; that a proper trial will be afforded  
in the courts to the traitors and civil offenders who have sought in the legations  
protection against justice due to them for murders, robberies, and defalcations; that  
the presence of members of the legations during the proceedings would be the greatest  
sign of distrust and they cannot allow them to be present, but that they hope the  
two representatives, by putting entire trust in the Persian courts, will co-operate with  
them in the matter.

M. Sabline, I think rightly, considers this reply to be a revolt against Russian  
influence, frequent signs of which have already become apparent in more or less  
tangible form. The bastis in question are for the most part in the Russian legation.

I understand that Russian chargé d'affaires is advising his Government that we  
should use the same pressure with the new Government as we did with the ex-Shah  
as regards our amnesty, and also uphold the right of the legation under whose  
protection the person to be proceeded against have placed themselves—in this case the  
Russians—to be represented at their trial.

I agree with M. Sabline, as we took up the same attitude in regard to our bast  
in June last, and as a prompt amnesty appears to me called for.

[32088]

No. 481.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 25.)*

(No. 690.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

EX-SHAH'S property.

*Gulahek, August 25, 1909.*

Please refer to my telegram No. 686 of the 24th August.  
Following from consul-general at Tabreez:—

No. 183 of the 24th August.

Revenues of Azerbaijan property vary with the price of cereals. I have ascertained  
on excellent authority that in time of order and peace yield is roughly 50,000 tomans  
per annum, 30,000 of which are paid in kind, and the remainder in cash. Russian  
consul-general is telegraphing to this effect.

The figure quoted by St. Petersburg is based probably on an exaggerated  
estimate of revenue that Shah derived from the property in 1906, by forcing up  
the price of grain to three times its normal value through judicious cornering, and by  
appropriating to himself, as Governor of Azerbaijan, not only revenues from Crown  
lands as distinct from personal properties, but total revenues of villages, including what  
was due to the Financial Department as Government taxes.

The price of grain fell to its normal level after the Constitution had been estab-  
lished, and only the share of his personal properties was received by Shah.



[32089]

No. 482.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 25.)*

(No. 691.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

EX-SHAH'S suite.

*Gulahek, August 25, 1909.*

With reference to Mr. O'Beirne's telegram No. 417 of the 23rd August, the action of Persian Minister in St. Petersburg is an attempt on the part of the Persian Government to elude agreement.

The delegates consented verbally on the 16th August, during the negotiations for the departure of the ex-Shah, to allow the bastis in question to leave with His Majesty if they appointed attorneys, against whom, in the presence of a representative of the Russian Legation, claimants could take action.

The new Government will be freed more effectively by their departure than by their imprisonment, and I believe this course, in addition to having been accepted by the Persian Government, is also the wisest. The delegates had intimated that, out of deference to the Russian legation, these men would in no case be condemned to the capital punishment.

During the six weeks during which they have been in bast no charges have been brought against them, although, in addition to the civil action pending, it would probably be possible to convict them of non-political offences. My Russian colleague has, besides, repeatedly declared to the delegates that he would sanction the trial of these bastis if a representative from his legation were present, and that he had no wish to prevent justice being meted out to them.

As far as possible, I have tried to avoid anything which looked like giving these men British protection, and my action in regard to the question has been limited to a general request, in our note regarding amnesty, that any legation should be represented at the trial of its bastis. In the course of the negotiations, however, in regard to the ex-Shah's departure, the delegates raised the question of their treatment, and I concurred in the course verbally agreed to.

With your approval, I propose, in the event of the question again being raised, to join M. Sabline in upholding the arrangement, which delegates of the Persian Government have accepted. Should these men return to Persia, it is perfectly understood by the delegates and by the two representatives that the Russians will afford them no protection, but it might be desirable to obtain a similar assurance from the Russian Government.

[32092]

No. 483.

*Mr. O'Beirne to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 25.)*

(No. 420.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

EX-SHAH'S properties.

*St. Petersburg, August 25, 1909.*

Please see Sir G. Barclay's telegram No. 686 of the 24th August and your telegram No. 1190 of the 19th.

On my calling on the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to urge that authorisation should now be sent to Russian chargé d'affaires to join in bringing pressure to bear on the ex-Shah with a view to obtaining his consent to the surrender of his estates, I found that a new suggestion had been made by the Minister of Finance, and M. Sazonow had already telegraphed to M. Sabline in the sense of this suggestion.

The Minister of Finance is afraid that, if the ex-Shah's properties were finally surrendered to the Persian Government, the Russian Government, in the event of His Majesty's death, would have to support his family.

He therefore desires the Persian Government to agree that the properties shall revert to His Majesty or to his family when the debts have been extinguished out of the revenues.

In view of the present estimate of the revenues, I am unable to see how the debts can ever be extinguished in this way. As, however, M. Sazonow had already sent instructions to M. Sabline, it did not appear of any use to urge him to telegraph again until the latter sends further report.

[32093]

No. 484.

*Mr. O'Beirne to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 25.)*

(No. 421.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

PERSIA.

Reactionaries in bast.

Please see my telegram No. 417 of the 23rd August.

I was begged by Persian Minister to impress on the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs how desirable it was to permit the five reactionaries now being sheltered by the Russian legation at Tehran to remain in bast at the capital after the ex-Shah's departure for a sufficient space of time to allow of an account of public moneys that have passed through their hands being rendered by them, and also in order that the popular excitement which has been aroused by the rumour of their departure may have a chance of calming down.

During an interview with M. Sazonow, I confined myself to asking whether his Excellency had replied to the representations of the Persian Minister on this subject. M. Sazonow said that he had told the Minister that the claims or charges which the Persian Government had to make against the persons concerned must be formulated more clearly. There is evidently a disposition on the part of the Russian Government to insist on the persons in question being permitted to leave Tehran at the same time as the ex-Shah.

[32089]

No. 485.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.*

(No. 438.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Foreign Office, August 25, 1909.*

YOU should support M. Sabline in action referred to in your telegram No. 691 of the 25th August concerning reactionaries in bast at the two legations.

[32104]

No. 486.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.*

(No. 439.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Foreign Office, August 25, 1909.*

CAPTURE of Messrs. Wright and James.

I am informed that Government of India can at a moment's notice move military force into Persia. What is your view as to this step? I consider it inadvisable, as it might produce serious complications, and it seems impossible that they would be in time to rescue Wright and James.

[32153]

No. 487.

*Mr. F. C. Strick to Foreign Office.—(Received August 26.)**Baltic House, Leadenhall Street, London,  
August 25, 1909.*

Sir,

FOR your information, I beg to enclose copy of a cable I have to-day dispatched to my agent at Tehran, Mr. David Brown.

I have, &amp;c.

FRANK C. STRICK.

Inclosure in No. 487.

*Mr. F. C. Strick to Mr. D. Brown at Tehran.**August 25, 1909.*

"EDENHALL" left Bussorah yesterday, therefore due Ormuz Thursday. In the event of your carrying through negotiations on the terms of our telegram of yesterday,



see that our interests are protected regarding value oxide shipped "Edenhall." Only way we see is by authorities cabling Bunder Abbas preventing shipment by "Edenhall" until captain gives written undertaking to our agent, Hussein Galladary, Bunder Abbas, to sign our bills lading to our order. You may give, on our behalf, our undertaking we will deliver bills lading Weir after sighting his contract against payment his contract price. Doubtless you will arrange Barclay will cable consul Bunder Abbas, necessary instructions.

[32104]

No. 488.

*India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received August 26.)*

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Viscount Morley, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 25th August, relative to disturbances in Persia.

*India Office, August 25, 1909.*

Inclosure in No. 488.

*Government of India to Viscount Morley.*

(Telegraphic.) P.

*August 25, 1909.*

THE following is purport of a message from the British consul at Kerman:—

"Eight hundred brigands are making hot attack on Rajsijnan. Information is difficult to understand, but, in addition to tribes already reported, the Lashanis are also out in force. Helplessness of the local authorities extends even to matters of obtaining information. The situation is most serious, the temper of the tribes being reckless. The position of James and Wright, who are in the midst of the fighting, is perilous."

The Europeans named are telegraph employés. We are anxious for your immediate instructions, military force being held in readiness to move at a moment's notice.  
(Repeated to Tehran.)

[32212]

No. 489.

*India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received August 26.)*

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Viscount Morley, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 25th August, relative to disturbances in Persia.

*India Office, August 26, 1909.*

Inclosure in No. 489.

*Government of India to Viscount Morley.*

(Telegraphic.) P.

*August 25, 1909.*

TREVOR telegraphs from Bushire under date 24th instant, and following is the purport of his message, which we transmit for your information:—

"A telegram has reached me to-day from consul at Shiraz. He says that two messages by telephone have been confidentially communicated to him. They are from Kawam to his son, dated Sivend, the 24th August. No. 1 conveys his orders for the immediate recall of Ainarlu Baharlu and others who have proceeded towards Yezd and Kerman, and directs that all property stolen by them shall be confiscated; No. 2 states that a man has been sent by him to turn back 'travellers to Yezd and Kerman,' and

that he is in doubt whether to await the arrival of the governor-general or to go himself and see order restored. The Arabs generally are unfortunately out of his control.

"As regards the telegram sent by him on the 30th, the following information transmitted by (? Indo-European) seems to relate to more recent events, and to indicate that the orders of Kawam are being obeyed by the Arabs. Capture of Wright was effected by Arabs on the night of the 19th in the neighbourhood of Kavalabad. One of the escort was shot. Wright was, after being stripped, released on the evening of the 22nd. The brigands then quitted the vicinity and proceeded in the direction of Fars. It is reported by Wright that there were nearly 1,000 men headed by Ali Khan. Aliabad is reported to have been looted by them.

"It seems improbable, judging from previous raids, that an attack on Kerman would be ventured on by them."

[32216]

No. 490.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 26.)*

(No. 692.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Gulahek, August 26, 1909.*

PLEASE refer to telegram to India Office yesterday from Indian Government: Situation at Kamalabad.

James telegraphs that he hopes robbers have withdrawn, as no sign of them can be seen anywhere.

[32199]

No. 491.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 26.)*

(No. 693.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Gulahek, August 26, 1909.*

WITH reference to your telegram No. 439 of the 25th August.

Wherever the danger to which British subjects are exposed is incidental merely to robber raids, I should not be in favour of sending a force.

In such cases it is in the highest degree unlikely that a force from India could arrive in time to be of any use, and although Major Kennion describes the tribesmen as reckless in the present case, they are never likely to be so reckless as to harm the persons of Europeans if they can avoid it. Wright was doubtless only detained in order that he should not reveal their movements.

[31968]

No. 492.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.*

(No. 440.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Foreign Office, August 26, 1909.*

CAPTURE of Messrs. Wright and James.

His Majesty's Government will hold Persian Government responsible for any harm done to them. You should inform Persian Government.

You should avail yourself of this opportunity to urge on Minister for Foreign Affairs great necessity of measures for ensuring greater safety of roads in Persia. Persian Minister here was urged in this sense yesterday, and asked to point the matter out to his Government.

[32087]

No. 493.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.*

(No. 443.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Foreign Office, August 26, 1909.*

SUGGESTED amnesty.

You should act in conjunction with M. Sabline in urging on Persian Government granting of amnesty, and of permission for legations to be represented at trial of bastis (see last paragraph of your telegram No. 689 of yesterday).



[32064]

No. 494.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.*

(No. 444.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

HORMUZ oxide concessions.

With reference to your telegram No. 412 of the 6th instant, you should ask Strick's Tehran agent to show you the telegrams which passed between him and Strick with regard to the acquisition of the Moin's concessions. Strick has shown them to us.

*Foreign Office, August 26, 1909.*

[31967]

No. 495.

*Sir Edward Grey to Mr. O'Beirne.*

(No. 1245.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Foreign Office, August 26, 1909.*

THERE is now no doubt that the estimate originally made by His Majesty's Minister at Tehran of the value of the Shah's property was too high.

The Russian Government should be convinced of this (for reference, see telegrams from Sir G. Barclay Nos. 673 of the 18th August, 679 and 681, both of the 22nd August, and 686 of the 24th August), and you should urge that instructions in the sense indicated by Sir G. Barclay should be sent without delay to the Russian chargé d'affaires at Tehran.

[31969]

No. 496.

*Sir Edward Grey to Mr. O'Beirne.*

(No. 1246.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Foreign Office, August 26, 1909.*

QUESTION of an advance to Persian Government.

It is evident from Sir G. Barclay's telegram No. 688 of the 24th August that a small joint advance must now be made in order to prevent the Persian Government addressing an application to some other Power.

You should approach M. Sazonow on this point without delay, as it is pressing. You may say that His Majesty's Government would consent to authorise the Bank to advance 50,000*l.* if Russia will do the same.

[31717]

No. 497.

*Foreign Office to India Office.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, August 26, 1909.*

WITH reference to your letter of the 21st January last, relative to the Taona murders, I am directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to transmit to you herewith copy of a telegram from His Majesty's Minister at Tehran,\* reporting the capture of one of the persons concerned, and setting forth the arrangements which it is proposed should be made for his custody and trial.

It will be observed that these arrangements involve a slight departure from those sanctioned by the instructions dispatched by telegraph to Mr. Marling on the 21st August last, Viscount Morley's concurrence in which was conveyed to Sir E. Grey in your letter of the 19th of that month, in that the prisoner will now be detained at Bahrein instead of at Abu Thabi.

In view, however, of the circumstances which render this modification of procedure desirable as set forth in Sir G. Barclay's telegram, Sir E. Grey is disposed, in the absence of objection on the part of Lord Morley, to signify by telegraph his approval of the course adopted.

I am, &amp;c.

LOUIS MALLET.

[32199]

No. 498.

*Foreign Office to India Office.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, August 26, 1909.*

I AM directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to inform you that, on the receipt of your letter of yesterday's date, relative to the question of whether troops should be sent from India to deal with the situation at Kerman, he addressed a telegram to His Majesty's Minister at Tehran, enquiring his views on the subject.

I am to transmit to you herewith copy of the reply of Sir G. Barclay to that communication,\* deprecating, in the circumstances, the dispatch of an Indian force to Persia, and I am to state that Sir E. Grey entirely shares Sir G. Barclay's view, and that he would accordingly suggest, subject to the concurrence of Viscount Morley, that a telegram should be addressed to the Government of India instructing them to take no steps in the matter.

I am to add that Sir E. Grey notes that, according to a further telegram from the Government of India, Messrs. Wright and James, who were reported to be surrounded by robbers at Kamalabad, are no longer in danger.

I am, &amp;c.

LOUIS MALLET.

[31382]

No. 499.

*Foreign Office to Anglo-Persian Oil Company.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, August 26, 1909.*

I AM directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to inform you that some doubt appears to exist as to the number and nature of the shares to be allotted to the Bakhtiari khans in the companies to be formed for the exploitation of the oil-fields in Arabistan, a doubt which is not entirely removed by a perusal of the prospectus of your company in connection with Mr. D'Arcy's agreement with the khans.

The language used by Mr. Preece appears to be susceptible of an interpretation different from that to be given to the utterances of Mr. Reynolds, with the result that both His Majesty's Minister at Tehran and consular officers on the spot find themselves in some perplexity on the subject.

I am accordingly to state that Sir E. Grey would be glad to receive from your company an authoritative statement of the exact position of the khans with regard to the different companies to be formed, in order that they may receive a clear explanation of it, and that future misunderstandings may thus be avoided.

I am, &amp;c.

LOUIS MALLET.

[32343]

No. 500.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 27.)*

(No. 694.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Gulahek, August 27, 1909.*

SITUATION at Kerman.

My telegram No. 692 of the 26th August.

Message from James yesterday states that robbers have already withdrawn fifteen miles towards the south-west.



[32347]

No. 501.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 27.)*

(No. 695.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Gulahek, August 27, 1909.*

I HAVE received a telegram from His Majesty's vice-consul at Resht, reporting that the Zil-es-Sultan has been released. It is rumoured that His Imperial Highness has paid 370,000 tomans as ransom.

[32348]

No. 502.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 27.)*

(No. 696.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Gulahek, August 27, 1909.*

THE Grand Council have chosen the younger brother of Muhammad Ali, Mohamed Hassan Mirza, as valiahd.

[32349]

No. 503.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 27.)*

(No. 697.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Gulahek, August 27, 1909.*

SITUATION at Tabreez.

Two hundred Cossacks, members of the Committee inform me, supported by some hundreds of other mounted troops, to form an escort for the governor of Tabreez, are under orders to start next week. They assure me that the funds necessary for the dispatch of this force are forthcoming.

[32350]

No. 504.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 27.)*

(No. 698.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Gulahek, August 27, 1909.*

HORMUZ oxide.

Although I must await the cancellation of Moin's concession before lending any open support to Strick, I am, nevertheless, keeping in close touch with his agent.

Strick, I see, in correspondence with his local agent, states that Weir denies the existence of a contract between himself and Moin at Tajar. Have you any explanation of this statement? I presume that Ellinger signed the contract mentioned in your telegram No. 363 of the 21st December of last year as Moin's agent.

In spite of Strick's assurance to you that Weir's contract would be respected by him, if, as I gather to be the case, Ellinger, relying on Weir's instalments, has accepted bills drawn by Moin, he (Ellinger) will be a sufferer, should Moin's concession be cancelled. He would have to try to recover from Moin, a pretty difficult job.

Reference is to your telegram No. 444.

[32351]

No. 505.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 27.)*

(No. 699.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Gulahek, August 27, 1909.*

WITH reference to my telegram No. 683 of the 22nd August regarding the capture of one of the Taoona murderers and the discussion about the place of trial, His Majesty's consul-general at Bushire is of the opinion that there would be no difficulty in trying the murderer at Abu Thabi. The sheikh's only objection was to the detention of the culprit there until such time as his confederates were captured.

I am accordingly giving authority to His Majesty's consul-general to send the prisoner to undergo his trial at Abu Thabi.

[32345]

No. 506.

*Mr. O'Beirne to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 27.)*

(No. 422.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Tehran, August 27, 1909.*

PERSIA. Property of ex-Shah.

Please see your telegram No. 1245 of yesterday's date.

The Russian Government have received a report from the Russian chargé d'affaires to the effect that the Persian Government now consent to allow about 20,000 tomans a-year to the ex-Shah's family in the event of His Majesty's death. In this way the objection raised by the Minister of Finance, as reported in my telegram No. 420 of the 25th instant, would be met. The Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs has telegraphed to M. Sabline that the Russian Government accept the proposed arrangement by which the property is to be surrendered to the Persian Government, provided that the latter give the necessary undertaking regarding pension, &c., in writing.

M. Sazonow tells me that he will instruct M. Sabline to join in using pressure on the Shah, as suggested by Sir G. Barclay in his telegram No. 673 of the 18th August, as soon as Persian Government have given requisite undertaking.

[32346]

No. 507.

*Mr. O'Beirne to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 27.)*

(No. 423.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*St. Petersburg, August 27, 1909.*

PERSIA.

I have acted on your telegram No. 1246 of yesterday's date on the subject of the advance to the Persian Government, and have explained to the acting Minister for Foreign Affairs the financial straits in which the Persian Government find themselves at the present moment, the danger of their looking elsewhere for the money, and the consequent urgency of the matter. M. Sazonow promised to communicate with M. Weber, the *locum tenens* of the Minister of Finance (the Minister himself is absent for a few days), and added that he would beg M. Weber to obtain the Minister's authorisation by telegraph in the event of his being unable to settle the matter himself.

(Confidential.)

The Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs has not yet made himself master of the details of this question, but, from what M. Poklewsky tells me, I gather that the Minister of Finance will in all probability show considerable disinclination to consent to any Russian advance, however small. The present attitude of the Persian Government does not, in the opinion of the Russian Government, entitle them to expect Russia to show herself very accommodating towards them.

[32436]

No. 508.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.*

(No. 446.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Foreign Office, August 27, 1909.*

PLEASE transmit the following to His Majesty's acting consul-general at Tabreez:—

"No time should be lost in coming to some arrangement with regard to the navigation of Lake Urumia. Wratislaw states that unless this is done soon, order for steamers on the lake will be secured by Germans. An Anglo-Russian partnership, provided that Stevens were appointed manager, might, it seems, secure the concession from Imam Kuli, but nothing will induce the latter to grant the concession to Russians. Imam Kuli has already sent for a German engineer, and consequently you should lose no time in consulting with your Russian colleague and ascertaining the facts of the case."

The above refers to Mr. Marling's despatch No. 230 of last year.



[32422]

No. 509.

*India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received August 28.)*

Sir,

*India Office, August 26, 1909.*

I AM directed to invite the attention of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the telegram from the Viceroy of the 15th instant, reporting enquiries made by Messrs. Wöneckhaus's agent at Bahrein as to wireless telegraphy in the Gulf. The present position as regards the proposals of the Government of India on the subject is stated in the enclosed copy of a Secret despatch to the Governor-General in Council of the 16th July last.

Viscount Morley is led by present circumstances to the opinion that if a British system of wireless telegraphy is to be established in the Gulf, it is expedient not to incur any avoidable delay. Should Sir E. Grey agree in this opinion, Lord Morley would propose to address a telegram to the Government of India in the terms of the enclosed draft, subject to any modifications that Sir E. Grey may have to suggest.

Lord Morley assumes that Sir E. Grey concurs in the view that if the establishment of a scheme of wireless telegraphy in the Persian Gulf is sanctioned by His Majesty's Government, the cost should be divided equally between the British and Indian Exchequers, and that he will be willing to approach the Treasury on the subject when the estimates are received.

The draft telegram is also being communicated to the Admiralty for the consideration of the Lords Commissioners.

I am to add that since this letter was approved your letter on the subject of the 24th instant has been received.

I am, &amp;c.

COLIN G. CAMPBELL.

Inclosure 1 in No. 509.

*Viscount Morley to Government of India.*

(Secret.)

My Lord,

*India Office, July 16, 1909.*

WITH reference to the fifth paragraph of your Secret letter, dated the 3rd June, 1909, in which you state that you are awaiting a communication from me on the general question of wireless telegraphic installation in the Persian Gulf, I would invite your attention to the correspondence forwarded with the letter from the secretary in the political and secret department of this office of the 30th October, 1908, from which it will be seen that it was decided to take no action in respect of the Persian Gulf pending the receipt of a reply from your Excellency's Government to my military (Secret) despatch, dated the 10th July, 1908, forwarding the observations of the Admiralty and the director-in-chief, Indo-European Telegraph Department, on the proposals of your Government as to the wireless telegraphy stations to be erected for strategic purposes on and near the coasts of India.

2. You will have learnt from inclosure No. 2 to my despatch of the 10th July, 1908, that the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty are of opinion that the two schemes, for India and the Persian Gulf respectively, should be considered in close connection with one another. I shall be prepared, on the receipt of your reply, which is still awaited, to take into careful consideration any detailed proposals you may submit, in accordance with the suggestion of the Admiralty, for the installation of wireless telegraphy stations on the shores of the Persian Gulf.

I have, &amp;c.

MORLEY OF BLACKBURN.

Inclosure 2 in No. 509.

*Viscount Morley to Government of India.*

(Telegraphic.) P.

*India Office, September 12, 1909.*

WIRELESS telegraphy in the Persian Gulf. Your telegram of the 15th ultimo. Please say when proposals referred to in my Secret despatch of the 16th July may

be expected. If possible it is desirable that schemes for India and the Persian Gulf should be dealt with as a whole, but if serious delay must be necessitated by this course, I shall be prepared, on the understanding that scheme for Gulf will be in harmony with that for British India, to consider the former scheme separately. It will presumably be desirable to have a station at Jask for purposes of dealing with arms traffic on completion of fitting wireless apparatus to subsidised vessels. Please refer to your telegram of the 4th September and to mine of the 29th July regarding naval commander-in-chief's proposals. It is necessary to remember that consent of Treasury to bear half the cost must be a condition of approval of any scheme for Persian Gulf. On receipt of estimates Treasury will be approached on this point.

[32350]

No. 510.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.*

(No. 447.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Foreign Office, August 28, 1909.*

HORMUZ oxide concessions (see your telegram No. 698 of yesterday).

Unless the cancellation of Moin's concession cannot be prevented, His Majesty's Government do not wish you to support Strick.

Ellinger and Weir do not want Strick to know that Weir has a contract with Ellinger, and consequently Weir denied to Strick that he had this contract. The contract, however, exists, as both Ellinger and Weir have assured us. Moreover, Strick knows of its existence. But in conversation with Strick's agent you should appear ignorant of it. Ellinger signed the contract as the agent of the Moin-ut-Tujjar.

Nothing has been heard here to lead us to believe that Ellinger has accepted the Moin's bill, but, supposing Strick maintains Weir's contract, and Weir receives instalments as a result, will not Weir's contract with Ellinger oblige him to pay Ellinger? Otherwise Ellinger would have nothing to depend on except the Moin-ut-Tujjar.

[32483]

No. 511.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 30.)*

(No. 143.)

Sir,

*Gulahek, July 21, 1909.*

WITH reference to my telegram No. 541 of the 6th July on the subject of the appointment of the Nasr-ed-Dowleh as Russian consular agent at Shiraz, I have the honour to forward herewith a report which I have received from His Majesty's acting consul on this subject, and on the present state of the British and Russian relations with the important Kawami family.

I have on several occasions discussed the question of the Nasr-ed-Dowleh's appointment with the Russian chargé d'affaires, and we agreed that we should press the Persian Government for the temporary removal from Shiraz of the Kawam-ul-Mulk and the Nasr-ed-Dowleh, the two representatives of this family. In view, however, of subsequent developments, this course appeared to be for the moment undesirable in the interests of order.

I have little doubt that the appointment of the Nasr-ed-Dowleh will be eventually cancelled, but I am reluctant to press this question, as I am particularly anxious just now to avoid taking any step which might run the risk of wounding the *amour-propre* of my Russian colleague.

I have, &amp;c.

G. BARCLAY.

Inclosure in No. 511.

*Acting Consul Bill to Sir G. Barclay.*

(No. 27.)

Sir,

*Shiraz, June 30, 1909.*

IN amplification of my telegram No. 53, dated the 28th June, on the subject of the appointment of Nasr-ed-Dowleh to be Russian consular agent, I have the honour to forward, for your information, the following detailed report on this very grave and



discouraging event, and on the present state of British and Russian relations with this family, as far as they are known to me.

I need not enlarge on the importance of the subject; it will be enough to say that the recent history of Fars is the history of this family, and its varying relations with the local authorities and the Supreme Government. Its present representatives, Kawam-ul-Mulk and Nasr-ed-Dowleh, have always displayed great ostensible friendship for the British Government and its consul at Shiraz, and although these professed feelings have not often led them to make any great exertions, or run any serious risks, in the many cases concerning our interests which have come within their purview, it must be admitted that their position has never been an easy one, and our friendly relations with them have occasionally been of value. Since their return from Europe last September they have pursued the line of conduct indicated above with even more assiduity than before, and have taken repeated opportunities of discussing the local political situation with me, and of asking for my advice, a request which I considered myself bound by the well-known policy of His Majesty's Government to meet with considerable reserve, and I have repeated comfortable platitudes on the blessings of peace, and the unalterable determination of both England and Russia to allow Persia to work out her own salvation.

In this connection I would refer to Mr. Grahame's telegram No. 27, dated the 15th March, 1908, and the accounts of various interviews with one or other of the brothers contained in "Shiraz News" of the following dates: 14th and 23rd October, 17th February, 17th and 24th March, and 28th April.

During the months of March and April there was a pronounced trend of feeling in the direction of British intervention, especially among the landowning and mercantile classes, who are being very hard hit by the chronic insecurity of property and communications. This movement was diverted partly by the vigorous irruption of Soulet-ed-Dowleh into Shiraz politics at the end of April, and partly by the revival of interest in the constitutional movement at Tehran; but it is not too much to say that even a slight change of attitude on the part of this consulate, without any overt action, would have sufficed, in my judgment, to bring about an organised demonstration with the object of inducing the British Government to intervene for the purpose of restoring order from Bushire to Shiraz.

Although the general interest was diverted to other matters, the attention of the Kawam and his brother remained fixed on their great object of obtaining such security for their property as would permit them to pay a prolonged visit to Europe. On the 21st instant Mirza Muhammed Baqir Khan, the principal agent for all the Kawami estates, and a most enlightened and moderate man, paid a visit to Mr. Christmas, who was then in charge of the Indo-European Telegraph Department here, with whom he has for years been on friendly terms, and brought out the proposal mentioned in my telegram No. 53. He did not profess to be speaking in the name of Kawam-ul-Mulk, or to bear any commission from him, but rather to be proposing an arrangement which should be in the nature of a partnership with himself. Mr. Christmas was to have the entire management of the whole of the Kawami properties, his remuneration was to be 10 per cent. of the gross income, which was stated to be 10,000 tomans to 20,000 tomans per mensem, and Mirza Baqir Khan would give him all the assistance he needed. Mr. Christmas replied that in any case he would prefer a fixed salary, but that this, with the expenses of management, would probably amount to not less than the 10 per cent., and that in the absence of the heads of the family it would probably be necessary to reserve another 10 per cent. for the conciliation of the governor-general for the time being. Muhammad Baqir replied with perfect confidence that that could be arranged, and added that Mr. Christmas's presence would help with the Arabs, and deter the Kashgai from interference with Kawami property; but he made no specific mention of British protection, probably assuming that that might be taken for granted. Mr. Christmas finally replied that the whole thing was very unlikely, but that he would mention it to me.

Mirza Baqir Khan then took up a new and, in the light of subsequent events, a very significant line; he enquired whether there was any way in which "we" (without specifying any names) could become British subjects, or acquire British protection. Mr. Christmas replied that he thought not, without living for some time within the British Empire. Mirza Baqir Khan then referred to Russian protection of the Bahou Uzma, and the subject dropped.

I was informed of this interview immediately, and told Mr. Christmas in reply that in my opinion His Majesty's Government would not hear of any proposal which would involve them in an unlimited liability for the protection of the vast Kawami

interests, but that I had already arranged to see the brothers on sundry current matters on the 24th, and they would then have an opportunity of making any proposals which might be seriously meant.

Accordingly on the 24th I saw them together, and gave them one or two openings in conversation which might have led up to a mention of Mirza Baqir Khan's proposals, but as they did not refer to them I concluded that they had been made without authority, or were not meant seriously, and in any case were not worth reporting to you.

Kawam-ul-Mulk did, however, without any previous reference to Zil-es-Sultan, volunteer the statement already reported in my telegram No. 52. I heard nothing more from them until I received the message reported in my telegram No. 55 of to-day's date.

To turn to the Russian aspect of the matter, I made the acquaintance of M. Kadloubovsky on the 24th, and returned his call on the 25th. We discussed the local political situation in general terms, without special reference to the Kawamis, and we exchanged assurances of mutual consultation and support, M. Kadloubovsky especially emphasising the warmth of his relations with His Majesty's resident in the Persian Gulf. He thus had ample opportunity to display that confidence which he was so ready to assert. On the morning of the 28th I received information from two reliable sources that on the previous day M. Kadloubovsky had written officially to the governor-general, to inform him of the appointment of Nasr-ed-Dowleh as Russian consular agent. The statement seemed to me so incredible that at the close of a private note to my Russian colleague I mentioned it as a rumour, and asked if it had any foundation. He replied, after some delay, also in a private note, that it was quite true, and he would send me an official communication later. Since then, though I have seen him, I have avoided official subjects pending the receipt of instructions.

The question of the future relations of the two Governments in connection with the affairs of Fars will presumably have been decided before this reaches you. It will be enough to say that if this appointment stands, the Russian Government will have to take up and settle all the innumerable claims against Nasr-ed-Dowleh on account of the Lari expedition, and all his claims against the Kashgais and others for depredations on his properties; in fact, scarcely anything of importance can happen in Fars which will not be the personal concern in some degree of the Russian consular agent.

With reference to the past, I feel bound to enter an emphatic protest against the whole conduct of the Russian Legation in this matter, and to emphasise the impossibility of carrying out in the spirit the orders contained in your telegram of the 26th June in the face of such a glaring instance of bad faith. It will be equally impossible, I fear, unless the appointment is speedily cancelled, to preserve among the Persians any belief in the unanimity and mutual confidence of the two consulates, which belief must, in any case, be seriously shaken by the glaring contrast between the attitude of strict abstention from interference which I have consistently maintained, and the extraordinary and far-reaching measure sprung upon the people of Fars in the first fortnight of the Russian consul's presence.

In conclusion, I would revert for a moment to the proposal made by Mirza Baqir Khan, merely to record my opinion that if the policy of non-intervention should be deserted in consequence of this event, and if His Majesty's Government should be prepared to exert a direct influence on the affairs of Fars, that proposal is perfectly feasible, and if combined with a partition between the Kawami brothers, might eventually result in some form of condominium in Fars. In any case it would go far by itself to pacify the province, provided it was understood that Mr. Christmas enjoyed the support of Government. This officer is probably the best-known European between Ispahan and Bushire; he is acquainted with all the prominent men in Fars, and is universally liked and respected, especially as he has a reputation for open-handedness and hospitality. The details of business would be safe in the hands of Mirza Baqir Khan, and the presence of Mr. Christmas in the management would be a guarantee to all who know him that these vast interests would be administered with absolute probity and devotion.

I have, &c.

J. H. BILL.



[32484]

No. 512.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 30.)*(No. 144.)  
Sir,*Gulahek, July 26, 1909.*

WITH reference to the correspondence which has passed regarding the Taona murders, and to your telegram No. 218 of the 21st August, 1908, I have the honour to state that His Majesty's consul-general at Bushire reports that one of the three men suspected of connection with the crime has been captured on the pearl banks by His Majesty's ship "Redbreast."

The man has been sent to Abu Thabi for temporary custody, pending the result of the endeavours which are now being made to apprehend the other two accused.

I have approved Major Cox's action.

I have, &amp;c.

G. BARCLAY.

[32485]

No. 513.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 30.)*(No. 145. Secret.)  
Sir,*Gulahek, July 26, 1909.*

WITH reference to my telegram No. 535 of the 5th July, I have the honour to transmit copy of a secret despatch from His Majesty's consul-general at Meshed, respecting the action of his Russian colleague in connection with the joint asylum given to the governor-general by the British and Russian consulates-general during the recent troubles.

In the interests of the relations between the two consulates-general, I have made no mention to my Russian colleague of this despatch; but I may take this opportunity to report that my colleague and I thought it well at the time when the crisis was at its worst, and when it was evident that Prince Dabija was not acting in accord with Major Sykes, to enjoin upon both the need for good and close relations between the consulates of the two Powers. This instruction, though intended for the benefit of Prince Dabija, was sent, in order to conceal this fact, as a circular to all British and Russian consulates.

I have, &amp;c.

G. BARCLAY.

Inclosure 1 in No. 513.

*Consul-General Sykes to Sir G. Barclay.*(No. 27. Secret.)  
Sir,*Meshed, June 28, 1909.*

I HAVE the honour to make the following report on the resignation of His Highness the Rukn-ed-Dowleh.

On the 26th June, about 9.30 A.M., His Highness expressed his intention of resigning, and begged to be allowed to take sanctuary at this consulate-general as he feared for his life. He followed this up with a message to the effect that he was coming over immediately.

I felt that this action was open to grave objections, if only that it prevented co-operation, and I sent the native attaché to His Highness with a message to the effect that if he really intended what he had said he should write a letter to my Russian colleague and myself announcing his resignation, and containing a request that we should arrange conjointly for his protection. The Rukn-ed-Dowleh at first said that I was not acting as his friend, as he did not wish to have anything more to do with the Russians; but he finally agreed that I was acting in his truest interests.

2. Shortly after noon, a letter, written as I had suggested, arrived from His Highness, of which I enclose a copy. Being the senior official, I waited until 2 P.M. before taking any action. At 2 P.M., not having heard from Prince Dabija, and as the matter was urgent, I sent the military attaché with a message to my colleague to the effect that I presumed he had received an identical letter from the governor-general. Prince Dabija, who evidently entertained no idea of co-operating with me,

replied in the affirmative, and he added that he was reporting the matter to Tehran. The military attaché then said that he had been instructed by me to propose that as, in my opinion, it was undesirable for us to send troops into the ark or fort the governor-general should be taken to a suitable house, should be guarded by an Anglo-Russian guard, and that both flags should be hoisted. My Russian colleague replied that his idea had been to send twenty Cossacks to guard the governor-general in the ark, but that he agreed to my plan. He went farther, and suggested a house near the Russian consulate, to which Major Redl agreed. The military attaché subsequently summarised his conversation to the effect that he, Prince Dabija, agreed that a force of twenty Cossacks and ten sowars should that evening meet the governor-general at the ark, and should arrange to escort him to the house chosen by Prince Dabija, close both to the Russian caravanserai and to the Russian consulate; finally, that the two native attachés should meet and inform the governor-general of the plan, and arrange details as to time, &c. To all this my Russian colleague agreed.

3. An hour later, when the two native attachés met, Khan Bahadur Ahmed Din compared instructions with the Russian native attaché, and was surprised to find that the latter had been instructed to inform the governor-general that Prince Dabija would arrange for his safety by sending twenty Cossacks to the ark. Upon my native attaché returning to report, I again deputed Major Redl, to whom the Prince stated that there had been a misunderstanding, and that he was ready to fall in with my views provided that the Rukn-ed-Dowleh agreed, but that he felt sure that he would not do so, in which case he proposed to guard him in the ark, and hoped that we would also send a detachment.

4. The military attaché pointed out that I had originally objected to our troops guarding the governor-general in the ark, as I considered that such action might lend itself to serious misinterpretation, also that delay might complicate matters. The point was therefore to find out the wishes of the governor-general. Consequently I sent the native attaché to the governor-general to say that as senior consul-general I had proposed as above. Khan Bahadur Ahmed Din found the governor-general entirely ready to be guided by us; but the Russian native attaché threatened the unhappy man with Russian hostility and the Shah's displeasure, practically in the presence of my native attaché. Indeed, in the presence of Khan Bahadur Ahmed Din, whose tact and influence were invaluable, the Rukn-ed-Dowleh said to the Russian attaché, "You threaten me with hostility and loss of the Shah's favour if I follow Major Sykes's advice, and leave the ark; but I do not wish to be assassinated like other Persian governors." He added that he had not dared to sleep for eight days, but that, thanks to me, he would sleep soundly that night.

5. To defeat further machinations of my colleague, Major Redl again visited him to inform him that the governor-general was ready to start. Prince Dabija then swore that this was impossible; but Major Redl went ahead to the Russian caravanserai near the ark gate to watch developments. In front of him ran the Russian native attaché whose futile efforts are narrated above. At the caravanserai Major Redl asked the Russian officers what their orders were, and they replied, "To escort the governor-general to the Russian consulate"! Finally, escorted by ten sowars and twenty Cossacks, the unhappy governor-general left the ark, and even then the Russian native attaché tried hard to have the carriage diverted to the Russian consulate; but the governor-general was furious at this, and the last intrigue failed. Shortly afterwards the governor-general sent me a message to the effect that I had saved his life, and that he would never cease to be grateful.

6. It is, I think, instructive to analyse my colleague's actions. It is to be noted that hitherto Prince Dabija has ostentatiously ignored me, and, as any friction seemed undesirable, I have contented myself mainly with observing and reporting to the legation. As I am the senior official, it was obvious that the initiative should have been taken by him upon hearing from the Rukn-ed-Dowleh; but he decided to again ignore me. The arrival of Major Redl—to whose knowledge of Russian and Persian, coupled with much tact—I am considerably indebted, with my worked-out proposal was a surprise, and my colleague, after some demurring, agreed to it, and even suggested a suitable house. Afterwards he reflected that it would perhaps be better if the Rukn-ed-Dowleh stayed in the ark so that he could act as instructed from Tehran, and this is obviously the cause of the pretended misunderstanding. Finally he threw caution to the winds, and the last desperate efforts to force the governor-general not to agree to follow a course to which he himself, Prince Dabija, was by honour committed and the frantic attempt to divert the carriage to the Russian consulate were puerile.



7. In conclusion, Sir, I have in the past, and shall probably in the future, send you copies of letters written by my Russian colleague, but I doubt whether I shall ever again be able to present you with such a complete character sketch of the Russian consul-general of Khorasan.

8. I am sending a copy of this correspondence to the Government of India.

I have, &c.

P. M. SYKES.

Inclosure 2 in No. 513.

*Governor-General Rukn-ed-Dowleh to Consul-General Sykes.*

(Translation.)

(After greetings.)

7th Jamadiul Sani (June 26, 1909).

DURING the last few days I have tried in every possible way to rid the city of anarchy, but the anarchy has assumed such magnitude that there is not only no hope for an amicable settlement but there is danger personally for myself. For this reason I am writing to inform you that from this hour I shall not concern myself with any affair connected with the town. Please make arrangements, in conjunction with Prince Dabija, for my protection, and send me a speedy reply.

[32487]

No. 514.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 30.)*

(No. 147.)

Sir,

Gulahek, July 27, 1909.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith copy of a despatch which I have received from His Majesty's consul-general at Bushire reporting the assurances given by him to the sheikh of Mohammerah in the form authorised by you in your telegram No. 164 of the 17th April last.

It will be noticed that the sheikh is not yet entirely satisfied. He asks that our assurances may be extended to his own successive male descendants, and that it should be stated that these assurances should hold good for 100, or better, 150 years. The sheikh apparently does not expect an answer to his request until Major Cox has talked the matter over with me. I had expected Major Cox to visit Tehran on his way home to England, but he has been unexpectedly delayed at his post. I gather that he has to be in England by a certain date, and he therefore now wishes to proceed home direct. In these circumstances he will not visit Tehran until October. Even if he had not been delayed, this would probably have been the better course, as the state of the southern roads may have improved by then.

I have, &c.

G. BARCLAY.

Inclosure 1 in No. 514.

*Consul-General Cox to Sir G. Barclay.*

(No. 55.)

Sir,

Bushire, June 12, 1909.

IN continuation of the correspondence on the subject of the assurances to be given to the sheikh of Mohammerah, ending with your telegram No. 99 dated the 19th April, 1909, I have the honour to report that at my last visit to the sheikh on the 15th and 16th May, I discussed the question with him at length in the presence of Mr. McDouall, and finding him, as the latter anticipated, still not fully satisfied with the deduction that his successors would presumably be his offspring, I gave him the slightly extended guarantee to cover his "heirs and successors," as authorised by His Majesty's Government. In the endeavour to persuade him that he had now got all he could reasonably want, I went through the record with him once more, reading him the various assurances that had been hitherto given him, and at his desire addressed him a communication epitomising the recent fragmentary negotiations and bringing the subject up to date in a convenient form for his information. Of this letter I enclose a copy.

The penultimate paragraph was included in order to satisfy him that his final representation was taken note of, but before parting with him it was agreed between

us that as I hoped very shortly to have the privilege of meeting your Excellency, it would be better that I should discuss his affairs with you personally, and he consequently does not expect an immediate reply to his last request.

I have, &c.

P. Z. COX, Major,

*British Resident in the Persian Gulf, and  
His Britannic Majesty's Consul-General for Fars, &c.*

Inclosure 2 in No. 514.

*Consul McDouall to Consul-General Cox.*

(No. 54.)

Sir,

April 24, 1909.

YOURS of the 20th about assurances to the sheikh. I have told Haji Rais to tell the sheikh the first part of the Foreign Office message, which is certainly an advance.

As to the question of successors, in my opinion it will not satisfy the sheikh, the pointing out that successors will be presumably heirs of his body lawfully begotten, and Haji Rais is of the same opinion. The sheikh is particularly anxious to have his offspring ("aolad") mentioned. So in my opinion it will be advisable to give him the extension to "heirs and successors."

W. McDOUALL.

Inclosure 3 in No. 514.

*Consul-General Cox to the Sheikh of Mohammerah.*

(After the usual compliments.)

Mohammerah, May 16, 1909.

ON the 1st December, 1908, I had the honour, by the direction of His Majesty's Government, to repeat to your Excellency the assurances given you on behalf of Government by his Excellency Sir Arthur Hardinge, British Minister at Tehran, in his letter of the 7th December, 1902, to your address, and to inform you that the British Government were now prepared to extend those assurances to your successors.

I was further directed to explain to you that the British Government had engaged to respect the integrity and independence of Persia, and that that undertaking in itself involved the maintenance of the *status quo* in Persia, and thus included the continuance of the same state of autonomy which your Excellency at present enjoys.

I was then to point out that it followed from the above that any external aggression upon your Excellency would constitute an act of infringement of that Persian integrity which has received recognition in the Anglo-Russian Convention.

While expressing your thanks for these amplified assurances, you represented that they seemed to you only to safeguard you so long as Persia continued to exist as a sovereign State and you pressed for a further assurance which would cover the contingency of Persia ceasing to exist as a sovereign State and the intervention or occupation by foreign Powers.

You also expressed doubt as to whether the present assurance only provided immunity against unwarrantable encroachment on your rights by the absolute government of His Majesty the Shah, or whether it also covered prevention of similar action on the part of parliamentary government. In reply to those representations, your Excellency was informed that Great Britain and Russia being pledged to respect the integrity of Persia, the British Government were not, properly speaking, able to admit even the possibility of Persia ceasing to be a sovereign State or coming under the occupation of a foreign Power, but that in the unlikely event of such a contingency the assurances already given to your Excellency would become even more binding than before.

I was further permitted to inform you that whatever change might take place in the form of government in Persia the British Government were prepared to give you the same support against any encroachment on your rights as was promised to you in 1902, and I was authorised to add that they were now prepared to extend the application of those assurances to your "heirs and successors."

Mr. McDouall and I have informed you that in our opinion the assurances as now extended and expressed, appear to satisfy all your requirements; but you have further requested that the words "heirs and successors" may be changed and the words



"own successive male descendants" may be written instead; and you have gone on to express the hope that His Majesty's Government will be pleased to dispel the last shadow of doubt from your mind regarding their own intentions in the future, by adding after the words "male descendants" as above, the words "up to a period of 100 years" (or if it be possible 150 years).

I cannot give your Excellency any reply on this point without reference to Government, but I will lose no time in communicating to them your representations.

I have, &c.

P. Z. COX, Major,  
Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.

[31382]

No. 515.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 20.)*

(No. 148.)

Sir,

Gulahek, July 29, 1909.

IN my despatch No. 89 of the 28th April I forwarded copy of a despatch from His Majesty's consul at Ahwaz on the subject of the shares to be allotted to the Bakhtiari khans of several companies to be formed for the exploitation of the oil-fields of Arabistan. In this despatch Captain Lorimer expressed his fears lest the interests of the khans might be ignored, and at the time I was inclined to think that there might be some ground for his fears. Subsequently I had the opportunity of perusing a private letter from Mr. Preece to a friend in Tehran (extract enclosed), which left me in some doubt as to whether my first impression was correct, and after a further study of the prospectus of the newly-formed Anglo-Persian Oil Company, and of the agreement with the Bakhtiaris, I dispatched my private telegram to Sir C. Hardinge of the 28th May.

The question of the treatment of the khans by the company has now again been raised in a despatch from Mr. Ranking, copy of which I have the honour to enclose herewith. In this despatch Mr. Ranking gives extracts of a letter addressed by Mr. G. B. Reynolds, general manager of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, to the Sardar Muhtasham, the terms of which are far from clear, and are certainly open to an interpretation differing from that given in Mr. Preece's letter.

I have, in reply, instructed Mr. Ranking to point out to the manager of the company the misleading impression conveyed to the khans by his letter to the Sardar, but it might also be well to suggest to the company that, in order to prevent future misunderstanding, it should be made perfectly clear to the khans how they stand as regards the different companies.

I have, &c.

G. BARCLAY.

Inclosure 1 in No. 515.

*Consul Ranking to Sir G. Barclay.*

(Confidential.)

Sir,

Camp Ispahan, July 18, 1909.

I HAVE the honour to address your Excellency on the subject of the shares due to the Bakhtiari khans from the Anglo-Persian Oil Company.

During my recent tour through the Bakhtiari country I obtained information that the Anglo-Persian Oil Company had written to the khans with regard to the shares due to them under agreement.

A translated extract of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company's letter, inasmuch as it deals with the question of shares, is given below.

*Extract of a Letter in Persian, and signed by Mr. G. B. Reynolds, General Manager Anglo-Persian Oil Company, to the Sardar Muhtasham, dated May 28, 1909.*

"(Compliments.)

"In accordance with a letter No. 328, dated the 22nd April, 1909, from my directors, telling me to give you the following information, I would inform you that a company

has been floated under the name 'Anglo-Persian Oil,' and a second under the name 'Bakhtiari Oil Company,' which latter will work in the Bakhtiari country.

"In accordance with the agreement made with their Excellencies the Bakhtiari chiefs, the latter will receive 3 per cent. of shares from these companies. That is to say, that their Excellencies the khans will receive 3 per cent. calculated on the capital of all companies which may work in the Bakhtiari country.

"The capital of the Bakhtiari Oil Company is 300,000*l.*, and the price of each share is 1*l.*"

The general impression conveyed to the khans by this letter was that the Anglo-Persian Oil Company intended only to give them 3 per cent. of shares calculated on the capital of the Bakhtiari Oil Company, that is to say, on 300,000*l.*, which they very correctly worked out to 9,000 *l.* shares. Moreover, this would appear to be the intention of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, otherwise why did they not simply say that the capital of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company was 2,000,000*l.*?

The paragraph dealing with the allotment of shares to the Bakhtiaris and His Imperial Majesty the Shah reads as follows in the prospectus issued by the Anglo-Persian Oil Company:—

"In the first-named company (the First Exploitation Company, Limited) His Imperial Majesty the Shah of Persia and other persons hold 50,000 fully-paid shares, and in the second-named company (Bakhtiari Oil Company, Limited), as well as in any other company that extracts oil from their territories, the chiefs of the Bakhtiari people will be entitled to 3 per cent. of the shares fully paid, which percentage will, so far as the original capital of the two companies is concerned, be provided by this company."

The clause in the original agreement with the Bakhtiari khans with regard to the allotment of shares reads as follows:—

*"Extract from Agreement between Mr. W. K. D'Arcy and the Concessions Syndicate (Limited) on the one side, hereinafter called the First Party, and the Bakhtiari khans on the other, hereinafter called the Second Party."*

"Further also, after the formation of one or more companies to work oil in the Bakhtiari Oil Company, and after the oil has passed through the pipes, the first party undertakes to give to the second party 3 per cent. of all the ordinary shares issued, which shares must be fully paid up."

Now it appears that the above clause in the agreement admits of a quibble; that is to say, from the oil company's point of view, it may be argued that the wording "after the formation of one or more companies to work oil in the Bakhtiari country, the first party undertakes to give to the second party 3 per cent. of all the ordinary shares issued" means that 3 per cent. of the ordinary shares appertaining to this company alone are to be given. On the other hand, it may be argued, from the khan's point of view, that the wording "after the formation of one or more companies to work oil in the Bakhtiari country, and after the oil has passed through the pipes," is merely chronological, and fixes a time when the shares must be given, and that hence the rest of the paragraph in question, namely, "the first party undertakes to give to the second party 3 per cent. of all the ordinary shares issued," entitles them to 3 per cent. of the total number of ordinary shares issued by the Anglo-Persian Oil Company.

Now the total number of ordinary shares issued was 600,000, 3 per cent. of which is 18,000 *l.* shares, or exactly double what the Anglo-Persian Company's letter to the khans led them to believe was their due.

At present the Bakhtiari khans are too much taken up with the part they are playing in the national movement to be able to devote any thought to their own affairs, but a time must surely come when, sooner or later, they will be able to attend to their own affairs, and then one of them, more clear-headed than the rest, may see the other interpretation of the share clause in the agreement, or they may be put up to it by people more accustomed to deal with such matters than themselves. If such were to happen, i.e., the khans, having been allotted 3 per cent. on 300,000*l.* by the oil company, were afterwards either to think, or have put into their heads, that they have not been fairly treated, it would have both a most deleterious effect on all the company's future dealings and negotiations with the khans, and, the Bakhtiaris finding it difficult to differentiate between the oil company and Messrs. Lynch Brothers in every respect,



it would react also to the latter company's great detriment in their relations with the khans.

Further, as the oil company, together with Messrs. Lynch Brothers, represent to the Bakhtiari khans the honesty and integrity of British commerce and trade, it would be deplorable that either the khans should have the slightest grounds for thinking themselves cheated out of their just dues, or that the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, after quibbling and making a stand, should have to give in with a bad grace.

It would be better for the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, having originally made an agreement which admits of a quibble, to give the Bakhtiari khans their 3 per cent. on 600,000 ordinary shares with a show of generosity rather than endanger (1) their future prospects of amicable relations with the khans, more especially as the Indian oil guard is about to be moved from the oil-fields; (2) the present good frame of mind of the khans towards the oil company; and (3) the successful working of the new guarding arrangement. Such being the case, I would beg to request your Excellency's decision on the exact meaning to be attached to the share clause; and secondly, if your Excellency is of opinion that the 3 per cent. should be calculated on 600,000l., that I may be permitted to obtain information either directly from the oil company's representative in Ahwaz, or through His Majesty's Legation, what the actual intentions of the oil company are, so that the whole question may be settled before the ultimate allotment of shares.

I have, &c.  
L. RANKING.

Inclosure 2 in No. 515.

*Mr. Preece to Mr. Churchill.*

(Extract.)

I DO not understand your reference to doing the khans in the eye. I send you a prospectus of the company. You will see that the Bakhtiaris come in on the First Exploitation Company 600,000l., and also 400,000l. capital in Bakhtiari Oil Company, of which altogether they will get 3 per cent. of 750,000l. The First Exploitation Company will have 1 square mile of ground at Maifan-i-Munaftun, the first to produce any profits, I am told. There has not been any idea of evading their rights. Of course they cannot claim on the big company, which is to cover all Persia.

In the agreement with them provision was made for this: "That they were to get 3 per cent. of capital issued to the public in any companies started for exploiting oil in their country." They will get their 3 per cent., and will partake of profits quicker than anyone else except the Shah. It has been so arranged on purpose, so as to interest both chiefs and Government.

[32488]

No. 516.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 30.)*

(No. 149.)

Sir,

*Gulahek, July 31, 1909.*

I HAVE the honour to report that the corps diplomatique was received in audience by Sultan Ahmed Shah for the first time this morning at 11 A.M.

The young Shah was accompanied by the Regent, Azad-ul-Mulk, the venerable head of the Kajar tribe, an old man about eighty years of age, with courtly manners and a dignified bearing, who acted as spokesman on behalf of the thirteen-year-old Shah.

The German Minister, as doyen, delivered a short address, offering the Shah the congratulations of the diplomatic body, and afterwards presented the felicitations of the Emperor and of the German Government.

The Regent replied on behalf of the Shah in a few well-chosen words, expressing gratitude for the good wishes conveyed by the doyen and assuring the diplomatic body of the determination of the Shah's Government to maintain and strengthen the friendly relations happily existing between Persia and the Powers.

The Regent then conducted the young Shah round the circle of foreign representatives, who presented their respective staffs to His Majesty, and replied to the usual formal inquiries as to their respective Sovereigns or heads of States.

When it came to my turn, I took the opportunity of conveying to His Majesty the

congratulations and good wishes of His Majesty the King, His Majesty's Government, and of the Viceroy of India, for which the Regent begged me to convey the Shah's heartfelt gratitude. He added that he had had the honour of meeting His Majesty the King and of being presented to Her late Majesty Queen Victoria on the occasion of one of the visits to Europe of the late Nasr-ed-Din Shah more than thirty years ago.

The diplomatic body was subsequently received by the Regent in a separate apartment. His Highness Azad-ul-Mulk, who at his advanced age and unaccustomed as he is to official life, or, in fact, to any intercourse with foreigners, must have found the ordeal a very trying one, received us again and went through a second process of presentations with remarkable charm of manner. He does not impress one as a great administrator or as a man of remarkable strength of character, but as a figure-head in the new scheme of government by which the real power has been transferred from the Shah to a committee, which will probably shortly be transformed into the National Assembly, he undoubtedly is well chosen and fills his office with charm and dignity.

The absence at the proceedings of the well-known faces of prominent courtiers who have done so much to bring about the collapse of Mohammad Ali's corrupt autocratic rule, was very noticeable.

The two leaders who have brought about this great change did not appear at the ceremony, though I believe they were present with the other Cabinet Ministers in another apartment of the town palace, where the audience took place.

I have, &c.  
G. BARCLAY.

[31383]

No. 517.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 20.)*

(No. 150.)

Sir,

*Gulahek, August 1, 1909.*

WITH reference to my telegram No. 522 of the 1st ultimo, I have the honour to report that from a telegram received some time ago by my Russian colleague, it seems that the Russian Government would not view with favour the employment of Mr. New in the Persian Telegraph Administration, as proposed by the late Minister of Telegraphs. They say the post which it is proposed that Mr. New should fill is one which would give him control over all telegrams passing over Persian wires, and they, therefore, think that it would be more suitably filled by someone of other than British or Russian nationality, e.g., by a Belgian.

After ascertaining from Mr. Barker that the Indo-European Telegraph Department would prefer that the post, if it could not be filled by one of their men, should be held by a Persian, I told my Russian colleague that as the Russian Government saw objections to the proposed appointment, I thought it would be better not to raise the question with the new Minister of Telegraphs, who would probably not himself revert to it. I at the same time made it clear to M. Sabline that when Mukhber-ed-Dowleh asked us to lend him a man, we did not know that his duties would embrace more than the work for which his Excellency told us he was needed, viz., corresponding with the international bureau, &c.

I have, &c.  
G. BARCLAY.

[32489]

No. 518.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 30.)*

(No. 151.)

Sir,

*Gulahek, August 7, 1909.*

I HAVE had the honour to receive your despatch No. 92 of the 28th June on the subject of the negotiations with the Mouin-ut-Tujjar regarding the lease of the Shellilieh property to Messrs. Lynch by Sheikh Morteza.

The circumstances under which the proposal was made and accepted that the question of the ownership of the land at Shellilieh should be referred to a Shari Court at Nejef are set forth in my despatch No. 65 of the 25th March.

Subsequently I received a telegram from His Majesty's consul at Ahwaz, dated the 12th May, stating that Messrs. Lynch's agent had informed him that Sheikh Morteza was averse to the case being decided at Nejef, on grounds of expense and inconvenience,

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desired that it should be referred to a Court at Dizful, and asked that, if possible, a representative of the consulate should watch the case. I replied that I could not now take any steps to modify the arrangement which had been proposed by Sheikh Morteza himself, and had been accepted by the Mouin-ut-Tujjar at my request.

As regards the penultimate paragraph of the Persian Transport Company's letter of the 17th June, I had heard from His Majesty's consul at Ahwaz that Sheikh Morteza proposed to continue the construction of buildings on the land in dispute, and I replied that should the works be forcibly stopped by the other party I could not interfere. The company is no doubt right in its opinion that Mouin-ut-Tujjar's real object is to prevent or delay the building of the company's shed, but unfortunately the fact remains that the ownership of the land is disputed between two Persian subjects, and in such cases a foreign legation has no *locus standi*. Moreover, Mouin-ut-Tujjar has been persuaded by the legation to accept a mode of settlement for this long-standing dispute proposed by Sheikh Morteza himself, and it behoves the latter, in the interests of the company, to refrain now from tardy objections to the course agreed to.

As regards the final paragraph, I shall of course do all I properly can to protect the company's interests, even if it takes possession of the premises before the question of ownership is decided, but I am not sure how far I should be able to go in supporting a British company's possession of premises which it holds from a landlord whose title at the time the company took possession was known to be in dispute.

I have, &c.

G. BARCLAY.

[32490]

No. 519.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 30.)*

(No. 152.)

Sir,

*Gulahek, August 10, 1909.*

SINCE the capture of Tehran by the Nationalist forces, government has been virtually in the hands of a committee of twenty-five, elected for the guidance of the Ministers by the Extraordinary Grand Council.

A Cabinet, as well chosen as the lack of good material permits, has been formed—its composition will be found in the monthly summary—but no Minister seems to venture upon action without the concurrence of the committee.

On the whole the committee has conducted affairs with success. Order was speedily restored in the capital after the fighting was over, and so far it has been well maintained, though the predatory proclivities of the dispersed or disbanded troops of the ex-Shah have from time to time given ground for anxiety in the neighbouring districts. No date has yet been fixed for the meeting of the assembly, but the committee fully realise the necessity for its meeting without delay, and elections on the basis of the new electoral law are already proceeding.

In the provinces generally the revolution has been well received. In their present financial straits the Government have not, of course, been able to take active measures towards suppressing the lawlessness prevalent in many districts, but as regards the chief provincial towns they have succeeded by means of urgent injunctions to would-be disturbers of the peace in producing a *détente*, and in some cases averting imminent disorders. They have also in large measure succeeded for the moment, by dint of pressing advice to the local Anjumans, in quieting the anti-Russian agitation, which seemed at one time to be assuming disquieting proportions. In the choice of provincial governors the new Government has not been altogether happy. The matter is a difficult one on account of the unfortunate dearth of men in the governing class of honesty and strength of character. For the moment counsels are divided as to whether it is better to appoint men who have been prominent in provincial administration in the past or to select men who have only held minor posts. In favour of the former course it is said that the more prominent men are likely to have greater personal influence, and it is on personal influence that for a long time to come the Government must mainly rely for the maintenance of order in the provinces. On the other side, it is contended that it will be easier with men of less standing to break with the corrupt traditions of the past. It is due to this difference of opinion that the post of governor-general of Fars remains unfilled, to the detriment of the province. Ain-ed-Dowleh had been appointed when it was found that the Kashgais would not accept Ala-ed-Dowleh, but in the meantime Tagizada had returned to Tehran, and at once made his influence felt against the selection of a prince who is the embodiment of the old system which it is desired

to reform. The governorship of Tabreez has been another difficulty. Notwithstanding the representations of my Russian colleague, which I have supported, the Government persists in the appointment of Mukhber-es-Sultaneh, rather than Ala-ed-Dowleh. The same objection applies to Ala-ed-Dowleh as to Ain-ed-Dowleh, but here at least it would have been wiser, in deference to the wishes of Russia, to waive any objections there may be to the employment of men of the old school.

It is in this question of the choice of governors that I think the Government has been least judicious, though there are other matters which have provoked criticism. I notice, for instance, that M. Isvolsky mentioned to you as an unsatisfactory feature that Yeprim had been appointed prefect of police. Yeprim was the leading spirit of the force which accompanied Sipahdar from Resht. M. Isvolsky has stated that this man has committed crimes in Russia. However this may be—and there are many who would dispute the charge—his conduct of affairs in his present post has, to the best of my belief, been so far irreproachable. He is, I am told, anxious to resign and retire from Persia, but the Persian Government have persuaded him to remain for the present. His presence and that of other Caucasians who were also with Sipahdar's force—there now turn out to be no more than eighty of them—do certainly involve possibilities of danger if they are interfered with from outside, but my Russian colleague has so far wisely refrained from raising the question of their position. They have not yet shown themselves to be an element of disorder, and any attempt on the part of Russia to arrest these men, even though some of them may be fugitives from Russian justice, would be to invite trouble. It would be well to leave the matter to the Persian Government and to time.

Other measures which have provoked criticism are the forced contributions alleged to have been levied on corrupt officials of the late régime and the execution of Sheikh Feizlullah and others. I have no certain knowledge that anyone has been squeezed, but supposing the allegations to be true, the methods by which these men have amassed fortunes render them fair game, besides which allowance must be made for a Government which is almost entirely without ordinary sources of revenue to draw upon. In the disorganised state of the provinces nothing is to be expected from the Maliat for a long time to come—indeed, much of that due for the current year has already been spent, and the other chief sources of revenue are heavily pledged. At the outset the new Government raised with difficulty a loan from local merchants of 20,000 tomans, not 20,000*l.* as reported by error in my telegram No. 627 of the 25th ultimo, but this sum is long ago exhausted. A fortnight ago a leading member of the committee told me in the course of a visit that the Government were undecided whether to have recourse to forced contributions or to make a request to the banks for accommodation. There were objections to both courses; the former would make a bad impression and provoke an outcry from those on the look-out for alarmist tales, while the latter would be inconsistent with the repeated declarations in the past that no foreign advance of any kind would be recognised without the approval of the assembly. Since my friend's visit it would appear, if the reports current are to be believed, that the Government has decided to follow the former course. This may enable them to carry on for a time; but many of the men who deserve squeezing are under foreign protection. This considerably reduces the fund available for such extortions, and I gather that the Government are likely to find themselves compelled before the assembly meets to apply to the banks.

The persons who have been executed are Mufakher-ul-Mulk, Sani Hazret, Mir Hashem, Sheikh Feizlullah, and a certain adjutant bashi. They were tried by a special court, which has now been dissolved, and though the reports published of the trials are somewhat inadequate, it may be asserted with confidence that, with the exception of the adjutant bashi, against whom the principal charge was that he had opened the fire on the Medjliss on the occasion of the *coup d'État* last year, none of these men call for any pity. Mufakher-ul-Mulk, Sani Hazret, and Mir Hashem all had murders to their account. This, perhaps, cannot be said of Sheikh Feizlullah, but he has been one of the most unscrupulous enemies of the constitutional cause, and, though no proper account of his trial has appeared, he is believed to have been plotting for the restoration of Mohammad Ali. The danger from such plots is very real in view of the presence of Russian troops at Kazvin, and that of the ex-Shah and his rascally suite at the Russian Legation, which together serve as a standing inducement to men like Sheikh Feizlullah to provoke an outrage upon foreigners in order to bring about foreign intervention, which the ex-Shah and his entourage fondly hope would set him again on the throne. Sheikh Feizlullah was a danger to his country, and Persia is well rid of him.



Before closing this despatch I should wish to touch very briefly on a matter which has been of some anxiety to me in the past few weeks. Since the victory of the Nationalists it has again and again been brought home to me how largely the recent revolution was a rebellion against Russian influence. The conviction that the Shah was a Russian puppet counted for much in the almost universal hatred felt for him, and now that he has been removed there is a general inclination to expect too much in the way of diminution of Russian influence, and there is disappointment and resentment that it cannot at once be shaken off. On the other hand, Russian *amour-propre* is just now so sensitive that any manifestation of this resentment is particularly inopportune at this moment. Fortunately, I have found the Nationalists very ready to respond to my counsels of moderation. They chafe especially at having to respect Russian protection, which has been so freely granted to Persian subjects in the past. At this moment the new Government wish to proceed with a free hand against the late Mint-master, who is one of the worst rascals in Persia, but they find that the man is a Russian-protected person. At any other time I should beg my Russian colleague to withdraw his protection from such a man, but on feeling my way I found that, in its present sensitive mood, the Russian Legation is little likely to be amenable to persuasion in such a matter. There are other questions, such as the treatment of the Cossack Brigade, where the conflict between the somewhat ambitious aspirations of the Nationalists and Russian influence has during the past few weeks made itself evident; but common sense has prevailed with the new Government, and in no case has the question become anything like acute. Still it is one of the many difficulties ahead. It is to be hoped that the assembly will prove as reasonable as the committee.

I have, &c.

G. BARCLAY.

[32491]

No. 520.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 30.)*

(No. 153.)  
Sir,

*Gulahek, August 10, 1909.*

FROM the reports which I received from His Majesty's consul-general at Bagdad during the period immediately preceding the overthrow of the ex-Shah's Government, it was evident that the continued presence of Russian troops in northern Persia had gone far to divert the attention of the heads of the Shiah religion in Mesopotamia from the abuses of the old régime to the more general and fanatical grievance of alleged foreign occupation of Persia. Greatly exaggerated accounts of the action of the Russian troops both at Tabreez and Meshed were assiduously spread at the religious centres, and an agitation directed chiefly against Russia, but likely, in the opinion of Colonel Ramsay, to be extended to all foreigners in Persia, was vigorously fomented at Kerbala and Nejef. The messages which Colonel Ramsay and the Russian consul-general at Bagdad were instructed to make to the Ulema were met with non-committal replies to both consuls-general, but Colonel Ramsay in interviews with representatives of the priests was able to gather a clearer idea of their views. Their indignation against Russia was mingled with surprise that England, after having helped Persia in her struggle for constitutional liberty, should now passively acquiesce in what they regarded as one more proof of Russia's traditional policy of aggression. They urged that England should do all in her power to free Persia from foreign occupation, averring that by her present attitude she was losing the trust and confidence which the Persian people had for years felt towards her.

What the Ulema intended really to do is difficult to estimate. It now seems doubtful that their rumoured decision to come to Persia for the purpose of preaching a holy war was ever more than a threat, but without the realisation of this project the influence which they can exercise throughout Persia must be a menace to the maintenance of order, and one that may at any time become a real danger so long as the Russian occupation continues. There is also to be reckoned with the authority of at least two of the Mujtehidis over the Mahomedan population of the Caucasus, and their power to create trouble for Russia in this direction is one which cannot be ignored.

I learn, however, from Lieutenant-Colonel Ramsay's latest reports, that since the accession of the new Shah the excitement at Kerbala and Nejef has somewhat abated, and a telegram from the Grand Vizier informing the Mujtehidis of the declaration of the Russian Government to the Powers that her troops will be withdrawn as soon as

they are no longer needed for the protection of foreigners, and advising them to do what lies in their power to restore peace in Persia, appears to have had a tranquillising effect.

I have, &c.

G. BARCLAY.

[32492]

No. 521.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 30.)*

(No. 154.)  
Sir,

*Gulahek, August 12, 1909.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith copy of a despatch which I have received from His Majesty's acting consul-general at Tabreez regarding the reception of the news of the overthrow of the ex-Shah's Government and its effect upon the general situation at that place.

I have, &c.

G. BARCLAY.

Inclosure in No. 521.

*Acting Consul-General Smart to Sir G. Barclay.*

(No. 23.)  
Sir,

*Tabreez, July 25, 1909.*

WITH reference to my telegram No. 171 of the 21st instant, I have the honour to report that the abdication of Muhammed Ali Shah was welcomed here with general satisfaction by all classes, who dislike and distrust him beyond hope of a reconciliation.

On the 22nd July Ijlal-ul-Mulk, the acting governor, gave an official reception in honour of the accession of Sultan Ahmed Shah, and since then festivities, illuminations, and fireworks have been the order of the day and night.

Sattar and Bagher Khan, who left the Turkish Consulate-General on the 10th July, immediately after the arrival of the new consul-general, Remsi Bey, in order to prepare for their departure with the outgoing consul-general, Muhammed Ali Bey, have changed their minds since the *coup d'Etat*. Muhammed Ali Bey left on the 22nd instant without Sattar and Bagher, who are at present keeping quiet in their houses, and have apparently abandoned all idea of leaving the country. All the respectable nationalists are anxious to get rid of them, and it is most desirable that they should be removed on some pretext. There is in Tabreez a strong party of moderate nationalists who, if Sattar and Bagher were removed, might be able to overcome the undesirable elements, consisting mainly of armed fedais.

The anti-Russian agitation, never serious, has collapsed for the present, and it is unlikely to become general unless the Russian troops are not withdrawn after the arrival of the governor-general with sufficient escort, or unless the military authorities break out again. Since the Hukmabad incident they have kept fairly quiet, having probably received strict orders to restrain their activity. The behaviour of the private soldiers continues to be, on the whole, exemplary, and the charges made against them of unveiling women or pilfering in the bazaars are either quite untrue or much exaggerated.

The Anjuman, which was re-elected at the beginning of this month, and the acting governor continue to govern the town, somewhat incoherently, but the presence of Russian troops is sufficient to prevent any disorder. My Russian colleague has not supported Ijlal-ul-Mulk as much as circumstances would seem to have required. He is incompetent and unreliable, but it would have been difficult to replace him had he persisted in his resignation. Mr. Miller occasionally interfered in the internal administration of the town in such a way as to weaken Ijlal's authority, already very slight, placed as he is without an escort between the Russian troops and the fedais. As a typical instance, Mr. Miller on one occasion intervened to demand the release of several Persian subjects arrested as reactionaries. The Anjuman refused to allow Ijlal to comply with this demand, and at last Mr. Miller asked me to intervene, hinting that, if the local authorities persisted in their refusal, he would be compelled to take stronger measures. I told him that I did not think that we had any right to interfere, but, to prevent possible complications, I made private representations on the subject, which



had the required effect, and the prisoners were released. Such interference and the insolence of the fedais, many of whom, disguised as police, continue to remain armed, made Ijlal's position so difficult that at one time he was hardly prevented from resigning. His resignation would not, perhaps, have been distasteful to Mr. Miller, who had been urging the necessity of bringing in Samad Khan as acting governor. Fortunately, since the *coup d'Etat*, Ijlal's position has been somewhat easier.

The appointment of Mukhber-es-Sultaneh as governor-general has caused general satisfaction, for he has the reputation of being a strong and enlightened man. He is apparently coming direct from Berlin via Julfa, but it is to be hoped that a strong escort for him will be dispatched from Tehran as soon as possible; otherwise he will be unable to suppress the fedais in Tabreez, much less restore order in the province.

The state of the province is very unsatisfactory, and, with the exception of the Julfa road, the roads are very unsafe. The Shahsevens have plundered all along the Tehran road between Mianeh and Haji Agha, as well as the country round Ardebil. Muhammed Kuly Khan, a Shahsevan chief and famous smuggler, having been appointed deputy-governor of Ardebil by Sipahdar, entered the town with his tribesmen, who indulged in general looting. Numbers of people, including the royalist governor, Rashid-ul-Mulk, took refuge in the Russian Consulate, and Muhammed Kuly was left in possession of the town. However, the arrival of 100 Russian Cossacks appears to have put an end to the disorders in the town. In Karadagh some fighting has been going on between the Shahsevan and Rahim Khan, in which the honours appear to have been divided. The two parties have now patched up a reconciliation.

The situation is just as bad all along the Turkish frontier. The Turks have completely cut off Urumia from communication with the outside world. They have blocked all the roads, and even prevent telegraphic communication from being re-established. Mr. Miller and myself have made representations to Remsi Bey on the subject, but I fear no improvement can be expected until we take up the frontier question again. Agha Bey, the new Turkish consul, has replaced the notorious Peter Elbow at Urumia. There are 150 Turkish troops in Dilman, and the same number in Urumia, as well as a few small detachments in the surrounding country. The Urumia deputation is still at Tabreez, having made little progress in the accomplishment of its mission. Muhtashem-es-Sultaneh told me a few days ago that he hoped to get out of going to Urumia, but I think he is really anxious to go, although he will not leave without money and an escort. He is not a suitable man for the post, as he is a recognised Turcophobe, and the ignominious treatment he suffered at the hands of the fedais when lately governor there is not likely to strengthen his authority.

My relations with Mr. Miller are most cordial, and his presence here at this moment is a godsend. With the frequent petty incidents arising out of the Russian occupation and the general uncertainty, a less amiable colleague might have been the cause of much trouble. At the same time, while not abandoning the traditional Russian policy here, his attitude towards the Persians is in marked contrast to that of his predecessor, and he treats them with a courtesy which they have not experienced for many years from the Russian representative in Azerbaijan.

I have, &c.  
W. A. SMART.

[32494]

No. 522.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 30.)*

(No. 156.)  
Sir,

*Gulahek, August 12, 1909.*

I HAVE the honour to forward copy of the protocol mentioned in my telegram No. 654 of the 5th August.

I need not trouble you with the wearisome negotiations which preceded the conclusion of this arrangement. It will suffice to say that in the early stages my Russian colleague and I held as much as possible aloof, leaving the questions of the surrender of the Crown jewels and of the ex-Shah's civil list to be dealt with between His Majesty's entourage and representatives of the Persian Government, and that it was only when matters had reached a deadlock between them—the ex-Shah refusing to give up a large part of the jewels—that we formally intervened. It was obviously in the highest degree desirable that Mohammed Ali's stay in Persia should be cut short, and we therefore decided to bring pressure to bear on both parties to come to an arrangement. Part of the jewels were among His Majesty's effects at the Russian

Legation, and, unless they were to be taken from him by force, it was necessary to bring the Persian Government to make some concession in regard to the civil list. The sum originally offered (25,000 tomans a-year) was small, even making allowance for Persia's poverty, and it would have left His Majesty largely dependent on Russia, which had promised him a welcome. In response to our pressing advice the committee consented to increase it to 75,000 tomans on the conditions set forth in the protocol.

On his side the ex-Shah has now, yielding to our pressure, surrendered for inspection certain boxes which contain a portion at least of the missing jewels. I have not yet heard the result of this inspection, but it is to be feared that a good many of the jewels claimed by the Government as Crown property will be found to have been pawned or sold. In this case the representatives of the two Powers are bound to do their best to secure from His Majesty the pawntickets and full particulars. I trust that the Persian Government, in its desire to see the last of His Majesty, will not be too exacting on this point.

I am glad to see that the Russian Government have no idea of delaying matters until the assembly has sanctioned the 75,000 tomans a-year. Before affixing our signatures we shall insist on those of the Cabinet using as leverage the stipulation for His Majesty's early departure, and if we obtain them the assembly will find it difficult to repudiate the arrangement.

There are other questions, of course, to be settled in connection with the ex-Shah's money matters, such as his claim to arrears of civil list and his debts to the two banks, but these can be arranged after he has left. His claim to arrears of civil list is in large part for the period during which he has been ruling as an autocrat, and as such is not likely to be admitted by the Persian Government. He is said to owe 1,500,000 tomans to the Russian Bank, and he owes some 150,000 tomans to the Imperial Bank of Persia. The former debt is secured on His Majesty's private property, and the latter was passed by Mohammed Ali during the post-Medjliss régime as a Government debt. If the assembly repudiate it, it will be worth considering whether we cannot obtain repayment for the bank from the 75,000 tomans a-year assigned to His Majesty.

I have, &c.  
G. BARCLAY.

Inclosure in No. 522.

*Protocol dated 21st July (3rd August), 1909.*

EN but d'accélérer le départ de Perse de Sa Majesté Mohammad Ali Mirza, ex-Schah de Perse, qui se trouve actuellement sous la protection des Légations d'Angleterre et de Russie, les représentants du Gouvernement persan et les représentants des deux légations ont dressé d'accord le protocole suivant, sujet à une ratification du Gouvernement persan, d'une part, et des deux représentants des deux Puissances, de l'autre :—

Article 1<sup>er</sup>. Mohammad Ali Mirza délivrera au Gouvernement persan tous les bijoux et autres objets de la Couronne qui restent encore en sa possession. Les bijoux à rendre seront déterminés après une investigation faite dans la présence des délégués des deux légations.

Art. 2. Mohammad Ali Mirza délivrera au Gouvernement persan tous les documents qu'il possède concernant les bijoux de la Couronne engagés dans les banques ou autres maisons de prêts contre des avances faites à Sa Majesté. Le Gouvernement persan pourra, selon son gré, racheter ses bijoux engagés.

Art. 3. Le Gouvernement persan assignera à Mohammad Ali Mirza une pension annuelle de 75,000 tomans, payables chaque semestre d'avance par l'entremise de la Banque d'Escompte de Perse à Téhéran.

Art. 4. Le Gouvernement persan, après avoir dressé une liste de tous les bijoux et autres objets dont il a pris livraison, présentera aux deux légations une liste de ce qui manque, et les deux légations obtiendront de Mohammad Ali Mirza des explications précises, avec tous les détails possibles, sur le sort de ces bijoux et autres objets, et en cas que quelques-uns de ceux-ci se trouveraient entre les mains de Sa Majesté elle-même, ou des personnes de son entourage qui se trouvent en bast à la Légation de Russie, ou que les détails donnés soient inexacts, les deux légations feront ce qu'il leur sera possible pour obtenir leur restitution.

Art. 5. Si, à partir de la date du présent protocole, il serait prouvé par-devant les tribunaux des deux légations que Sa Majesté Mohammad Ali Mirza aurait vendu à



partir de cette date des bijoux ou autres objets de la Couronne, le montant de telle vente sera déduit de sa pension par le Gouvernement persan.

Art. 6. Mohammad Ali Mirza quittera Téhéran pour l'étranger aussitôt que possible, mais pas plus tard que dans quinze jours à partir de la date du présent protocole.

Fait à Zerguendé le 3 août, 1909 (N.S.) (21 juillet, 1909 (V.S.)).

VOSSOUGH-ED-DOULEH,  
HUSSEIN KULI,  
DR. IBRAHIM,  
DR. HAKIM-UL-MULK,  
*Members of Extraordinary Committee.*  
ASSADULLAH (MUSHAR-ES-SULTANEH),  
*Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*  
MOVASSAK-ED-DOULEH,  
*Minister of the Court.*  
G. P. CHURCHILL.  
A. BARANOWSKY.

[32495]

No. 523.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 30.)*

(No. 157.)

Sir,

*Gulahek, August 13, 1909.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 140 of the 16th July, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith copy of a further memorandum by Major Stokes in regard to the Bakhtiaris and the constitution

I have, &c.  
G. BARCLAY.

Inclosure in No. 523.

*Memorandum by Major Stokes respecting the Bakhtiaris and the Constitution, July and August 1909.*

ON the 4th July Salar-i-Jung, with 200 royalist Bakhtiaris, left Kashan for Tehran. They left the Kum road at Kaleh, and made straight for Robat Karim.

On the 5th July the British and Russian consuls-general at Ispahan called on Samsam-es-Sultaneh, and, in accordance with instructions from their legations, conveyed to him a warning similar to that sent to Sardar-i-Assad the day before.

On the 6th July Samsam-es-Sultaneh, accompanied by Sardar-i-Muhtasham and Mutamid-i-Khakan, who, though not a Bakhtiari, appears to possess the confidence of the khans, met the two consuls-general, and, after an interview lasting two hours, agreed to send telegrams to Kerbela and to the nationalists at Constantinople, Tabreez, and other towns informing them of the warning he had received. Salar-i-Masoud (Mehdi Kuli Khan, son of Sardar-i-Zafar) left Ispahan for Tehran with 140 men. One hundred and twenty of the royalist force from Kashan took refuge in the shrine at Kum, refusing to go to Tehran.

On the 7th July Samsam-es-Sultaneh sent most of the telegrams he had undertaken to send the day before.

On the 8th July Samsam-es-Sultaneh received a reply from Constantinople to the effect that the object of the constitution was to maintain the independence of Persia, which foreigners for their own objects were seeking to belittle. If success was not obtained at Tehran in a day or two Persia was lost. The neighbouring tribes should be warned that Persia and Islam were in danger.

On the 9th July Sardar-i-Muhtasham and Sardar Bahadur left Ispahan for Tehran with 450 to 600 men. Zargham-es-Sultaneh, with 400 men, and Salar-i-Masoud, with 300, reached Kashan. Sardar-i-Motazid, with the royalist force from Kashan, left Kum for Tehran. In villages near Kum his men disarmed a number of Bakhtiaris sent by Sardar-i-Assad to collect taxes.

On the 10th July Zargham-es-Sultaneh marched from Kashan by Naizar, and Salar-i-Masoud from Kashan by Kuhrud, for Tehran. Sardar-i-Motazid and the royalist force passed Kala-i-Muhammad Ali Khan. A fight took place between royalist and

nationalist Bakhtiaris near Tehran, the former being Amir-i-Mufakham's men. A blood feud has thus been started which may have important consequences in the future.

On the 11th July a telegram for Sardar-i-Muhtasham from Amir-i-Mufakham reached Ispahan. It told him of the fighting on the previous day, and warned him that things were becoming serious, and he had better take heed for himself.

From the 13th July to the 16th July fighting took place at Tehran, in which the Amir-i-Mufakham's men alone of the Bakhtiaris took part on the royalist side. Sardar-i-Motazid's force of Persian infantry and Salar-i-Jung's Bakhtiaris reached Tehran on the 15th, but took no part in the fighting. After the fighting was over the royalist Bakhtiaris withdrew to the hills north of Tehran, where they entrenched themselves. A meeting of the khans, the royalists excepted, decided that, all things considered, it was best to patch up the quarrel, and after much negotiation this was done, and Amir-i-Mufakham left for the Bakhtiari country early in August. Few people, Bakhtiaris included, believe that the peace will be a lasting one, the Bakhtiari idea being that a blood feud cannot be allowed to end in this manner.

On the 15th July Salar-i-Masoud's contingent reached Kum; that of Sardar-i-Muhtasham and Sardar Bahadur left Kashan.

On the 17th July the latter contingent reached Kum.

On the 18th July Samsam-es-Sultaneh was appointed Governor of Ispahan. Orders were sent by Sardar-i-Assad, as Minister of the Interior, to patrol the road, Sardar-i-Muhtasham being placed in charge of the section Tehran-Kashan, and Samsam-es-Sultaneh of that from Kashan to Ispahan. At a large meeting held in the mosque at Kum, Sardar-i-Muhtasham read a telegram announcing the deposition of Muhammad Ali Shah and the accession of Sultan Ahmad Shah. Four thousand tomans were handed to him on behalf of the town.

On the 19th July Sardar-i-Muhtasham and Sardar Bahadur, with their contingent, left Kum for Tehran, which they reached a few days later. Salar-i-Masoud's force also reached Tehran about the same time.

On the 28th July Samsam-es-Sultaneh received a telegram from the Anjuman-i-Saadat at Constantinople saying that Zil-es-Sultan was trying to become Regent, and this must be prevented. This warning seems unnecessary, as Sardar-i-Assad, when the question of appointing Zil-es-Sultan Governor-General of Fars arose, declared that if the appointment was insisted on he would resign the Ministry of the Interior and retire to the Bakhtiari country with all his men. It is to be remembered that Sardar-i-Assad's father was murdered by Zil-es-Sultan when a guest in the latter's house at Ispahan.

In all about 2,500 to 3,000 Bakhtiaris have come to Tehran in the last month, of whom the greater number are still here. It is difficult to get at the exact numbers, as they are billeted all over the town in caravanserais and stables. A suggestion that they should all camp outside the town was rejected by the khans, who do not wish the exact numbers of their men to become known.

C. B. S.

*Tehran, August 12, 1909.*

[32496]

No. 524.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 30.)*

(No. 158.)

Sir,

*Gulahek, August 13, 1909.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith the usual monthly summary of events in Persia for the last four weeks.

I have, &c.  
G. BARCLAY.

Inclosure in No. 524.

*Monthly Summary No. 8.—(June 19 to August 6, 1909.)*

*Tehran.*

SAAD-ED-DOWLEH'S Cabinet resigned on the 24th June, owing to panic caused by news of the advance on Tehran of the nationalist forces from Ispahan and Kazvin.  
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The Shah, however, asked the Ministers to retain office temporarily, which they did, and the two legations sent their dragomans to enjoin "solidarity" upon several of the Ministers, especially Farman Farma, who were acting in a very foolish manner.

The British and Russian consuls-general at Ispahan arrived at Kum on the 26th to urge Sardar Assad to abandon his advance on Tehran. They returned to their posts a few days later, and subsequent events showed that their mission had failed.

On the 28th the Sipahdar's mixed force of Caucasians and Persians from Resht and Kazvin arrived at Yengi-Imam, 45 miles from Tehran, within 20 miles of the Cossack post established four days before at Kerej under the command of Captain Zapolsky. The question of the attitude of the Russian officers of the Persian Cossack brigade had by this time become one of some importance, and it transpired that Colonel Liakhoff had received instructions "to protect the Shah and to take the field."

On the 1st July Sardar Assad advanced from Kum much to the surprise of everyone, as it was thought that the serious warning given to him by the two legations would deter him. At Tehran the bazaars were closed, and a general exodus from town to the country began.

The following day the British and Russian representatives had a painful audience of the Shah at Sultanetabad, when he was told that he should have followed the advice of the two Powers sooner, that they had done what they could, and would continue to use their influence to bring about a pacific solution of the present crisis. The Shah was dignified in his attitude, and did not raise the question of the guarantees given to him.

On the 3rd and 4th July important developments occurred: Sardar Assad arrived at Robat Kerim, some 40 miles from Tehran, and the Cossacks were ordered to retire from Kerej, which was followed by a forward movement by Sipahdar, who occupied Kerej.

Seeing that the two commanders were rapidly drawing their forces nearer to the capital, the British and Russian representatives decided, in pursuance of instructions from their Governments, to send a delegate each to the two leaders. Mr. Churchill and M. Romanowsky were sent to the Sardar Assad, while Major Stokes and M. Baronowsky went to see Sipahdar. They left at 1 A.M. on the 4th July, but the latter party found, on arriving at Shahabad, 15 miles from the town, to which place the Cossacks had retired, that a body of Sipahdar's men were attacking them. They were actually fired at by the Cossacks, and had to retire. This engagement appears to have been merely one of outposts, and the Cossacks held their ground inflicting considerable loss to the opponents, from whom they captured one gun. The delegates from the two legations delivered their messages to the two commanders respectively, and, though the language used was of the strongest, and warned them that their action might lead to foreign intervention, it produced no effect whatever.

On the 6th July the Russian Legation announced to the Persian Government that a force of Russian troops was on its way to Kazvin, not to intervene in the struggle then proceeding, but to be at the disposal of the Russian Legation for the protection of Russian and other foreign lives and property.

On the 9th July Sipahdar left Kerej with about 1,000 men, outflanked the Cossacks who remained posted at Shahabad, and advanced in a south-easterly direction towards Robat Kerim, from whence Sardar Assad had advanced to meet him with about 1,200 Bakhtiari. Notwithstanding a treacherous attempt to surprise the fedai under Sipahdar, which was clumsily made by Amir Mufakham, the royalist Bakhtiari chief, the two nationalist forces joined hands, and for three days maintained their position against severe artillery fire.

On the night of the 12th July the combined nationalist force marched between the opposing Cossacks and irregulars. Owing to what appears to have been gross mismanagement on the part of Captains Zapolsky and Peribinoszeff, they succeeded in getting through unnoticed, and at 6 A.M. on the 13th July the whole nationalist force entered Tehran by the north, or Yousufabad gate, which was not held against them. They rode three abreast past the British Legation, and shortly afterwards, dividing into three columns, proceeded to the Baharistan, or assembly building, which they reached practically without opposition. The soldiers on duty at the various guard-houses were disarmed without difficulty, though two or three men were killed and wounded at the guard-house opposite the main gate of the legation. A column which descended the legation street towards the Artillery Square was fired upon by soldiers posted in the square, the various gates of which were immediately closed.

The three northern and three eastern gates of the town were immediately taken possession of by the Bakhtiaris, but the three western gates remained in the hands of

the Cossacks. During the course of the morning Captain Zapolsky with 400 Cossacks under him entered the town by one of these gates and joined Colonel Liakhoff, who was throughout at the Cossack barracks in the western part of the town with 400 men. The remaining 300 Cossacks, under Captain Peribinoszeff, went to Sultanetabad to protect the Shah, who had besides some 2,000 men under Amir Bahadur who had taken no part whatever in the hostilities.

Throughout the three days on which hostilities lasted, viz., 13th, 14th, and 15th July, the Cossacks remained on the defensive in and around their barracks, while an irregular force of some 500 absolutely undisciplined men held the gun square; the main force, under Sipahdar and Sardar Assad, held the rest of the town, with their headquarters at the Baharistan, whilst a determined body of fedai crept gradually as close to the barracks as possible, using their Mausers with great effect and throwing bombs at night.

On the 14th the Shah declared that he intended to stake his all on a determined combined attack on the town by all the forces at his disposal and to take refuge at the Russian Legation if it failed. The attack proved a complete failure. Captain Peribinoszeff shelled the Baharistan quarter from the hills near Kasr-i-Kajar, which covered an attack by some of the irregulars on the Dochantapeh gate. The Bakhtiari, however, appeared in such force to defend that approach that the attacking party fled in confusion, while the bombardment produced no impression whatever. Colonel Liakhoff endeavoured to shell the Baharistan at the same time, but the range must have been most inaccurate as a number of the shells exploded over the Imperial Bank without doing much harm.

The Shah was assured by his Persian officers that victory might still be his, and, consequently, the following day (the 15th July) further attempts were made by his irregulars to attack the gates, but the Cossacks remained entirely on the defensive. Every attack was, however, repulsed with severe loss to the royalists. During the day a small number of the royalist Bakhtiari contrived to reach a house near the British Legation, and a great deal of firing went on between them and the fedai.

The total casualties are unknown, but probably did not exceed 300.

On the 16th July the Shah took refuge at the Russian Legation under a joint Anglo-Russian guard, and the dragomans of the two legations were sent to town to make terms between the nationalist leaders and Colonel Liakhoff, which they succeeded in doing. The same day the Cossacks began to fraternise with the Bakhtiari and fedai, and by the following day normal conditions had been re-established in the town.

An extraordinary grand council was then formed at the Baharistan, and on the 17th the council proclaimed Mohammed Ali's deposition and the enthronement of the Valiahd as Sultan Ahmed Shah. Azad-ul-Mulk was temporarily appointed to be Regent, and the following Cabinet was formed as a provisional Government pending the convocation of the National Assembly:—

Minister of War ...	...	Sipahdar.
" " Interior ...	...	Sardar Assad.
" " Foreign Affairs ...	...	Naser-ul-Mulk.
" " Finance ...	...	Mustaufi-ul-Mamalek.
" " Justice ...	...	Farman Farma.
" " Education, &c. ...	...	Sani-ed-Dowleh.
" " Court ...	...	Muvassak-ed-Dowleh.
" " Telegraphs and Posts ...	...	Sardar Mansur.

A telegram was sent to Naser-ul-Mulk inviting him to return to Persia immediately to take up his post, and in the interim the Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Mushar-es-Sultaneh, was given official charge of the Foreign Office, and the legations were informed accordingly.

Several other minor appointments were made including the notorious leader of the reputed Caucasian revolutionaries, known as Yeprem, who became chief of police. Ala-ed-Dowleh, who had arrived at Tehran a few days before, was appointed governor-general of Fars, and Mukhber-es-Sultaneh, who was still in Europe, was summoned back and told to go direct to Tabreez to take over the government of Azerbaijan, which he held at the time of the last *coup d'Etat* in June 1908. Samsam-es-Sultaneh was confirmed as governor of Ispahan.

Saad-ed-Dowleh and Mukhber-ed-Dowleh took refuge at the British legation, but seeing that there was no likelihood of their being interfered with they left after a day or two for their homes, but Saad-ed-Dowleh has since placed himself under Russian protection.



The provisional Government having officially notified the legations of the change of Sovereign, the British and Russian legations signified their recognition of Sultan Ahmed Shah and the other legations followed suit.

The town was illuminated on the 21st July and the 22nd and newspapers began to reappear.

On the 26th Mufakher-ul-Mulk, the notorious reactionary agent of the ex-Shah, was captured, and two days later, after trial by a special court, he was shot at the Bagh-i-Shah. The same court also tried three other prominent reactionaries, including Sani Hezret, the leader of the armed roughs employed by Mohammed Ali, and Sheikh Fazlullah, the reactionary chief Mollah, who had done so much against the constitutional régime, and they were publicly hanged in the artillery square. Several arrests were also made, including Haji Majd-ed-Dowleh, K.C.M.G., and Amir Nizam, the ex-Minister of Finance.

In the meantime steps were taken by the nationalist committee, which seemed to be managing affairs, and of which Hussein Kuli Khan, C.B., is the leading spirit, to take possession on behalf of the Government of the crown jewels and other property which Mohammed Ali had taken to the Russian legation. A large portion of these jewels was taken over without much trouble, but Mohammed Ali endeavoured to retain a considerable quantity. The committee offered to give the ex-Shah 5,000*l.* per annum as a pension, but after lengthy negotiations carried on with them by the two legations, a protocol was signed on the 3rd August by which the ex-Shah is to receive 15,000*l.* a-year, hand over all the jewels and leave Tehran at latest by the 17th August. The remaining jewels were handed over the following day.

On the 31st July Sultan Ahmed Shah, supported by the Regent who acted as spokesman for His Majesty who is only about 13 years of age, held his first reception of the corps diplomatique.

Colonel Liakhoff left Tehran for Russia on the 4th August, and it is not at all likely that he will return.

Mohammed Ali brought with him to the Russian legation most of his reactionary following, including Amir Bahadur. Naib-es-Sultaneh had preceded his nephew a few days before. A number of the Silakhori and other irregulars also pitched their tents in the grounds outside the legation walls and were removed with difficulty. Some of them attempted to loot villages in the vicinity, and a force of Bakhtiari had to be sent up from town to disperse them.

Normal conditions have now been restored, and the elections for 15 members of Parliament for the Tehran district are proceeding on the basis of the Electoral Law already elaborated under the old régime.

Zil-es-Sultan arrived at Resht and left for Tehran on the 5th August, but was stopped at Menjil. Taki Zadeh arrived at Tehran on the 6th August.

G. P. CHURCHILL, *Oriental Secretary.*

*Gulahek, August 6, 1909.*

#### *Tabreez.*

1. On 22nd July two detachments of Russian Cossacks, each consisting of one officer and fourteen men left Tabreez to map the country in the direction of Soujbulak and of Mianeh. They returned about a fortnight later.

2. Towards the end of July His Majesty's acting consul-general gathered from conversations he had with General Snarski and other officers that there was some likelihood of the Russian troops remaining at Tabreez for the winter. In reporting this to His Majesty's Minister, he urged that the Persian Government should at once send a governor with a force capable of keeping order, so as to leave no excuse for the Russian troops remaining at Tabreez. Mukhber-es-Sultaneh, who has been appointed governor-general of Azerbaijan, has not yet reached Tabreez from Europe. The local assembly of Tabreez is anxious that Samad Khan, a tribal Chief, and lately one of the Shah's generals, should be dismissed from the governorship of Maraga. As he is a good governor, and his is the only tranquil district in Azerbaijan, both legations have advised that he should be left in his post.

#### *Ardebil.*

1. The Russian Government having informed the Persian Government on the 1st August that unless a strong governor with a suitable escort was dispatched to

Ardebil by the 4th August they would themselves send troops in to keep order. Fath-es-Sultan was on the 2nd August appointed governor, and has started from the neighbourhood of Tabreez for Ardebil.

#### *Resht.*

1. Three Russian transports reached Enzeli on the 9th July, and three on the 10th July, and landed troops. On the 10th, 625 Cossacks left Resht for Kazvin. The boycott of Russian goods begun on the 10th was abandoned the next day, but some merchants telegraphed to Russia cancelling large orders for Russian goods. Protests against the Russian action were addressed to the consulates at Resht, to the legations at Tehran, and to the British public. The armed supporters of the nationalist cause laid down their arms. On the 13th about 1,000 infantrymen and four guns left Enzeli for Resht. The Cossacks were accused of having cut the telegraph wire near Rudbar. They reached Kazvin on the 16th July. The infantry left Resht on the 15th; they were accused of uprooting eighteen telegraph poles. The telegraph wire was cut at Yangi Imam. Three more transports reached Enzeli on the 19th July, from one of which supplies were landed next day in charge of 159 commissariat personnel. On the 3rd August fifty Russian soldiers landed at Enzeli, and His Majesty's vice-consul was informed that more were to come in small detachments.

2. Events at Tehran gave pleasure to the people of Resht generally. Very strong feeling, however, still prevailed against Russia.

3. Taki Zadeh passed through Resht on his way from Tabreez to Tehran on the 3rd August.

#### *Astrabad.*

1. The news of the abdication of Muhammad Ali Shah was received with great joy. The town was illuminated for three nights, and salutes were fired.

#### *Meshed.*

1. M. Courtin, manager of the Russian bank, left for Tabreez on transfer early in July. M. Budolevich, who was removed from Tabreez a few months ago at the instance of the Russian consul-general, and who acted for M. Courtin, left on the 21st July. In the few weeks he was at Meshed he started a policy hostile to the Imperial bank. It appears that a short time ago the local manager of the Imperial Bank of Persia was informed confidentially by the local manager of the Russian bank that the latter intends to close its branch in Seistan on account of the useless expenditure at present incurred by it. The Russian bank wished to know on what terms the Imperial bank would take over its business in Seistan.

2. Quiet has prevailed at Meshed since the reconciliation reported in last summary. The change of Sovereigns was celebrated by illuminations and rejoicings on an extravagant scale. Extraordinary demonstrations of gratitude to His Majesty's consulate-general were noted. The local press was full of gratitude to the consul-general, and of compliments to British policy. In this connection all consuls have been instructed by His Majesty's Minister to combat the idea that the recent revolution was in any way a victory of British over Russian policy. Major Sykes expresses the opinion that the presence of a second sotnia of Cossacks is no longer necessary.

3. An attempt was made to start a boycott of Russian goods at Meshed. Major Sykes took steps, with success, to have this stopped. He reports that Prince Dabija, whose attitude towards him was temporarily somewhat improved by instructions from his legation to co-operate with his British colleague, is now working hard against him, and is much upset at Russian intervention not being justified.

#### *Turbat-i-Haidari.*

1. Twelve Russian Cossacks arrived from Karej on the 26th June. On the 11th July four arrived from Meshed, of whom three were to go to Karej, one remaining at Turbat. On the 12th July four arrived from Birjand for Russia via Karej.

2. Baron Tcherkassof, the new Russian Consul for Seistan, arrived from Meshed on the 29th June. He left for Birjand on the 4th July with thirteen Cossacks.



*Seistan.*

1. Dr. Kosminsky informed Major Kennion that the Seistan vice-consulate had been permanently extended to embrace Kain, which had consequently been separated from Turbat. It will remain a vice-consulate, but Baron Tcherkassof will have the rank and status of consul. Neither he (Dr. Kosminsky) or Dr. Otto, at Seistan, had any powers. The flag was flown over his house because the consular escort was there.

2. There is much feeling against the Russians at Birjand owing to their troops entering Persia, and because they have, so it is believed, helped the Shah. Dr. Kosminsky told Major Kennion that though he had many friends in Birjand it was now quite disagreeable for him to come into the place, as Russians were regarded by every one in the most unfriendly way. The worst of it was, he said, that he was unable to give any adequate reply to his friends' outspoken criticism of Russian action.

*Ispahan.*

1. In consequence of excesses of all kinds committed by Bakhtiari, the British and Russian consuls-general early in July addressed strong notes to the Persian Foreign Office agent. This led to the dismissal of the chief of the police, who was replaced by Gharib Khan. The latter has displayed much energy in keeping order. Samsam-es-Sultaneh has also taken steps to this end. He published a proclamation to the effect that any Bakhtiari extorting money from the townspeople or molesting women would be very severely dealt with, and another forbidding any firing in town. The house of any offender was to be pulled down. Ispahan has consequently remained quiet.

2. The entry of the nationalist forces into Tehran on the 13th July was announced to Ispahan the same day by the firing of guns. The bazaars were illuminated for two evenings. On the 16th, news was received of the Shah's having taken refuge in the Russian Legation, and on the 18th the appointment of Samsam-es-Sultaneh as governor-general of Ispahan was announced. A day or two later Agha Nourullah, who had striven to assert the pre-eminence of the clergy, was compelled to resign the presidency of the local assembly. There is considerable ill-feeling between Samsam and the clergy. On the 20th July salutes were fired to announce the accession of Sultan Ahmed Shah, and in the evening there were illuminations and fireworks in Ispahan and Julfa. The khans were on that evening the guests of the Armenian Archimandrite. Mr. Grahame reports that events at Tehran have created curiously little impression at Ispahan, and that the dominant note there was indifference. The majority, including enlightened notables and merchants, favours the new régime, but a large minority is against it. The minority consists of the clergy and the officials. The former feel that their influence is doomed, while the latter fear a reduction of their emoluments. There is a steady chorus of praise for England, designed perhaps to accentuate the dislike for Russia. There are even some people who credit His Majesty's Government with the subtle policy of having landed a small force at Bushire in order to lead Russia into pouring large bodies of troops into the northern provinces at considerable expense and without practical result except that of estranging the feelings of all Persia.

3. The Tehran-Ispahan road was for some weeks quite unsafe, and robberies of travellers and posts were frequent. The royalist and nationalist forces moving on the road appear to have been equally concerned in these robberies. Sardar-i-Assad, on being appointed Minister of the Interior, at once issued orders for the patrolling of the road by Bakhtiari, with the result that on the 24th July the road was reported free from brigandage. The Ahwaz road was reported at the end of July to be very unsafe—two large robberies of caravans having recently taken place.

4. The elections for the national assembly began on the 29th July, and were to close on the 12th August.

*Yezd.*

The condition of the roads to Yezd did not improve during July. They were still frequented by large bodies of robbers, and numbers of robberies were reported. The postal service was very irregular. In the town and suburbs the Parsees and Jews suffered continual annoyance at the hands of Mahomedans. The newest form of tyranny is the forcible conversion to Islam of Parsee girls. One or two cases have occurred, and threats of more have caused the closing of Parsee girls' schools, the girls being afraid to leave their homes. The Parsee community is unfortunately at this moment somewhat bitterly divided over the question of the succession to the office of priest, to which the two sons of the late priest are the rival claimants. Adl-ed-Dowleh, who resigned the governorship, was reappointed to it.

*Kerman.*

The situation has not altered appreciably in the last month. Nizam-es-Sultaneh has been confirmed in the appointment of governor by the new Central Government, but has not yet left Tehran for Kerman.

*Kermanshan.*

1. The people of Kermanshan seem to have been divided into two parties by a private quarrel among the priests. Of the two factions, the one headed by Seyyid Kamal-ud-Din, a Tehran priest, was supported by most of the notables of the town, the other, under Moin-i-Raya, had the secret support of the local clergy. On the 14th July fighting took place between the two parties, in which Moin-i-Raya was defeated, the other party's force being commanded by Zahir-ul-Mulk. Early on the 15th, Moin-i-Raya and two others took refuge in the grounds of His Majesty's consulate without Captain Crossle's permission. In anticipation of such an incident, Captain Crossle had issued strict orders that no refugees should be admitted, but as the consulate grounds are quite open it is impossible to prevent entrance to them by night. Captain Crossle had also requested the governor to provide guards for British subjects, but the governor replied that he was powerless, as he had no troops and Zahir-ul-Mulk had seized the arsenal. Captain Crossle saw the refugees, and protested against their presence. They refused to leave, as if they did so they would be killed at once. Captain Crossle also communicated with his Russian colleague, requesting him to join with him in arranging matters, but the latter declined to interfere in local affairs. At the same time Captain Crossle wrote to the governor to inform him that these men had taken refuge at the consulate, and asked him to make arrangements that they should be removed as soon as possible. The Foreign Office agent arrived on the part of the governor, and Captain Crossle protested strongly against these men taking refuge, and demanded that arrangements should be made for them to leave at once. He informed him, at the same time, that he had sent several times to the governor asking for guards, and had always received the reply that the latter was unable to supply them. Captain Crossle went on to say that the consulate would not interfere in an affair exclusively local, and which did not affect our interests.

The Foreign Office agent deplored the governor's want of power, and after an interview with the refugees agreed to go and see Zahir-ul-Mulk and inform him that they were ready to leave the town if their lives were spared. In the meanwhile, Zahir-ul-Mulk took advantage of the excitement in the town to burn Moin-i-Raya's house and to loot several others. In the evening Zahir-ul-Mulk sent messengers, saying that the refugees must be handed over unconditionally, and that he would put them in chains and have them tried; that in the beginning Moin-i-Raya had sent to Nazr Ali Khan and a son of Daoud Khan, who is in revolt against his father, asking them to come and help him. Moin-i-Raya denied this, and gave letters to be dispatched to both these chiefs asking them not to come to Kermanshan on his account. Zahir-ul-Mulk's messengers were accompanied by a large crowd of people, who said they were come to take the refugees, if necessary by force. As it was evident that if Captain Crossle handed them over they would be killed once they got out of the consulate grounds, he refused to do so unless an assurance were given that they would not be touched. On the 16th Zahir-ed-Dowleh, the governor, wrote informing Captain Crossle that he had resigned the governorship. He was induced to reconsider his decision, but refused to do anything until he got support from Tehran. He informed the consulate Mirza that he would not act as governor so long as Zahir-ul-Mulk made use of Government guns and soldiers for his private quarrels. On the morning of the 17th Daoud Khan, chief of the Kalhors, arrived with 200 horsemen to help Zahir-ul-Mulk. It was reported that he would loot the town unless Moin-i-Raya were surrendered unconditionally. During the day news arrived from Tehran that the Shah had abdicated, and this took a great deal of attention off local affairs. In the evening the consulate Mirza had an interview with Daoud Khan, and explained the position of affairs to him. As a result, the night passed quietly. On the 18th Zahir-ul-Mulk and his party called on Daoud Khan and asked him to send back his horsemen with the exception of some thirty as an escort. Daoud Khan agreed to do so, and later signed a telegram to be sent to the Sipahdar demanding that Moin-i-Raya should be handed over to Zahir-ul-Mulk unconditionally. On the 29th one refugee left the consulate. The governor again resigned, but once more resumed office on the 30th. Zahir-ul-Mulk, however, remained paramount. The other refugees left on the 3rd



August of their own accord. On the 5th August a representative of the Persian Foreign Office called on His Majesty's Minister to protest against the refugees being kept in the consulate. He was informed, in reply, that they were no longer there, and His Majesty's Minister took the opportunity of protesting very strongly against the behaviour of the governor, Daoud Khan, and Zahir-ul-Mulk, and added that nothing would have induced him to send the men out, as it was known that ruffians like Zahir-ul-Mulk were waiting to massacre them. Little impression was created at Kermanshah by the news of events at Tehran, the town being occupied with local affairs.

2. Carriages now run from Hamadan to Kazvin, the journey taking forty-eight hours.

3. About the 10th July the governor of Kasr-i-Shirin telegraphed to the governor here that Agha Mullah Ahmad Yezdi had arrived there on behalf of the chief priests of Kerbela. He was in telegraphic communication with Naib-es-Sultaneh, the Shah's uncle, to ascertain the Shah's intentions. He stated that if the constitutional movement did not gain ground the chief priests of Kerbela would come to Persia and take a lead in the matter.

4. Hamadan has remained quiet. There was apparently some preparation for sending a contingent to help the nationalist forces advancing on Tehran, but few, if any, men eventually started.

#### Shiraz.

1. On the 11th July Asaf-ed-Dowleh informed the British and Russian consuls that he had resigned the post of governor-general rather than be the cause of bloodshed. On the 12th all the regular troops in Shiraz took refuge at the two consulates, encamping round them, as a protest against not receiving pay, while the governor-general was paying the Kashgais regularly. The Arab tribes sent word that they were ready to attack Shiraz whenever the Kawan ordered it. On the 13th July Seyyid Abdul Hussain Lari was reported to be near Darab with Sheikh Zakaria and 400 men. The two consuls delivered to Asaf-ed-Dowleh a message from the two legations conveying to him an emphatic warning, and got from him positive orders to the Lari Seyyid and Soulat-ed-Dowleh forbidding them to advance on Shiraz. The governor-general still maintained that he was going, and promised to send the Kashgais away from the town. On the same day the appointment of Zil-es-Sultan as governor-general was announced, and was received with the utmost enthusiasm. The consulate Munshi visited Asaf-ed-Dowleh on the 14th, and found him ignorant of his own dismissal, the news of which he received with evident consternation. Unfortunately the news of Zil-es-Sultan's appointment was not confirmed. On the same day His Majesty's consul at Bunder Abbas reported that the Lari Seyyid was ill at Tahrin, 100 miles from Bunder Abbas. The non-confirmation of the appointment of Zil-es-Sultan by Mushir-ul-Mulk, who, according to the official announcement, was to be the new Wazir, led to a renewal of the agitation against Asaf-ed-Dowleh, and Seyyid Muhammad addressed the two consuls declaring that the crowd assembled in the Shah Chiragh mosque was beyond his control, and that if disorder was to be avoided Asaf-ed-Dowleh must leave at once. On the 17th news of Ata-ed-Dowleh's appointment as temporary deputy governor, pending the arrival of Bahram Mirza, was received. The two consuls visited him privately and urged him to take immediate steps to restore order, which he promised to do. Asaf-ed-Dowleh, however, in spite of his previous declarations that he had resigned and was anxious to leave, refused to do so, on the ground that the Zil-es-Sultan's appointment had been made by the Government of Muhammad Ali Shah, who had been dethroned. Rumours were also circulated that the Zil-es-Sultan had never been appointed at all, and that the telegram announcing his appointment and that of Ata-ed-Dowleh had been forged by the two consuls to keep their refugees quiet. On the 17th the two consuls wrote to Ata-ed-Dowleh urging him to pay no attention to unconfirmed rumours, and reminding him that whatever might have happened elsewhere he was responsible for order in Shiraz until further instructions were received. On the same day a messenger came in from Jahrum reporting that the Lari Seyyid had sent an emissary to that place to buy cartridges at any price. Telegrams were received from Sipahdar and Sardar-i-Assad announcing themselves respectively Minister of War and of the Interior. On the 18th a telegram was received from the latter addressed to Soulat-ed-Dowleh directing him not to move, and on the same day the Kawan received a telegram from the Arabs at Dehbid urging him to fight the Kashgais at Beyza. The Kawan sent excited messages to both consuls that Soulat-ed-Dowleh had left his summer quarters for Shiraz, and that consequently he

was forced to summon his Arabs. In reply, he was urged to be careful to avoid any action which would serve as a pretext to Soulat-ed-Dowleh for coming, and it was pointed out that, as Soulat-ed-Dowleh was apparently still some eight stages away on the Sarhad route, he had no justification for representing the danger to be imminent. He then asked whether the consuls would permit him to send men out from Dehbid to defend his properties which were being ravaged, and was told in reply that the matter did not concern the consuls, whose duty was confined to warning both him and Soulat-ed-Dowleh that whoever moved their forces first towards Shiraz would be held responsible for any damage to the persons or property of foreign subjects which might result from the ensuing fighting. On the 19th telegrams from Sardar-i-Assad and from Seyyid Assadullah at Bushire to the address of the Lari Seyyid and Soulat-ed-Dowleh were received, urging them to keep quiet. On the 20th the Shah Chiragh mosque was evacuated in the belief that Asaf-ed-Dowleh's dismissal was assured. On the 21st the appointment of Ala-ed-Dowleh was announced, and was apparently received with somewhat mixed feelings, the respectable classes welcoming the appointment and the professional agitators resisting it. On the 22nd an agitation was begun against Ala-ed-Dowleh and in favour of Zil-es-Sultan's return, and the bazaars were closed. On the 23rd Soulat-ed-Dowleh telegraphed to Asaf-ed-Dowleh telling him not to leave Shiraz, and that if he did he (Soulat-ed-Dowleh) would bring him back.

On the 24th, Asaf-ed-Dowleh started from Shiraz leaving the Palace in the hands of his Kashgai guards. On the 25th a telegram from Abadeh informed Mr. Bill that Soulat-ed-Dowleh had started for Shiraz with a large force, and had sent another to Abadeh to prevent Ala-ed-Dowleh reaching Shiraz. Mr. Bill, therefore, asked His Majesty's Minister to allow the reinforcement for his consular guard to start from Bushire. The move was accordingly sanctioned. The Russian consul had on the 14th informed Mr. Bill that he was asking for Russian Cossacks from Ispahan. The Kashgai guards on the same day expelled the deputy governor from the Palace. On the 27th July, Soulat-ed-Dowleh was reported to be within five easy marches of Shiraz; the Kawan had meanwhile left Shiraz to join the Arabs. At Mr. Bill's suggestion Mr. Christmas, of the Indo-European Telegraph Department, was sent to see Soulat-ed-Dowleh in order to get him to stop his advance. Mr. Christmas started on the 29th, and returned with an answer from Soulat-ed-Dowleh asking Mr. Bill to visit him at his camp twelve miles from Shiraz. Mr. Bill visited him, and on the 3rd August reported that Soulat-ed-Dowleh had said that he did not wish to be governor-general, and he would accept anyone else except Ala-ed-Dowleh whose enmity was of long standing and who was untrustworthy. He would withdraw every Kashgai from Shiraz the day another governor-general was appointed. To show that his object was not to capture Shiraz, he would wait for three days on condition that the Kawan did not advance on Shiraz and that Ala-ed-Dowleh did not start from Tehran. He wished the Persian Government to be informed of this decision. It was a matter of life and death to him to resist Ala-ed-Dowleh. At Mr. Bill's suggestion he agreed to write in the above sense to the Russian consul. Mr. Bill thought that his force numbered over 2,000 men, and that more were probably within call. Soulat-ed-Dowleh had already sent into Shiraz a proclamation stating that he was coming at the bidding of the chief priests of Kerbela to enforce the laws of the National Assembly, to hold elections and to start a local assembly, and to put an end to tyrants. He promised to pay compensation for anything taken, and to maintain order. The reinforcement for the consular guard reached Shiraz on the 2nd August. The detachment was unfortunate enough to have three cases of heat-stroke resulting in the death of two of the Indian soldiers on the road. On the 5th August Soulat-ed-Dowleh, at the expiration of the three days, encamped outside Shiraz and entered into telegraphic communication with the Persian Government. On the 11th August it was reported that Saham-ed-Dowleh had been appointed governor-general of Fars.

2. Events at Tehran produced no signs of regret for the late Shah or of enthusiasm for the new régime, attention being entirely engrossed with local affairs.

3. The appointment of Nasr-ed-Dowleh as Russian consular agent has not yet been cancelled, but His Majesty's Minister has received satisfactory assurances from M. Sablime. The Russian consul informed Mr. Bill on the 27th July that he had received no further instructions from his legation after the original order announcing the appointment. When the appointment was made the Persian Government summoned Nasr-ed-Dowleh to Tehran from which the Russian consul concluded that they would refuse to accept the appointment. His Majesty's consul has not been informed officially of the appointment. Nasr-ed-Dowleh abstains from taking part in local affairs, and has adopted the attitude of a Russian subject. The general belief is that he has become one.



*Persian Gulf.—Bushire.*

1. Seyyid Murteza, who had been a prisoner from the 7th July, was shipped off in the fast mail to Bussorah early in July *en route* to Najaf, in charge of Seyyid Abdul Sahib. Both Darya Begi and the local assembly wrote to the leading priests of Najaf, saying that he was a dangerous firebrand and should be kept under surveillance and not allowed to leave the place.

2. On the 20th June a local assembly was elected consisting of six priests and five merchants.

3. On the 23rd June, Darya Beggi moved out to Moqam, a village five miles from Bushire, *en route* to Tangistan. He took with him 300 infantry and artillery, and three guns under the Amir Panj, 200 riflemen under Ahmad Khan, nephew of the Khan of Bundur Rig, 250 riflemen under Sheikh Hussain Chahkutai. It was reported that Zahir Khadir, a Tangistani adherent of Darya Beggi, had collected 250 men at Ahrem to assist him. The latter had sent some messengers to deliver an ultimatum to Rais Ali and Hussain Bakshu, the recalcitrant Tangistani chiefs. The former was to give up Dilwar to Zahir Khadir, who would instal a customs official, and be responsible for the revenue. Rais Ali and Hussain Bakshu were to refund at once all moneys and goods plundered by their followers at Bushire. On the 25th June Zahir Khadir attacked Ahrem and captured it. The same afternoon Darya Beggi left Moqam for Bune Gez. On the 30th June news was received from Darya Beggi from Shamshiri, the village of Zahir Khadir, to the effect that Rais Ali and Hussain Bakshu had bolted and taken to the hills, abandoning their villages, Dilwar and Ambarek. Darya Beggi had placed Dilwar under the control of Zahir Khadir's son, and had installed one Muhammad Bakir as customs director there. On the same day news was received that Darya Beggi had demanded compensation from Hussain Bakshu for loss, etc., but having received no reply, had bombarded, captured, and burnt his village, Ambarek. Darya Beggi caused a lot of date trees, valued at some 2,000 tomans, to be cut down as a punishment. It was reported that Darya Beggi was going to attack Dilwar on the 1st July, as Rais Ali had refused to pay the fine demanded, and the "Persepolis" was to leave on that day to co-operate from the sea. Ras Ali reoccupied Dilwar on the 5th July.

4. It is reported that Mirza Hussain, dragoman of the German consulate, is on very friendly terms with Seyyid Assadullah, the delegate of the Kerbela priests.

*Bundur Abbas.*

1. M. Roever, of Messrs. Wöneckhaus and Co., left for Bahrein on the 17th June by the steam-ship "Christiania," chartered by the Hamburg-Amerika Company.

2. Owing to the lull in the activity of the Lari Seyyid during June caravans once more ventured to take the road. The main caravan route to Kerman appeared for the time to be fairly safe.

*Mohammerah.*

1. Mr. Ritchie, who has been deputed from England to make an estimate of the cost of laying a pipe for the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, arrived on the 10th June.

2. Mr. Lloyd received instructions about the middle of June to open the new firm of Lloyd, Scott, and Co., at Mohammerah, managing agents to the Anglo-Persian Oil Company.

3. Sirdar Arfa has placed his nephew, Sheikh Hanzal, under close arrest on a charge of conspiring with some of the Chab tribe against him. The case is somewhat obscure at present.

C. B. STOKES, Major,  
Military Attaché.

[32497]

No. 525.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 30.)*

(No. 159. Secret.)

Sir,

*Gulahek, August 13, 1909.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit copy of a memorandum by the military attaché to this legation on Colonel Liakhoff's tenure of command of the Persian Cossack brigade.

In this memorandum Major Stokes draws special attention to Colonel Liakhoff's persistent efforts to withdraw the brigade from the control of the Persian Ministry of War, and in fact to make the brigade virtually a Russian force. In the concluding paragraph of my despatch No. 152 of the 10th instant I have briefly adverted to the difficulty which is to be feared in reconciling the aspirations of the new Government with the maintenance of Russian acquired influence. This difficulty may in the near future assume a concrete form over the question of the retention of the Russian officers with the brigade. It will be remembered that, in the arrangement come to on the 17th between the dragomans of the two legations and the nationalist leaders, the latter undertook to retain the Russian officers for the present, and on condition that they should be under the orders of the Ministry of War. I have since had occasion to report that my Russian colleague had informed his Government that Colonel Liakhoff showed a tendency to regard the brigade as a Russian force, and only the other day an impending order from the Minister of War, which my Russian colleague showed signs of resenting and which seemed likely to raise the question of the Minister of War's authority over the brigade in an acute form, was, I believe, only averted by my private advice to the leading member of the committee to refrain from raising a thorny question of the kind at such an inopportune moment.

The question of the Russian officers is, I fear, bound to be raised in the assembly, and strong pressure will be needed to impose their retention on the Persian Government. It is to be hoped that the Russian Government will be able to convince the Persian Government that there will in future be no attempt on the part of the Russian officers to withdraw the brigade from the control of the Minister of War, and that their work in future will be confined strictly to their duties as instructors.

I have, &c.  
G. BARCLAY.

Inclosure in No. 525.

*Major Stokes to Sir G. Barclay.*

(No. 34. Secret.)

Sir,

*Gulahek, August 12, 1909.*

THE departure of Colonel Liakhoff for Russia brings to an end his tenure of command of the Persian Cossack brigade, and seems an appropriate occasion for reviewing his work as commandant of the brigade.

Colonel Liakhoff, on his arrival at Tehran in September 1906, found the brigade completely out of hand and the administration of its affairs in the hands of a "military council" of Persian officers. Beginning by keeping rather aloof from the Persian officers, he gradually made friends with some of them, and succeeded in abolishing the "military council." He then set to work to weed out of the brigade every Persian officer who was opposed to the force becoming a Russian force. In this he met with considerable difficulty, as, besides intrigues in the brigade itself, the leading priests, several Ministers, and the national assembly all made efforts to curtail his power in the brigade; but Colonel Liakhoff persevered, and by insisting on the regular payment of the men, and by promoting and distributing decorations amongst those officers who supported him, he gradually obtained the good-will of the larger part of the brigade. Another fact which operated in his favour was that the national assembly objected to any more detachments of Cossacks being sent to the provinces, and demanded the recall of all detachments away from Tehran. As such detachments always drew allowances on a very liberal scale during their absence from Tehran, the men naturally sided with their commandant, who wished to continue to send out detachments. The national assembly's objection was to these detachments acting as intelligence agents for the Russians. That they were so employed as a general rule is a fact, and a series of questions given to one detachment, which was sent to Southern Persia, to answer was published in a Tehran newspaper. Detachments were sent with Russian officers travelling in Persia, and also to shadow British officers in this country. The detachment detailed to report on the movements of Colonel Douglas and Captain Lorimer in 1904 was itself plundered by Lurs.

Colonel Liakhoff also arrogated to himself the power of promoting officers, which formerly rested with the Minister of War, and though the national assembly in 1907 expressly placed him and the brigade under the orders of the Minister of War, with the Shah's support he disregarded that Minister altogether.

By December 1907 the brigade was considered ripe for the work of destroying the



national assembly, but almost at the last moment reports reached the senior Persian officers that if any attempt were made to use the brigade for that purpose the junior officers would shoot them; the result of this was that Colonel Liakhoff reported to the Shah that he could not rely on the brigade. From that time until the 23rd June, 1908, the process of eliminating the anti-Russian element was continued, and on that day the brigade justified the confidence of its commandant. Their conduct was rewarded with promotion and gifts of money, in addition to the plunder each man secured for himself. For several months after the *coup d'État* Colonel Liakhoff was, under the existing martial law, military governor of Tehran. Efforts were made to increase the strength of the brigade, but lack of funds prevented any permanent increase being made.

There is no doubt that the discipline and *moral* of the brigade were much improved under Colonel Liakhoff, and it is to his credit that 1,100 men out of a total of 1,500 remained with their Russian officers during the recent fighting; the remainder quietly disappeared, discarded their uniforms, and remained in hiding. When the nationalist advance on Tehran was seen to be serious, several meetings of the Persian officers of the brigade were held to decide whether the brigade should fight or not. At the last of these, on the 1st July, the Russian officers were present, and Colonel Liakhoff put the question direct to the Persian officers and left them to discuss it. He is said on this occasion to have offered the whole brigade Russian protection if they would fight. After some discussion it was decided that the brigade would not fight unless the Shah were attacked, in which case it would defend him. It is not clear what caused the brigade to change its mind a few days later. Possibly the success of the detachment at Shahabad on the 4th July encouraged the men, but more probably the news of the landing of Russian troops at Enzeli decided them to fight. Colonel Liakhoff is known to have pressed the Russian Legation strongly to get Russian troops brought to Tehran, and the report that during the fighting he encouraged his men to hold out with the promise that Russian troops should extricate them is confirmed by the fact that for days afterwards many Cossacks maintained that Russian troops would yet come to Tehran.

The brigade having been a force so entirely under Russian influence, it is only to be expected that the new Government will take all possible measures to prevent that influence, now completely shattered by the events of last month, reasserting itself. While they have treated questions concerning the brigade with tact and moderation, Colonel Liakhoff has persisted in regarding it as under Russian protection, and the Russian Legation, in a note informing the Persian Government of Colonel Liakhoff's impending departure, went out of its way to use a phrase implying that the brigade was a Russian force.

In conclusion, successful as Colonel Liakhoff's efforts have been in disciplining the brigade, his undoubted connection with the two *coups d'État*, which aimed at the destruction of the constitution, and his persistent efforts to make the brigade a Russian force have earned for him and for his country the deep hatred of a large number of Persians. So deep is this feeling that, should the retention of Russian officers in the brigade be forced on the Persian Government, it need cause no surprise if men cannot be found to enlist in it.

I have, &c.

C. B. STOKES, Major,  
Military Attaché, Tehran.

[32683]

No. 526.

Consul-General Cox to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 30.)

(No. 12. Commercial. Confidential.)

Sir,

Bushire, August 4, 1909.

I HAVE the honour to enclose a copy of a communication received from His Majesty's acting consul at Mohammerah on the subject of the privileges accorded by His Majesty's Government, firstly to the Oil Concessions Syndicate, and now to the Anglo-Persian Oil Company (Limited), in connection with the dispatch of telegrams between their London offices and their representatives in Arabistan.

There is force in Lieutenant Wilson's concluding remark, but if the contemplated assumption of the control of the Arabistan lines by the Indo-European Telegraph

Department is likely soon to take practical shape, it will perhaps be considered unobjectionable to allow existing arrangements to continue until then.

A copy of this despatch is being forwarded to His Majesty's Minister, Tehran.

I have, &c.

P. Z. COX, Major,  
British Resident in Persian Gulf, and His Britannic  
Majesty's Consul-General for Fars, &c.

Inclosure in No. 526.

Acting Consul Wilson to Consul-General Cox.

(No. 37.)

Sir,

Mohammerah, July 24, 1909.

I HAVE the honour to address you on the subject of the telegraphic facilities granted to the Anglo-Persian Oil Company (Limited) by His Majesty's Government, and by consular authorities in Arabistan.

2. It will be within your knowledge that during the past three years telegrams for Mr. G. B. Reynolds, general manager of the late Concessions Syndicate (Limited), from his principals and *vice versa*, were sent by arrangement with the Foreign Office through His Britannic Majesty's consuls at Bussorah and Mohammerah.

3. The principal advantage of this arrangement to the syndicate seems to have been, and still is, that they were enabled to use ordinary code over Turkish wires—a convenient and economical arrangement denied to other commercial firms at present.

4. Messrs. Lloyd, Scott, and Co., managing agents for the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, are now established at Mohammerah, and all the company's business is transacted through them. They are able at will to use the Bussorah-Bagdad, or the Mohammerah-Borasjun-Tehran, or the Fao-Bushire telegraph wires, and can in addition receive or dispatch messages via Bushire. Over the last two routes code is permissible.

5. Moreover, the principal negotiations in which His Majesty's Government are concerned seem now drawing to a close, and the company is now no longer an exploring syndicate, but it is established on a commercial basis, in competition with other British firms.

6. I venture to submit, therefore, with great respect, that the time has come to withdraw from the company the privilege of telegraphing in either direction through the Foreign Office and His Majesty's consuls at Mohammerah and Bussorah, as it is a privilege which, unless extended to other British firms, will inevitably cause jealousy and induce a belief, on the part of Messrs. Lynch Brothers in particular, that the Anglo-Persian Oil Company is receiving preferential treatment at their expense.

I have, &c.

A. T. WILSON, Lieutenant, Indian Army.

[32471]

No. 527.

Mr. O'Beirne to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 30.)

(No. 474. Confidential.)

Sir,

St. Petersburg, August 23, 1909.

M. POKLEWSKI tells me that the intentions of the Russian Government with regard to the withdrawal of the Russian troops from North Persia are, so far as he knows, as follows:—

As a first step they are thinking of withdrawing a portion of the Tabreez force. The Russian military authorities now consider that a somewhat smaller force could be left temporarily at Tabreez without danger, and it is hoped that a partial withdrawal will produce a favourable impression as regards Russia's good intentions.

No decision will be come to respecting the Kazvin force until M. Poklewski reaches Tehran. He has been instructed to take particular care not to recommend its withdrawal until it is quite plain that there will be no necessity for sending the troops back again after they have once left Persia. He hopes that within a month or so of his arrival at Tehran it will be possible to withdraw the bulk of the force from Kazvin, leaving, perhaps, a couple of hundred men at that place to maintain order on the road. It is contemplated, however, that the troops withdrawn from Kazvin should not at

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once be sent back to the Caucasus, but that they should remain for a while at Enzeli or Resht, the object being, as I understand, to diminish the violence of the shock that would be caused to Russians with commercial interests in North Persia by the sudden withdrawal of the troops from Persian soil altogether.

M. Poklewski would no doubt wish what he told me of the intentions of the Russian Government to be treated as confidential.

I have, &c.  
HUGH O'BEIRNE.

[32503]

No. 528.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 30.)*

(No. 700.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

OIL Commission.

Your telegram No. 428 of the 21st August, 1909.

Up till now I have failed to obtain a definite reply to question contained in your telegram No. 397 of the 23rd July. A verbal statement somewhat to the effect that, as it is the intention of the Persian Government not to change the present commissioner, Vincent Katabji cannot be appointed, is all that I have been able to obtain. I shall continue to press for reply.

*Gulahek, August 30, 1909.*

[32628]

No. 529.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 30.)*

(No. 701.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Gulahek, August 30, 1909.*

REFERRING to my telegram No. 695 of the 27th August, in which I informed you of the reported release of His Highness Zil-es-Sultan, I received a telegram on that day from His Majesty's vice-consul at Resht to the effect that the Zil-es-Sultan was coming to Tehran. Yesterday, however, I received another telegram from Resht, saying that his departure had encountered opposition. I am telegraphing to ask for information of a more definite nature.

My Russian colleague, afraid lest the Zil-es-Sultan's sons should try to take refuge in the Russian legation, has, I understand, made the suggestion to the Government at St. Petersburg that the two consuls at Resht should jointly compel the governor to give the Zil-es-Sultan over to them, and they would see him, under joint protection, on board ship.

All the communications which we have addressed to the Persian Government on behalf of the Zil-es-Sultan have elicited nothing but a verbal answer. It was given us on the 18th August, and was to the effect that His Highness would be allowed to return safely to Europe at once, but he is still being pressed for money by the committee.

The time has come, I think, for us to use greater insistence, but if we took such drastic action as my Russian colleague has suggested, an accident might occur. A joint note from the two legations, issued under instructions from the two Governments, appears to me to be the best method of dealing with the case. The reason given for this interference might be that His Highness holds decorations from both Governments.

The Zil-es-Sultan is willing, I think, to pay something in the way of a ransom, but, if the note were sent, it would be well not to mention a payment, but simply to ask that he should be freed from molestation and permitted to go quietly to Europe.

[32504]

No. 530.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 30.)*

(No. 702.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

HORMUZ oxide.

The local agent of Messrs. Strick is already aware of my knowledge of the existence of the contract referred to in your telegram No. 447 of 28th August. In

*Gulahek, August 30, 1909.*

order satisfactorily to explain to him my attitude towards Moin's concession, I found it indispensable to tell him of it. In any case Mr. Brown would have known of it, as some time ago Moin himself showed a copy of it to the bank. It must, moreover, have become known locally in April last, when we intervened to prevent the Nationalists stopping mining operations on Hormuz.

It was on account of a statement made by Moin to the Imperial Bank, when he desired to pledge Weir's instalments, to the effect that only those from April onwards were available, that I thought that Moin must have drawn on Ellinger in anticipation of these instalments.

When Strick undertook, provided he got the concession, to respect Weir's contract, I doubt whether he intended that Weir's payments for oxide should continue to be made to Ellinger when the oxide would be Strick's property. Although I have not seen the undertaking, I presume that Strick contemplates receiving Weir's instalments himself later on—and no doubt Strick's telegrams to his agent have shown you that he is desirous that the oxide already mined may be included in his concession.

I still fear that, if Moin's bills have been accepted by Ellinger, the latter will suffer in the event of a cancellation of the existing contract.

If I could know why Weir and Ellinger are so anxious for secrecy as regards their contract, it might afford me useful light in this intricate affair.

[32568]

No. 531.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 30.)*

(No. 703.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Gulahek, August 30, 1909.*

ST. PETERSBURGH telegram No. 422 of the 22nd August.

The ex-Shah has appealed to the Emperor as a result of the pressure exercised by M. Sabline to induce His Majesty to surrender his property.

M. Sabline has telegraphed to his Government, suggesting that His Majesty should be urged by Emperor to submit to counsel of legation.

Russian chargé d'affaires does not feel authorised to make the communication suggested in last paragraph of my telegram No. 673 without explicit authorisation. I hope that he may receive it, and that Russian Government will not weaken in consequence of Mehemet Ali's telegram.

[32744]

No. 532.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 30.)*

(No. 704.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Gulahek, August 30, 1909.*

M. SMIRNOW, the Russian tutor to the Shah, has been, without warning to the Russian legation, discharged by the Persian Government. It appears also likely that they will not keep the ex-Shah's Russian doctor, although retaining Lindley in his position as first European doctor.

I have urged the reinstatement of Smirnow and the retention of the Russian doctor in a strong letter to the member of the committee whom the Russian chargé d'affaires considers to be the author of these changes, but the committee have not lent lately the ready ear they did formerly to my counsels of moderation.

[32743]

No. 533.

*Mr. O'Beirne to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 30.)*

(No. 424.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*St. Petersburg, August 30, 1909.*

PLEASE refer to Tehran telegram No. 703 of to-day's date: Property of Mohammed Ali.

No news has so far reached M. Sazonow from the Russian legation at Tehran of the undertaking in writing, mentioned in my telegram No. 422 of the 17th instant, having been given as required by the Russian Government. I was also told by his Excellency that he had no knowledge of the Emperor receiving an appeal from the



ex-Shah, but should His Majesty receive an appeal of this kind, the attitude of the Imperial Government would, his Excellency assured me, undergo no change whatever. M. Sazonow would do "all within his power" to induce Mohammed Ali to hand over his property, on condition that the above-mentioned undertaking in writing is given by the Persian Government.

The giving of this undertaking by the Persian Government must be the first step

[32568]

No. 534.

*Sir Edward Grey to Mr. O'Beirne.*

(No. 1263.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Foreign Office, August 30, 1909.*

PROPERTY of ex-Shah.

The Russian chargé d'affaires in Tehran has not yet received explicit authorisation to make the communication indicated in Sir G. Barclay's telegram No. 673 of the 18th August (see Tehran telegram No. 703 of to-day's date). You should suggest to the Russian Government that they should give the desired authorisation.

[32628]

No. 535.

*Sir Edward Grey to Mr. O'Beirne.*

(No. 1265.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Foreign Office, August 30, 1909.*

HIS Majesty's Government agree with objection mentioned in Tehran telegram No. 701 of the 30th August against suggestion of Russian chargé d'affaires with regard to Zil-es-Sultan. You should explain attitude of His Majesty's Government, and ask Russian Government to instruct their representative at Tehran to join in communication suggested by Sir G. Barclay.

[32503]

No. 536.

*Foreign Office to Anglo-Persian Oil Company.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, August 30, 1909.*

WITH reference to your letter of the 19th instant relative to the question of who is the proper person to receive the salary due to the Persian Imperial Commissioner for the Oil concession, I am directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to inform you that he has received a telegram from His Majesty's Minister at Tehran, reporting that his efforts to expedite an authoritative declaration from the Persian Government as to their wishes in this respect have so far been fruitless, and that he has only been able to elicit a vague verbal statement that they intend to retain the present commissioner in the post, and are therefore unable to appoint Vincent Kitabji Khan, as desired by Mr. D'Arcy.

Sir G. Barclay adds that he is continuing to press for a reply to his enquiry.

I am, &c.

LOUIS MALLET.

[32856]

No. 537.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 31.)*

(No. 705.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Gulahek, August 31, 1909.*

THE ex-Shah's pension, as at present arranged, is to be paid in advance by quarterly instalments. The Persian Government may not be in a position to pay the first of these instalments, but it would be a great pity that His late Majesty's departure should be delayed on this account. Without this instalment the Shah would leave practically penniless.

M. Sabline is proposing to his Government that the Russian bank should be authorised to advance the half of this sum should the necessity arise. Might we not give a similar authorisation to the manager of the Imperial Bank?

Mr. Wood tells me that he could not, as a purely financial transaction, make any advance to the Persian Government unless early repayment were sufficiently guaranteed. He added that such a guarantee would be constituted by an undertaking on the part of the Persian Government that within a fixed period an application would be made to the two Governments for a loan, and that any advance now made would be considered as a first charge on such loan. The Persian Government could not easily pledge the adherence of the assembly to this undertaking, and would doubtless be most reluctant to enter into it.

In spite of the Persian Government's failure to obtain an overdraft from the banks, it is still far from realising that for the requirements of simple banking business it has no proper security, and that sooner or later it must have recourse to the two Governments.

[32865]

No. 538.

*Mr. O'Beirne to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 31.)*

(No. 425.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*St. Petersburg, August 31, 1909*

PERSIA. Ex-Shah's property.

Please see your telegram No. 1263 of yesterday.

It is absolutely essential that the written undertaking asked for by the Russian Government (please see my telegrams Nos. 422 and 424 of the 27th and 30th August respectively) be in the first place given by the Persian Government. So far as M. Sazonow knows they have not yet given it. In an interview this afternoon his Excellency assured me again that he would send instructions to the Russian chargé d'affaires in the sense suggested by Sir G. Barclay as soon as the Persian Government fulfil this condition. The Russian Government's decision will not be affected by the telegram sent to the Emperor by the ex-Shah.

[32866]

No. 539.

*Mr. O'Beirne to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 31.)*

(No. 426.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*St. Petersburg, August 31, 1909.*

PERSIA. Zil-es-Sultan.

Please see your telegram No. 1265 of yesterday.

I saw Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs this afternoon and he assured me that he would telegraph to the Russian chargé d'affaires in the sense suggested in telegram No. 701 of the 29th August from Sir G. Barclay.

[32856]

No. 540.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.*

(No. 451.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Foreign Office, August 31, 1909.*

DEPARTURE of ex-Shah.

The Shah cannot be expected to leave the country without any definite guarantee that his pension will be paid, and the Persian Government should not be surprised if his departure is delayed through their inability to take any engagement.

If some of the Shah's jewels were sold would it not be possible to devote the interest to the payment of part of his pension. Another possible alternative might be to give the jewels as security to the two banks.

If this cannot be arranged, an undertaking must be obtained from the Persian Government that part of the first instalment of any advance which may be agreed upon by the two Governments should go to pay off the debt to the bank.



[32346]

No. 541.

*Sir Edward Grey to Mr. O'Beirne.*

(No. 1272.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Foreign Office, August 31, 1909.*

ADVANCE to Persian Government. Please see your telegram No. 423 of the 27th August.

The Russian Minister of Finance is unwilling to consent to making any advance of money to the Persian Government. Unless the latter obtain money, it is certain that disorder throughout the country will increase. So long as disorders are likely to continue, it is impossible for the Russian troops to be withdrawn (in point of fact, they are at present making their presence felt more and more), while the Persians themselves are demanding with insistence the withdrawal of these troops. Thus it appears that matters are drifting into a vicious circle.

If you can arrange a simultaneous interview with the Russian Minister of Finance and Minister for Foreign Affairs, you should urge that, on the understanding that ratification by the Medjliss will be necessary, and that some adequate arrangement will be made for checking its expenditure, a small joint advance of money should be made to the Persian Government.

British trade has suffered owing to the insecurity of the southern trade routes, but we should much prefer to secure an improvement in this respect by an advance to the Persian Government, part of which would be allocated to the maintenance of road guards, to attaining our object of keeping the roads open by the dispatch of any British force. This method would, as far as I can see, apply equally to the roads in Northern Persia, and therefore there is no reason why His Majesty's Government and the Russian Government should not act together in this matter—such co-operation being the principal object of our policy.

[32744]

No. 542.

*Sir Edward Grey to Mr. O'Beirne.*

(No. 1273.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Foreign Office, August 31, 1909.*

TUTOR for Shah: dismissal of M. Smirnoff.

The substance of Sir G. Barclay's telegram No. 704 of the 30th August should be communicated to the Russian Government, and you should inform them that I will see the Persian Minister in London and speak to him in the sense of the above-mentioned telegram.

[32351]

No. 543.

*Foreign Office to India Office.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, August 31, 1909.*

WITH reference to my letter of the 26th instant, relative to the Taoona murders, I am directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to transmit to you herewith copy of a further telegram on the subject from His Majesty's Minister at Tehran,\* from which it appears that there will be no difficulty in trying at Abu Thabi the culprit already captured.

As this course is in accordance with the instructions conveyed to Mr. Marling in Sir E. Grey's telegram No. 218 of the 21st August, 1908, it appears unnecessary, at any rate for the present, to address a further communication to Sir G. Barclay on the subject, and my letter above referred to, proposing to approve his action in detaining the prisoner in custody at Bahrein, no longer calls for a reply, since the man will now be sent at once to Abu Thabi for trial.

I am, &c.,  
LOUIS MALLET.

[32504]

No. 544.

*Foreign Office to Messrs. M. Ellinger.*

Gentlemen,

*Foreign Office, August 31, 1909.*

WITH reference to my letter of the 20th instant, relative to the extraction and transport of red oxide from the Island of Hormuz, I am directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to inform you that the existence of the contract signed by you with Messrs. Andrew Weir and Co. in this connection last December has been known for some time past to Messrs. Frank C. Strick and Co., the Mouin-ut-Tujjar himself having shown a copy of that document at the Imperial Bank of Persia at Tehran, in which Messrs. Strick's agent is employed.

His Majesty's Minister at that capital, who has reported this fact to Sir E. Grey by telegraph, adds that the existence of such a contract must also have been known at Hormuz itself when, at your request, His Majesty's Legation, in the month of May last, intervened to prevent the Persian nationalists from stopping mining operations on the island.

I am further to point out that the obligation to maintain secrecy as to the contract is a source of difficulty to Sir G. Barclay, as it precludes him from offering any reasonable explanation of his action in endeavouring to prevent the cancellation of the Mouin's concessions.

I am to state that these concessions appear to be in imminent danger, and that Sir G. Barclay, by Sir E. Grey's instructions, is doing all he can on the Mouin's behalf, and, even if his efforts prove unsuccessful, will endeavour to protect the rights of Messrs. Weir under their contract with you.

I am to add that it would strengthen Sir G. Barclay's hands in the task which he has to perform if he knew the reason of your desire for the maintenance of secrecy with regard to that instrument.

I am, &amp;c.

LOUIS MALLET.

[32957]

No. 545.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 1.)*

(No. 706.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Gulahek, September 1, 1909.*

I HAVE received the following telegram No. 185 from His Majesty's acting consul-general at Tabreez:—

"I was asked some three weeks ago by Mr. Stevens to reopen the question referred to in Foreign Office telegram No. 446, on the ground that Imam Kuli had stated that if Stevens definitely refused the offer he would call in Germans. I suggested that he should urge the Imam temporarily to defer any action, and that he should meanwhile extract from him any exact information as to the Germans to whom he contemplated making the offer. The Imam is now at Soujboulak. Mr. Stevens has written to him as I asked, but has as yet received no reply.

"So far a German engineer, who, however, has no voice in the management, has always been employed. No other Germans, to the best of my knowledge, have been sent for.

"I have frequently discussed this matter with my Russian colleague, who says that Imam should form a company under a Russian name, taking a Russian into partnership, and reserving the management for Mr. Stevens by a special clause in the contract.

"The question is simply one of the Imam's associating some Europeans in his own enterprise in order to avoid the interference of the Persian authorities, and does not in any way partake of the nature of a concession. It should be arranged that the Russian partnership should be of such a kind as to ensure Mr. Stevens having a free hand in the management in order to make Anglo-Russian combination acceptable to the Imam."

My Russian colleague has instructed his consul to send him a report on this subject, but he has not yet received a reply.



[32961]

No. 546.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 1.)*

(No. 707.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Gulahek, September 1, 1909.*

I HAVE received the following telegram No. 186 of the 30th August from His Majesty's acting consul-general at Tabreez:—

"An affray has recently taken place at Urumia.

"A number of Kurds were engaged in persecuting the inhabitants of a Christian village near the summer residence of the English mission, and some 6 miles distant from Urumia. The Russian vice-consul at this town, with thirty-five of his escort, set out to expel the Kurds. They, however, met with a strong resistance from the Kurds, whom they were unable to dislodge, and after the Russians had had two men wounded they retired to Urumia. Next day the Russian vice-consul dispatched a force of armed Syrians to remove the Kurds, apparently in deference to a Persian protest against this employment of Russian troops. No further news has reached me as yet.

"A body of fifty Russian soldiers left Tabreez yesterday as a reinforcement for the consular guard. I have, however, received an assurance from my Russian colleague that no further offensive movement will be made.

"The Kurds, according to the assertion of the Russian vice-consul, were, if not actually commanded by Turkish officers, at least incited by them.

"The Urumia district has been left without any defence against Kurds by the withdrawal of Turkish troops, and any outbreak of these tribes would give Turkey a pretext for reoccupying the district.

"There is still no governor at Urumia, troops are entirely lacking, and the authorities are powerless."

[32976]

No. 547.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 1.)*

(No. 708.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Gulahek, September 1, 1909.*

HORMUZ oxide.

Strick's agent has to-day reported to his principals that for the present there is a complete suspension of negotiations relative to the concession.

The Persian Government, according to the announcement of the committee, are too occupied to give the matter their attention, and they have not yet taken into consideration the question of cancelling Moin's contract.

From this one would gather that Moin and the committee have come to terms.

Reference is to my telegram No. 702 of the 2nd August.

[32980]

No. 548.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 1.)*

(No. 710.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Gulahek, September 1, 1909.*

MY Russian colleague has telegraphed at length to his Government, complaining of the committee's attitude. He calls their attention to Smirnow's dismissal, to the appointment of governors distasteful to Russia, and to their decision to refuse to admit a representative of the legation to the trial of its bastis. He suggests that the Russian Government should consider what steps are necessary to bring this body to reason, and to give it to understand that, although Russia has refrained from intervention during the recent troubles, she does not intend to resign any part of her influence in Persia.

I have privately done all in my power to combat the anti-Russian feelings which are dominant in the committee, but, though my advice was listened to in the early days of the new régime, I now find that I cannot persuade them to modify this attitude; in fact, they apparently fail to realise how very urgent it is at the present moment to handle Russian susceptibilities with delicacy.

The continued presence of the Russian troops at Kazvin, and Russian interference with matters which they hold to be of entirely internal interest, such as the

appointment of a tutor and governors for the Shah, are continual sources of ill-feeling.

I can quite realise how this attempt on the part of the Persian Government to get rid of their influence must try the patience of the Russian Government, but the goodwill of the two Powers is so necessary to the new Government, a breakdown of which would produce a most complicated situation, that it is to be hoped that the Russian Government will not adopt an unfriendly attitude, and in particular will not show their resentment by withholding an advance when the time comes.

So far the committee has only applied to the two banks for accommodation, and evidently the fear of the foreign control which would be necessitated by such a step has deterred them from having recourse as yet to the two Governments.

In the above telegram I have treated of the committee as distinct from the Persian Government. I have been able hitherto indistinctly to employ either term, but I learn from my Russian colleague this morning that he has indications that the Cabinet is trying to withdraw itself from the influence of the other body. I have, however, as yet no confirmation of this.

[32989]

No. 549.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 1.)*

(No. 711.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Gulahek, September 1, 1909.*

I THINK it desirable, in view of your telegram to Mr. O'Beirne No. 1272 of the 31st August, to explain somewhat fully what appears to me to be the attitude of the committee towards financial assistance from Russia and England.

They wish to obtain a loan from the Imperial Bank and the Russian Bank, but they fight shy of anything in the nature of control. They affect to think they could obtain what they want as an ordinary business transaction by opening a current account with the banks and overdrawing. They choose to forget that the Russian Bank is no more than a branch of the Ministry of Finance, and that the Imperial Bank would require the backing of His Majesty's Government before it would advance its moiety.

It should not be long before they find out the impracticability of what they want, but some time must still elapse before they can allow themselves to fall back on the alternative of a loan under the guarantee of Great Britain and Russia.

[32986]

No. 550.

*Mr. O'Beirne to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 1.)*

(No. 427.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*St. Petersburg, September 1, 1909.*

YOUR telegram No. 1273.

I have communicated substance of Sir G. Barclay's telegram No. 704 respecting the dismissal of Smirnow to the Acting Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

The Russian Government seem inclined to view the matter calmly. His Excellency told me that they realise the impracticability of compelling the Persian Government to retain Smirnow in office if the Persians are bent on his dismissal. M. Sazonow intimated that it could perhaps be arranged that Smirnow should be replaced by another Russian if the Persian Government's objection was to him personally, on the ground that he had been in close touch with the ex-Shah.

[32987]

No. 551.

*Mr. O'Beirne to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 1.)*

(No. 428.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*St. Petersburg, September 1, 1909.*

YOUR telegram No. 1272.

Proposed Anglo-Russian advance to the Persian Government.

The Minister of Finance has refused to allow the Russian bank to join in making the advance. With the consent of the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, I am asking M. Kokovtsoff for an interview on his return to St. Petersburg to-morrow.

[1665]

4 P



Such an interview will be as effectual, I think, as a conversation *à trois*, as M. Sazonow is quite neutral in this question and it will be far easier to arrange.

I will lay before his Excellency the considerations contained in your telegram No. 1272, and I will do my best to convince him that to maintain the Russian force in Persia for an indefinite period, a course which will be rendered necessary if the Persian Government have not the means at their disposal for maintaining order, will be more expensive than making the advance. But I know that he has declared himself determined to lend the Persian Government no more money. An eventual loan will probably meet with greater objections on his part even than the advance now proposed.

[32988] No. 552.

*Mr. O'Beirne to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 1.)*

(No. 429.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*St. Petersburg, September 1, 1909.*

PLEASE refer to my telegram No. 425 of yesterday: Property of Mohammed Ali.

Instructions have been sent to the Russian chargé d'affaires at Tehran to represent to the ex-Shah that no more favourable arrangement can be come to than the one proposed, and he is to make a peremptory request of His Majesty to agree to it. I drew M. Sazonow's attention to the fact that you had proposed a threat to Mohammed Ali of the confiscation of his property by the Persian Government (I had communicated your proposal to his Excellency in writing). He replied, however, that M. Sabline's instructions were the same as this, to all intents and purposes.

[32888] No. 553.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.*

(No. 452.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Foreign Office, September 1, 1909.*

HORMUZ oxide.

With reference to your telegram No. 702 of the 30th August, I am informed that Ellinger no longer wishes his contract with Weir to be kept secret.

[32744] No. 554.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.*

(No. 453.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Foreign Office, September 1, 1909.*

SHAH'S tutor.

I have pointed out to Persian Minister here that his Government cannot expect Russia to accept quietly a less influential position in North Persia than that which they occupied prior to the fall of Mahomet Ali, and that consequently the dismissal of M. Smirnoff is sure to annoy Russia and involve the Persian Government in embarrassing complications.

[32744] No. 555.

*Note communicated to Mirza Mehdi Khan.*

HIS Majesty's Minister at Tehran has reported that the Persian Government have, without any warning, discharged M. Smirnoff, the Russian tutor attached to the Shah, and that there is reason to suppose that they also intend to dismiss the Russian doctor who was in attendance on the late Shah.

His Majesty's Government wish strongly to urge on the Persian Government the advisability of cancelling at once the dismissal of M. Smirnoff, and of abstaining

carefully for the future from giving provocation of this kind to the Russian Government, which must involve the new Persian Government in embarrassing complications.  
E. G.

*Foreign Office, September 1, 1909.*

[33078]

No. 556.

*Foreign Office to Mirza Mehdi Khan.*

My dear Minister,

*Foreign Office, September 1, 1909.*

IN the course of a conversation which you had at this Office on the 27th August, you enquired whether His Majesty's Government had taken any further steps at St. Petersburg to induce the Russian Government to begin the withdrawal of their troops from Persian territory, and you were told that no action of the kind had been taken since you spoke to Sir E. Grey on the subject of the 17th August.

You then said that your Government had instructed you to repeat the request that His Majesty's Government would use their good offices to obtain the withdrawal of these troops, and their abstention while they remained from interference with Persian subjects. In support of this request you left a paper containing the text of a telegram from Mukhber-es-Sultaneh, stating that he could not maintain order at Tabreez unless these conditions were fulfilled.

You were promised an answer in writing, conveying Sir E. Grey's decision as to the matter referred to, and I am now desired by him to inform you that he cannot see his way again to approach the Russian Government on the subject, and that the Persian Government should deal with them direct.

You also spoke of the conditions arrived at regarding the departure of the persons who have taken refuge along with the ex-Shah in the Russian Legation at Zergendeh. As regards this point, Sir G. Barclay reports that the delegates of the Persian Government and the two representatives agreed verbally on the 16th August to the departure of these refugees with His Majesty on condition that they left representatives against whom claimants could proceed in the presence of a member of the Russian Legation. The delegates said that they would in any case refrain from executing them out of deference to the Russian Legation.

Sir G. Barclay is of opinion that their departure rids the country of them more effectively than imprisonment, and is the best solution of the difficulty, apart from the fact that the Persian delegates agreed to it.

Sir G. Barclay points out that during the time which these people have spent at the Russian Legation (which on the day when he sent his telegram was about six weeks) the Persian Government brought no charge against them, though the Russian chargé d'affaires repeatedly assured the Persian delegates that he had no desire to shield them from justice, and would allow them to be tried in the presence of a member of his staff.

Sir E. Grey hopes that you will urge your Government to maintain the undertaking given by their delegates.

We have, as you have already been told, no information about the sixth refugee whom you mentioned.

Yours sincerely,  
LOUIS MALLETT.

[33043]

No. 557.

*India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received September 2.)*

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Viscount Morley, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, with reference to previous letter, copy of a telegram to the Viceroy, dated the 27th August, relative to the Kherkha irrigation scheme.

*India Office, September 2, 1909.*



Inclosure in No. 557.

*Viscount Morley to Government of India.*

(Telegraphic.) P.

August 27, 1909.

KHERKHA irrigation.

Please see telegrams from Barclay of the 29th July and of the 5th instant.

The Foreign Office, in telegrams of the 23rd instant, have instructed Barclay, with my concurrence, that survey by Wilson might be authorised, and have asked, at the same time, for information as to the proportion of the oil guard which should be retained with him. The Treasury will be asked to bear a moiety of the cost of those retained from the date of the departure of those withdrawn.

[33068]

No. 558.

*India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received September 2.)*

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Viscount Morley, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram to the Viceroy, dated the 29th August, relative to the situation in Persia.

*India Office, September 2, 1909.*

Inclosure in No. 558.

*Viscount Morley to Government of India.*

(Telegraphic.) P.

*India Office, August 29, 1909.*

THE situation at Kerman. Your telegrams of the 25th instant.

Troops from India will not be required. They would arrive too late in the case of a temporary raid of this kind. The news conveyed in your later telegram, and in Barclay's No. 692 of the 26th instant, as to the safety of James and Wright, is, I trust, confirmed. In a telegram No. 440 of the 26th August, Barclay was instructed to impress upon the Persian Government the necessity for taking measures to ensure the better security of the roads.

[33047]

No. 559.

*Messrs. Ellinger and Co. to Foreign Office.—(Received September 2.)*

28, Oxford Street, Manchester,  
September 1, 1909.

Sir,

WE are in receipt of your letter of yesterday relative to the oxide concession at Ormuz, and, in view of what you write, we telegraphed you to-day withdrawing our request for the maintenance of secrecy as to Messrs. Andrew Weir and Co.'s participation in the contract, and trust this course will materially assist Sir G. Barclay in his endeavours to prevent the cancellation of the Mouintujar's concession.

We shall be glad to hear from you as soon as you have further news of the result of Sir G. Barclay's efforts, and sincerely trust that he may be successful.

Yours faithfully,

ELLINGER AND CO.

[33046]

No. 560.

*Anglo-Persian Oil Company to Foreign Office.—(Received September 2.)*

Winchester House, Old Broad Street, London,  
August 31, 1909.

Sir,

I HAVE to acknowledge receipt of your letter of the 26th instant, enclosing copy of a despatch from His Majesty's consul at Bushire giving an account of the negotia-

tions which led to the conclusion of the agreement between this company and the sheikh of Mohammerah, and some observations on the instrument itself.

These are extremely interesting reading, and we are much obliged to Major Cox for the very valuable assistance he gave in bringing this matter to so successful a conclusion.

I also note that the agreement has been endorsed by the tribal elders, and that the amounts payable on account of the Government loan and on account of rent have been duly paid over.

I have, &amp;c.

[Illegible.]

[33076]

No. 561.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 2.)*

(No. 712.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Gulahek, September 2, 1909.*

THE Persian Government has now addressed a more satisfactory note to the two legations regarding its attitude towards the persons in bast and the question of an amnesty (please see my telegrams Nos. 662 and 689 of the 8th and 25th August respectively).

In this note the proclamation of an amnesty for political offenders in Tehran itself is announced, but a reservation is made with regard to certain "traitors" (named in the note) who are at present in bast. In deference, however, to the Russian Legation and Turkish Embassy, which are affected by this exception, the Persian Government will postpone their trial, exiling in the meanwhile the persons in question. Any sentence which may be passed on them during their absence may be executed in the event of their returning to Persia. The Persian Government at the same time ask the legations concerned to hasten their departure, and to impress upon them that the legation's protection will be forfeited should they return to this country.

[33060]

No. 562.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 2.)*

(No. 713.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Gulahek, September 2, 1909.*

PLEASE see last paragraph of your telegram No. 1272 of the 31st August to Mr. O'Beirne.

There is, in my opinion, no need for the Russian troops to remain at Kazvin in order to ensure the safety of the road from Resht to Tehran. No case of interference with traffic has occurred, although transport of goods has occasionally been delayed on account of the groundless fears of traders.

As far as my experience goes, guards have never been necessary on this road; it will not therefore be needful for Russia to await the creation of such a force before withdrawing her troops.

[33176]

No. 563.

*Mr. O'Beirne to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 2.)*

(No. 432.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*St. Petersburg, September 2, 1909.*

ADVANCE to Persia.

Since despatching my telegram of yesterday's date, No. 428, I have received telegram No. 711 from Teheran also dated yesterday; and in view of the information contained therein I would propose, unless otherwise instructed, to wait a little before asking the Minister of Finance for an interview, which I have not yet done.

The present position seems to be that both banks at Teheran have received and refused applications from the Persian Government for an overdraft, and that the latter, although they made this application, are not willing to consent to an advance being made jointly under the conditions laid down by you in your telegram No. 1272 of the 31st ultimo, the expenditure of which would have to be controlled by the British and

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4 Q



Russian Governments. If no such supervision is provided for, M. Kokovtsoff will almost certainly refuse to agree to an advance; and it would seem therefore to be preferable that, until the Persian Government show themselves ready to accept the necessary conditions, I should postpone discussing the matter with his Excellency.

[33084]

No. 564.

*Mr. O'Beirne to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 2.)*

(No. 433.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*St. Petersburg, September 2, 1909.*

TEHRAN. Telegram No. 710 of the 1st September.

There is not, in my opinion, any immediate danger of the Russian Government abandoning the attitude of moderation which they have adopted and maintained up till now.

They naturally resent the behaviour of the new Persian Government, and their unwillingness to make any advance at Tehran is due to a certain extent to this resentment. The Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs informed me yesterday that the new governor at Tabreez had taken up an unfriendly attitude towards Russia, and had refused to call on the officer commanding the Russian troops. His Excellency said this tallied with the general behaviour of the Persian Government. In a conversation which I had with M. Poklewsky on the 27th ultimo, he also showed considerable irritation against the new régime in Persia, and declared that the Persians would have to be brought to understand the real state of affairs.

Nevertheless the Russian Government, as you will have remarked, took up a sensible attitude in regard to the dismissal of M. Smirnow, and in another conversation which I had yesterday with M. Poklewsky he said that in his opinion it would not do for Russia to deliver a sort of ultimatum to the Persian Government in regard to their attitude, but that the various opportunities which would offer, such as an advance of money, the withdrawal of troops, &c., should be utilised by the Russian Government to bring the Persian Government gradually to make the desired concessions. If some new injudicious action on the part of the Tehran Government does not exhaust the patience of the Russian Government altogether it is to be hoped that they will adhere to the policy outlined above.

I still anticipate that the Finance Minister will put the greatest difficulties in the way of a money advance to the Persians, although M. Poklewsky alluded to the possibility of such a thing.

[33079]

No. 565.

*Sir Edward Grey to Mr. O'Beirne.*

(No. 1280.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Foreign Office, September 2, 1909.*

RUSSIAN troops in North Persia.

I have received an urgent appeal from Persian Minister against the retention and high-handed action of the Russian troops. He specially mentioned the Tabreez force. He urged that, even if they must be retained, they might make some show of acting through the governor and of supporting his authority. At present, he said, they were making the governor's position impossible by ignoring his authority. I replied that, as to withdrawal of the troops, I was sure that Russian Government wished to remove them as soon as order was secure, but that they must be their own judges of what precautions were necessary on their own frontier, and that no third Power could dictate to them on this point. I think, however, that his request that troops should acknowledge authority of governor is reasonable, and although I made no promise to the Persian Minister to make representations to Russian Government, you might in conversation with Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs mention this last point.

[33194]

No. 566.

*Mr. O'Beirne to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 3.)*

(No. 434.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*St. Petersburg, September 3, 1909.*

PERSIA.

Please see your telegram No. 1280 of the 2nd September.

In a conversation which I had with the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs to-day, I alluded to the complaint which the Persian Minister in London had made to you respecting the action of the Russian general at Tabreez. M. Sazonow replied that as the Persian governor of Tabreez had complained, amongst other things, of the alleged interference of General Suarsky in the civil administration of the town, he had at once begged the military authorities to send instructions to the general to the effect that he should be careful to refrain from interfering in the way alleged. Both sides are, in the opinion of M. Sazonow, to blame. As regards the attitude of the governor, it was hostile from the very first (see my telegram No. 433 of yesterday's date).

To my question as to whether the Russian Government had received any information which indicated that measures for the re-establishment of order had been instituted by the governor, M. Sazonow replied that no reports had as yet reached him on the subject, but that the Russian troops would be withdrawn so soon as order was re-established.

[33195]

No. 567.

*Mr. O'Beirne to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 3.)*

(No. 435.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*St. Petersburg, September 3, 1909.*

PERSIA.

Advances of money to Persian Government.

In a conversation which I had to-day with the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, his Excellency remarked that the Persian Government appeared, according to a telegram which had been received from M. Sabline, to dissociate themselves from the efforts of the committee to obtain money. The Persian Government hinted that no authorisation had been given to the committee to raise funds, and that its members were not fit people to be trusted with money.

M. Sazonow informed me that he has telegraphed to M. Sabline for further details respecting the constitution of the committee.

[33286]

No. 568.

*Anglo-Persian Oil Company to Foreign Office.—(Received September 4.)*

*Winchester House, Old Broad Street, London,  
September 3, 1909.*

Sir,

IN reply to your favour of the 25th ultimo, I was not aware that any dubiety existed or that any misunderstanding was possible on the subject of the free shares to be given to the Bakhtiari chiefs in addition the cash subsidy.

The agreement between the Khans and the concessionaire negotiated by Mr. J. R. Preece and dated the 15th November, 1905, provides as follows:—

"Further also, after the formation of one or more companies to work oil in the Bakhtiari country, and after the oil is passed through the pipes, the first party undertakes to give to the second party 3 per cent. of all the ordinary shares issued, which shares must be fully paid up."

I have another and more literal translation of this clause given to me by Mr. J. R. Preece, and it reads as follows:—

"And also after the formation of a petroleum company in the Bakhtiari country and after the flowing of petroleum through the pipes of every 100 ordinary public shares of one or more petroleum companies that are formed in the Bakhtiari country, three



shares will be given to the Bakhtiari Khans, and they (the syndicate) will not exact the price of the three shares of the Company from the Bakhtiari Khans, and they (the syndicate) have not the right to demand the price of the three shares."

I would refer you to my letters to you dated the 25th June and the 13th July, from which you will see that the agreement was executed in Persian only.

The two companies, the only two companies, which will work oil in the Bakhtiari country, are:—

1. The First Exploitation Company (Limited); and
2. The Bakhtiari Oil Company (Limited).

The First Exploitation Company (Limited), is a company with an authorised share capital of 600,000 shares of 1*l.* each, all these shares being of one class, and there have been issued 500,000 of these shares all now fully paid. It has the right to work blocks aggregating one square mile which blocks were to be selected by it, and it has selected the whole of them at Musjid-i-Suleiman, which is in the Bakhtiari country.

The Bakhtiari Oil Company (Limited) is a company with an authorised share capital of 400,000 shares of 1*l.* each, all of these shares being of the same class, and there have been issued 300,000 of these shares all now fully paid. It has the right to work all oil in the Bakhtiari country minus blocks aggregating one square mile—the blocks referred to above as workable by the First Exploitation Company (Limited).

Under their agreement of the 15th November, 1905, above referred to, the Bakhtiari chiefs are therefore entitled to receive "after the oil is passed through the pipes," free of cost, 3 per cent. of the fully-paid shares, *i.e.*, 15,000 shares of 1*l.* each in the First Exploitation Company (Limited), and 9,000 shares of 1*l.* each in the Bakhtiari Oil Company (Limited).

Also, when and if further shares of these two companies are issued and paid up, the Bakhtiari chiefs will be entitled to receive 3 per cent. of such further issue—"after the oil is passed through the pipes."

I have, &c.

E. W. WALLACE, *Vice-Chairman.*

[33326]

No. 569.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 4.)*

(No. 714.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Gulahek, September 4, 1909.*

IN the final paragraph of my telegram No. 710 of the 1st September I reported my Russian colleague's allusion to a dissension between the Cabinet and the committee; but it now transpires that this was merely a disagreement between the Minister of War, who seems inclined to act independently, and the latter body. The Sipahdar's Russian sympathies have to a certain extent brought him into discredit, while the committee's authority appears to remain unimpaired.

[33317]

No. 570.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 4.)*

(No. 715.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Gulahek, September 4, 1909.*

THE traffic in goods imported at the Gulf ports has of late been largely diverted to the Karun in place of the Bushire-Ispahan route, owing to the insecurity of the latter road. The Bushire customs receipts are consequently far from sufficing for the monthly instalments of interest due to the Imperial Bank, and at present arrears of two months remain unpaid.

I have now received from the bank manager a request that I should press for the Mohammerah customs to be pledged, in addition to those of Bushire, for the service of this interest.

I can see no objection to this course, except that we would thus encroach on the revenues from which the interests on our Government loan, which are now two years in

arrears, are to be paid. For the service, however, of this loan the receipts at Ahwaz, Lingah, and Bunder Abbas should amply suffice.

I await your instructions on this question.

Reference is to your telegram No. 19 of the 11th January.

[33176]

No. 571.

*Sir Edward Grey to Mr. O'Beirne.*

(No. 1292.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Foreign Office, September 4, 1909.*

PROPOSED joint advance to Persian Government.

I concur in suggestion in your telegram No. 432 of the 2nd September.

In any case, one of the conditions on which we should insist would be that the expenditure of the loan should be supervised by us.

[32489]

No. 572.

*Foreign Office to Persian Transport Company.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, September 4, 1909.*

WITH reference to my letter of the 28th June last, relative to the property leased to Messrs. Lynch Brothers by Sheikh Morteza at Shellilie, I am directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to inform you that he has received a despatch from His Majesty's Minister at Tehran, stating that on the 12th May, after the proposal to refer the question of the ownership of that land to a Shari court at Nedjef had been made and accepted, he received a telegram from His Majesty's consul at Ahwaz to the effect that, according to Messrs. Lynch's agent, the sheikh was averse to the case being tried at Nedjef on grounds of expense and inconvenience, that he wished it to be referred to a court at Dizful, and that he asked that, if possible, a representative of His Majesty's consulate should watch the case.

Sir G. Barclay replied that he could not then take any steps to modify the arrangement which had been proposed by Sheikh Morteza himself, and accepted by the Moin-ut-Tujjar at Sir G. Barclay's own request.

As regards the penultimate paragraph of your letter of the 17th June, Sir G. Barclay states that he had already heard from His Majesty's consul at Ahwaz that Sheikh Morteza proposed to continue the construction of buildings on the land in dispute, and that he had replied that, if the works were forcibly stopped by the other party, His Majesty's Legation could not interfere. You are doubtless right in thinking that the Moin-ut-Tujjar's real object is to prevent or delay the construction of the shed, but unfortunately the fact remains that the ownership of the land is disputed between two Persian subjects, and in such cases a foreign legation has no grounds for intervention.

The Moin-ut-Tujjar has, moreover, been persuaded by His Majesty's Legation to accept a mode of settlement of this long-standing dispute proposed by Sheikh Morteza himself, and Sir G. Barclay is accordingly of opinion that it behoves the latter, in the interests of your company, to refrain at this stage from tardy objections to the course agreed to.

As regards the last paragraph of your letter referred to, Sir G. Barclay states that he will of course do all that he properly can to protect your company's interests, even if Messrs. Lynch take possession of the premises before the question of ownership is decided, but he is not sure how far he should be able to go in supporting such a claim to the possession of premises held from a landlord whose title, at the time possession was taken, was known to be in dispute.

I am to add that Sir E. Grey fully concurs in the opinions expressed by Sir G. Barclay on this subject.

I am, &c.

LOUIS MALLET.



[33327]

No. 573.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 5.)*

(No. 716.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Gulahek, September 5, 1909.*

PERSIAN Government and committee.

Please see St. Petersburg telegram No. 435 of the 3rd September, and my No. 714 of the 4th September.

Sipahdar, Minister of War, recently sent a message to my Russian colleague asking that no advance might be made to the committee, thus occasioning the telegram from M. Sabline to which Mr. O'Beirne refers. I do not profess to understand the intricacies of Sipahdar's attitude; he has already more than once expressed to Russian chargé d'affaires a desire to take refuge with him. This Minister's attitude, however, is no criterion for that of his colleagues, and, so far as I can ascertain, the committee, including as it does the majority of the members of the Cabinet, is in no way in conflict with the Government.

There could of course be no question of making an advance to the committee as distinct from the Cabinet, and although no doubt the former would direct in what manner the money should be spent, the Government proper would have to sign any agreement relative to a loan. The new Government is, I have every reason to think, no less fit to be trusted with money than any other purely Persian administration.

In the event of the Persian Government applying to us, M. Sabline would, I believe, be prepared, in spite of his hostility to the committee, which has shown such slight consideration for Russian *amour-propre*, to recommend to his Government a joint Anglo-Russian advance on the condition that it should be subjected to the same control as that proposed for the Russian advance which it was intended to make to the Persian Government under the old régime (see my despatch No. 129 for the conditions on which this advance was to be made).

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No. 574.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 6.)*

(No. 717.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Gulahek, September 6, 1909.*

GOVERNOR-GENERAL of Azerbaijan.

Please see St. Petersburg telegrams Nos. 433 and 434 of the 2nd and 3rd September respectively.

I have telegraphed to His Majesty's acting consul-general at Tabreez requesting him to report on the new governor-general, and particularly on his alleged anti-Russian attitude. Mr. Smart has replied as follows:—

"Everything that could be expected from a governor-general with no military or financial support has been done, and although it is early to pass judgment on him, he has already given proof of a reasonable spirit, and has had a morally pacifying influence on the province in general.

"I cannot see that his attitude towards Russia has been hostile. He has talked frankly to Russian consul-general, exposing his plans and asking for any suggestions that he might see fit to make. He had to protest immediately after his arrival against the Russians sending a force to Karadagh without any notification to him, and he has since objected to other acts of interference on the part of Russia, although his attitude has on the whole been conciliatory. From the first my Russian colleague has been ill-disposed towards him.

"Russian consul-general tells me that Russian general is charged with the maintenance of order in Tabreez and in the neighbourhood of Julfa under consul-general's instructions. Such usurpation of the governor-general's functions by the Russians must of necessity produce friction.

"Mukhber-es-Sultaneh declined to pay first call on the general on the ground that while this gentleman has no official status which can be recognised by the local authorities, the official representative of Russia had already paid first visit to him. I told M. Miller that in my opinion the governor's view was correct, but urged the latter to adopt a conciliatory attitude on the question. He has now put the whole matter in

the hands of my Russian colleague, who has suggested a compromise by which I trust the incident will shortly be closed."

On the 4th September an escort of 200 Cossacks, who will collect other troops *en route* up to a total of 900, left Tehran for Tabreez.

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No. 575.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 6.)*

(No. 718.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Gulahek, September 6, 1909.*

MY Russian colleague is asking his Government to authorise him, in concert with me, to request our consuls at Tabreez to press Imam Kuli to admit Russians to partnership in his enterprise in order that its Russian character may be assured, stipulating, however, that the post of paid manager shall be reserved for Mr. Stevens.

Reference is to my telegram No. 706 of the 31st August.

[33606]

No. 576.

*Mr. O'Beirne to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 7.)*

(No. 482. Confidential.)

Sir,

*St. Petersburg, August 30, 1909.*

I HAD the honour to receive your telegram No. 1246 of the 26th instant on the morning of the following day, and the same afternoon I had an interview with the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, at which I handed to his Excellency an *aide-mémoire* concerning the proposal of His Majesty's Government that an advance of 50,000*l.* should be made to the Persian Government by the Imperial Bank and the Russian Bank respectively. I laid stress verbally on the financial straits in which the Persian Government is placed, and the danger that if the proposed advance is not authorised by the British and Russian Governments the Tehran authorities may be driven to apply for money elsewhere, and I explained that it was therefore urgent to act promptly.

M. Sazonow did not appear to see any objections to the proposal. He was aware that a sum of 100,000*l.* had been actually set aside by the Russian Government for the purpose of an advance to the ex-Shah shortly before he lost his throne. He said, however, that M. Kokovtsoff was absent from St. Petersburg for a few days, but that he would communicate with M. Weber, who is acting for him, and he would ask M. Weber, if he could not settle the matter on his own authority, to telegraph to the Finance Minister for his assent.

Before seeing M. Sazonow I happened to meet M. Poklewski, who is better acquainted with Persian questions than the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, and I had spoken to him of the proposed joint advance. M. Poklewski said that he thought M. Kokovtsoff would be strongly opposed to the Russian Bank making even so small an advance as suggested. M. Poklewski observed that when the ex-Shah was still on the throne His Majesty's Government had refused to make a similar advance pending the meeting of the Medjliss. I pointed out that the case was quite different, because the ex-Shah was then engaged in his final struggle with the Nationalists, and it might have been said that to lend money to His Majesty was to furnish him with funds for the fight. M. Poklewski went on to say that at the time when the British Government refused to join in the advance to Mohammed Ali which Russia wished to make, the Finance Minister had declared that if the Shah fell he would refuse to advance a penny to the new régime. The present Persian Government, he continued, were adopting an attitude towards Russia which certainly did not entitle them to expect the latter to show herself accommodating, and the Emperor was decidedly of that opinion. I remarked that the advance could be made the means of bringing the Persian Government to give Russia satisfaction in the matters as to which she had cause to complain of the Persian attitude, and I also reminded M. Poklewski that Persia would necessarily have to find the money somewhere. However, he continued to dwell on the unfriendly attitude of the Persians in a way which shows the strong resentment felt on the subject by the Russian Government. It was, he said, necessary that the Persians should understand that it was foolishness for them to talk of anyone showing confidence in



the Persian administration, either in regard to their methods of justice or otherwise. There was nothing to show that the new régime was a whit less corrupt and worthless than the old. On the contrary, there was reason to think that bribery was just as rife as formerly, and it was a well-known fact that the first Medjliss was anything but free from reproach in that respect.

I referred to the necessity that would arise when the new Medjliss assembled of considering arrangements for a fresh Persian loan. M. Poklewski said, as to that, that the Persians had better reform their finances and obtain funds in that way. He was convinced that M. Kokovtsoff would not agree to take part in a loan. The Finance Minister had always been most reluctant to lend money to Persia, even under the old régime, which was friendly to Russia, and he certainly would not consent to do so now. Russia had no money to lend abroad; the Duma would refuse to guarantee a loan of the kind, and, in short, His Majesty's Government would have to finance Persia themselves.

In the course of the conversation M. Poklewski touched on the question of the appointment of foreign advisers. He said that he understood that His Majesty's Government did not favour this idea, but he thought that it would be necessary to adopt it. He referred to a telegram from Tehran, published by the "Agence de Saint-Petersbourg," reporting the speech made by Count Quadt on presenting his letters of credence. Count Quadt was reported to have said that Germany had no political interests in Persia, and the "Agence" telegram added that the Persian Government were desirous of selecting foreign advisers from among the countries which pursued no political aims. M. Poklewski, of course, saw a danger here of the Persian Government calling in German advisers, which must, above all, be avoided. Speaking of the branches in which the British and Russian Governments might wish respectively to advise the Persian Government, he stated that he thought Russia would desire to reorganise the Persian army, and he suggested that His Majesty's Government might wish to undertake the reform of the internal administration. I should not be surprised, though he did not say so, if the Russian Government had some thoughts of laying down their requirements with regard to foreign advisers as one of the conditions of the withdrawal of the Kasvin force.

M. Poklewski would probably not wish to be quoted as having made certain of the statements above reported with regard to the views and intentions of the Russian Government.

I have, &c.  
HUGH O'BEIRNE.

[33675] No. 577.

*Mr. F. C. Strick to Foreign Office.—(Received September 7.)*

Baltic House, Leadenhall Street, London,  
September 6, 1909.

Sir,  
I BEG to inform you that the last telegram received by my firm from Mr. David Brown, of Tehran, in regard to the concession of the mining rights for Hormuz and the other Persian islands, was worded as follows:—

"Communicate the following to F. C. Strick and Co. (Limited) from D. Brown:—  
"Negotiations suspended for the present."

This message was received on the 31st August.

I have, &c.  
FRANK C. STRICK.

[33681] No. 578.

*Anglo-Persian Oil Company to Foreign Office.—(Received September 7.)*

Winchester House, Old Broad Street, London,  
September 6, 1909.

Sir,  
I BEG to acknowledge receipt of your letter of the 21st ultimo advising that Sir E. Grey does not feel justified in approaching the Lords Commissioners of His Majesty's Treasury with a request for authority to incur the expense of sharing in the cost of a

topographical survey for the part of Persia in which this company is carrying on work, and that the Secretary of State for India also sees no sufficient reason for a grant from Indian revenues for the purpose.

We regret these decisions because, though a triangulation of the country is necessary for the work of our company, it would also doubtless be of considerable value both to the British Government and to the Government of Persia, and therefore there would seem to be good grounds for a division of the costs.

Under the circumstances, however, we have no alternative but to avail ourselves of Lord Morley's kind offer to ask the Government of India if they can spare the services of an officer for the purposes of the proposed survey, on the understanding that the whole of the cost is to be defrayed by our company.

I shall therefore be obliged if you will kindly cause this request to be put forward, at the same time explaining—

1. That the officer should bring with him one or two native assistants, should he consider their services necessary.
2. That the whole party should leave for Mohammerah as soon as possible in order to begin operations at the commencement of the cold weather.
3. That Messrs. Shaw, Wallace, and Co., of Bombay or Kurachee, will, on application, arrange for passages, &c.
4. That on arrival at Mohammerah the officer should report himself to Messrs. Lloyd Scott and Co., who will make the necessary arrangements for the equipment of the party, and instruct him as to the work required.

I have, &c.

[Illegible], Director.

[33680]

No. 579.

*Anglo-Persian Oil Company to Foreign Office.—(Received September 7.)*

Winchester House, Old Broad Street, London,  
September 7, 1909.

Sir,

I BEG to acknowledge receipt of your favour of the 30th ultimo advising receipt of a telegram from His Majesty's Minister at Tehran reporting that he has been unable as yet to obtain an authoritative declaration from the Persian Government in regard to the payment of the Imperial commissioner's salary, but that he has elicited a vague verbal statement to the effect that it is their intention to retain the present commissioner in the post.

In the meantime I have paid the commissioner's salary for the month of August to Sadigh-es-Salteneh—and I now beg to enclose copies of some further correspondence that has passed between the commissioner and ourselves, of a letter received by the commissioner from the Persian Minister of Public Works, and of two letters exchanged between this company and the Persian Legation—all on the same subject.

The letter of the 1st instant to the Persian Legation was written at the suggestion of Sadigh-es-Salteneh, and presumably the reply is quite sufficient authorisation for us to act upon pending receipt of a more formal authorisation from the Persian Government through the medium of Sir George Barclay.

I have, &c.  
C. GREENWAY, Director.

Inclosure 1 in No. 579.

*Anglo-Persian Oil Company to Sadigh-es-Salteneh.*

Sir,

August 19, 1909.

I AM in receipt of your letter of the 17th instant, and of the latter one dated the 18th enclosing receipt for payment of the commissioner's July salary, for which I am obliged.

I note what you write in the former with regard to the embargo placed on the payment of this salary. But we cannot be expected to have any cognizance of the changes which may have taken place in the Cabinet of your Government.

So far as we are concerned, the position is that your Government, by its Minister of Foreign Affairs, notified us in April last, and again on the 21st May last, through

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His Majesty's Minister at Tehran, that the commissioner's salary was to be paid direct to the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

The only modification of this notification that we have received from your Government through His Majesty's Minister was an authorisation to pay the commissioner's salary to you for the months of May and June only.

Consequently, if your Government desire that we should continue to pay to you the salary instead of to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, it is necessary that they should officially, and through the same channel, cancel the above notifications.

I do not wish to trouble you unduly in this matter, but it is, as I am sure you will appreciate, irregular for us to go on paying you the commissioner's salary in opposition to the instructions of your Government now before us. I therefore hope that you will before the end of this month be able to induce your Government to withdraw, through the British Minister at Tehran, the notifications of April and May last.

I may point out this is the more necessary seeing that the embargo still remains notwithstanding that your Government must have long ago received the copy of your letter of the 21st May addressed to Mr. Wallace, in which you questioned their action.

I am, &c.

C. GREENWAY, *Director*.

Inclosure 2 in No. 579.

*Anglo-Persian Oil Company to Persian Chargé d'Affaires.*

Your Excellency,

September 1, 1909.

SOME time ago (in April and May last) we were on two occasions notified by the Persian Government through His Majesty's Minister at Tehran that the imperial oil commissioner's salary was to be paid by us direct to the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

In June last we received another notification through the same source that the salary might be paid by us to the commissioner up to the end of June, but not afterwards, as he had been summoned to Tehran.

His Excellency, Sadigh-es-Saltaneh, has now shown us a letter dated early in August, from the Minister of Public Works, stating that the action of the Minister of Foreign Affairs in placing an embargo on the payment by us to the commissioner of his salary was irregular, and that the company should without hesitation pay the salary to the commissioner as before.

As this letter was not addressed to us we are not strictly entitled to take official notice of it, but as we are desirous of overcoming the difficulty that is created by the conflict of advices, we shall be glad if you can officially authorise us to pay the commissioner's salary to Sadigh-es-Saltaneh.

I have, &c.

C. GREENWAY, *Director*.

Inclosure 3 in No. 579.

*Sané-ed-Dowleh to Sadigh-es-Saltaneh.*

*Tehran, beginning of August.*

REGARDING the suspension of the commissioner's salary the Ministry of Public Works has some time ago wired directly to you to the effect that the Anglo-Persian Oil Company should pay the salary regularly as before to yourself. With a view to removing all possible difficulties a note seven days ago was sent to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs intimating that the imposition of embargo by that ministry on the commissioner's salary was an irregular proceeding and beyond the sphere of the action of that department, and they were requested to cancel the suspension by telegram. Irrespective of its having yet been communicated or not, the company has without a hesitation to pay as before the commissioner's salary directly to yourself. With regard to the arrears of 2,000 tomans, "annual rent of the three oil mines," you have not yet, in spite of the repeatedly strict instructions from the Ministry of

Public Works, taken necessary steps to obtain and send the same! Of course you will not allow the matter to be dragged on any longer and in accordance with the 4th clause of the concession you will get the sum in arrears which amounts to 16,000 tomans.

SANÉ-ED-DOWLEH.

Inclosure 4 in No. 579.

*Anglo-Persian Oil Company to Sadigh-es-Saltaneh.*

Sir,

September 2, 1909.

REFERRING to your interview with me a few days ago I have as a matter of form, as you suggested, addressed a letter to the Persian Legation asking for authorisation to pay you the commissioner's salary, but in the meantime pending receipt of their reply I have the pleasure to enclose a cheque for 83*l.* 6*s.* 8*d.* on account of the salary for the month of August.

I am, &c.

C. GREENWAY, *Director*.

Inclosure 5 in No. 579.

*Sadigh-es-Saltaneh to Anglo-Persian Oil Company.*

*Royal Palace Hotel, Kensington, London,*

September 2, 1909.

Sir,

YOUR letter of the 19th ultimo to hand, for which I am obliged.

With regard to the so-called embargo, you state that "if your Government desire that we should continue to pay to you the salary, it is necessary that they should officially and through the same channel cancel the above notification." I am surprised to see that you have overlooked the official telegram of the new Government cancelling the embargo which I duly communicated to you on the 20th July. The stress, that you put on the expression "the same channel" is quite unwarrantable. If you refer to all the communications which have passed between the former and the present oil companies, you will see that there was no other intermediary but the Imperial commissioner, and a single mistake on the part of a member of the late Cabinet cannot establish rule or precedent. I also handed to you on Monday the 30th ultimo copy of a letter received from our present Minister of Public Works respecting my salary and 2,000 tomans; this should be quite sufficient for you.

I trust that you will give your immediate attention to the matter, especially of the 2,000 tomans, and settle it without further delay, which I am sure will be in the best interests of the company.

Yours truly,

SADIGH-ES-SALTANEH.

Inclosure 6 in No. 579.

*Persian Legation to Anglo-Persian Oil Company.*

Sir,

*Persian Legation, September 4, 1909.*

IN reply to your letter dated 1st instant regarding the payments made by your company to the Imperial Commissioner (Sadigh-es-Saltaneh) I beg to say that I have seen a telegram and a letter addressed to the commissioner by the Persian Minister of Public Works stating that he is to receive full payment. Consequently I think you will be quite in order in doing so.

Yours, &c.

Persian Legation (?).



Inclosure 7 in No. 579.

*Anglo-Persian Oil Company to Sa'igh-es-Saltaneh.*

Your Excellency,

September 6, 1909.

I HAVE to acknowledge receipt of your letter of the 2nd instant.

As regards the payment of the commissioner's salary to you, I had, before receipt of your letter, sent you a cheque for the amount due for August, in anticipation of receiving the authorisation which you suggested my obtaining from the Persian Legation.

I have now received the enclosed letter from the Persian Legation, and although it does not (as I asked) specifically authorise the payment of the salary to you, I have no doubt that my board will consider the confirmation of the Persian Minister of Public Works' telegram and letter, and the expression of opinion contained therein, as sufficient for their purpose, pending receipt of the more definite authorisation which we have asked for from the Persian Government, through His Majesty's Minister at Tehran, in cancelment of their previous instructions.

As regards the question of rent for the oil springs, and with reference to the information which you kindly gave to our vice-chairman in July last, we have now received definite information showing that not only has at least one of the springs been farmed out by others during the period of our concession, but that the farmer in question has regularly been paying to your Government a royalty—or rent—in respect thereof.

Article 4 clearly contemplated that the 2,000 tomans to be paid by the concessionaire was to be paid *in lieu of*—and not in addition to—the 2,000 tomans rental which had previously been paid to your Government in respect of these springs by private persons, and if your Government has, since the date of the concession, been collecting or receiving the same (or any) royalties or taxes, there is absolutely no ground at all for claiming payment of the 2,000 tomans by this company.

Under the circumstances, therefore, I regret that it will be impossible for the company to meet this claim until they have been satisfied more fully than they are at present that it is justly due.

To assist in bringing the matter to a settlement I shall be much obliged if you will exercise your good offices in obtaining for us from your Government the following information:—

1. The names of the "private persons" who were paying the 2,000 tomans annually referred to in article 3 of the concession prior to the 28th May, 1901, and the amount paid annually by each.
2. The amounts claimed or collected since the 28th May, 1901, from any of the above persons—or any one else—in respect of any of the three springs.
3. The amounts, if any, still due by these persons in respect of royalties or rents on the three springs.
4. Whether any official intimation was sent to these persons on the 28th May, 1901, or subsequently thereto, that the three springs had been included in our concession, and therefore that thereafter the rents would be payable to the concessionaire.

With this information before us, but not otherwise, it should be practicable to arrive at the amount payable by this company in respect of the condition covered by article 4.

Yours, &amp;c.

C. GREENWAY, Director.

[33703]

No. 580.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 7.)*

(No. 719.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Gulahek, September 7, 1909.

I HAVE received a letter from the manager of the Imperial Bank, in which he informs me that he has received from the Persian Government an application for a temporary advance of 100,000 tomans. They offer as security for this advance Crown jewels estimated at 500,000 tomans. These they wish the Imperial Bank to transmit

to the Crédit Lyonnais at Paris, from whom they hope to obtain a larger sum at lower interest on the same security. The Persian Government would repay the Imperial Bank in the event of either successfully contracting the more substantial loan or selling the jewels.

Mr. Wood has strongly recommended to his principals the advisability of undertaking this business.

In informing M. Sabline of this, I am telling him that, in view of the purely commercial character of the transaction, the directors of the Imperial Bank must be free to consult their own interests in the matter.

[33267]

No. 581.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 7.)*

(No. 315.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Constantinople, September 7, 1909.

REFERRING to your despatch No. 97 of the 5th April last, I have been asked by Rifaat Pasha whether the charge of Ottoman interests may now be taken over by His Majesty's consuls at Lingah and Bunder Abbas.

[33717]

No. 582.

*Mr. O'Beirne to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 7.)*

(No. 438.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

St. Petersburg, September 7, 1909.

PERSIA: Confidential.

Please see telegram No. 680 of the 22nd ultimo from Sir G. Barclay.

I was told to-day, privately, by M. Poklewsky that the question of the transfer of the Russian vice-consulate from (I understood him to say) Hosainabad to Birjand is under consideration by the Russian Government. The former place has, I presume, been the head-quarters of the Russian vice-consul for Seistan up to now. M. Poklewsky spoke of the arrangement as if it was intended to be one of a permanent nature.

[33703]

No. 583.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.*

(No. 456.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Foreign Office, September 7, 1909.

YOUR telegram No. 719 of the 7th September, last paragraph: Advance to Persian Government by the Imperial Bank on security of State jewels.

I agree.

[33627]

No. 584.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.*

(No. 457.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, September 7, 1909.

TURKISH interests at Bunder Abbas.

I have received a request from Ottoman Government to allow His Majesty's consul to take charge of their interests at Bunder Abbas and Lingah. If we do not agree to do this, they will ask German Government to do so, therefore I am desirous of complying with their request.

Could the residency agent at Lingah take charge of Turkish interests until someone is appointed to the consulship there? Meanwhile, I propose to reply that His Majesty's consul there shall receive instructions to take charge, as soon as his appointment is decided on.



[33317]

No. 585.

Foreign Office to Treasury.

(Confidential.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, September 8, 1909.

WITH reference to my letter of the 2nd April last, relative to the service of the Anglo-Indian loan to Persia, I am directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to transmit to you herewith copy of a telegram from His Majesty's Minister at Tehran,\* reporting that the manager of the Imperial Bank of Persia is pressing him to obtain the assignment of the customs receipts of Mohammerah, which are at present pledged to the service of that loan, to that of the bank's own loan to the Persian Government.

In view of the statement of Sir G. Barclay that the receipts of the customs at Bunder Abbas, Linga, and Ahwaz are sufficient for the service of the Government loan without those of Mohammerah, Sir E. Grey is disposed, subject to the concurrence of the Lords Commissioners of His Majesty's Treasury, to authorise him by telegraph to comply with the manager's request, should he see no objection to such a course.

I am to add that a similar letter has been addressed to the India Office.

I am, &amp;c.

LOUIS MALLET.

[33317]

No. 586.

Foreign Office to India Office.

(Confidential.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, September 8, 1909.

WITH reference to my letter of the 23rd March last, relative to the service of the Anglo-Indian loan to Persia, I am directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to transmit to you herewith copy of a telegram from His Majesty's Minister at Tehran,\* reporting that the manager of the Imperial Bank of Persia is pressing him to obtain the assignment of the customs receipts of Mohammerah, which are at present pledged to the service of that loan, to that of the bank's own loan to the Persian Government.

In view of the statement of Sir G. Barclay that the receipts of the customs at Bunder Abbas, Linga, and Ahwaz are sufficient for the service of the Government loan without those of Mohammerah, Sir E. Grey is disposed, subject to the concurrence of Viscount Morley, to authorise him by telegraph to comply with the manager's request, should he see no objection to such a course.

I am to add that a similar letter has been addressed to the Treasury.

I am, &amp;c.

LOUIS MALLET.

[33855]

No. 587.

The Imperial Bank of Persia to Foreign Office.—(Received September 9.)

Dear Mr. Mallet,

25, Abchurch Lane, London, September 8, 1909.

WITH reference to our conversation of yesterday, I enclose copy of the confidential letter from the chief manager of the bank, Tehran, dated the 14th August, with statement of debts and translation of our telegram to Tehran of the 11th August.

I enclose a draft of the telegram we propose sending to Tehran to-day, if you approve its terms.

Yours truly,

T. JACKSON.

Inclosure 1 in No. 587.

Mr. Wood to Mr. Newell.

(Confidential.)

Dear Mr. Newell,

Tehran, August 14, 1909.

I WROTE you last on the 11th instant, and since have not received any of yours. Outstandings.—In accordance with your wire received on the 12th instant, we sent

\* No. 570.

in the same day to the legation a list of principal debtors, together with a letter in the sense of your message.

Yesterday I saw Sir G. Barclay on the subject, and he was strongly of opinion that to include those debts which have been taken over by Government would tend to weaken our claim on the latter, who (i.e., the new Government) have expressed their intention to dispute some of the accounts. Such debts, therefore, will not be included in the list submitted to the Persian Government by the legation.

A short time ago Sir G. Barclay telegraphed to the Foreign Office asking what line of action His Majesty's Government intended to adopt in connection with such debts, but so far is without instructions. As a distinct understanding is most desirable, I have prepared a statement of these debts, and inclose it herein for the information of the Foreign Office. A copy has also been sent to Sir G. Barclay, who thinks that the matter had better be laid before the Foreign Office by the bank.

If the present Persian Government dispute any of the items, it can only be on the plea that their predecessors had no right to enter into such engagements; but this is no argument at all, for after the *coup d'Etat* of June 1908 the Shah reverted to autocratic Government, formed a cabinet, and had responsible dealings with foreign Powers. Under these circumstances I do not see that the British Government need have any hesitation in holding the present Persian Government responsible for the acts of their predecessors.

I have discussed the matter in this sense with Sir G. Barclay, who does not actually say, or even suggest, that support will not be forthcoming, but there appears to be a lukewarmness about the affair which I think ought to be dispelled without delay. It must be remembered that when the Foreign Office asked us not to advance any money to the Government in connection with the Amin-ul-Zarb affair, we scrupulously carried out their wishes to our own detriment, and did all in our power to further their policy in Persia.

Yours sincerely,

A. O. WOOD.

Inclosure 2 in No. 587.

## STATEMENT of Debts taken over by the Persian Government.

## Exclusive of Interest.

Name.	Amount	Date when passed.	Authority.
Nasr-es-Sultaneh ..	Krans. 2,061,593·80	May 6, 1905 .. April 12, 1905 ..	Autograph order of Muzaffer-ed-Din Shah and the Prime Minister, 530,000 krans. Autograph order of Muzaffer-ed-Din Shah and the Prime Minister, 1,531,593·80 krans.
Shoa-es-Sultaneh ..	2,100,000	July 27, 1907 ..	Autograph order of Mohamed Ali Shah, passed by the Minister of Finance, and duly accepted for payment by the Administrator-General of Customs.
Amir Bahadur Jang	1,200,000	April 2, 1908 ..	Passed by Minister of Finance, and ratified by his successor in office 29th August, 1908, and duly accepted by Administrator-General of Customs.
Mushir-ed-Dowleh	650,000	November 24, 1906	Pro note of Mushir-ed-Dowleh as Prime Minister. The Administrator-General of Customs has paid interest on this debt up to 20th September, 1908.
Nizam-ul-Mulk ..	200,000	April 21, 1908 ..	Passed by Sani-ed-Dowleh as Minister of Finance.
Mohamed Ali Shah	1,542,444·70	December 9, 1908 ..	Autograph order of Mohamed Ali Shah, passed by the Prime Minister and Minister of Finance, and duly accepted for payment by the Administrator-General of Customs.
Nayeb-es-Sultaneh	1,311,012·85	March 17, 1903 .. April 17, 1909 ..	Order of Prime Minister and M. Naus, 252,702 krans. Order of Prime Minister, 1,058,310·85 krans. Both duly accepted for payment by Administrator-General of Customs.



Inclosure 3 in No. 587.

*Imperial Bank of Persia, London, to Imperial Bank of Persia, Tehran.*

(Telegraphic.)

*London, August 11, 1909.*

REFERRING to "Times" telegram to-day, submit list principal debtors to legation, make strong representation that bank have priority of claim should payment be levied by Government on Persians who are large debtors to bank, otherwise they will be denuded of means of settling with us.

Inclosure 4 in No. 587.

*Mr. Wood to Mr. Newell.*

(Confidential.)

(Extract.)

*Tehran, August 25, 1909.*

GOVERNMENT debt.

In the various discussions with regard to the late Shah's debt to the Banque d'Escompte, Sir G. Barclay refrained from mentioning our claim because it has already been passed as a Government liability, but at the last discussion he considered it advisable to introduce the subject in case of subsequent prejudice. He is writing to the Foreign Office on the subject of my letter to you, dated the 14th August, regarding which I wired you on the 23rd instant not to take any action until further advice. His letter, I believe, leaves to-day.

Inclosure 5 in No. 587.

*Draft Telegram from Imperial Bank of Persia, London, to Imperial Bank of Persia, Tehran.*

REFERRING to your letter of the 14th August, we have been to Foreign Office and represented to them that the bank's full claim must be put forward, otherwise would seriously prejudice bank's position in any future settlement. We draw your attention to Blue Book, particularly pp. 38-40 and 54. We are convinced Foreign Office will make strong efforts to obtain prompt fulfilment of Bushire customs arrangements.

[33881]

No. 588.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 9.)*

(No. 720.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Tehran, September 9, 1909.*

INDIAN oil guard. Please see my telegram No. 653 of the 5th August.

Major Trevor has pointed out that the oil company may object to paying the guard should they remain much longer at Ahwaz.

He proposes that at least four of these men might be retained to form the Mohammerah consular escort.

Four men would, in my opinion, amply suffice to facilitate Mr. Wilson's survey work in the Kerkha district, and afterwards to constitute a regular consular guard.

Sheikh Khayzal has no objection to the retention of a consular guard.

[33895]

No. 589.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 9.)*

(No. 721.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Gulahek, September 9, 1909.*

HIS Majesty's acting consul-general at Bushire telegraphs on the subject of Turkish interests at Bunder Abbas and Lingah (please see your telegram No. 457 of the 7th September), that these could be entrusted to His Majesty's consul at the former place, and that the consular agent at the latter, who is one of the most influential men there, could also well be charged with them.

I concur in Captain Trevor's opinion.

No. 590.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 9.)*

(No. 722.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Gulahek, September 9, 1909.*

THIS afternoon at 4 o'clock the ex-Shah left the Russian Legation for Enzeli with his suite.

120 Persian Cossacks under a Russian officer escort him as far as Kazvin, where they will be relieved by Russian troops.

The party will be accompanied to Enzeli by a member of the staff of either legation and three sowars and three Cossacks from the British and Russian Legations respectively.

[33881]

No. 591.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.*

(No. 458.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Foreign Office, September 9, 1909.*

OIL guard.

MY telegram No. 432 of the 23rd August gave you authority (as required in your telegram No. 720 of to-day) to instruct His Majesty's consul-general at Bushire to send away the guard and to retain four of them to help Wilson. You are again authorised to do this, but I must know exact cost of retention before I lay matter before Treasury (see my telegram referred to above).

We must also have Treasury sanction to divide with Government of India cost of consular escort for Mohammerah, and, before asking for this sanction, I must be in a position to show that the consular escort is necessary.

[33855]

No. 592.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.*

(No. 459.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Foreign Office, September 9, 1909.*

CLAIMS of Imperial Bank of Persia.

See, in "Blue Book No. 1 (Persia), 1909," Sir C. Spring-Rice's despatches Nos. 32 and 45 of the 12th July and 13th September, 1907.

Bank hope that those claims, which Persian Government took over, will not be omitted when the moment arrives. They are anxious about payment of their claims. I have informed bank that we have no reason to suppose from anything we have received from you that you favour omission of these claims.

[33573]

No. 593.

*Sir Edward Grey to Mr. O'Beirne.*

(No. 247.)

Sir,

*Foreign Office, September 9, 1909.*

WITH reference to your telegrams No. 433 of the 2nd and No. 434 of the 3rd instant relative to the attitude of the Russian towards the Persian Government, with special reference to the situation created at Tabreez by the simultaneous presence there of the new governor-general and the Russian general and troops, I have to inform you that I read to the Russian Ambassador on the 6th instant the first and the first sentence of the second paragraph (as far as the word "Russians") of the telegram addressed to His Majesty's Minister at Tehran by the British acting consul-general at Tabreez, reporting on the actions of the Mukhber-es-Sultaneh, and his alleged hostile attitude to the Russians since his arrival at his post.

Mr. Smart's telegram referred to was repeated to this office in Sir G. Barclay's telegram No. 717 of the 6th instant, which was also sent to you.

I am, &amp;c.

E. GREY.



[32422]

No. 594.

*Foreign Office to Treasury.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, September 9, 1909.*

I AM directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to approach you on the subject of the extension of telegraphic communication in the Persian Gulf.

In the report of the sub-committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence appointed to consider questions relating to the Gulf, which is dated the 26th January last, the following passages occur:—

"A scheme for establishing wireless telegraphy stations in the Gulf is now under the consideration of the Government of India in connection with a general scheme for establishing, for strategical purposes, such stations on the coast of India. . . .

"A proposal to fit the three subsidised vessels in the Gulf with wireless telegraphy is under consideration by the India Office, Admiralty, and Foreign Office."

In a letter addressed to this department on the 5th August, 1908, the India Office gave details of this scheme, but, in spite of the strong support lent to it by the Government of India, it was not at that time taken into practical consideration for financial reasons.

In a further letter, dated the 28th October, 1908, the particular question of the installation of wireless telegraphic apparatus on board the three subsidised vessels employed in the suppression of the arms traffic in the Gulf was discussed. This proposal, which emanated originally from the officer commanding His Majesty's ship "Sphinx," was warmly approved by His Majesty's consul-general at Bushire.

On the 20th February the India Office addressed to this department a further letter, from which it appeared that the cost of the scheme, as calculated by Mr. Akers of the Colonial Office, would be much below the estimate previously furnished.

Sir E. Grey, on the 23rd March, caused a letter to be addressed to the India Office in reply to this communication expressing the belief, founded on his experience in the case of the Zanzibar and Pemba cable, that the figures furnished by Mr. Akers were likely to be accurate.

On the 18th August the India Office forwarded to this department copy of a telegram from the Government of India relative to the reported intention of Messrs. Wöckhaus and Co. to establish communication by wireless telegraphy between Bahrein and Bushire, to which, on the 24th August, he caused a reply to be sent in the form of an enquiry as to whether any further steps had been taken to carry out the Indian scheme.

On the 26th August the India Office addressed a further letter to this department, drawing attention to the telegram above referred to and expressing Viscount Morley's opinion that, if a British system of wireless telegraphy was to be installed in the Gulf, this should be done as soon as possible at the joint expense of the Imperial and Indian Exchequers.

I am to state that Sir E. Grey entirely concurs in the view expressed in this letter, and is of opinion that the rapid execution of the contemplated scheme is of great importance to Imperial interests from a commercial as well as a political point of view, and also to ensure greater efficiency in the measures taken for the suppression of the arms traffic in the Gulf.

The question has, moreover, acquired greater urgency than ever in view of the reported intention to establish a similar system under German auspices, to forestall which is a matter of the first necessity.

I am accordingly to express the hope that the Lords Commissioners of His Majesty's Treasury will give their early and favourable consideration to the question of dividing the expenses involved in the execution of the scheme in the manner proposed, and I am to state that a further communication will be addressed to you on the subject as soon as a definite estimate of these is received.

Copies of the correspondence referred to in this letter are enclosed herewith.\*

I am, &amp;c.

LOUIS MALLET.

\* India Office, August 5 and October 28, 1908, and February 20, 1909; to ditto, March 23; India Office, August 18; to ditto, August 24; India Office, August 26, 1909.

[32633]

No. 595.

*Foreign Office to India Office.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, September 9, 1909.*

I AM directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to transmit to you herewith copy of a despatch to His Majesty's consul-general at Bushire,\* relative to the advisability of discontinuing the privileges now allowed to the Anglo-Persian Oil Company (Limited) in connection with the exchange of telegrams between their central office and their representatives in Arabistan.

Sir E. Grey agrees with Major Cox in considering that there is much to be said for the view expressed on the subject by Lieutenant Wilson, but before taking any definite steps in the matter he would be glad to be favoured with any observations which Viscount Morley may have to offer as to the course to be adopted in dealing with the question.

I am, &amp;c.

LOUIS MALLET.

[32422]

No. 596.

*Foreign Office to India Office.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, September 9, 1909.*

I AM directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 26th ultimo, relative to the proposed establishment, under British auspices, of a system of wireless telegraphy in the Persian Gulf.

I am to inform you, in reply, that Sir E. Grey entirely concurs in the views expressed by Viscount Morley on the subject, and in the terms of the telegram which his Lordship proposes to address to the Government of India with regard to it.

I am further to transmit to you herewith copy of a letter which Sir E. Grey has caused to be addressed to the Treasury,† inviting the favourable consideration of the Lords Commissioners of the proposal to divide the expenses involved in the execution of the scheme between the Imperial and Indian Exchequers pending the receipt of a definite estimate.

I am, &amp;c.

LOUIS MALLET.

[33286]

No. 597.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.*

(No. 135.)

Sir,

*Foreign Office, September 10, 1909.*

WITH reference to your despatches No. 89 of the 28th April and No. 148 of the 29th July, relative to the attitude of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company towards the Bakhtiari khans as regards the allotment to the latter of shares in companies formed for the exploitation of the oil deposits in their country, I have to inform you that, on the 26th ultimo, on the receipt of the later despatch referred to, I caused a letter to be addressed to the company stating that some doubt appeared to exist as to their intentions on this point, and asking for an authoritative statement of the exact position of the Khans in this respect.

I transmit to you herewith copy of the reply which has now been received from the company,‡ from which it appears that the khans are entitled to receive, "after the oil is passed through the pipes," free of cost, 3 per cent. of the fully-paid shares in both the First Exploitation and Bakhtiari Oil Companies (Limited).

The explanation thus furnished appears to me, so far as I am able to judge, to be satisfactory, and the suspicions entertained by Messrs. Lorimer, Wilson, and Ranking

\* No. 526.

† No. 594.

‡ No. 568.



as to the honesty of the company's intentions towards the khans to be founded on a misapprehension caused by a lack of clearness in the statements of the company's representatives on the spot.

I am, &c.  
E. GREY.

[34083]

No. 598.

*India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received September 11.)*

Sir,

*India Office, September 9, 1909.*

WITH reference to previous correspondence as to the unsatisfactory conduct last year of the consular guard at Ispahan, I am directed by the Secretary of State in Council to enclose copy of a letter from the Government of India reporting that they are treating as expenditure in connection with Persian consulates, to be equally defrayed by British and Indian revenues, the salary and travelling allowances of Lieutenant Ranking during the period of his deputation from the 30th December, 1908, to the 31st March, 1909, to give evidence at the court-martial proceedings that were instituted as the result of the incidents at Ispahan.

Subject to the concurrence of Secretary Sir E. Grey, Viscount Morley proposes to approve the proceedings of the Government of India, the effect of which will be to relieve the Anglo-Persian Oil Company of a charge of approximately 718 rupees a-month (574l. 8s. a-year) in respect of Lieutenant Ranking's salary from the 18th January last, when the syndicate became chargeable with the cost of the oil guard, till the 31st March last, and to impose a corresponding charge on British and Indian revenues, together with a charge for Lieutenant Ranking's travelling allowance while on deputation to India, the amount of which has so far not been reported.

I am, &c.

COLIN G. CAMPBELL.

Inclosure in No. 598.

*Government of India to Viscount Morley.*

My Lord,

*Simla, July 29, 1909.*

WITH reference to our telegram dated the 31st December, 1908, we have the honour to report, for the information of His Majesty's Government, that before Lieutenant Ranking proceeded to Ahwaz to take over the duties of consul from Captain Lorimer, he was deputed to India, at the instance of the military authorities, to give evidence at the court-martial proceedings instituted against the late consular escort at Ispahan for the insubordination which was referred to in your Lordship's military despatch dated the 11th December, 1908.

2. As this duty was unconnected with that of the Indian guard attached to the Oil Concessions Syndicate, we are of opinion that no part of the cost of Lieutenant Ranking's deputation, which lasted from the 30th December, 1908, to the 31st March, 1909, can in fairness be recovered from the syndicate. We have accordingly directed that his salary and travelling allowance for this period should be charged to civil estimates, and treated as expenditure connected with the Persian consulates.

3. We trust that our proceedings will meet with your approval, and that His Majesty's Government will agree to bear a moiety of the charges involved.

We have, &c.

MINTO.  
KITCHENER.  
H. ADAMSON.  
J. O. MILLER.  
W. L. HARVEY.  
G. F. WILSON.  
S. P. SINHA.

[34695]

No. 599.

*Anjuman Eyaleti to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 11.)*

(Télégraphique.)

*Tabriz, le 11 septembre, 1909.*

MALGRÉ assurance Légation russe auprès Cabinet persan et Puissances ainsi garantie, consuls russe anglais devant Endjoman eyaleti, force militaire russe, au lieu refréner ses agressions, augmente toujours son intervention illégitime après maint excès commis par troupes russes pendant absence gouverneur; prétextant sécurité publique, ils continuent en sa présence leur manière agir; récemment ils expédièrent détachement Cosaques soldats avec deux canons, insu gouverneur à Caradja Dag, pour restituer leurs revendications auprès Rahim Khan, lui enlevèrent somme considérable comme indemnité leurs réclamations; ils attaquèrent maison Ali Khan à Caradja Dag, saccagèrent, tuèrent sa fille. Consul russe à Kazvin intervient directement affaires indigènes. Ce qui survit aux cruautés ex-Schah devient leur proie. Désespoir suprême, perissons sous tyrannie. Si vos peines, sacrifices sont pour genre humain, ne sommes-nous pas corps et âmes à famille humaine? Présence troupes russes cause anarchie continuelle. Au nom humanité sollicitons assistance, délivrance.—ENDJOMAN EYALETI.

[34038]

No. 600.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 11.)*

(No. 724.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Gulahek, September 11, 1909.*

SHAHRUD telegraph line.

Please see your telegram No. 1219 of the 21st August to Mr. O'Beirne.

Seeing that the Russian Government are in agreement with us, could we not immediately set to work on the erection of this line? Mr. Barker would, however, require Kirk's authorisation for this.

I have mentioned this project to M. Sabline, but his Government have not consulted him on the matter.

[34116]

No. 601.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 11.)*

(No. 725.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Gulahek, September 11, 1909.*

MONDAY, the 13th September, has been announced by the Persian Government as the birthday of Sultan Ahmed Shah.

The King may wish to send his felicitations to the Shah on this occasion.

[34121]

No. 602.

*Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 11.)*

(No. 440.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*St. Petersburg, September 11, 1909.*

PLEASE see your telegram No. 1219 of the 21st August and telegram No. 724 from His Majesty's Minister at Tehran dated to-day.

Tehran-Shahrud telegraph line.

There is no objection whatever on the part of the Russian Government to the erection of the second wire. There is therefore no reason why work on it should not be begun immediately.



[34038]

No. 603.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir A. Nicolson.*

(No. 1307.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

*Foreign Office, September 11, 1909.*

SIR G. BARCLAY'S telegram No. 724 [of 11th September: Persian telegraphs: Duplication of Tehran-Shahrud line].

Have Russian Government any objection?

(Repeated to Tehran, No. 460.)

[33895]

No. 604.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.*

(No. 461.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

*Foreign Office, September 11, 1909.*

YOUR telegram No. 721 [of 9th September: Bunder Abbas].

Please give instructions accordingly.

[33895]

No. 605.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.*

(No. 666.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Foreign Office, September 11, 1909.*

IN reply to your telegram No. 315 of the 7th September, you may inform Porte that, pending appointment of a vice-consul, which will, we hope, not be delayed, His Majesty's consular agent at Linga and His Majesty's consul at Bunder Abbas will be authorised to take charge of Turkish interests there.

[33606]

No. 606.

*Sir Edward Grey to Mr. O'Beirne.*

(No. 250. Confidential.)

Sir,

*Foreign Office, September 11, 1909.*

I HAVE received your despatch No. 482, Confidential, of the 30th ultimo reporting conversations which you have had with the Acting Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs and the newly appointed Russian Minister at Tehran on the subject of the proposed Anglo-Russian advance to the Persian Government.

With reference to the views expressed on this question by M. Poklewski, I have to observe that His Majesty's Government have no desire to make a large loan to Persia, but have, on the contrary, always held the opinion that the resources of that country, if properly developed, should suffice to supply its financial needs.

All that His Majesty's Government have in view in the nature of a loan is a small advance to enable the reformed Persian Government safely to tide over a period of transition, to improve the security of the roads, and to anticipate a possible application to a third Power.

I am, &amp;c.

E. GREY.

[33681]

No. 607.

*Foreign Office to India Office.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, September 11, 1909.*

WITH reference to your letter of the 18th ultimo relative to the desire of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company to undertake a topographical survey of the oil-producing regions of Persia, I am directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to inform you that he caused the company to be informed of Viscount Morley's views on the subject.

I am to transmit to you herewith copy of a letter from the company,\* expressing

\* No. 578.

their desire to avail themselves of his Lordship's offer to obtain from the Government of India, on their behalf, the loan of the services of an officer for the purposes of the survey, on the understanding that the whole of the expense incurred in connection with these proceedings should be defrayed by the company.

I am to observe that the company ask at the same time that certain explanations may be conveyed to the Government of India in connection with their request, and to express the hope that Lord Morley will see no objection to compliance with their wishes in this respect.

I am, &amp;c.

LOUIS MALLET.

[33680]

No. 608.

*Foreign Office to Anglo-Persian Oil Company.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, September 11, 1909.*

I AM directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 7th instant relative to the tenancy of the post of Persian Imperial Commissioner for the oil concession.

I am to inform you, in reply, that, in view of the information communicated to you in my letter of the 30th ultimo, Sir E. Grey concurs in the opinion expressed by you, that the answer of the Persian Legation, dated the 4th instant, to your enquiry of the 1st, constitutes, in spite of the vagueness of its terms, sufficient authority to justify the payment to the Sadegh-es-Sultaneh of the commissioner's salary for August pending the receipt of more formal declaration from the Persian Government through His Majesty's Legation at Tehran.

I am, &amp;c.

LOUIS MALLET

[34117]

No. 609.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 12.)*

(No. 726.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Gulahek, September 12, 1909.*

I HAVE received the following telegram, No. 188 of the 11th September, from His Majesty's acting consul-general at Tabreez:—

"Sattar Khan, charged with a mission to Ardebil, has now left Tabreez. Before his departure he endeavoured, by means of a paid demonstration, to prevent the governor-general from enforcing his despatch. The governor, however, did not give way, and must be credited with a marked success."

[34116]

No. 610.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.*

(No. 462.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Foreign Office, September 12, 1909.*

CONSULT your colleagues as to what steps their Governments are taking with regard to the Shah's birthday, and act similarly.

[34173]

No. 611.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 13.)*

(No. 162.)

Sir,

*Gulahek, August 24, 1909.*

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your despatch No. 110 of the 24th ultimo.

My Russian colleague informs me that his Government maintain no guards on the Julfa-Tabreez and Resht-Tehran roads, but I need hardly point out that the condition of these roads is very different from that of those in the south. So far as my



experience goes, the Resht-Tehran road has always been perfectly safe, and in normal times the same may be said of the road from Julfa to Tabreez.

I had hoped before this to have the advantage of discussing with His Majesty's consul-general at Bushire the question of the better protection of trade on the southern roads, but Major Cox who had intended to pass through Tehran in July on his way home has been obliged to postpone his leave until now, and as he desires to be in England as soon as possible, I have concurred in his proposal that he should proceed direct to England, and that he should defer his visit to Tehran until his return journey in November. You will thus have an opportunity of seeing him before I shall, and as you may wish to discuss with him the proposal mentioned in my despatch No. 122, I transmit papers regarding it.

Since my despatch above mentioned, I have again talked over this scheme with Mr. Barker, who, while quite ready to co-operate, thinks it would be unwise for his department, which has hitherto adopted a non-militant attitude, to play the militant part it is proposed by Mr. Bill to allot to it, and is very doubtful if such a proposal will meet with the approval of the head of his department. Apart from the question of the cost, which, of course, need not necessarily fall on the department, but could be met by funds specially set aside for the purpose, there must always remain the serious objection that the police work would provoke the hostility of the tribesmen with whom it is obviously to the department's interest to keep on good terms. In case, however, the Indo-European Telegraph Department should look with favour on the proposal, I have requested Mr. Bill, as suggested by him, to sketch the details of a scheme in consultation with the telegraph assistant superintendent at Shiraz.

Not having had the advantage of considering the matter with the assistance of Major Cox, I feel some diffidence in expressing an opinion, but I am inclined to think that, failing the organisation of a force of road guards under British officers which would certainly be the most effective plan, the best—as it certainly would be the most expeditious—remedy for the present situation would be to interest the tribes in the maintenance of order. Subsidies to the tribal chiefs and payment of the tribesmen employed, provided regularity of payment were ensured, would, I think, have most beneficial results. The experience of the Bakhtiari road, which on account of its relative security is now absorbing much of the traffic of the Bushire-Ispahan road, is all in favour of such a scheme. I take it the Persian Government could designate without difficulty the various tribes which could best be entrusted with the work. Regularity of payment is, of course, a condition precedent of efficiency, and this could be best secured by entrusting the work of paying the chiefs and the tribesmen employed to the officers of the Indo-European Telegraph Department, who being stationed along the roads most in need of guards are conveniently placed for the work. Even if the objections of the Russian Government could be overcome to the introduction of British military officers for the organisation of a force of road guards—and it must be remembered that the road most in need of improvement, i.e., the Bushire-Ispahan route, lies entirely in the neutral zone—I presume that we should have some difficulty in persuading the Persian Government to consent to it. On the other, the utilisation for the purpose indicated of British telegraph officers who are already in the country, and who from the nature of their service and from their distribution throughout the country are peculiarly suited for dealing with the tribes could hardly be open to objection from either country.

Of the methods suggested by Mr. Bill of raising the funds for defraying the cost of the maintenance of order, a surcharge on the customs would, if it be negotiated, clearly be the easier, but should there be insuperable objections to this course, we might insist on the assignment of the receipts of one of the southern ports for the purpose. Without some fund specially allocated the necessary regularity of payment could not be assured, but even were this done it would be some time before it could produce funds for inaugurating any scheme, and whatever plan His Majesty's Government decide to urge upon the Persian Government, it would probably be desirable to make the cost of starting its working a first charge on any loan to be made to the Persian Government.

I have, &c.  
G. BARCLAY.

Inclosure 1 in No. 611.

*Consul-General Grahame to Sir G. Barclay.*

(No. 23.)

Sir,

*Ispahan, March 10, 1909.*

I HAVE the honour to submit for your consideration a copy of a letter addressed under date of the 17th October, 1908, by Messrs. H. C. Dixon, of Manchester, to their representative in Ispahan, Mr. Kay, by whom it was brought to my attention a few days ago.

Messrs. Dixon suggest that patrols—preferably of telegraph gholams—might with advantage be employed to go up and down the Bushire road, not so much with a view to themselves arresting robbers as of giving notice by means of field telephones of the presence and number of robbers, thus facilitating the dispatch of soldiers.

In my conversation with Mr. Kay I pointed out the many and obvious difficulties attaching to the execution of any project of the nature of that suggested by Messrs. Dixon. I also mentioned that some time ago I made proposals for certain measures to be taken by His Majesty's Government for the better security of the Bushire road, but that these have been unfavourably viewed both by His Majesty's Minister (Sir C. Spring-Rice) and by the Foreign Office.

I undertook, however, to bring Messrs. Dixon's suggestions under your consideration.

It may not be out of place here to mention that I have noted in the course of the last few years an increasing feeling among British mercantile men in Persia that the steps hitherto taken with regard to the robberies of British merchandise on the Bushire road have ceased to be adequate, and that the increasing frequency of these and the inability or unwillingness of the Persian Government to bring the culprits to justice would, in their opinion, make it desirable that His Majesty's Government should consider what other measures it might be prepared to take in the interests of British trade in Persia.

I am now addressing a copy of this despatch and inclosure to His Majesty's consul at Shiraz.

I have, &c.  
G. GRAHAME.

Inclosure 2 in No. 611.

*Acting Consul Bill to Sir G. Barclay.*

(No. 18.)

Sir,

*Shiraz, April 21, 1909.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 23, dated the 10th March, 1909, from His Majesty's consul-general at Ispahan to your address, a copy of which was forwarded to me, I have the honour to offer for your consideration the following observations on this subject, with a suggestion towards a remedy.

I must, in the first place, emphatically endorse the statement made by Mr. Grahame in the letter above quoted, in relation to the increasing feeling among British firms that the steps taken with regard to the robbery of British goods on the Bushire road have ceased to be adequate, and that it has consequently become desirable that His Majesty's Government should consider what other steps it might be prepared to take in the interests of British trade in Persia. In this connection, I have the honour to forward for your information a copy of my reply to Mr. Grahame, and to invite a reference to my despatch No. 88, dated the 19th December, 1908. It appears to me to be a matter of urgent importance that His Majesty's Government should be fully aware that under present circumstances there appears to be no prospect whatever of any considerable or permanent improvement in the present conditions of transport from Bushire to Ispahan, and that to all appearances a volume of British and British Indian trade, which reached in the year 1907-1908 a total value of 1,200,000*l.*, will continue to be exposed not only to direct depredation, but also to increasingly oppressive charges arising out of the exactions and misconduct of the headmen and roadguards who prey every year more severely on this commerce. A point which might, I think, be emphasised with advantage is that, although no doubt this road has always been exposed in some degree to these evils, the situation in the past year or two has changed in a very important particular.

Formerly outbursts of lawlessness upon this road were the outcome either of local



feuds or of intrigue by some powerful personages designed to discredit someone or other of the local authorities, and such outbursts tended to subside on the removal of the exciting cause. The present state of things is, in my diagnosis at least, widely different: it is simply due to the fact that the individual nomads, and to a less degree the villagers, have realised the almost complete incapacity of the Imperial authority to inflict any punishment for either robberies or illegal exactions; and it is obvious enough that this fact renders the solution of the problem far more difficult, and wholly beyond the capacity of any authority which the Persian Government has it in its power to establish.

In saying this I have not overlooked the possibility that the success of the constitutional movement may induce some of the nomad chiefs to exert themselves to maintain order within their sphere; but a genuine amelioration of the conditions of transport by this means appears to me in the last degree improbable, and in a matter of such vital importance it is incumbent, I think, upon British consular authorities not only to prepare His Majesty's Government for the failure of such attempts, but to lay before them concrete proposals for a remedy. I imagine that a few months now, will be sufficient to demonstrate clearly the truth of the opinion which Mr. Grahame and I have already expressed, namely, that the employment of some form of special force, organised and paid under foreign supervision, is absolutely the only alternative to the perpetuation and aggravation of existing disorders.

With this in view, it may perhaps be held that Messrs. Dixon's suggestion, in itself impracticable, contains the germ of a more effective system. The annual losses of the Indo-European Telegraph Department by wilful damage to the line have increased very considerably in the last few years, and this sum, amounting as I am informed to some 16,000 krans in Fars alone for the year 1908, has to be provided by the Persian Government. It is probable, therefore, that the latter would not look with disfavour upon a scheme which, while in no way interfering with its sovereign rights, would at the same time relieve it from this annually increasing expenditure, and would also satisfy the clamorous demands of Persian merchants for the security of their merchandise. Such a scheme might be begun in a tentative manner by the gradual establishment, as part of the ordinary staff of the telegraph department, of a force of well-armed and well-mounted gholams. Parties of these would be continually on the move between the various telegraph stations, and being provided with portable telephones would be able to summon reinforcements with the least possible delay. Their primary object would, of course, be the protection of the telegraph line, and their mere presence, in sufficient force to resist any ordinary party of marauders, would probably have a very considerable deterrent effect on the robbers. But they might further be empowered to take charge of caravans in a fixed proportion of mules per man of the escort, some due being fixed, half of which would be collected at the point of departure and half at the point of arrival by the European officials of the department.

I have not discussed any such proposals with any members of the department, and it is possible any system of the kind might be considered to lie too far beyond the proper sphere of their activities; but if you should consider the idea worth following up I should be quite prepared, in consultation with the assistant superintendent, Shiraz (of course with the permission of the director), to elaborate the details of such a scheme. It would probably necessitate the employment of one or two additional European officers, at any rate for the first few years, but I fancy it could be made to a large extent, if not entirely, self-supporting, and I believe that no other system would combine in the same degree the efficient protection of the road with a due respect for the internal independence of Persia, to the maintenance of which His Majesty's Government is so firmly pledged. At all events I have felt it my duty to lay the alternatives clearly before you, in the hope that it may be found possible, either by the adoption of some such scheme as that sketched above or by some other means, to give to a branch of British trade, which even under present conditions is far from unimportant, that minimum of ordinary security which alone is required to ensure its prosperous development.

I am forwarding a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's resident at Bushire and consul-general, Ispahan.

I have, &c.  
J. H. BILL.

Inclosure 3 in No. 611.

*Acting Consul Bill to Consul-General Grahame.*

(No. 6.)

Shiraz, March 24, 1909.

Sir,  
I HAVE the honour to acknowledge with thanks receipt of your despatch No. 3, dated the 10th March, 1909, and to enclose in reply a copy of my despatch No. 88, dated the 19th December, 1908, to the address of His Majesty's Legation.

2. From this you will see that I have already been obliged to renew the recommendations made by yourself during your tenure of this post, and I continue of opinion that no other method offers much chance of permanent success. One drawback to Messrs. Dixon's proposal, which has probably occurred to you, would be that the tribesmen already understand the meaning of a field telephone, and even under present conditions do not always respect the persons of the telegraph gholams; and if they once understand that the gholams had standing orders to report their misdeeds the service of the latter would become so dangerous that men would not be found willing to undertake it. Unless, therefore, the proposed system were adopted merely as an unobtrusive method of introducing the regular employment of a force of road guards as already recommended by yourself, I fear it would be neither acceptable to the telegraph department nor effective in the suppression of road robberies. I fear, therefore, that unless the revolutionary movement in Shiraz would have the effect of inducing the nomad chiefs to charge themselves effectively with the protection of the road, there is no alternative to the present disastrous condition of affairs but to press on the adoption of your original proposals.

I have, &c.  
J. H. BILL.

Inclosure 4 in No. 611.

*Memorandum on despatch No. 18 of 1909 from Acting Consul Bill to Sir G. Barclay.*

THE proposal made by His Britannic Majesty's consul at Shiraz, that the Indo-European Telegraph Department shall engage in policing the Bushire-Ispahan road is one in which a good many factors have to be considered.

To begin with, under article 2 of the convention between Great Britain and Persia, dated the 2nd December, 1872, the employés of the department are placed under the special protection of the Persian Government. If, therefore, the department reverses this obligation and takes to protecting, it will go far to abrogate its right to be protected, a right which, however ineffective now, is one which should not be lightly given up.

Another consideration is the financing of the scheme. To be strong enough to protect the travellers on 500 miles of road a very large increment to the existing staff will be required—there are at present some twenty gholams on the section in question; to be in any way effective that number must at the lowest computation be multiplied by ten, commanded by additional European officers. It seems hardly likely that merchants will submit to the imposition of dues which would cover the cost of so large an establishment.

After Nasr-ed-Din Shah's death in 1896 the country from Ispahan to Bushire was as disturbed as it is now, but it settled down to comparative quiet in a short time. The same may occur again, and the services of a special police be no longer required. The department would then find itself with a staff much beyond its necessities, and no dues would be coming in to cover the extra cost. To reduce the staff to normal dimensions would prove difficult, and a considerable sum might have to be disbursed from British and Indian revenues in the way of compensation or in gratuities.

Apart from petty damages, the lines have been allowed to stand through the troubles of the past two or three years. This immunity from serious damage is as much a matter of astonishment to the departmental officers as it is to everyone else, and proves that the country generally has no quarrel with the department. If the departmental attitude changes it is possible such change may operate adversely, and the regard now shown for it may be turned into resentment, and lead to the wholesale destruction of portions of the lines.

Other points to which attention may be drawn are—

(1.) That there will be more risk of injury to employés, European and native, than there is at present is obvious; those exposed to such risks will therefore require extra pay to cover the cost of insurance &c., before they undertake them.



(2.) So large an increase of the personnel will throw much extra work on the direction, consequently additional office establishment will be required to cope with it.

(3.) The department recovers sooner or later the cost of petty damages to the line, therefore the advantage to it claimed in the proposal is not of much account. It is calculated that the scheme would cost at the lowest computation 3,000 tomans a month, viz. :—

	Tomans.
Two Europeans, at (say) 125 tomans .. .. .	250
Horse allowance, at (say) 12 tomans .. .. .	24
Two hundred men, at (say) 6 tomans .. .. .	1,200
Two hundred horse allowances, at (say) 12 tomans .. .. .	1,200
Contingencies .. .. .	326
	<hr/> 3,000

Say, between £6,000 and £7,000 a-year, according to the rate of exchange.

R. C. BARKER.

Inclosure 5 in No. 611.

Acting Consul Bill to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 29.)

Sir,

Shiraz, July 7, 1909.

WITH reference to your despatch No. 122, dated the 15th June, 1909, to the address of His Majesty's Secretary of State, of which I have been favoured with a copy, I venture to offer a few remarks on the position which I understand the director of the telegraph department has taken up on the subject.

In the first place I fully accept Mr. Barker's estimate of the annual extra expenditure, which is very much the same as that which I had myself anticipated. I would, however, observe that the Persian merchants of Shiraz have already agreed to pay Soulet-ed-Dowleh 17,000 tomans per annum (3,400*l.*) for a very unsatisfactory undertaking to police the Firuzabad route from Shiraz to Bushire. It is not, therefore, probable that they would raise any objections to paying, roughly, double the sum for an efficient police system over the entire route from Isfahan. Such a sum, I may add, would amount to a total charge of little over  $\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. on the total average trade of Bushire for the last three years, and a little over 1 per cent. if charged on the imports only. It should also be noted that the cost of the existing gholams and the annual charge for wilful damage should also be deducted from the total estimated cost of the scheme.

2. The proposal is, however, open to one very serious criticism on the administrative side. The idea originally suggested in my despatch No. 18, dated the 21st April, 1909, was that the muleteers should place themselves under the protection of the gholams, and that the dues should be paid either by them or by the consignees of the goods. Even setting aside the difficulty of obtaining cash payments from Persians, this system presents the obvious drawback that the greater the success in the restoration of order the less will be the proportion of its cost recoverable from the trade, because it is obvious enough that the protection of the gholams would only be invoked in the presence of a real and serious danger of robbery; to meet this objection I would suggest that provisionally at least the cost of the scheme should be covered by a single impost to be charged on imports alone at the port of Bushire. It might even with the consent of the Powers interested be levied as a general surtax on the existing customs duty and paid directly by the Customs to the telegraph department. This suggestion would, of course, entail a certain amount of negotiation, but it would at the same time place the system upon a thoroughly sound financial basis while avoiding an enormous number of difficulties in detail.

3. The exemption of export trade, while not perhaps theoretically justifiable, would have the advantage of putting a slight premium on exports, the encouragement of which is so eminently desirable in the interests of trade; but should objections be raised there would be no particular difficulty in realising the charge on arrival at Bushire either at a special barrier or at the custom-house itself.

4. In conclusion, I venture to repeat the principal theses of my former despatch, viz.: (a) the discovery and application of some effective remedy is a matter of very urgent necessity in the interests of the British and Persian Governments equally; (b) no remedy is likely to be efficient which does not include constant and competent

European supervision; and (c) under no other system could such supervision be provided with less disturbance of existing conditions and greater respect for the sovereignty of the Persian Government.

I have, &c.

J. H. BILL.

[34154]

No. 612.

Mr. O'Beirne to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 13.)

(No. 483.)

Sir,

St. Petersburg, September 4, 1909.

I HAVE the honour to report that the "Novoe Vremya" yesterday published a leading article on Persia, which is satisfactory, as showing that this influential paper is for the moment taking a fairly moderate line with regard to Persian affairs.

The writer observes that the Russian and British legations at Tehran have not directly interfered in the civil war, but that they interceded with the ex-Shah on behalf of the nationalists, and that they are now asking the latter to spare the lives of the partisans of the fallen monarch. Their voices have at last been heeded, and an amnesty has been signed and promulgated, so that all persecution of the defenders of Mohamed Ali should now cease; the saving of the lives and property of even the unknown rank and file of those who did not desert their Sovereign in misfortune is, in the paper's opinion, a considerable service rendered by European diplomacy.

The writer goes on to remark that certain other action taken by Russia in North Persia has been more directly effective. The secretary of the Russian consul-general, accompanied by officers of General Snarsky's staff, has visited Karadagh, where he met Rahim Khan, who not long ago laid siege to Tabreez. The result of this step was the liberation of the nationalist prisoners, the return of 180 camels seized by Rahim from Russian subjects, and the payment of £T. 200,000 on account of losses sustained by Russians in the course of the revolution.

Russia, the paper continues, has been reproached and slandered by one of the political parties in Persia; she has been accused of insincerity and dissimulation, and all her actions have been misrepresented. The latest events constitute an answer to all this. At Tehran the Russian Government intervenes on behalf of the persecuted royalists; in Tabreez they induce Rahim to liberate nationalists. Russia therefore takes no sides, but only endeavours to mollify political hatred. Her action therefore is in every respect beneficent.

As regards the dispatch of Russian troops into Persia, the writer is of opinion that Russia has no reason to regret the step, for by that means she helped to re-establish the movement of trade along the caravan routes, put a stop to brigandage within the zone under the influence of the troops, and caused the restoration of property to the rightful owners. The writer, however, regrets that there was so much delay in sending the troops.

I have, &c.

HUGH O'BEIRNE.

[34158]

No. 613.

Mr. O'Beirne to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 13.)

(No. 487.)

Sir,

St. Petersburg, September 6, 1909.

AS I had the honour to report in my despatch No. 482, Confidential, of the 30th ultimo, M. Poklewski expressed the opinion to me on the 26th ultimo that M. Kokovtsoff would be strongly opposed to the Russian Bank taking part in the joint advance of money to the Persian Government, which His Majesty's Government then had in contemplation, and that the Finance Minister would also refuse to join in an eventual Persian loan. M. Sazonoff confirmed this opinion shortly afterwards, informing me that M. Kokovtsoff at a recent Council of Ministers had declared that there must be an end of the system of doles to Persia. The Finance Minister believed, M. Sazonoff said, that the sum of 3,000,000 roubles due by the ex-Shah to the Russian Bank would prove to be a bad debt, and he considered that Russia had lent quite money enough to Persia.

[1665]

4 Z



M. Poklewski's anticipations proved to be quite correct, so far as the joint advance was concerned, for, as I had the honour to report in my telegram No. 428 of the 1st instant, the Finance Minister refused his assent to any advance by the Russian Bank. I had, however, a further conversation with M. Poklewski on the 1st instant, at which he expressed the opinion that this decision might possibly be reconsidered. He said that as the money for the purpose had actually been set aside, Russia would not refuse to advance it merely on the ground of the change in régime at Tehran. On the other hand, she would insist on the same conditions from the Persian Government as would have been required from the late Shah. He also gave me to understand that Russia might not eventually refuse to participate in a regular loan, and proceeded to explain that what he had in contemplation was the issue of a Persian loan jointly guaranteed by the British and Russian Governments.

M. Poklewski had not seen the Finance Minister since our former conversation, and I do not suppose that he had any good grounds for believing that the Minister's opposition to a joint advance, or to participate in an eventual loan, would be less decided than I had been previously led to expect. What M. Poklewski said to me probably represents the views prevailing in the Russian Foreign Office on the subject. It is possible that M. Kokovtsoff could be induced by some pressure to advance to the Persian Government a portion of the sum which has already been provided with that intention, subject of course to strict supervision of its expenditure. He might also, perhaps, be willing to join in an Anglo-Russian guarantee of a Persian loan if he was satisfied that the payment of interest was fully secured by the Persian revenues still available; but he will certainly make the greatest difficulty in future about agreeing to any proposal which would involve the assignment of fresh sums out of the Imperial Treasury for the purpose of giving financial assistance to Persia.

I have, &c  
HUGH O'BEIRNE.

[34159]

No. 614.

*Mr. O'Beirne to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 13.)*

(No. 488.)  
Sir,

*St. Petersburg, September 6, 1909.*

THE attitude taken up by the Tehran committee towards Russia must in any case have aroused a good deal of resentment on the part of the Russian Government, but it has been particularly irritating to them because it seemed to afford a kind of justification for the criticisms directed from certain quarters against Russia's recent policy in Persia. Russians who disapprove of M. Isvolsky's Persian policy—and they are neither few nor without influence—maintained at the time of the popular struggle with Mahommed Ali that the triumph of the nationalists would mean so severe a blow to Russian prestige that Russia should at all costs uphold the authority of the ex-Shah. These critics consider that Russia made a serious mistake when, following the advice of Great Britain, she allowed the revolution in Persia to take its course, and Mahommed Ali to be driven from the throne; and they are very ready to seize on such incidents as the dismissal of Russians hitherto employed in the Persian service, the appointment of governors objectionable to Russia and other manifestations of an anti-Russian spirit as affording proof of the correctness of their view.

The Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs has spoken to me several times during the last few days regarding the refractory attitude of the Committee, and he allowed me to read the telegram from M. Sabline referred to by Sir G. Barclay in his telegram No. 710 of the 1st instant, in which the chargé d'affaires suggested to the Russian Government that they should consider the course which they would take in order to bring the committee to reason. M. Sazonoff himself took the matter with considerable calm. While expressing in a general way his concurrence in M. Sabline's opinion that the Persian authorities must be brought to respect Russia's predominant position in North Persia, he has not given me to understand that he contemplated taking any very drastic steps at Tehran. I informed His Excellency of the language which you had used to the Persian Minister in London with regard to the proposed dismissal of M. Smirnoff, and I have also kept him informed of the different steps taken by Sir G. Barclay to influence the committee to a conciliatory sense; and M. Sazonoff has more than once expressed to me his warm appreciation of the support received from His Majesty's Government and from the British Legation.

As regards the case of M. Smirnoff, the chief anxiety of the Russian Government seems to be to avoid the unfortunate effect on Russian public opinion that would be produced by his summary dismissal, especially if it was accompanied by that of the Russian doctor. If the Persian Government are resolved to dispense eventually with M. Smirnoff's services, the Russian Government would wish him to retain his present position, at any rate nominally, for some little time to come. They would of course prefer that he should ultimately be replaced by another Russian who would not be personally objectionable to the nationalists; but if the Persian Government will not agree to such an arrangement M. Sazonoff would I think acquiesce in the Shah no longer having a Russian tutor charged with his general education, so long as the tutor appointed in his place was a Persian. M. Sazonoff would expect however that a Russian teacher should be engaged as well as teachers of other languages. I understand that M. Poklewski will be given considerable latitude in dealing with this question on his arrival at Tehran.

The Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs spoke to me on the 1st instant regarding the unsatisfactory behaviour of Mukhbir-es-Sultaneh, the newly appointed governor at Tabreez. He stated that Mukhbir had declined to call on the Russian commanding officer and had generally taken up an attitude of protestation against the presence of the Russian troops. While admitting the difficulties of the governor's position M. Sazonoff remarked that his unfriendly behaviour was part and parcel of the whole Persian attitude. I informed His Excellency two days later of the counter-complaint made to you by the Persian Minister regarding the action of the Russian general. M. Sazonoff appeared to think that there were probably faults on both sides. He said that Mukhbir-es-Sultaneh has complained amongst other things of General Snarsky having interfered in the civil administration of the town. He believed that there was some ground for this complaint and had caused instructions to be sent to the general through the military authorities to abstain in the future from issuing orders in matters connected with the civil administration.

M. Poklewski, as I had the honour to report in my despatch No. 482 of the 30th ultimo, spoke to me on the 27th ultimo in terms of extreme irritation regarding the unfriendly attitude taken up by the Tehran committee, and intimated that it would be necessary to take strong measures of some kind to make the Persians understand the real position of affairs. At a subsequent conversation which I had with him on the 4th instant, however, he appeared to take a less pessimistic view of the question. He expressed the opinion that Russia could not well deliver a sort of ultimatum to Persia with regard to her general attitude, but that she ought to make use of the opportunities that would arise, as for instance when the moment came for considering the withdrawal of the Russian troops, or when there was a question of advancing money to the Persians, in order to bring the Persian authorities to make the necessary concessions in the matters as to which Russia must insist. He gave me to understand that the Russian Government set great store by the statement you made to M. Isvolsky at Cowes to the effect that His Majesty's Government would co-operate with Russia in order to prevent changes in Persia which would be to her disadvantage. M. Poklewski remarked that it was of extreme importance to Russia to have received formal assurances on this point, and he evidently considered that they would be of great value to the Russian Government in any further differences that might arise between the Persian Government and themselves.

I have, &c.  
HUGH O'BEIRNE.

[34200]

No. 615.\*

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 13.)*

(No. 60. Consular.)  
Sir,

*Therapia, September 8, 1909*

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith copy of a despatch which reached me yesterday from His Majesty's consul-general at Bagdad, on the subject of a proposal, of which up to the present I have had no knowledge, to transfer the consulate-general at Bagdad from the Indian to the Levant consular service.

Colonel Ramsay's arguments against this proposal seem to me sound in every way, and I have the honour to recommend them to your most favourable consideration. I



deprecate the proposed change altogether, as it appears to me that it would be extremely detrimental to British interests, more especially at this moment, when it is essential that British influence and prestige in those regions should make themselves felt.

I have, &c.

GERARD LOWTHER.

Inclosure 1 in No. 615.

*Lieutenant-Colonel Ramsay to Government of India.*

Sir,

*Bagdad, August 7, 1909.*

IN accordance with the instructions contained in foreign department telegram No. 285 S, I have the honour to submit my views on the proposal to transfer the consulate-general at Bagdad from the Indian to the Levant consular service.

2. In the India Office the Bagdad post appears to have been treated as if it was on all fours with the consular posts in inland Persia, but I venture to suggest that the proposal to withdraw an Indian officer from Bagdad should be considered on its merits, without reference to inland Persian posts. Such of the latter as are held by officers of the Indian service are, to the best of my belief, of comparatively recent creation, they have never been, and have never pretended to be, more than consular posts, and our representatives have probably to deal with no large Indian population except at Meshed.

At Bagdad the reverse is the case. The Bagdad residency has a traditional influence, acquired by more than a century of liberal expenditure. There is no comparison between the style in which it is maintained and the style of the establishments kept up by other Powers. It dates back to the time when the Government of India used to make treaties with the Pasha of Bagdad, when the resident had under his orders a flotilla of gun-boats which used to freely navigate the waters of Mesopotamia, when the resident was in touch with the chief Arab sheikhs of the country. In fact, it may truthfully be said that at one time the resident at Bagdad was the most powerful man in Mesopotamia. I have read in the old records letters from the Pasha of Bagdad asking the resident to assist with his ships at Bussorah and against the Arab tribes, and asking for his advice in international questions. All this has changed with the introduction of the telegraph and better means of communication, the introduction of a more centralised Government into Turkey, and the appointment of consular representatives of other Powers. So much has it changed that Europeans who have not studied the history of the past are apt to forget the past. The Arabs, however, except that they are better armed, are very much what they were 100 years ago, for information and guidance they rely more on tradition than on the telegraph, and the result of this is that they consider the English as the foreign nation. The Turks they despise and hate as a corrupt and inefficient body of robbers and cheats, while they have been taught in the past to trust the word of an Englishman, and to believe in the real power that lies behind him. Their traditions tell them that we are in a different plane from other nations, and when they compare the British establishment with other consulates, they feel convinced that there has been no real change. I will give a few instances to show what I mean:—

Only a few days ago the Nakib of Bagdad, the most influential Sunni Mohammedan in the country, when talking to Sir William Willcocks, pointed to the new residency buildings and said that he and others looked upon our expenditure and establishment here as a sure sign of the interest we have in the country. How would the uneducated sheikhs be likely to interpret visible reductions?

It will be remembered that our steamers were fired on in 1906 and again in 1908. I think no one doubts that the Arabs fired on us because they wanted us to force the Turks to treat them justly. They had no quarrel with us, and they had a feeling that justice would be done to them if we could be dragged into their quarrel. After the second attack I took pains to let it be known that the Arabs were mistaken in supposing that they could force us to be their advocates by such methods, and during the very serious river disturbances of 1909 the British steamers, when they were alone, were only once molested by a few irresponsible Arabs, and the only time that the British steamer was seriously attacked was when she was in company with Turkish steamers carrying large numbers of troops for offensive purposes.

One night, when I was going down the Tigris in the "Comet," we reached the

village of a sheikh who expressed a wish to see me, unfortunately the message was not delivered to me till we had left. I was then informed that he had said, "This is our ship and our beg (officer), how is it that he was not able to see us?"

Going down the Euphrates as the guest of Sir William Willcocks, when we got to the most disturbed part of the river, near Suk-esh-Sheyukh, the Turkish official who was with us begged us to pull down the Turkish flag and hoist the British flag, as he said that we should otherwise certainly be fired at.

When Sir William Willcocks was arranging for the survey of the country between the Tigris and the Euphrates near Bagdad he saw a number of the influential sheikhs of the powerful Delaim tribe. They said that his operations might have very serious consequences for them, and that they could not allow the work to go on unless Sir William gave his promise as an Englishman that the survey should be done by Englishmen, and that no engineering proposals should be made which would be hurtful to the Arabs. The sheikhs said that they would accept no promises made on behalf of the Turkish Government, but they wanted the word of an Englishman, because they knew from experience that they could trust it.

3. The Arabs judge by experience, tradition, and appearances. Whether our reputation among them is worth what it has cost us in the past is not the question that need now be considered, but rather the question whether we should at the present time do anything that may diminish our influence.

There is no Anglo-Russian agreement in force at Bagdad, and the Turks seem to be quite incapable of governing the country.

On the Lower Euphrates they are unable to collect any revenue, even within gunshot of the Naseriyeh Fort. On the greater part of the Lower Tigris they are able to collect very little, and there are annual military expeditions to the east and west to collect revenue. In fact, I think I am only expressing the universal opinion when I say that the Turks do not govern the country and that their position is precarious. Turkish rule in Arabia may, of course, continue for many years, but there is always a possibility that the Arabs will oust it. If Sir William Willcocks' schemes are carried out, external pressure will force the Turks to introduce some semblance of decent government, but the initiative will in that case have to come from foreigners, for the Turks have no men of experience in the art of civilised government.

4. I am therefore strongly of opinion that no change should be made in Bagdad, which might be misunderstood by the sheikhs, until it is definitely known whether this country is going to be really developed or not. If it is not, an occasion may at any time arise when we shall have need of all our influence; if it is developed, Bagdad will be brought into railway communication with the Mediterranean, and it would then lose its isolated position and its importance as an outpost of British interests.

5. I have tried to show above that it would be unwise in the present critical state of Turkish affairs materially to reduce the style and status of the British representative at Bagdad. There would not be any great saving unless the "Comet," the residency surgeon, and the sepoy guard were abolished. The saving on the consul-general's salary would not perhaps be as large as at first appears, for it would surely be considered fair to give a man more for living in Bagdad than for living, say, in Salonica or Beirut, and he would no doubt expect concessions in the way of leave and counting his service for pension.

It may be argued that there would be a great saving in the cost of the office establishment. Here, again, it would be unwise to draw inferences from other posts in Turkey. I do not think that elsewhere the courts can be as dilatory and inefficient as they are here. Cases of the simplest nature are heard day after day, and an immense amount of the dragoman's time is taken up without result. At most places the British subjects are probably Europeans of respectable position, but at Bagdad, including Karbala, there are about 1,800 Indians who are registered as British subjects. These have mostly been born in the country of Arab or Persian mothers, and have become land-holders united by many ties with the people of the country, with the result that there are sometimes two or three cases in the courts on the same day at which the British dragoman has to attend. He often has to attend the court at Kadhmain, which is about 5 miles from Bagdad.

The office establishment might be less well paid, but it would be less efficient, and the saving would not be very great. I have ventured to lay my views before his Excellency the Ambassador in regard for the need for increasing the office establishments maintained by consular officers, and I enclose copies and extracts of some letters



which I have received. These show that the result of an efficient office establishment is appreciated, if the necessity for it is not admitted.

6. The Foreign Office, in addition to urging financial grounds for transferring Bagdad to the consular service, has urged that the consul-general should be under the sole control of the Ambassador at Constantinople, and that Indian political and commercial interests would not suffer by the change. I have certainly considered myself, while at Bagdad, as entirely under his Excellency's orders, and I have seen nothing in the records to show that my predecessors have held a contrary opinion. Consequently it seems to me that the argument that the consul-general should be under the sole control of the Ambassador is sufficiently answered by the statement that he already considers himself so.

I venture to think that an officer with Indian experience can more usefully serve the political and commercial interests of India than can an officer of the consular service.

As regards commercial interests, an officer of the consular service would be at a disadvantage, because he would probably know little about the products of India. He would not know the best sources of information, and he would be able to supply enquirers with little first-hand knowledge. These difficulties might of course be partially met by addressing all communications to the Government of India, and leaving it to that Government to send them on to the person concerned; but the fact would always remain that an officer of the consular service would lack that personal interest in India without which he could no doubt work with honest effort, but not with enthusiasm.

It is the political interests of India which will, I think, suffer most by the withdrawal of an Indian officer. Since the consul at Bussorah has been appointed from the Levant service, the resident at Bagdad is the only officer in Turkish Arabia with any knowledge of India and Indians. There is not only a resident population of about 1,800 Indians, but there are large numbers of pilgrims who pass through on their way to Karbala and Nedjef, and Sir William Willcocks has proposed importing 15,000 Indian labourers. Whether he does or not, if the irrigation of Mesopotamia is undertaken, the Indian population will largely increase by the immigration of traders, artisans, and labourers, many of whom will probably settle down in the country.

This office has a great deal of work connected with India. It distributes the Oudh bequest which amounts to 8,000*l.* a-year; it pays a number of pensioners and Wasikadars; it finances the whole establishment by cheques drawn on the Government of India; it has the control of the post-office; and it is continually being applied to for assistance by Indians. Pilgrims of all classes come here, and often find themselves in difficulties, generally of a pecuniary nature. Some are gentlemen of position, some are or have been servants of Government, some come from the native States, including distant parts of Cashmere, and some are little more than beggars. It requires a good deal of experience of Indians correctly to distinguish the deserving from the undeserving. To some I give money, to others I give loans, and some I decline to help. So far, I have made no bad debts, but I doubt if a consular officer would be equally fortunate. He would not have the experience to enable him to judge between different claimants, and he would not have sufficient knowledge of India to enable him to ascertain the probability of recovering money lent. I think that the help given to Indians in trouble must have a good effect on the Mohammedans of India, and it would not be to our political advantage for the Mohammedan Anjumans to think that the interests of their co-religionists were being less well looked after than in the past.

It is very difficult for uneducated Indians to explain their troubles to a man who understands neither their language nor their country. On one occasion a man came all the way from Jaffa to Bagdad to see me, because he said that he and his companions had been put in gaol and he could get no assistance, so he had come to Bagdad to ask help of the sahib from India. I found that he was a British Indian subject, but he had been refused assistance because, in reply to a question, he had said that he was an Afghan. He was an Afghan by race, but he was a resident of the Kohat district, and some of his companions were also British subjects.

Considering that India, according to the latest information at my disposal, pays 1,400*l.* a-year for the consulate at Bussorah, and will pay half the cost of the Bagdad establishment, it seems fair that at least at one place there should be an officer of the Indian Government.

As resident I do many little services for Indians free of charge, for which I should have to charge consular fees if I did them as consul-general. It is, perhaps, not a very important matter, but little kindnesses are much appreciated by Indians. Here they

feel like strangers in a strange land, and seem delighted to meet a responsible officer who understands their difficulties.

7. Sir William Willcocks and the schemes which he is preparing seem to me to form the chief factors in the problem. If his schemes are not carried out it is difficult to see how the Turkish finances are to be put on a sound basis and a decent Government established; while without these supports the Ottoman Government can scarcely hope to withstand the strain that will be put upon it by internal dissensions over a large area in which the Turks are foreigners neither liked nor respected.

Should the schemes be carried through they will probably attract a large number of Indians, and they will certainly lead to a period of great commercial activity, which will not allow of any reductions in the office establishment. If the schemes are carried out with British capital it seems clear that we shall require some guarantee that the money is properly spent, and that in important matters of local administration our views receive respectful consideration. The financial control might be arranged through a bank perhaps, but the political control could best be exercised by the resident and consul-general. For work of this kind I cannot help thinking that an officer of the Indian Political Department would be best fitted. He is likely to have had experience of advising native chiefs, of directly administering a district, of dealing with Mohammedan tribes, and of judicial work. A consular officer has probably enjoyed few of these advantages, while he would not even have had the advantage of seeing an oriental country well governed. In the matter of advising a vali on practical questions of administration the consular officer would be to the officer of the Indian Political Department as an amateur is to an expert.

8. Further, I think it is against the interest of the Young Turk Government that anything should be done which the Arabs can take as a sign that our interest in this country is diminishing. The employment of Sir William Willcocks and a number of British engineers is taken as an unmistakable sign that the present Turkish Government enjoys our friendly assistance and approval. But for this the survey parties would never have been able to move about freely, as they have done, in the tracts where Turkish authority is no more than nominal. I have confidentially consulted Sir William Willcocks on the proposal to reduce the status of the residency and consulate-general, and he tells me that he would consider any reduction as a most serious impediment to his work. He says that his surveys have only been possible owing to British influence, and the confidence which the Arabs have that we will do nothing to injure them. He has gone so far as to say that if there is any sign of our withdrawing, in outward appearances, from our paramount position in Mesopotamia he will not feel justified in taking the risk of sending survey parties into outlying and disturbed parts of the country. I have personally no doubt that, unsupported by British influence, the Turkish Government would be unable to arrange for the surveys.

9. His Majesty's Ambassador is inclined to favour the construction of a railway from Bagdad to the Mediterranean by British capital or under British control. Such a railway is essential to the development of the country, but perhaps it cannot be constructed without raising questions regarding the railway rights of German and French groups. It seems to me important that we should keep up all external appearances of influence and power until discussion of this subject is closed, for the more we show our determination to keep the position we have earned by a century of sacrifice and expenditure the better terms are we likely to get.

10. I am addressing you in a separate communication regarding certain confidential matters concerning Sir William Willcocks.

11. Put briefly, the arguments which I have ventured to urge are as follows:—

The question of a change at Bagdad should be considered separately from questions connected with inland posts in Persia, because for more than a century Bagdad has been maintained in a style out of all proportion to foreign consulates here. The resident has in the past exercised a unique influence in the country, and in the estimation of the people he still enjoys much of his past power, but he is likely to lose this if reductions are insisted on.

The inland Persian consulates are of recent creation, and have not the same close connection with large Indian interests.

The present is the worst possible moment for making reductions. The Turkish Empire is practically in a state of revolution. It rules an alien population which detests it, and this is especially true of Turkish Arabia. It is in financial straits, and its only means of escape seems to be the development of Mesopotamia. If irrigation works are carried out it will be convenient to have at Bagdad as British representa-



tive an officer who has had some experience of governing in oriental countries. If irrigation is not introduced, the hold of Turkey on the country is precarious. Should the Arabs prove too strong for the Turks we shall need all our influence.

Very little will be saved by changing the Indian officer for a consular officer, unless the "Comet," doctor, and sepoy guard are abolished. The abolition of these would be locally interpreted as an inclination to withdraw from our position. The Turks are not strong enough to get the irrigation surveys completed, and the engineers working under Sir William Willcocks have only been able to go to all parts of the country because they were Englishmen.

If the Arabs think that our interest in the country is waning, Sir William Willcocks will hesitate to send out his parties, and thus for a small saving the early development of this rich country may be jeopardised.

It is to our interest in India that there should be at least one officer of standing in Turkish Arabia who can understand and appreciate the difficulties of the large Indian population, both permanent and floating.

If reduction is desirable, the most suitable time for bringing it into force will be when Bagdad is brought into railway communication with the Mediterranean.

12. I should, perhaps, state in conclusion that my opinions are not biassed by any personal consideration, however unconsciously, for I some months ago asked the Government of India to allow me to leave Bagdad shortly, and since I began the preparation of the letter I have been offered an appointment in India.

I have, &c.

J. RAMSAY, *Lieutenant-Colonel, Political Resident  
in Turkish Arabia, and His Britannic Majesty's  
Consul-General, Bagdad.*

P.S.—I have examined the first 500 entries in my register of letters received in 1908 with the following result:—

Letters from India	..	..	..	..	..	262
Other letters	..	..	..	..	..	226
Letters from Embassy	..	..	..	..	..	12
Total	..	..	..	..	..	500

J. R.

Inclosure 2 in No. 615.

*Sir N. O'Connor to Lieutenant-Colonel Ramsay.*

Sir, *Constantinople, September 4, 1906.*

I HASTEN to express to you my best thanks for your despatch No. 67 of the 6th August, with its very interesting enclosures regarding the probable demand for mechanical pumps in Mesopotamia.

I appreciate your efforts on behalf of British trade, and I am writing to draw the particular attention of the Foreign Office to the opening for British manufacturers which you have brought to the notice of the Board of Trade.

I sincerely trust that you will continue to give the matter your attention, and that the assistance you are rendering to British commerce in Mesopotamia will be attended with satisfactory results.

I am, &c.

N. R. O'CONOR.

Inclosure 3 in No. 615.

*Sir N. O'Connor to Lieutenant-Colonel Ramsay.*

Sir, *Constantinople, January 30, 1907.*

I HAVE received your despatch No. 130 of the 31st ultimo, enclosing copy of your letter to Messrs. Raffael Brothers respecting the market for high-speed looms in Mesopotamia. It is with great pleasure that I have learnt of your action in the matter,

and I am convinced that such enterprise on the part of consular officials and British trade agents is calculated to produce satisfactory results.

I am, &c.

N. R. O'CONOR.

Inclosure 4 in No. 615.

*Sir N. O'Connor to Lieutenant-Colonel Ramsay.*

Sir, *Constantinople, April 16, 1907.*

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your despatch No. 22 of the 19th ultimo, reporting the steps which you have taken to bring to the notice of British firms the requirements of the concessionnaires of the Nedjef Kufa tramway in respect of plant and carriages, and I wish to express my warm approval of the activity which you have displayed in this and other kindred matters.

I am, &c.

N. R. O'CONOR.

Inclosure 5 in No. 615.

*Sir N. O'Connor to British Resident.*

Sir, *Constantinople, March 17, 1908.*

I FORWARDED to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Major Ramsay's despatch No. 115 of the 16th October last, on the subject of the right of British vessels to navigate the Tigris above Bagdad, and I have now received instructions from Sir E. Grey to convey to Major Ramsay the thanks of His Majesty's Government for his interesting report.

Should events or special circumstances suggest or favour an opportunity of navigating the Tigris above Bagdad there is no objection to Major Ramsay taking advantage of it.

I am, &c.

(For the Ambassador),

G. BARCLAY.

Inclosure 6 in No. 615.

*Sir G. Lowther to Lieutenant-Colonel Ramsay.*

Sir, *Therapia, December 12, 1905.*

I FORWARDED to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs copy of your despatch No. 84 of the 22nd August, forwarding a note on consular efforts made to encourage trade in Bagdad during the last two years, and I have now received a despatch from Sir Edward Grey in reply, requesting me to express to you his thanks for your concise and interesting report, and his appreciation of the energy and enterprise which it shows. Copies of your report have been circulated to His Majesty's consular officers in Turkey and Asia Minor.

Sir Edward Grey is considering, in consultation with the Board of Trade, your proposal that in future similar reports should be required from all consular officers for circulation among their colleagues in the country in which they reside.

I am, &c.

GERARD LOWTHER.

Inclosure 7 in No. 615.

*Board of Trade to Foreign Office.*

Sir, *Board of Trade, May 3, 1909.*

I AM directed by the Board of Trade to advert to your letter of the 4th December, transmitting copy of a despatch from His Majesty's Ambassador at [1665]



Constantinople, with notes by His Majesty's consul-general at Bagdad, in regard to the promotion of British trade in his consular district.

With reference thereto, I am to say that the Board fully concur in Sir Gerard Lowther's remarks as to the great credit which is due to Major Ramsay for the pains which he has taken in this matter, and the success which he has achieved.

I am accordingly to suggest that, should Sir E. Grey see no objection, an expression of the Board's appreciation of his work in the interests of British trade, and of the notes transmitted by His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, may be conveyed to Major Ramsay, together with their thanks for the assistance rendered by him to Mr. C. E. Akers in the course of his recent enquiry.

I have, &c.

G. R. ASKWITH.

Inclosure 8 in No. 615.

Director, Commercial Department, Board of Trade, London, to Lieutenant-Colonel Ramsay.

(Semi-official.)

Dear Colonel Ramsay,

Board of Trade, July 9, 1909.

ASSURING you of my most earnest desire to second your strenuous efforts in the direction of helping British trade, I am, &c.

THOMAS WORTHINGTON.

[34386]

No. 616.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received September 13.)

Sir,

India Office, September 11, 1909.

I AM directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 23rd August, 1909, as to the services rendered by certain members of the staff of His Majesty's Legation at Tehran and other gentlemen during the events at Tehran which culminated in the deposition of the late Shah.

In reply I am to say that Lord Morley fully agrees with Secretary Sir E. Grey as to the conduct of these gentlemen, and that he will request the Government of India to convey to Major C. B. Stokes and Major W. F. T. O'Connor, on behalf of His Majesty's Government, an expression of appreciation of their services.

I am further directed to enclose copy of a minute by the director-in-chief of the Indo-European Telegraph Department regarding the conduct of the staff of that department during the same crisis.

Lord Morley would be glad, subject to the concurrence of Secretary Sir E. Grey, to authorise Mr. Kirk to make a communication to the staff on behalf of His Majesty's Government in the terms that he recommends. Lord Morley would also propose to authorise Mr. Kirk to make to Dr. Scott an intimation similar to that which will be made to Major Stokes and Major O'Connor.

I am, &c.

COLIN G. CAMPBELL.

Inclosure in No. 616.

Minute by the Director-in-chief of the Indo-European Telegraph Department, dated August 26, 1909.

ON the 18th July, 1909, the British Minister at Tehran addressed a letter to the director of telegraphs, Mr. Barker, in which he said:—

"Owing to press of business I have not been able before to express my high appreciation of the courage, coolness, and good sense shown by the British community during the very trying conditions of last week. I beg you to be good enough to convey this message to the members of your staff, and to express to them my gratitude for their conduct."

The distance between the telegraph quarters at Tehran and the telegraph office, which is situated in the artillery square, is over a mile. The square was held by the Royalists, and the streets outside by the Nationalists. During the four days, 13th to 16th July, there was heavy firing going on incessantly between the attacking and defending forces. All the telegraph signallers, however, regularly attended at the office when due for duty, and ran the risk of being shot as they walked to and from the office in the firing that went on. The telegraph office could not deliver messages, but the urgent messages from the British and Russian Ministers received from Gulahek for the Sipahdar and Sardar Assad, the Nationalist leaders, were telephoned to the telegraph quarters and delivered from there by the general service clerks, as the Persian messengers were afraid to venture out. A repair to the telephone line to Gulahek was carried out at much risk by a general service clerk, as the head gholam hesitated to expose himself until the clerk accompanied him. In fact, all the staff behaved admirably under very trying conditions.

I feel sure that it would be an encouragement to the telegraph staff at Tehran, and in Persia generally, if the Secretary of State would be pleased to recognise the good conduct of the men at Tehran. I would therefore ask that I may be allowed to notify to the staff at Tehran that the Secretary of State had much appreciated the coolness, courage, and cheerful spirit with which, it had been reported to him, the telegraph staff at Tehran had carried out their duties during the fighting in July last between the Royalist and Nationalist forces.

H. A. KIRK.

[34388]

No. 617.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 13.)

(No. 727.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Gulahek, September 13, 1909.

RUSSIAN troops at Tabreez.

Please see my telegram No. 697 of the 27th August.

I have received the following telegram No. 189 of the 13th September from His Majesty's acting consul-general at Tabreez:—

"I learn from my Russian colleague that yesterday, after conferring with the military authorities, he and General Snarsky telegraphed in identic terms to St. Petersburg, advising that the reduction of troops indicated in my telegram No. 184 (repeated in Tehran telegram above referred to) be at once taken in hand, so that it may be completed by the middle of next month. The general and his staff would thus leave Tabreez with the bulk of the troops.

"On this occasion my Russian colleague appears to be treating the matter more seriously."

[34393]

No. 618.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 13.)

(No. 728.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Gulahek, September 13, 1909.

PERSIAN Government and committee.

An advisory commission of forty members has now replaced the committee, to which the name of "Directoire" had recently been given. The members of the defunct body are included in the new commission.

Henceforward the Cabinet is to be subjected to no external restraint.

It is stated that the cause of this change is that, with Mohammed Ali's departure, normal conditions have been restored.



[34473]

No. 619.

*Treasury to Foreign Office.—(Received September 14.)*

Sir, *Treasury Chambers, September 13, 1909.*  
 WITH reference to Mr. Mallet's letter of the 8th instant, relative to the service of the Anglo-Indian loan to Persia, I am directed by the Lords Commissioners of His Majesty's Treasury to acquaint you, for the information of Secretary Sir Edward Grey, that on the understanding that the customs receipts at Bunder Abbas, Lingah, and Ahwaz are sufficient for the service of the Government loan, they offer no objection to the release of the Mohammerah receipts for the purpose of the Imperial Bank's loan.

My Lords gather from Sir G. Barclay's telegram that no payments on account of the Anglo-Indian loan have been made since that referred to in the letter from the India Office of the 17th February last, namely, a sum of 13,601*l.*, representing interest due on the 4th April, 1907. In these circumstances my Lords would be glad to be informed whether the Secretary of State does not consider that the time has arrived when the Persian Government should be pressed for a further payment.

I am, &amp;c.

G. H. MURRAY.

[34482]

No. 620.

*Messrs. Ellinger and Co. to Foreign Office.—(Received September 14.)*

Sir, *28, Oxford Street, Manchester, September 13, 1909.*  
 REFERRING to your letter of the 31st ultimo, we should be glad to hear if you have any further news from Tehran as to the results of Sir G. Barclay's efforts on the Moin's behalf, and whether the Moin's position as regards his concession is altered in any way since you wrote on the 31st August.

We are, &amp;c.

ELLINGER AND CO.

[34496]

No. 621.

*Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 14.)*

(No. 441.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*St. Petersburg, September 14, 1909.*

ADVANCE to Persia.

Information reached me that an application has been made by the Persian Government to the Russian Bank at Tehran, through the Persian Minister here, for the sum of 200,000*l.* As regards the view taken by the Russian Government, I will enquire and report.

[34506]

No. 622.

*Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 14.)*

(No. 445.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*St. Petersburg, September 14, 1909.*

ADVANCE to the Persian Government.

Please see my telegram No. 444 of this morning.

I was told to-day by M. Sazonow that, in view of the unfriendly attitude adopted by the Persian Government of late towards the Russian Government, latter do not feel at all inclined to authorise any advance. In the request just made to the Russian Government there was no mention of any control; and I have considerable doubts whether permission will be given to the Russian Bank to make any advance of however moderate an amount to the Persian Government. The question might be reconsidered were the attitude of the latter towards Russia to change.

In reply to question of Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs as to how the matter of an advance by the Imperial Bank stood, I said that I would enquire by telegraph.

[34507]

No. 623.

*Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 14.)*

(No. 446.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*St. Petersburg, September 14, 1909.*

PERSIAN telegraphs: Repairs on the line between Meshed and Nasratabad.

The Imperial Ministry for Foreign Affairs have communicated to me an *aide-mémoire*, in which it is stated that telegraphic communication on the above line will be completely interrupted unless the most urgently necessary repairs are taken in hand at once, and the Russian officials have therefore received orders to carry them out. The *aide-mémoire* further states that the instrument now at Birjand is quite inadequate, and that the installation of a new one is indispensable; and in this connection the Ministry renew the assurance given in their *pro-memoriâ* dated the 5th (18th) March of last year (which formed Inclosure No. 1 in my despatch No. 149 of the following day), to the effect that they are ready to hand over the instrument in question to the Indo-European Telegraph Department.

It would appear that no proposals were made by us in reply to the Russian suggestion that we should execute these repairs, and so it seems to me that it would not be easy for us to raise any objection to their being undertaken by the Russian Government.

As regards the general question of the exchange of lines, I said to M. Sazonow that to raise the question with the Persian Government at the present moment was apparently thought inopportune. His Excellency suggested that it might be possible to effect the exchange, and when it was a *fait accompli* the Persian Government could simply be informed of the fact. I replied to M. Sazonow by pointing out the difficulties which lay in the way of any such action.

[33895]

No. 624.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir A. Nicolson.*

(No. 252.)

Sir,

*Foreign Office, September 14, 1909.*

I TRANSMIT to your Excellency herewith copies of telegraphic correspondence exchanged between His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople and Minister at Tehran and myself on the subject of the assumption by His Majesty's consular representatives at Bunder Abbas and Linga of the protection of Ottoman interests at those places.\*

I have to request that your Excellency will inform the Russian Government of the nature of the arrangement now arrived at in settlement of this question.

I am, &amp;c.

E. GREY.

[34580]

No. 625.

*Manchester Chamber of Commerce to Foreign Office.—(Received September 15.)*

Sir,

*Manchester, September 14, 1909.*

I AM desired by the board of this Chamber to ask you to convey their thanks to Sir Edward Grey for the letter received at the Chamber from the Foreign Office, dated the 18th August.

The question of the appointment of road guards for the security of trade, which the Secretary of State regards as encompassed with difficulties, the principal one being that of expense, has again been considered by the board in conjunction with the merchants principally concerned. The enclosed letter, signed by the principal houses in the Persia trade, states their views on this particular point and suggests a method of meeting it which is approved by the board.

The directors think it probable that if the means suggested, viz., a toll or charge for the use of the roads, proportionate to the distance travelled—with the specific object of meeting the expense of guarding—were adopted, it would remove the

\* Nos. 581, 584, 589, 604, and 605.



main objection of the Persian authorities, and might indeed be welcomed by them as indicating a means for restoring, as soon as possible, ordinary peaceful and commercial avocations.

I am to express the hope that this proposal commends itself to the Secretary of State and that he will be able to give it his support.

I am, &c.

WALTER SPEAKMAN, *Secretary.*

Inclosure in No. 625.

*Joint Letter communicated to Manchester Chamber of Commerce.*

Dear Sir,

*Manchester, August 31, 1909.*

WE are greatly obliged by your sending us the copy of the reply to the petition on the state of affairs in mid and southern Persia, and are gratified to learn that this matter is having the serious attention of His Majesty's Government. We note that the chief difficulty in the way of establishing a system of road guards to protect the trade routes is the raising of funds for the payment of these men's wages.

We are well aware, from conversations with His Majesty's consuls in Persia, that it has been very definitely laid down that in no manner whatever or under any name at all are the octroi duties formerly in force in Persia to be re-established. However, we do not think there can be any objection to the establishment of a system of tolls at various stations along the caravan routes on the principle that the goods should pay tolls according to the distance travelled; thus, goods destined for Shiraz, for instance, would pay less than goods destined for Tehran. We feel convinced that an arrangement of this sort would present no insuperable difficulties, and we know as a result of many conversations with native Persian merchants in various parts of Persia that they would gladly pay these tolls if they were guaranteed the safe delivery of their goods at destination.

We are aware of the embarrassment of the Persian Government for funds, referred to in the letter from the Foreign Office dated the 18th instant. Nevertheless, we think it should be understood that tolls should only be levied pending the Persian Government being in a different financial position. We make the suggestion in the hope that it may prove practicable, and if you will be good enough to forward it on to the proper quarters you will greatly oblige, yours faithfully,

PH. ZIEGLER AND CO.

LYON, LORD, AND CO.

H. C. DIXON AND CO.

LIVINGSTONE, ZEYTOON, AND CO. (Limited).

CHAS. I. SASSOON AND CO.

[34624]

No. 626.

*Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 15.)*

(No. 448.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*St. Petersburg, September 15, 1909.*

AT an interview which I had to-day with the Minister of Finance, his Excellency told me that personally he is opposed to any advance being made to the Persian Government, but that he would follow in the footsteps of His Majesty's Government if latter are anxious to make advance. I replied that in the absence of proper control over expenditure I was sure you would not make an advance, and that the Persian Government appear to be unwilling to concede the question of control. The Minister of Finance said that he thought even a control would be exceedingly difficult to exercise, in view of the fact that the situation at Tehran was so obscure and so precarious.

[34473]

No. 627.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.*

(No. 463.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Foreign Office, September 15, 1909.*

I SEE nothing against releasing Mohammerah receipts for service of bank loan, as suggested in your telegram No. 715 of the 4th September, if, as you say, Bunder Abbas, Lingah, and Ahwaz receipts are sufficient for Government loan.

[34506]

No. 628.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir A. Nicolson.*

(No. 1310.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Foreign Office, September 15, 1909.*

ADVANCE to Persian Government by Imperial Bank.

See your telegram No. 445 of yesterday.

No further news has reached us regarding the advance since Sir G. Barclay's telegram No. 719 of the 7th instant, which, together with my reply of the same date (No. 456 to Tehran), was repeated to you, and we do not know whether any decision has been come to by the bank authorities.

[34507]

No. 629.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir A. Nicolson.*

(No. 1311.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Foreign Office, September 15, 1909.*

MESHED-NASRATABAD telegraph line.

I agree with you in view expressed in last paragraph of your telegram No. 446 of yesterday.

As regards execution of necessary repairs mentioned in your telegram, we consented to their being carried out last year (see my telegram No. 64 to Mr. Marling, Tehran, of the 20th March, 1908); I think, therefore, that there is no objection to their execution now. I should like, however, to see text of Russian memorandum before finally assenting. I shall be glad if you will send Russian memorandum by post.

[34121]

No. 630.

*Foreign Office to India Office.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, September 15, 1909.*

WITH reference to your letter of the 19th ultimo relative to the erection of a second wire on the Tehran-Shahrud telegraph line, and to copies of telegraphic correspondence between this Office and His Majesty's representatives at St. Petersburg and Tehran dealing with this subject which have since been forwarded to you, I am directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to transmit to you herewith copy of a telegram from Sir A. Nicolson reporting that the Russian Government have no objection to the proposed arrangement.\*

I am accordingly to state that, so far as Sir E. Grey is aware, no obstacle any longer exists to the work being undertaken immediately.

I am, &c.

F. A. CAMPBELL.



[34633]

No. 631.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 16.)

(No. 164.)

Sir,

Gulahek, August 29, 1909.

I HAVE the honour to forward a list furnished me by the chief manager of the Imperial Bank of Persia of debts with interest up to the 31st December, 1908, contracted with the bank by the ex-Shah, Princes, Ministers of State, and others, which have been taken over by the Persian Government.

I understand that the Imperial Bank is likely to approach you with a view to ascertaining what will be the attitude of His Majesty's Government if the Persian Assembly refuses to recognise certain of these debts, two of which having been in whole or in part taken over by the Government subsequently to the destruction of the Medjliss are quite likely to be disputed by the Assembly. I refer to those marked (A) and (B) in the list, viz., personal debts of the ex-Shah amounting to 186,421 tomans, and debts contracted by Naib-es-Saltaneh, the ex-Shah's uncle, for 131,101 tomans. The former is made up of Mohammad Ali's direct liabilities to the bank during the time he was valiahd in Tabreez, and a promissory note of His Majesty to a Persian, Hajji Bagher Saraf, who had lent money to Mohammad Ali for his journey to Tehran when Muzaffer-ed-Din Shah was dying, and who, subsequently, borrowed from the bank, giving as security Mohammad Ali's promissory note. The debts marked in the enclosed list as contracted by Naib-es-Saltaneh are spread over a number of years, 25,270 tomans were passed as Government debt as early as 1903, and should therefore not be disputed, the rest were only taken in April 1909, and as will be noticed merely by order of the Prime Minister.

It is open to question how far it was fair on the country for the late Government to take over these debts, especially those of Naib-es-Saltaneh, but it seems to me a quite tenable view that we need not concern ourselves with their original character or go behind the fact that they have been taken over by a Government which we recognised.

I do not now ask for instructions, which unless the Assembly disputes these debts will not be needed, but I have wished to place the matter before you so that you may if the question arises be in a position, after your department has discussed the matter with the Imperial Bank of Persia, to instruct me in reply to a telegraphic inquiry.

I should mention in conclusion that the Imperial Bank have not released Hajji Bagher Saref or Naib-es-Saltaneh from their personal obligations to the bank, and that Naib-es-Saltaneh's estate would doubtless easily cover his debt, though the fact that he is a Russian protected person would make recovery from him more difficult than in the case of debts of ordinary Persian subjects.

I have, &amp;c.

G. BARCLAY.

Inclosure 1 in No. 631.

## STATEMENT of Debts taken over by the Persian Government.

Name.	Amount.	Date when passed.	Authority.
	Krans.		
Nasr-es-Saltaneh ..	2,061,593·80	May 6, 1905	Autograph order of Muzaffer-ed-Din Shah and the Prime Minister for 530,000 krans.
Shoa-es-Saltaneh ..	2,100,000·00	April 12, 1905 July 27, 1907	Ditto, for 1,531,593·80 krans. Autograph order of Mohammad Ali Shah, passed by the Minister of Finance, and duly accepted for payment by the Administrator-General of Customs.
Amir Bahadur Jang ..	1,200,000·00	April 2, 1908	Passed by the Minister of Finance and ratified by his successor in office, August 29, 1908, and duly accepted by the Administrator-General of Customs.
Mushir-ed-Dowleh ..	650,000·00	November 24, 1906	Promissory note of Mushir-ed-Dowleh as Prime Minister. The Administrator-General of Customs has paid interest on this debt up to September 20, 1908.
Nizam-ul-Mulk ..	200,000·00	April 21, 1908	Passed by Sani-ed-Dowleh as Minister of Finance.
(A.) Mohammad Ali Shah..	1,542,444·70	December 9, 1908	Autograph order of Mohammad Ali Shah passed by the Prime Minister and Minister of Finance, and duly accepted for payment by the Administrator-General of Customs.
Naib-es-Saltaneh ..	1,311,012·85	March 17, 1903	Order of Prime Minister and M. Naus for 252,702 krans.
(B.) " " ..		April 17, 1909	Order of Prime Minister for 1,058,310·80 krans. Both duly accepted for payment by Administrator of Customs.

## STATEMENT of the Debt of the ex-Shah, March 20, 1909.

	Dr. Krans.	Cr. Krans.
Balance of current account in Tabreez as on September 20, 1908 .. .. .	362,830·85	..
Interest to December 31, 1908 .. .. .	171,026·10	..
Loan account in Tabreez due August 2, 1906 .. .. .	277,156·80	..
Interest on same to December 31, 1908 .. .. .	91,151·05	..
Promissory note in favour of Hajji Bagher due November 17, 1907 .. .. .	800,000·00	..
Interest on same to December 31, 1908 .. .. .	114,222·80	..
Interest on current account and loan account to March 20, 1909 .. .. .	23,757·05	..
Interest on promissory note to March 20, 1909 .. .. .	24,074·50	..
By amount recovered, being interest on current and loan accounts to March 20, 1909 .. .. .	..	285,934·20
By amount recovered, being interest on promissory note to March 20, 1908 .. .. .	..	33,066·65
By amount recovered, being interest on promissory note to September 20, 1908 .. .. .	..	2,773·60
By balance .. .. .	..	1,542,444·70
	1,864,219·15	1,864,219·15

To balance—1,542,444·70 krans.

E. AND O. E.

Tehran, August 23, 1909.

N.B.—The sums credited to this account were taken out of the refunds made in Bushire on account of the Ain-ed-Dowleh's robberies, the action being approved of by M. Mornard. Since then, however, the robbery account has been credited with all refunds made in Bushire, and the credits in the ex-Shah's account now stand to the debit of a Government account, which consequently is overdrawn.



## Inclosure 2 in No. 631.

## List of Principal Debtors of the Imperial Bank of Persia, Tehran, August 12, 1909.

	Krans.	Krans.
Mirza Seyyid Abdulla Mostofi—		
Bill discounted, due September 29, 1907. Guaranteed by Moez-es-Sultaneh .. .. .		30,000·00
Mirza Ali Reza Khan—		
Bill discounted, due September 29, 1906. Guaranteed by Naib-es-Sultaneh .. .. .	20,000·00	
Bill discounted, due February 16, 1907. Guaranteed by Nasr-es-Sultaneh .. .. .	220,000·00	
		240,000·00
Azad-ul-Mulk—		
Bill discounted, due August 17, 1909. Guaranteed by Amjad-ed-Dowleh .. .. .		307,030·00
Behjat-ul-Mulk—		
Bill discounted, due November 2, 1908. Guaranteed by Mirza Mohammad Ali Khan Mostofi .. .. .		21,884·00
Dabir-ul-Mulk—		
Bill discounted, due November 2, 1908. Guaranteed by Mirza Seyyid Abdulla Khan Mostofi .. .. .		10,820·00
Ejlal-ed-Dowleh—		
Bill discounted, due November 20, 1908. Guaranteed by Shoa-es-Sultaneh .. .. .		16,165·00
Hakim-ul-Mulk—		
Bill discounted, due August 25, 1908. Guaranteed by Allam-ed-Dowleh .. .. .		11,550·00
Hessam-ul-Mulk—		
Bill discounted, due July 19, 1906. Guaranteed by Mushir-ed-Dowleh .. .. .		54,162·15
Beshrat Khan Aga—		
Bill discounted, due July 21, 1908 .. .. .		17,000·00
Hajji Hussein Aga Amin-i-Zarb—		
Bill discounted, due August 30, 1908. Guaranteed by Hajji Mirza Ismail Kazvini .. .. .	140,000·00	
Bill discounted, due April 9, 1908. Guaranteed by Seyyid Hashem .. .. .	28,250·00	
Bill discounted, due August 21, 1908. Guaranteed by Customs Administration .. .. .	100,000·00	
Bill discounted, due August 21, 1908. Guaranteed by Customs Administration .. .. .	110,067·35	
Bill discounted, due May 29, 1908. Guaranteed by Aga Mehdi Mohammad Ali Kazvini .. .. .	4,000·00	
Bill discounted, due June 7, 1908. Guaranteed by Aga Mehdi Mohammad Ali Kazvini .. .. .	500·00	
Bill discounted, due July 6, 1908. Guaranteed by Sardar Mofakham .. .. .	395,568·35	
Bill discounted, due August 30, 1908. Guaranteed by Assef-ed-Dowleh .. .. .	320,000·00	
Bill discounted, due September 14, 1908. Guaranteed by Etessam-es-Sultan .. .. .	70,000·00	
Bill discounted, due September 14, 1908. Guaranteed by Shuja-es-Sultaneh .. .. .	180,000·00	
Bill discounted, due September 14, 1908. Guaranteed by Mostofi-ul-Mamalek .. .. .	128,000·00	
Bill discounted, due January 15, 1909. Guaranteed by Hajji Moin-i-Tojar .. .. .	150,000·00	
Loan, due March 14, 1909. Guaranteed by Hajji Moin-i-Tojar .. .. .	267,000·00	
Current deposit account payable on demand .. .. .	1,724,282·35	
		3,617,668·05
His Highness Jellal-de-Dowleh—		
Bill discounted, due February 9, 1908 .. .. .	60,000·00	
Loan, due June 2, 1908 .. .. .	318,700·00	
		378,700·00
Mojelal-ul-Mulk—		
Bill discounted, due October 6, 1907. Guaranteed by Mirza Seyyid Abdulla Khan .. .. .		30,000·00
Mokarrem-ed-Dowleh—		
Bill discounted, due April 27, 1907. Guaranteed by Shoa-es-Sultaneh .. .. .	30,000·00	
Bill discounted, due November 10, 1907. Guaranteed by Hajji Amin-i-Zarb .. .. .	11,900·00	
		41,900·00
Mostofa Khan Sartin—		
Bill discounted, due November 10, 1906. Guaranteed by Naib-es-Sultaneh .. .. .		2,000·00

	Krans.	Krans.
The late Nizam-es-Sultaneh—		
Bill discounted, due October 8, 1908 .. .. .		80,703·00
Zil-es-Sultaneh—		
Bill discounted, due February 25, 1909. Guaranteed by Princess Souroor-ed-Dowleh .. .. .	30,000·00	
Bill discounted, due April 6, 1909 .. .. .	100,000·00	
		130,000·00
Vazir-i-Dufar—		
Bill discounted, due September 11, 1908. Guaranteed by Hajji Amin-i-Zarb .. .. .		1,605·00
Vazir-i-Maksoos (now Sahib Ikhtiar)—		
Bill discounted, due May 26, 1908. Guaranteed by His Highness Jellal-ed-Dowleh and His Excellency Assef-ed-Dowleh .. .. .		200,000·00
Amin-ul-Mulk—		
Loan, due June 4, 1907. Guaranteed by Kazem Hozoor .. .. .		200,000·00
Badi-ul-Mulk—		
Loan, due May 24, 1907. Guaranteed by Princess Banou Osma .. .. .		26,876·40
Hajji Sheikh Fazlullah—		
Loan, due January 16, 1909. Guaranteed by Hajji Mirza Ali Akbar Mujthed .. .. .		22,561·65
Imam Jumah—		
Loan, due September 4, 1908 .. .. .		17,000·00
Hajji Seyyid Mehdi Mujtaheed—		
Loan, May 2, 1909. Guaranteed by Hajji Sheikh Fazlullah .. .. .		1,500·00
Movassagh-ul-Mulk—		
Loan, due April 30, 1909. Guaranteed by Mushir-es-Sultaneh and Hajji Mirza Seyyid Razi .. .. .		41,429·20
Mushir-es-Sultaneh—		
Loan, due October 8, 1908 .. .. .		150,000·00
Sardar Atkham—		
Loan, due October 8, 1908 .. .. .		180,000·00
Mukbar-es-Sultan—		
Loan, due October 7, 1909. Guaranteed by Sani-ed-Dowleh .. .. .		1,600·000
Mirza Ali Asghar Khan (late Ata Bag-i-Azam)—		
Current account balance .. .. .	8,912·30	
Promissory note .. .. .	70,562·50	
Advance made in London, 1,241 <i>l.</i> 1 <i>s.</i> 10 <i>d.</i> , say .. .. .	68,260·05	
		147,734·85
Firman Firma—		
Current account .. .. .		667,270·20
Fathollah Khan Sirdar Mansoor—		
Current account .. .. .		209,869·40
Hajji Bagher Sarraf—		
Current account. Promissory note of ex-Shah .. .. .		872,862·10
Hazrat Olya—		
Current account .. .. .		293,246·30
Arbad Jamsheed Bahman—		
Current account .. .. .		664,037·55
Hajji Aga Mohammad Moin Tojar—		
Current account .. .. .		159,305·15
Sani-ed-Dowleh—		
Current account .. .. .		138,407·00
His Highness Zil-es-Sultan—		
Current account, Tehran .. .. .	84,805·45	
Current account, Isfahan, with interest to June 30, 1909 .. .. .	451,572·40	
		536,377·85

[34731]

No. 632.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received September 16.)

Sir,

India Office, September 15, 1909.

IN reply to your letter dated the 8th September, 1909, I am directed to say that Viscount Morley concurs in the proposal of Secretary Sir Edward Grey to authorise His Majesty's Minister at Tehran by telegraph to comply with the request of the manager of the Imperial Bank of Persia that the assignment should be obtained of the customs receipts of Mohammerah to the service of the bank's own loan.

I am, &amp;c.

COLIN G. CAMPBELL.



[34735]

No. 633.

*India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received September 16.)*

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Viscount Morley, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 13th September, relative to the proposed retention of four sowars for the purposes of Karkha irrigation work.

*India Office, September 16, 1909.*

Inclosure in No. 633.

*Government of India to Viscount Morley.*

(Telegraphic.) P.

*September 13, 1909.*

SEE your telegram dated the 27th ultimo.

Four sowars are recommended as sufficient for work on Karkha, and subsequently as escort for consulate. Telegraphic orders are solicited.

[34719]

No. 634.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 16.)*

(No. 729.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Gulahek, September 16, 1909.*

ADVANCE to Persian Government.

Please see St. Petersburg telegram No. 445 of the 14th September and my No. 719 of the 7th September.

Board of directors of Imperial Bank of Persia have authorised the chief manager to make the advance to the Persian Government on the security of the State jewels. The Government, however, have not again referred to their proposals on this subject. The late committee, I understand, on reconsideration of the question, decided to leave it in suspense pending the meeting of the Assembly, but the Cabinet, now that the committee is abolished, is considering the advisability of undertaking on its own responsibility the proposed transaction.

Zil-es-Sultan, the Government believe, will shortly pay them 100,000 tomans, for which purpose he has applied to the Imperial Bank for an advance.

We have now made further representations in favour of His Imperial Highness, and it appears probable that on payment of this sum, and after handing a promissory note for an additional contribution to the Persian Government, he will be permitted to leave the country.

[34624]

No. 635.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.*

(No. 466.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Foreign Office, September 16, 1909.*

ADVANCE to Persian Government.

Please let me know how far you think Persian Government are prepared to go in allowing proposed joint advance to be subjected to proper control (see Sir A. Nicolson's telegram No. 448 of yesterday).

[34700]

No. 636.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.*

(No. 137.)

Sir,

*Foreign Office, September 16, 1909.*

THE Persian Minister called at this Office on the 13th instant and asked that His Majesty's Government would put pressure on the Imperial Bank of Persia to induce them to make to the Persian Government an advance on current account.

Asked what security it was proposed to offer for the repayment of this advance, he promised to enquire, and added that he understood that the Russian chargé d'affaires at Tehran was now in favour of an advance by the Russian Government.

Mehdi Khan then renewed his complaints as to the action of the Russian troops at Tabreez, where, he said, an attack had been made by them on the house of a prominent resident, whose daughter had been wounded as the result of it. He also asserted that more Russian troops had crossed the frontier and had proceeded to Urumia.

Mehdi Khan was informed that the Persian Government should address their complaints to the Russian Government, and that His Majesty's Government recommended to the Persian Government patience and the assumption of a friendlier attitude towards Russia.

He was further assured that there was every prospect of a large reduction in the numbers of the Russian troops in Persia during the month of October.

I am, &c.

E. GREY.

[34473]

No. 637.

*Foreign Office to Treasury.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, September 16, 1909.*

I AM directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 13th instant, relative to the service of British loans in Persia.

In reply to the inquiry contained in the last paragraph of that communication, I am to state that, in Sir E. Grey's opinion, it would be useless, in view of the present financial condition of Persia, to press the Persian Government for a further payment in respect of the Government loan at present, but that the question must be considered when Persian finances are set in order, or if a further loan to the Persian Government is eventually guaranteed or made.

I am, &c.

LOUIS MALLET.

[34386]

No. 638.

*Foreign Office to India Office.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, September 16, 1909.*

I AM directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 11th instant relative to services rendered by certain gentlemen during the recent disturbances at Tehran.

I am to inform you, in reply, that Sir E. Grey entirely concurs in the suggestion of Viscount Morley to authorise the director-in-chief of the Indo-European Telegraph Department to make, on behalf of His Majesty's Government, a communication to the staff of the department in the terms which he recommends, and to convey to Dr. Scott an intimation similar to that which will be conveyed to Majors Stokes and O'Connor.

I am, &c.

F. A. CAMPBELL.



[34482]

No. 639.

*Foreign Office to Messrs. Ellinger and Co.*

Gentlemen,

*Foreign Office, September 16, 1909.*

I AM directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 13th instant relative to the concessions held by the Moin-ut-Tujjar for the extraction of red oxide on Hormuz Island.

I am to inform you, in reply, that the only information which has reached Sir E. Grey on this subject since the date of Mr. Mallet's letter of the 31st ultimo, to which you refer, is contained in a telegram from His Majesty's Minister at Tehran dated the 1st instant.

In this telegram Sir G. Barclay states that negotiations on the subject of these concessions are suspended for the present.

The nationalist Executive Committee state that the Persian Government are too busy to attend to the matter, and that the question of cancelling the Moin's concession has not yet been considered, which, in Sir G. Barclay's opinion, would appear to indicate that the Moin has come to terms with the committee.

I am, &amp;c.

F. A. CAMPBELL.

[34768]

No. 640.

*Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 17.)*

(No. 498.)

Sir,

*St. Petersburg, September 14, 1909.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 149 of the 19th March, 1908, I have the honour to transmit herewith copy of an *aide-mémoire* which I have received from the Russian Government respecting the Meshed-Nasratabad telegraph line.

I have, &amp;c.

A. NICOLSON.

Inclosure in No. 640.

*Aide-mémoire communicated to Sir A. Nicolson by Russian Government.*

LA section sud de la ligne télégraphique de Méched-Nousretabad n'ayant pas subi des réparations depuis longtemps, elle se trouve actuellement dans un état de délabrement. L'échange des lignes entre la Russie et la Grande-Bretagne n'a pas pu être opéré jusqu'à présent; en conséquence, et afin de parer à ce que le télégraphe cesse complètement de fonctionner, il est indispensable que les réparations les plus urgentes soient faites pour le moment par le service télégraphique russe, et des mesures dans ce but ont été prises par l'administration postale du Caucase. Entre autres, un appareil qui se trouve à Birdjand est tout à fait insuffisant, et les employés de télégraphe réclament l'installation d'un autre appareil à sa place.

Il semblerait nécessaire de satisfaire à cette demande et d'installer l'appareil en question. Afin d'éviter tout malentendu sous ce rapport, le Gouvernement Impérial tient à confirmer qu'ainsi que cela avait été dit dans le *pro-memoria* du Ministère des Affaires Étrangères du 5 mars, 1908, il se déclare prêt à céder l'appareil dont il s'agit à l'administration télégraphique anglaise.

*Saint-Petersbourg, le 1<sup>er</sup> (14) septembre, 1909.*

[34836]

No. 641.

*India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received September 17.)*

Sir,

*India Office, September 16, 1909.*

WITH reference to previous correspondence, ending with the letter of this Office dated the 21st December last, communicating copy of Secret despatch dated the 18th December, 1908, to Government of India as to the appointment of military attaché at

Meshed, I am directed to enclose copy of a letter from the Government of India dated the 12th August, 1909, pointing out that, in addition to the pay of the military attaché, varying from 574l. 8s. to 927l. 4s. a-year, according to rank, there are certain miscellaneous expenses connected with the appointment which should be shared, as in other analogous cases, equally between the British and Indian Governments.

Viscount Morley regrets that this aspect of the matter has not previously been brought to notice in the correspondence, but he trusts that Secretary Sir F. Grey will see fit to represent it to the Lords Commissioners of His Majesty's Treasury and move them to accept as a charge against British revenues a moiety of the total expenditure involved in the appointment.

That expenditure will have approximately amounted to 863l. for the period 21st October, 1908, to the 31st March, 1909, and is likely to amount to 2,372l. during the current financial year.

I am, &amp;c.

COLIN G. CAMPBELL.

Inclosure 1 in No. 641.

*Government of India to Viscount Morley.*

(Secret.)

My Lord,

*Simla, August 12, 1909.*

WE have the honour to refer to our military (Secret) despatch dated the 19th October, 1905, in which we requested sanction to the appointment of a military attaché at Meshed, and to the cost being met equally by His Majesty's and the Indian Governments.

2. In your Lordship's foreign (Secret) telegram of the 28th November, 1908, sanction was accorded to the appointment in question for two years with effect from the 21st October, 1908, it being added that the Treasury agreed to bear half the cost. We observe, however, that in the letter from the Treasury to the Foreign Office, dated the 11th November, 1908, which conveyed authority for the charge to Imperial funds of one-half of the cost involved, the amount in question is stated as "varying, according to the rank of the officer employed, from 574l. 8s. to 927l. 4s. per annum."

We would point out that, in addition to the actual pay of the incumbent, there are certain miscellaneous expenses connected with the appointment which should be shared equally by the Imperial and Indian Governments as in other similar cases—such as our consular establishments in Persia—where arrangements exist in the interests jointly of the Home and Indian Governments.

3. We forward a statement showing approximately the expenditure involved by the appointment for 1908–1909, i.e., from the 21st October, 1908, to the 31st March, 1909, and also the probable expenditure during the current financial year.

We have, &amp;c.

MINTO.

KITCHENER.

H. ADAMSON.

J. O. MILLER.

GUY FLEETWOOD WILSON.

S. P. SINHA.



## Inclosure 2 in No. 641.

(Secret.)

STATEMENT showing the approximate expenditure for 1908-1909 and the probable expenditure involved during the current Financial Year in connection with the appointment of the Military Attaché, Meshed.

Detail.	Monthly rate.	Annual rate.	Estimated expenditure, 1908-1909, from October 21, 1908, to March 31, 1909. = 5½ months, or 162 days.	Estimated expenditure, 1909-1910.	Remarks.
	Rs. a. p.	Rs. a. p.	Rs. a. p.	Rs. a. p.	
Pay as Captain ..	415 6 0	4,984 8 0	2,215 5 0	1,453 13 0	* 3½ months.
Exchange compensation ..	25 15 4	311 8 6	138 7 4	90 13 8	† 3½ ..
Pay as Major ..	640 14 0	7,690 8 0	..	5,447 7 0	† 8½ ..
Exchange compensation ..	40 0 10	480 10 6	..	340 7 1	† 8½ ..
Deputation ..	15 0 0	5,475 0 0	2,430 0 0	5,475 0 0	
Pay of permanent clerk ..	200 0 0 per day	2,550 0 0	1,185 0 0	2,125 0 0	
	plus compensa- tion at ½ of pay				
Pay of officiating incumbent	Ditto	2,550 0 0	..	1,487 8 0	
House-rent (attaché) ..	72 0 0	864 0 0	288 0 0	864 0 0	4 months.
" (clerk) ..	33 12 6	405 6 0	180 2 8	405 6 0	
Ration allowance (clerk) ..	7 8 0	90 0 0	40 0 0	37 8 0	¶ 5 months.
Pay of chaprassi ..	16 0 0	192 0 0	85 5 0	192 0 0	
Secret service ..	..	10,000 0 0	4,444 7 1	10,000 0 0	
Contingent ..	363 0 0	4,356 0 0	1,936 0 0	4,356 0 0	
Travelling expenses (attaché)	..	..	..	3,300 0 0	On relief.
" " (clerk) ..	..	..	..	..	
Total ..	..	..	12,942 11 1	35,574 14 9	

[34843]

No. 642.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 17.)

(No. 730.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Gulahek, September 17, 1909.

JOINT advance to Persian Government.

Your telegram No. 466 of the 16th September.

The Persian Government will, I think, wait until they are reduced to the last extremity before consenting to an adequate control of expenditure, and if Zil-es-Sultan pays the expected 100,000 tomans (question of an advance to His Imperial Highness by the Imperial Bank—see my telegram No. 729 of yesterday—has been referred by the local manager to his board of directors) they will probably be able, with this and whatever they can get from other sources, to eke out a precarious existence until the meeting of the Assembly, which is expected to take place before the middle of next month.

This morning I received a visit from the financial adviser, who enquired on behalf of the Minister of Finance as to my attitude in the event of the Persian Government applying to His Majesty's Legation for financial assistance.

I replied that the matter would have to be referred to His Majesty's Government, who, I was convinced, would only advance money jointly with the Russian Government, and that on the stipulation that the expenditure of any sums so advanced would be submitted to proper control.

To-morrow M. Bizot will make the same enquiry of the Russian chargé d'affaires. I am informing M. Sabline of my reply to these overtures.

The most practical form of supervision in present circumstances would be, M. Bizot thought, similar to that proposed for the intended Russian advance to the late Government (details of which are given in inclosure in my despatch No. 129 of the 18th June). I think that this control would be at least as effective now than when first contemplated. The Minister of Finance at present in office is relatively honest, and on this point differs from the Acting Minister under the late régime.

No. 643.

[34507]

Foreign Office to India Office.

Sir,

Foreign Office, September 17, 1909.

I AM directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to transmit to you herewith, copy of a telegram from His Majesty's Ambassador at St. Petersburg,\* relative to the desire of the Russian Government to undertake certain indispensable repairs on the Meshed-Nasratabad telegraph line.

It will be within Viscount Morley's recollection that a similar question arose last year, and that on the 20th March Sir E. Grey addressed a telegram to His Majesty's chargé d'affaires at Tehran, with his Lordship's concurrence, stating that His Majesty's Government had no objection to necessary repairs being undertaken.

Sir E. Grey is disposed, if Lord Morley agrees, to return a similar reply to the present request of the Russian Government, should the terms of the memorandum in which it is made appear satisfactory to His Majesty's Government.

I am to transmit copy of a telegram which Sir E. Grey has addressed to Sir A. Nicolson,† instructing his Excellency to forward that document by post, and I am to add that, as soon as it is received, a copy of it will be submitted for Lord Morley's consideration.

I am, &amp;c.

F. A. CAMPBELL.

[34885]

No. 644.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received September 18.)

Sir,

India Office, September 16, 1909.

WITH reference to correspondence of last year ending with the letter of this office,‡ dated the 19th October, 1908, I am directed to enclose copy of a telegram from the Government of India, dated the 7th September, 1909, suggesting that Mr. New should again be given while on tour an escort of thirty men from the Mekran Levy Corps.

Viscount Morley would propose, subject to the concurrence of Secretary Sir E. Grey, to approve the proposal of the Government of India, and would suggest that it might, as before, be left to the discretion of His Majesty's Minister at Tehran whether to notify the matter to the Persian Government.

I have, &amp;c.

COLIN G. CAMPBELL.

Inclosure in No. 644.

Government of India to Viscount Morley.

(Telegraphic.) P.

September 7, 1909.

REFERENCE is invited to your telegram of the 16th October, 1908, as to arms traffic. It is again recommended by director, Persian Gulf Telegraphs, that Mr. New, while on tour, should be furnished with an escort. Major Cox supports the proposal. We propose that thirty men from Mekran Levy Corps should, as last year, be given to New as escort. Should this be approved by you we would request that, if it is considered necessary, steps may be taken to obtain Persian Government's consent.

\* No. 623.

† No. 629.

‡ Communicating copy of the Secretary of State's telegram to Viceroy, dated October 16, 1908.



[34952]

No. 645.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 19.)*

(No. 731.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Gulahek, September 19, 1909.

ZIL-ES-SULTAN'S contribution.

My telegram No. 730 of the 17th September.

The board of directors of the Imperial Bank have refused to authorise their Tehran manager to make the contemplated advance to His Imperial Highness.

One of Zil-es-Sultan's sons, however, learning of this, has persuaded the Persian Government to stand security to the bank for the advance of 100,000 tomans, the Cabinet binding itself, in the event of His Imperial Highness failing to pay, to take over this sum as a Government debt.

For repayment of the advance Zil-es-Sultan is ready to give a written assurance that this will be effected as early as possible from the proceeds of the sale of first class Indian securities. The formalities connected with the sale must, however, take several weeks to conclude.

Mr. Wood is asking for further instructions from his principals.

I have communicated the substance of the above to my Russian colleague.

[34975]

No. 646.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 20.)*

(No. 732.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Gulahek, September 20, 1909.

NASR-UL-MULK.

I learn from the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs that Nasr-ul-Mulk has finally declined to accept that Ministry. I understand, nevertheless, that he is on his way back to this country.

[35185]

No. 647.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 20.)*

(No. 733.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Gulahek, September 20, 1909.

A MEMBER of the Government has given me to understand that the Cabinet has decided on the renewal of the appointments of M. Sadowsky, Russian doctor to Mohamed Ali, and of M. Smirnow.

The same information has reached M. Sabline, who tells me that he is recommending to his Government that, in the event of these appointments being renewed, the Russian troops at Kazvin should be withdrawn at the end of this week on the occasion of the new Minister's arrival.

Such an inauguration of M. Poklewski's mission would make an excellent impression.

[35203]

No. 648.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 20.)*

(No. 734.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Gulahek, September 20, 1909.

BAKHTIARI road.

Outstanding account for repairs to Godar Bridge.

Please see Mr. Marling's despatch No. 122 of the 21st May, 1908.

I learn from His Majesty's acting consul at Ahwaz that the Khans are willing to consider the bill, amounting to 18,476 krans, for repairs during 1907. Mr. Ranking at the same time requests that he may be authorised to accept in settlement the sum originally claimed free of interest, or to come to a compromise for not less than half the total sum, together with interest, should the Khans refuse the former alternative. The local agent of Messrs. Lynch is telegraphing to his head office.

Owing to the diversion of traffic from Bushire, the Bakhtiari road has lately prospered. The opportunity for a settlement consequently appears propitious. It is much to be desired that Messrs. Lynch will allow Mr. Ranking some latitude in the matter of a settlement.

[35210]

No. 649.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 20.)*

(No. 735.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Gulahek, September 20, 1909.

RETENTION of additional consular guard at Shiraz.

I have received the following telegram, No. 107 of the 19th September, from His Majesty's acting consul at Shiraz :—

"I propose, subject to your approval, to inform the governor-general, who arrives to-day, that you will decide as to the retention or departure of the Bushire detachment, that you are anxious that normal conditions may as soon as possible be restored, but that it is necessary for us to have suitable guarantees against a recrudescence of the late disorders. Thus, whilst posts are continually being robbed in the immediate neighbourhood of the town, and whilst, owing to the weakness of the local authorities, who are unable to enforce the attendance of headmen or the payment of debts, British claims to the extent of 40,000 tomans remain uninvestigated, I could not recommend the withdrawal of the detachment. The best proof of restored order will be the speedy settlement of these claims.

"If the detachment were to be immediately withdrawn, I am afraid that the existing idea, that our policy of non-intervention removes any need for seriously considering our general claims, would only be confirmed."

I have replied as follows, No. 81 :—

"We should not be justified in retaining the Bushire detachment with a view to obtaining settlement of our outstanding claims; and I cannot see that the maintenance of order on the roads would be ensured by such a step.

"The detachment should be sent back to Bushire unless foreign lives and property are in actual danger."

I should be glad to keep the Maxim in the country if the Admiralty could see their way to leaving it, without the detachment, at Shiraz.

[34885]

No. 650.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.*

(No. 467.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, September 20, 1909.

MR. NEW.

We have concurred in Government of India's proposal to proceed in the same manner as last year with regard to Mr. New's escort (see my telegram No. 282 of last year).

You may inform Persian Government of this or not, as you think best.

[34885]

No. 651.

*Foreign Office to India Office.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, September 20, 1909.*

I AM directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 16th instant, relative to the proposal of the Government of India that an escort of thirty men from the Mekran Levy Corps should again be furnished to Mr. New, of the Indo-European Telegraph Department, while on tour.

I am to inform you, in reply, that Sir E. Grey concurs in Viscount Morley's suggestion that this proposal should be approved, and that it should be left to the



discretion of His Majesty's Minister at Tehran whether to bring the matter to the notice of the Persian Government.

I am to transmit to you herewith copy of a telegram which Sir E. Grey has addressed to Sir G. Barclay to this effect.\*

I am, &c.  
F. A. CAMPBELL.

[34768]

No. 652.

*Foreign Office to India Office.*

Sir, *Foreign Office, September 20, 1909.*  
WITH reference to my letter of the 17th instant, relative to the desire of the Russian Government to effect certain urgent repairs on the Meshed-Nasratabad telegraph line, I am directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to transmit to you herewith copy of a despatch from His Majesty's Ambassador at St. Petersburg,† enclosing the text of the *aide-mémoire* by which this request is conveyed.

I am to state that the proposal, as set forth in this paper, appears to Sir E. Grey to be unobjectionable, and that he is accordingly disposed, with Viscount Morley's concurrence, to instruct Sir A. Nicolson to inform the Russian Government that His Majesty's Government will raise no obstacle to the realisation of their wish under the conditions indicated.

I am to add that Sir E. Grey would be glad to be favoured with an expression of Lord Morley's views on this question with as little delay as may be convenient.

I am, &c.  
F. A. CAMPBELL.

[34083]

No. 653.

*Foreign Office to Treasury.*

Sir, *Foreign Office, September 20, 1909.*  
I AM directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to transmit to you herewith, for the information of the Lords Commissioners of His Majesty's Treasury, copies of correspondence between this department and the India Office,‡ relative to the unsatisfactory conduct, last year, of the consular guard at Ispahan, which has involved some additional expenditure of public money.

It will be observed that the Government of India have treated this expenditure as in connection with Persian consulates, and that Viscount Morley proposes to approve their proceedings, which will have the effect of charging Imperial revenues with one-half of the cost incurred.

I am to state that, subject to the concurrence of their Lordships, Sir E. Grey is disposed to express agreement in Lord Morley's suggested reply to the Government of India.

In explanation of the reference contained in the last paragraph of the India Office letter of the 9th instant, I am to advert to your letter of the 18th February last, and previous correspondence relative to the employment of an Indian guard in connection with the operations of the Oil Concessions Syndicate (now the Anglo-Persian Oil Company) near Ahwaz.

I am, &c.  
F. A. CAMPBELL.

[34580]

No. 654.

*Foreign Office to Manchester Chamber of Commerce.*

Sir, *Foreign Office, September 20, 1909.*  
I AM directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 14th instant, relative to the proposal to secure the protection of trade in Southern Persia by the organisation of a system of road guards.

\* No. 650.

† No. 640.

‡ India Office, August 20; to India Office, August 26; India Office, September 9, 1909.

I am to inform you, in reply, that the suggestion made by the principal houses at Manchester which are interested in Persian trade, as set forth in their letter to your chamber, will be carefully considered by His Majesty's Government in conjunction with the various proposals now under discussion for putting an end to the present state of insecurity in those regions.

I am, &c.  
F. A. CAMPBELL.

[35235]

No. 655.

*Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 21.)*

(No. 509.)

Sir, *St. Petersburg, September 18, 1909.*  
WITH reference to my telegram No. 440 of the 11th instant, I have the honour to forward to you herewith copy of an *aide-mémoire* which I have received from the Imperial Ministry for Foreign Affairs, stating that the Imperial Russian Government have no objections whatever to the immediate commencement of the construction of a second wire to the Tehran-Shahrud telegraph line by the Indo-European Telegraph Department.

I have, &c.  
A. NICOLSON.

Inclosure in No. 655.

*Aide-mémoire by Russian Government.*

(Translation.)

IN the *aide-mémoire* dated the 10th (23rd) August the British Embassy stated that the Persian Government had made further representations to the Indo-European Telegraph Department respecting the speediest possible construction of a second line to the Shahrud line, and that an immediate reply to the Government of the Shah was very desirable.

On their part the Imperial Government have no objections whatever to the immediate execution of the necessary work by the above-named department.

*St. Petersburg, September 4 (17), 1909.*

[35321]

No. 656.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 21.)*

(No. 736.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Gulahek, September 21, 1909.*

CUSTOMS receipts of Gulf ports.

Your telegram No. 463 of the 15th September.

Last year 217,000 tomans were received at the three ports in question, and approximately 81,000 during the first half of this year. The above sum would suffice for the service of the Government loan, provided that His Majesty's Government would accept a gradual payment of the two years' arrears of interest.

[35326]

No. 657.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 21.)*

(No. 737.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

*Tehran, September 21, 1909.*

MY telegram No. 735 [of 20th September].

Retention of relieved consular escort at Shiraz was sanctioned in your telegram No. 185 of 23rd July last year for a further period of six months from 19th June. Further renewal of sanction for subsequent retention of guard has not yet been obtained. I suggest, in view of disturbed state of that province, that escort should be maintained at present strength, at any rate until the end of next year.



[35433]

No. 658.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 22.)*

(No. 738.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Gulahek, September 22, 1909.*

ADDITIONAL consular guard at Shiraz.

Mr. Bill has replied to my telegram (repeated to you in my telegram No. 735 of the 20th September) that, although foreigners in Shiraz are in no immediate danger, he cannot guarantee that his guard might not again very shortly be in need of reinforcement, the governor-general having brought no troops with him.

I have, in these circumstances, consented to a further temporary retention of the detachment at Shiraz, instructing at the same time His Majesty's acting consul to avoid any action which might give rise to the idea that the retention of these troops has been determined upon with the object of compelling a settlement of the claims of British subjects outstanding.

[35210]

No. 659.

*Foreign Office to Admiralty.*

(Confidential.)

Sir,

*Foreign Office, September 22, 1909.*

WITH reference to previous correspondence, I am directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to transmit to you, to be laid before the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, the accompanying copy of a telegram, as marked in the margin, from His Majesty's Minister at Tehran,\* respecting the recall of the naval detachment from Shiraz to Bushire.

I am to express the hope that the Lords Commissioners will be able to assent to Sir G. Barclay's request that the detachment may be instructed to leave their Maxim gun with ammunition; and I am to suggest that this might perhaps be done on loan.

I am, &amp;c.

F. A. CAMPBELL.

[35461]

No. 660.

*India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received September 23.)*

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Viscount Morley, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram to the Viceroy, dated the 20th September, relative to the proposed retention of four sowars for the purposes of Kherkha irrigation work.

*India Office, September 22, 1909.*

Inclosure in No. 660.

*Viscount Morley to Government of India.*

(Telegraphic.) P.

*India Office, September 20, 1909.*

SEE your telegram dated the 13th September,

Guard should leave without delay, with exception of four sowars, who should be retained for survey work. Instructions in this sense were sent on the 9th instant to Sir G. Barclay. When estimates of cost have been received, question of subsequent retention of sowars as consular escort will be considered.

[35679]

No. 661.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir A. Nicolson.*

(No. 264.)

Sir,

*Foreign Office, September 23, 1909.*

I TOLD Count Benckendorff to-day of the good opinion of the Persian governor of Tabreez which we had heard from our consul-general. I also observed that the Persian Government had now reinstated the Russian tutor of the Shah. I thought the Persian Minister here might have been useful in this respect, for I had explained to him how impossible it was to expect the Russians to withdraw their troops so long as the Persian Government worried the Russians by annoyances such as the dismissal of the tutor. The Persian Minister had very strongly expressed his view that the dismissal of the tutor had been a mistake, and had said that he would report to his Government.

Count Benckendorff told me that there had been some discussion with the Persian Minister at St. Petersburg as to lending money. Apparently the Persian Government did not wish to submit to any control, and the Russian Finance Minister was very unwilling to lend anything.

I said that I heard the Persian Government were applying for money to both the Russian and the British bank in Tehran. But as far as a loan by the two Governments was concerned our position was that a loan should be made only if the Persian Government would consent to the conditions laid down by the Russian Government before the late Shah was deposed, these conditions seemed to me reasonable and necessary.

I am, &amp;c.

E. GREY.

[35326]

No. 662.

*Foreign Office to Treasury.*

(Confidential.)

Sir,

*Foreign Office, September 23, 1909.*

WITH reference to your letter of the 21st July, 1908, on the subject of the maintenance at increased strength of the consular guard at Shiraz, I am directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to transmit to you herewith paraphrase of a telegram from His Majesty's Minister at Tehran\* suggesting that, in view of the disturbed state of that province, the guard should be maintained at its present strength, at any rate till the end of next year.

I am to state that Sir E. Grey entirely concurs in Sir G. Barclay's suggestion, and to express the hope that the Lords Commissioners of His Majesty's Treasury may see their way to consent to the proposed arrangement of the equal division of the expense involved between the Imperial and Indian Exchequers.

I am to add that a similar letter has been addressed to the India Office.

I am, &amp;c.

F. A. CAMPBELL.

[35326]

No. 663.

*Foreign Office to India Office.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, September 23, 1909.*

WITH reference to my letter of the 29th July, 1908, on the subject of the maintenance at increased strength of the consular guard at Shiraz, I am directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to transmit to you herewith copy of a telegram from His Majesty's Minister at Tehran suggesting that, in view of the disturbed state of that province, the guard should be maintained at its present strength, at any rate till the end of next year.\*

I am to state that Sir E. Grey entirely concurs in Sir G. Barclay's suggestion, and to express the hope that Viscount Morley may see his way to consent to the proposed



arrangement of the equal division of the expense involved between the Imperial and Indian Exchequers.

I am to add that a similar letter has been addressed to the Treasury.

I am, &c.

F. A. CAMPBELL.

[34633]

No. 664.

*Foreign Office to Imperial Bank of Persia.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, September 23, 1909.*

WITH reference to Sir T. Jackson's letter of the 8th instant, addressed to Mr. Mallet, relative to the debts due to the Imperial Bank of Persia by the late Shah, Princes, Ministers, and others which have been taken over by the Persian Government, I am directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to inform you that, in view of the fact that these debts were taken over by a responsible Government, recognised by and maintaining diplomatic relations with His Majesty's Government, he is prepared to support the bank in any attempts which they may make to recover the sums due to them in the event of the newly elected Persian Medjliss disputing the claim.

Should such a case arise His Majesty's Minister at Tehran will be furnished with instructions accordingly.

I am, &c.

F. A. CAMPBELL.

[35203]

No. 665.

*Foreign Office to Persian Transport Company.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, September 23, 1909.*

WITH reference to previous correspondence respecting the outstanding account in connection with the Godar Bridge on the Bakhtiari road, I am directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to state, for the information of your Board, that the acting consul at Ahwaz has reported that the Bakhtiari khans are disposed to consider the bill for repairs of 1907, viz., 18,476 krans. Mr. Ranking requests that he may be authorised to accept payment of the original claim without interest, or, if the khans refuse, that he may be allowed to compromise for not less than half the total claim with interest added.

Sir G. Barclay states that your agent is telegraphing to London on the subject; he adds that, the Bakhtiari road having recently prospered owing to the diversion of traffic from Bushire, the moment appears propitious for a settlement; and he earnestly trusts that Mr. Ranking will be allowed some latitude in dealing with the khans.

I am to add that Sir E. Grey is of opinion that no more favourable terms than those proposed may be anticipated, and I am to strongly urge their acceptance by your Board.

I am, &c.

F. A. CAMPBELL.

[35596]

No. 666.

*India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received September 24.)*

Sir,

*India Office, September 22, 1909.*

IN reply to your letters dated the 17th and 20th September, 1909, as to the desire of the Russian Government to effect certain urgent repairs on the Meshed-Nasratabad telegraph line, I am directed by Viscount Morley to enclose copy of a note by the director-in-chief of the Indo-European Telegraph Department on the subject.

Lord Morley concurs generally in the instructions that Secretary Sir E. Grey proposes to issue to His Majesty's Ambassador at St. Petersburg, but he would suggest that, as proposed by Mr. Kirk, consent to the proposal of the Russian Government should be given subject to the condition that the new instrument to be installed at Birjand should be of the same pattern as the present one, which is reported to be

non-recording; or that, if it is proposed to substitute a tape-recording instrument in place of the defective instrument, the recording portion should be removed, which would be a simple matter.

I am, &c.

COLIN G. CAMPBELL.

*Inclosure in No. 666.*

*Note to the Director-in-Chief of the Indo-European Telegraph Department.*

THE Meshed-Nasratabad line is reported to be in such a bad state that if immediate repairs are not carried out there will be complete telegraphic interruption. It is to our advantage that these repairs should be carried out by the Russians, both on account of maintaining communication for the present and of obtaining a better line when it is transferred to our control.

There seems to be no objection to installing a new instrument at Birjand, provided that it is of the same pattern as the present one that is reported to be defective. This instrument is of a non-recording pattern. If it is proposed to substitute a tape-recording instrument in place of the defective one, objection should, I think, be made to this arrangement, unless the recording portion of the instrument is removed, which it is a simple matter to do.

H. A. KIRK.

*September 20, 1909.*

[35620]

No. 667.

*India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received September 24.)*

Sir,

*India Office, September 23, 1909.*

IN reply to your letter dated the 15th September, 1909, I am directed by Viscount Morley to inform you that the director-in-chief of the Indo-European Telegraph Department has issued instructions to the director at Tehran to arrange for the erection of a second wire on the Tehran-Shahrud telegraph line.

I am, &c.

COLIN G. CAMPBELL.

[35637]

No. 668.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 24.)*

(No. 739.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Gulahek, September 24, 1909.*

THIS morning the new Russian Minister arrived in Tehran.

I should like to take this opportunity of recording how highly I have appreciated the privilege of being able to work during the recent crisis with such a colleague as M. Sabline.

His loyal co-operation and assistance have left me profoundly grateful.

[35433]

No. 669.

*Foreign Office to Admiralty.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, September 24, 1909.*

WITH reference to my letter of the 22nd instant respecting the naval detachment now at Shiraz, I am directed by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to inform you that according to a telegram from His Majesty's Minister at Tehran, the acting consul at Shiraz has reported that though there is no immediate danger to foreigners there at present, the Governor has no force at his disposal, and it is therefore

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impossible to guarantee that reinforcements will not very soon be required again. In the circumstances Sir G. Barclay has instructed the acting consul that the detachment should not for the present be withdrawn.

I am, &c.  
F. A. CAMPBELL.

[35727]

No. 670.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 27.)*

(No. 163.)

Sir,

*Gulahek, August 27, 1909.*

I HAVE now received from His Majesty's consul-general at Bushire his able statement of the evidence against the mirza of the German vice-consulate, which, I see from the print sections, reached you in Major Cox's despatch No. 3 of the 27th June.

I agree with Major Cox in thinking that it would serve no useful purpose to make further complaint in regard to the mirza's intrigues with Seyyid Murteza, or to seek to obtain an explanation of the incompatibility of the alleged appeal of the German vice-consulate to Berlin for a German war-ship with the attitude of the Germans in Bushire as observed by Major Cox at the time. I propose, therefore, unless instructed to the contrary, to say nothing now to my German colleague on either subject.

I also concur with Major Cox in thinking that it would be well to follow up the information he has already obtained tending to prove the connection of the mirza and Messrs. Wöneckhaus' agent with the illicit arms traffic; should facts come to light establishing fully that the mirza is connected with this traffic there should be no difficulty in securing his dismissal.

I have written to Major Cox in the above sense.

I have, &c.  
G. BARCLAY.

[35728]

No. 671.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 27.)*

(No. 165.)

Sir,

*Gulahek, August 31, 1909.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 42 of the 2nd March last enclosing two despatches from Captain Lorimer (Nos. 1 and 3) on the subject of the repairs of the Godar bridge on the Ahwaz-Ispahan road, I have the honour to forward herewith a copy of a further despatch which I have received from His Majesty's Consul at Ahwaz on the subject.

In view of the serious state into which the bridge is evidently falling, and the expense and dislocation of traffic which would be entailed should communication on the road become thereby interrupted, I would suggest that steps should be taken as soon as possible to decide the question of the incidence of the responsibility for repairs.

I have, &c.  
G. BARCLAY.

Inclosure 1 in No. 671.

*Consul Ranking to Sir G. Barclay.*

(No. 41.)

Sir,

*Camp, Ispahan, July 9, 1909.*

I HAVE the honour to address your Excellency on the subject of the Godar bridge, and to forward in that connection a comparative memorandum on its present state.

2. In view of the expense and serious dislocation of traffic which would be entailed if anything serious happened to the bridge, I would beg to request that the question of the incidence of responsibility for the repairs, as raised in your despatch No. 42, dated the 2nd March last, be decided as soon as possible, so as to enable the responsible party or parties to take such steps as will ensure the safety of the bridge.

I have, &c.

T. RANKING,

*Lieutenant, Indian Army.*

Inclosure 2 in No. 671.

*Memorandum on the state of Godar Bridge, June 1909.*

IT is intended in this Memorandum to draw a comparison between the state of the bridge in its present state; with this end in view I first quote some of Captain Lorimer's remarks made at that time, from which also I have been able to ascertain roughly the position and extent of cracks in the masonry which existed at that time. (These being shown in the elevation drawings in red.)\*

#### *East Pier.*

*Crack No. 1.*—"This point is now more opened than before. It is now  $\frac{1}{2}$ -inch at under part of arch and  $\frac{1}{8}$ -inch at top. Extends under the arch to the other side. . . ."

*Crack No. 2.*—"The stone here also showed signs of parting. . . ."

*Crack No. 3.*—"Crack extends from top of pier to the other side."

At the top of the pier the crack appears to have been then about  $\frac{1}{8}$  in. wide, it is now about  $\frac{1}{2}$  in.

*Crack No. 4.*—" . . . open from  $\frac{1}{8}$ -inch at top to  $1\frac{1}{2}$ -inch at top of arch . . . extends through the thickness of the pier."

It is impossible to say if the cracks have widened appreciably, as neither in the present case nor, I understand, in the former instance, was it possible to take any actual measurements, and, not having seen the bridge before, I am unable to make any visual comparison, with the exception noted above, where the crack appears to have widened considerably.

#### *West Pier.*

Such notes as I have of Captain Lorimer's have no reference to the west pier.

2 With regard to the cracks (shown on the elevation drawing in blue) which appear to have developed since the above notes were written by Captain Lorimer, I beg to offer the following explanatory remarks:—

#### *East Pier.*

1. *Crack at A.*—About  $\frac{1}{8}$  inch broad. Splits stones in first and fourth rows, and follows the line of the mortar in the second and third rows. Position, about 18 inches from inner angle of pier.

2. *Crack at B.*—About  $\frac{1}{8}$  inch broad. Follows line of mortar—otherwise as at A. 1 and 2 do not show on west face of east pier.

3. *Crack at C.*—About  $\frac{1}{8}$ -inch broad, extends along almost whole length of top of pier, between first and second rows of stones.

4. *Crack at D.*—About  $\frac{1}{8}$ -inch broad, has joined up with old crack.

5. *Crack at E.*—About  $\frac{1}{8}$ -inch broad, in same line as 3. About 4 inches to 6 inches long.

#### *West Pier.*

1. *Crack at A.*—About  $\frac{1}{8}$  inch broad. Position as shown in Elevation III. Passes under arch, and is visible to a like degree on the opposite side.

2. *Crack at B.*—About  $\frac{1}{8}$  inch broad. Extends right across the top of the arch from edge to edge. Position, as shown in Elevation III.

3. *Crack at C.*—About  $\frac{1}{8}$  inch broad. Extends from top of arch, as shown in Elevation III, to a point roughly vertically above the keystone.

With regard to the roadway, one or two points came under notice, which, however, it is impossible, without technical and structural knowledge of the bridge, to determine as coming into the category of faults or not.

\* Sketch maps not reproduced.



## Roadway.

1. The ends of the balustrade on both sides of the roadway appear to have shrunk away about 2 inches from the stone basements of the east pier.

The bridge may, of course, have been built so, and this can only be ascertained from those who are in possession of structural facts regarding the bridge.

2. Facing the west pier. The 1st and 2nd sections (counting from the west face of the east pier) of the balustrade on the south side of the roadway.

Irons are bent, as shown in drawing below Elevation III.

Whether this is buckling, caused by strain, or merely a structural peculiarity must be determined by the builders; though the latter seems the more likely explanation, for had it been the former, other irons would have been similarly affected.

3. Two iron rails of roadway are exposed for the distance of about one yard, commencing from a point about two yards from the west face of the east pier; this however can be easily remedied by putting a little earth over them.

4. Another point was noticed: On putting the eye on the level of the top of the balustrade at a point where it approaches the west face of the east pier, and looking along the top of the rails across the bridge towards the west pier, the bridge on the north side appears to be slightly bent for a short distance northwards out of the straight, from a point commencing from the third rivet-plate on the top of the balustrade; and on the south side appears to be slightly bent in a like manner southwards from a point commencing from the sixth rivet-plate.

Given that the roadway of the bridge was originally straight, it would appear that the bridge is screwing from some cause or other.

Taking the above facts into consideration, it appears that the bridge has developed new cracks, and that, at least in one case, the old cracks have widened since the bridge was visited by His Britannic Majesty's representative at Ahwaz, and such being the case it would seem advisable that, when possible, steps be taken to remedy both these present defects and structural defects, if any, which may have caused this state of affairs.

T. RANKING, *Lieutenant, Indian Army,*  
*His Britannic Majesty's Consul at Ahwaz.*

[35729]

No. 672.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 27.)*

(No. 166.)

Sir,

*Gulahek, August 31, 1909.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 157 of the 13th instant, I have the honour to transmit herewith copy of an interesting memorandum, which has been drawn up by Mr. Churchill, Oriental Secretary to His Majesty's Legation, giving particulars regarding the various Bakhtiari Khans who have taken part in recent events here either for or against the nationalists and also regarding the Sipahdar who figured prominently as the chief of the revolutionaries from Resht, when they marched on the capital last month.

I have, &c.

G. BARCLAY.

P.S.—I also enclose some photographs illustrative of recent events in Tehran.<sup>\*</sup>  
G. B.

Inclosure in No. 672.

*Memorandum by Mr. Churchill.*

IN view of recent events and of the prominent part taken in them by the Bakhtiari Khans, it may be useful to give a short account of the genealogy and characters of the principal Khans.

<sup>\*</sup> Not printed.

The following is the genealogical tree of the ruling family:—

## HUSSEIN KULI KHAN.

(Sons.)

1. Isfendiar Khan (dead).
2. Nejef Kuli Khan (Samsam-es-Sultaneh).
3. Amir Kuli Khan (dead).
4. Haji Ali Kuli Khan (Serdar Assad).
5. Haji Khosrou Khan (Serdar Zafar).
6. Ioussuf Khan (Salar Hashmat).

## HAJI IMAM KULI KHAN.

(Sons.)

1. Lutf Ali Khan (Amir Mufakham).
2. Mohamed Hussein Khan (Sipahdar), dead.
3. Mahmud Khan (dead).
4. Gholam Hussein Khan (Serdar Mohtashem).
5. Haji Abbas Kuli Khan.
6. Nassir Khan (Serdar Jang).
7. Sultan Mohamed Khan (Serdar Ashraf).
8. Ali Akber Khan (Saham-es-Sultaneh).
9. Mohamed Reza Khan (Muin-i-Homayun).

Isfendiar Khan became Ilkhani or supreme chief on the death of his uncle Haji Imam Kuli Khan in 1899 and maintained union among the tribesmen until his death in 1902. He was succeeded by his cousin Mohamed Hussein Khan, Sipahdar, while Nejef Kuli Khan, Samsam-es-Sultaneh, was appointed Ilbeggi or vice-chief.

Haji Ali Kuli Khan, Sardar Assad, who had travelled to Europe and spoke a little French had the reputation of being the discordant element in the tribe and of having caused the trouble which arose among the chiefs after the death of Isfendiar Khan. He assumed an attitude of superiority to his cousins and even to his elder brother, who he declared had inferior rights to his own owing to the fact that his own mother was a lady of higher birth than his elder brother's. This element of discord was made use of by the Central Government at Tehran to weaken the authority of the Ilkhani. The Persian Government often used this form of intrigue to prevent semi-independent tribes from falling away from their suzerainty.

The *status quo* was, however, not seriously disturbed until the death in February 1905 of Mohamed Hussein Khan, Sipahdar, when Haji Ali Kuli Khan's elder brother Nejef Kuli Khan, Samsam-es-Sultaneh, was appointed Ilkhani and Gholam Hussein Khan, Sardar Mohtashem, became Ilbeggi. Haji Ali Kuli Khan's intrigues at Tehran finally resulted in his own appointment as Ilkhani at the end of 1905, but his success was only temporary. Early in 1906 the principal members of the two families assembled at Tehran and consulted His Majesty's chargé d'affaires who gave them good advice with the result that Haji Ali Kuli Khan consented to relinquish all claim to the chieftaincy during his elder brother's lifetime. Samsam-es-Sultaneh was then confirmed by the Shah as supreme chief and Sardar Mohtashem as Ilbeggi.

In April 1907 owing to further intrigues the families were again divided and Sardar Mohtashem was promoted to the chieftaincy while Sardar Jang became Ilbeggi. This change occurred owing to the influence acquired at Court by Amir Mufakham who had come to Tehran at the end of 1906 with Mohamed Ali Shah from Tabreez where he had been in attendance on His Majesty for some years.

In August 1907, however, the former arrangement was reverted to and held good until the end of 1908, when Mohamed Ali Shah called on the tribe to supply men for the operations he had undertaken against Tabreez.

Amir Mufakham, who remained loyal to Mohamed Ali throughout, could only obtain the active adhesion to the royalist cause of his younger brother, Sardar Jang. Samsam-es-Sultaneh, the chief, and Sardar Mohtashem, his deputy, refused to go to Tehran.

Sardar Assad left for Europe, and Sardar Zafar obeyed the summons, but succeeded in keeping out of active service.

Shortly after the successful *coup d'Etat* of June 1908, Mohamed Ali dismissed Samsam-es-Sultaneh from the chieftaincy of the tribe as a sign of his deep displeasure. This was followed in January 1909 by the capture of Ispahan by that chief, who, however, had not sufficient courage to follow up his action by the threatened move on Tehran. It remained for Sardar Assad to return from Europe, and to put this plan into execution.

It will be seen that the ruling families are by no means united. The split between Amir Mufakham (in association with his brother, Sardar Jang, who threw in his lot with Mohamed Ali) and the rest of the Khans, will be difficult to mend.

Sardar Assad is not liked by the rest of the Khans, including his own brothers, though he is looked up to by the tribesmen on account of his European experience, and no doubt his recent achievement will raise him in the estimation of the tribe as paramount chief, but it remains to be seen whether he will be able to assume the title officially.

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Sardar Assad is not generally credited with possessing any considerable qualities. He is vain, indolent, and self-opinionated. He has not the courage to state his opinions and intentions in the face of opposition. It is true that he advanced on Tehran and joined the Sipahdar's force, in the face of urgent joint Anglo-Russian representations, which warned him of the danger of his action leading to foreign intervention. But it must be remembered that, during the several months he remained inactive at Ispahan, he was taunted by the European press and elsewhere, and twitted for his want of courage, patriotism, and initiative. He had no doubt been considerably influenced while in Europe by the Persian refugees there, and also by European sympathizers. His *amour-propre* and vanity could stand the strain no longer, and he finally decided to move, and, having once started, it was practically impossible, save by the complete loss of all that is dear to such a man, to retire.

With the poor forces at the disposal of Mohamed Ali, and the want of discipline, courage, money, or commanders, it was a foregone conclusion that once the so-called nationalist forces joined, and threatened the capital, nothing remained for Mohamed Ali to do but to take refuge at the Russian Legation, and thereby to abdicate.

Sipahdar-i-Azam, Vali Khan, formerly known as Nasr-es-Sultaneh, under which title he will be found in the Biographical Notices of 1905, was born about 1846. He has held a number of important provincial governorships, including that of Ghilan, where he governed comparatively well from 1899 to 1903. He had previously been Mint Master and Minister of the Treasury. In 1905 he was appointed Minister of Telegraphs, which Sardar Mansur administered for him during his absence from 1907 to 1908.

In August 1908 he was sent by Mohamed Ali Shah to command the troops ordered to besiege Tabreez, but he refused to co-operate with Ain-ed-Dowleh, and withdrew, leaving the command entirely to the latter. He next appeared mysteriously at Resht in February 1909, a few days after the murder of the governor by a band of revolutionaries, including some Caucasians and a few of his own followers. He was chosen by the people as governor, and from that date until the capture of Tehran on the 16th July he figured as chief of the revolutionaries, who held the Resht-Kazvin road throughout the spring of 1909 and captured Kazvin in April on Mohamed Ali's birthday.

Sipahdar is no nationalist, and during 1906 he openly expressed his contempt for the reform movement which had then begun to manifest itself, and he took a prominent part in suppressing the outbreaks of July by shooting down the people.

He, however, detested Mohamed Ali personally for the want of confidence displayed towards him, as, in fact, was the ex-Shah's custom in his dealings with all his subjects.

He is a man of quite exceptional qualities and means for a Persian. He is outspoken and sometimes quite embarrassingly frank. But he of course has characteristic Persian duplicity, and throughout his stay at Kazvin he was secretly in treaty with Mohamed Ali, through the Russian Legation, with a view to the possibility of being obliged to abandon his following and to throw himself at Mohamed Ali's mercy under Russian protection.

Even when he had come as far as Kerej, within 30 miles of the capital, when it was still uncertain how events would turn, Europeans who saw him declare that he was a reluctant figure-head, and that the Caucasian element forced him on.

He owns considerable estates in Ghilan, Mazanderan, in the Kazvin district, and elsewhere.

G. P. CHURCHILL.

August 24, 1909.

[35731]

No. 673.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 27.)*

(No. 168.)

Sir,

*Gulahek, September 9, 1909.*

DURING the past four weeks the principal seats of disturbance have been the Kerman district, where a large band of Arab robbers has been ravaging the country and the neighbourhood of Sultanabad, where the depredations of the Lurs, noticed in previous monthly summaries, still continue. In the north there have been affrays between the Russian consular escort at Urumia and some Kurds at a village near (see my telegram No. 707), and between some of the Russian troops at Tabreez and a band of fedai near Marand. But except for the above there have been no serious disturbances. While lawlessness is rife on most of the southern roads, especially on the Bushire-

Ispahan road as far north as Abadeh and on the Kerman-Yezd route, no disturbances are reported from the principal towns in the provinces, and in the capital perfect order prevails.

Government is still entirely in the hands of the committee, now generally known as the "directoire"; the composition of this body has been slightly modified by the admission of some of the Cabinet members, notably Sardar Assad, Minister of the Interior, and Sipahdar, Minister of War—a change made in the interest of harmony between the body which really governs and the ministers who exist merely to carry out its orders and maintain the semblance of a Cabinet. Sardar Assad and Sipahdar, the latter especially, had on several occasions acted independently of the committee, and it was thought that their inclusion in that body would bring them into line. I believe it has not had the desired effect with Sipahdar, who, according to all accounts, is still refractory. He seems even to be scheming against the directoire, though he is a member of it, for I am confidentially informed by my Russian colleague that he recently begged him to prevent any money from being advanced to it. The directoire, however, made light of his opposition, and, as far as I can ascertain, there is no foundation for the impression which my Russian colleague seems to have given to his Government, that there is divergence between it and the Cabinet as a body.

I notice in one of the numbers of the "Times" which has just reached me that, according to its St. Petersburg correspondent, a pessimistic view is taken in Russian official circles of the situation, and it is asserted that anarchy is increasing in several provinces, that the roads are infested by robbers, and that commerce is said to be losing heavily. I gather from this telegram that an impression prevails in St. Petersburg that things in Persia are worse after a month of the new Government than they were under the late régime. I do not think that this impression is warranted by facts. It is nothing new that the roads are infested with robbers. The same might have been asserted at any time during my year's experience of Persia. The allegation that commerce is losing heavily is one that was made with equal truth under the late régime; and as regards Russian commerce, it is of very questionable accuracy. M. Mornard informs me that the northern customs receipts are increasing rather than falling. Nor is it true, I think, that anarchy is on the increase. There are disorders in certain districts, but this also is no new thing, and until the country receives substantial pecuniary assistance it would be folly to expect in this respect any great improvement, no matter what Government rules in Tehran. At the present moment the Government is living from hand to mouth on what it can collect by means of forced contributions from reactionaries, supplemented by meagre doles from the heavily pledged customs. They derive nothing from what is usually the main source of revenue, the "malat," which I understand they do not feel strong enough to collect till the Medjliss meets. They are thinking of pawning some of the Crown jewels; but these expedients afford no means for a systematic attempt to pacify the disturbed districts, and merely enable them to carry on. Whether they will suffice to keep them going till the meeting of the Medjliss, which will commence its sittings as soon as a quorum of deputies is present at Tehran—probably in the middle of next month—remains to be seen. What is certain is that they will not apply to the two Governments for an advance, which they know must mean at least supervision of expenditure, until their need is extreme, and then the sooner a substantial sum is advanced the better. Refusal might well involve application to a third Power or a collapse of the new régime; neither contingency would be at all to our liking.

I notice with regret that His Majesty's chargé d'affaires at St. Petersburg thinks that the Russian Government will be indisposed not only to make a small advance, but also, and even more so, to facilitate an eventual loan. It is unfortunate that at a moment when, if ever, Persia stands in need of the good-will of the two great neighbouring Powers, those who conduct affairs should have given umbrage to Russia. They have chosen to forget that the recent revolution was carried through by the sufferance of Russia, and they regard it as entitling them to freedom from Russian influence, of the exercise of which they have had such unhappy experience in the past. They intensely resent the continued presence of the Russian troops at Kazvin, when there is no sign of disorder in Tehran or on the Resht road. This resentment doubtless counts for a good deal in the injudicious attitude of the past few weeks, by which they have incurred Russia's ill-will. The appointment of Mukhber-es-Saltaneh as governor-general of Azerbaijan, the dismissal of M. Smirnov, in whom they saw a prospective Chapchal, their efforts to deprive the scoundrels in the ex-Shah's suite of the ordinary privileges of bast, and the annoyance they have displayed at the manner in which Russian protection is now shown to have been granted in the past, all of these mani-



festations of the revolt against Russian influence are in themselves perfectly natural and intelligible, but coming at the time they did, when Russia was naturally sensitive at the change in the balance of the two Powers' influence, inseparable from the advent of a constitutional Government in Tehran, they constitute a foolish blunder. It is to be hoped that the consequence will not be an uncompromising attitude in St. Petersburg in the question of financial assistance. Under the influence of the anti-Russian attitude of the committee, on the one hand, and of the criticisms to which he has been subjected for his self-restraint during the recent crisis on the other, my Russian colleague has lately adopted anything but a conciliatory and sympathetic attitude towards the new Government, but I am happy to say that he is prepared, if the Persian Government applies for money to the two Powers, to recommend an advance under proper control. I trust that M. Poklewski, who is due to arrive here next week, will not only take the same line in the question of financial assistance when the time comes, but will also adopt a conciliatory attitude in other matters. A show of good-will as regards financial and other matters, such as the withdrawal of the Russian troops from Kazvin after Mohammad Ali has left Tehran and a more considerate attitude as regards the granting of Russian protection to Persian subjects, would do more to stem the revolt against Russian influence than any attempt to impose that influence short of upsetting the present Government.

I have, &c.

G. BARCLAY.

[35732]

No. 674.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.*—(Received September 27.)

(No. 169. Confidential.)

Sir,

*Gulahek, September 9, 1909.*

WITH reference to my telegram No. 157 of the 17th March, I have the honour to forward herewith copy of a despatch from His Majesty's consul-general at Bushire, transmitting correspondence regarding the question of the Perso-Turkish boundary-line so far as it concerns Mohammerah territory.

In the interesting despatch from Mr. Wilson which forms part of this correspondence, that gentleman points out that the boundary laid down by the Mediating Commission differs considerably to the disadvantage of the Sheikh of Mohammerah, from the frontier locally recognized by the Bussorah and Mohammerah authorities.

To raise the question of this portion of the Perso-Turkish frontier at this moment would be to do so unnecessarily, but I presume that when it is raised His Majesty's Government would be prepared, in view of Mr. Wilson's information, to reconsider the ruling recorded in your despatch No. 75 to the late Sir Nicholas O'Connor of the 25th February, 1908, which was made, I take it, with a view to be used if necessary for the prevention of possible Turkish encroachments, and was, I believe, never brought to the notice of the Porte.

I have, &c.

G. BARCLAY.

Inclosure 1 in No. 674.

*Major Cox to Sir G. Barclay.*

(No. 60. Confidential.)

Sir,

*Bushire, July 4, 1909.*

I HAVE the honour to refer to your telegram No. 49, dated the 17th March, 1909, addressed to His Majesty's Secretary of State and repeated to India and to me, and beg to forward, for your information in that connection, copies of the correspondence cited in the appended list dealing with the vexed question of the Perso-Turkish boundary-line so far as it affects Mohammerah territory.

The Bushire records do not enable me to supplement the information now furnished except to the extent indicated in my memorandum, and I therefore confine myself to an expression of the view, with which I feel sure you will be in agreement, that it is of much importance that all available documentary evidence bearing on the boundary question should be authoritatively examined and His Majesty's legation and local officers apprised, as precisely as may prove feasible, of the course which His Majesty's Government find

themselves prepared to recognise provisionally as the correct boundary between Mohammerah territory and Turkey.

I am forwarding copies of the papers simultaneously to the Government of India, who will doubtless be pleased to examine their records for any maps or documents bearing on the question.

I have, &c.

P. Z. COX, Major, British Resident in the Persian Gulf, and His Britannic Majesty's Consul-General for Fars, &c.

Inclosure 2 in No. 674.

*Lieutenant Wilson to Major Cox.*

Sir,

*Mohammerah, May 26, 1909.*

I HAVE the honour to address you on the subject of the Arabistan portion of the Perso-Turkish boundary-line.

I will commence by a brief recapitulation of its history.

2. By article 3 of the Treaty of Erzeroum provision was made for the appointment of a commission to define the Perso-Turkish boundary (*vide* Aitchison's "Treaties," vol. ix, Appendix 17).

This commission, as appears from p. 218 of Hertslet's "Persian Treaties," 1891, held meetings in Bagdad and Mohammerah in 1849-50-51. In 1851 Lord Palmerston stated that it was clear that no settlement could be come to except by an arbitrary decision on the part of Great Britain and Russia, and he therefore proposed that the general line of frontier should be traced by the agents of the Mussulman Powers at Constantinople, assisted by the commissioners, leaving doubtful localities to be settled in detail in future.

3. The Russian Government agreed to this proposal, and the work of surveying the whole frontier was then commenced. In September 1869 a copy of the map thus prepared was officially communicated to the Turkish and Persian Governments, but no boundary was marked on it, the Porte having been informed that, in the opinion of the mediating Powers, the future line of boundary was to be found within the limits traced on the map (a strip of country 20 to 40 miles wide), and that the two Mahomedan Governments should themselves mark out the line. The boundary has remained unsettled to the present day.

4. In August 1869 a protocol was concluded between Turkey and Persia for the maintenance of the *status quo* on the frontier. It was renewed in 1873 and is still in force (*vide* Aitchison, Appendix 18).

5. In March 1909, in discussing the sheikh of Mohammerah's anxieties regarding Turkish aggression, Sir George Barclay suggested to His Majesty's Government "that the sheikh might be informed of the substance of Sir E. Grey's despatch No. 75 of the 25th February, 1908, to Sir N. O'Connor, in which the latter was informed that in the Mohammerah district His Majesty's Government were not prepared to recognize any other frontier than that laid down by the Mediating Commission in 1850."

6. It is on the subject of this boundary, and the results that would accrue from our upholding it now, that I venture to address you.

There is nothing in the pages of Aitchison or Hertslet to show that the Mediating Commission ever "laid down" a boundary. The declaration of 1865 (*vide* paragraph 3 *supra*) did not refer to it, and the frontier map presented in 1869 did not show a boundary at all.

This is confirmed by an inspection of the map, which was published at the Ordnance Office, Southampton, in 1870 (scale 4 miles = 1").

7. Further, as far as my incomplete information goes, it seems not unreasonable to suppose that the recommendations of the commission in 1851 were cancelled by the declaration referred to above. In any case I can discover nothing to show that the recommendation was ever accepted by the Persian or Turkish Governments,\* or that the line recommended was ever marked out on the ground.

8. A marginal note† in the first edition of the Survey of India Map of Persia

\* It was accepted by the Persian Government (see No. 8800, Confidential, of 1906).—A. P.

† The Perso-Turkish boundary from the Shatt-el-Arab to Hawizeh is that recommended by the Perso-Turkish Boundary Commission in 1851.



(16 miles = 1") makes it plain that the boundary referred to by Sir E. Grey is that now marked on most maps, and shown in the above map\* as running from Failiya to Hawizeh (see enclosure (A)). The third edition of the same map shows the boundary running from Mohammerah town to a point south of Hawizeh, but this is probably a draughtsman's error.

9. I submit that this boundary is not in accordance with the frontier locally recognised by the Bussorah and Mohammerah authorities, and that any attempt on our part to assert its validity or to cause its recognition, would cause grave injustice to the Sheikh of Mohammerah, and would in fact involve a wholly impracticable alteration of the *status quo*.

From Mohammerah to Hawizeh the country is desert, so we need only consider the position of the boundary at these two places, assuming for the present a straight line across the intervening space.

10. Enclosure (B) shows the actual boundary at the point where it takes off from the Shatt-el-Arab until it reaches the desert which stretches uninterruptedly thence to Hawizeh. This part of the boundary, which is 5 miles west of that "recommended" by the Mediating Commission, is as far as I know not disputed locally by either party. The sheikh has built several palaces on it, and no objection having been raised to his doing so, it may be considered that, in view of the provisions of paragraph 4 of the Perso-Turkish protocol of 1869, his right to this territory is not disputed.

11. The shaded red line on enclosure (A) indicates approximately the boundary claimed by the sheikh north of Mohammerah. As far as that portion of the boundary west of Hawizeh is concerned, our lack of exact geographical knowledge renders it impossible to lay down the limits of Hawizeh territory with certainty, but the sheikh's contention that the ground for 6 or 8 farsakhs west of Hawizeh is and has for many generations been occupied by the tribes tributary to the Wali of Hawizeh, and consequently to the Persian Government, is fully borne out by such facts as I have been able to ascertain. The extensive irrigation system of Hawizeh extends nearly 16 miles to the west of the town, and, though only a few of the canals are now in use, Sheikh Khazal hopes, by restoring the dam at Kut Nahr Hashim, to bring them into use again. Beyond the area irrigable by the canal system shown on the map extend marshes inhabited by Beni Turuf Arabs, lawless tribes, to punish whom the Sheikh of Mohammerah collected a large force and expended large sums in military preparations last year.

12. But whatever the true line of demarcation be, I venture to think that the boundary referred to in Sir E. Grey's despatch, which bisects the territory of the Wali of Hawizeh, placing some of its inhabitants (including the turbulent Beni Turuf) under Turkish rule, whilst leaving in Persian territory the head-waters of the canal system on which they depend is one which it would be impossible for us to urge upon the sheikh or upon the Persian Government. Its adoption would prevent the steady consolidation of the Sheikh of Mohammerah's authority west of the Karun, as it would place out of his power the tribes whose incursions into Persian territory are a constant menace to the peace of the district, but who are now under the control of the sheikh. It would deprive the sheikh of thousands of acres of valuable date groves and irrigated lands, and entirely upset the *status quo*.

13. I therefore submit that we should altogether disregard the "recommendations" of the Mediating Commission of 1851 as far as they affect the Mohammerah-Hawizeh frontier and simply take our stand on the authoritative Anglo-Russian declaration of May 1865 that the future line of boundary is to be found within the limits of the map which was presented in 1869.

This policy will perpetuate the *status quo*, as is presumably desired by His Majesty's Government, and will not prejudice the consideration of the question at any future time.

I have, &c.

A. T. WILSON, Lieutenant, I.A.

\* Not printed.

Inclosure 3 in No. 674.

Major Cox to Consul McDouall.

Bushire, June 8, 1909.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to request that you will be good enough to let me have any observations you may wish to make in comment of Lieutenant Wilson's letter, dated the 26th May, 1909, on the subject of the boundary between Mohammerah territory and Turkey.

I have, &c.

P. Z. COX, Major,  
Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.

Inclosure 4 in No. 674.

Consul McDouall to Major Cox.

(No. 65. Confidential.)

Sir,

Mohammerah, June 12, 1909.

IN compliance with your despatch No. 1366, dated the 8th June, regarding Lieutenant Wilson's letter on the subject of the Perso-Turkish border near Mohammerah, I have the honour to inform you that I entirely agree with the statements made by him. The boundary he shows near Daiaji is that which for some years has to my knowledge been acknowledged as the border by the two local Governments. I enclose a translation from the French of Cufnet's "Turquie d'Asie," which confirms this, in so far that the Persian border is on the limits of the Daiaji district. As a fact, there are one or two districts between Daiaji and the creek Nahr Yousif. The names also below that are incomplete, and not arranged in proper order. Mirza Hamza tells me that about thirty years ago a dispute occurred as to the ownership of the limestone, which is found from Daiaji to Mendowan, and is used to make "gach," and that the present border was then fixed by representatives of the Bussorah and Mohammerah authorities, giving the limestone to Mohammerah.

In 1892 and 1893 the Turks claimed the right to collect duty on goods from, or for, Mohammerah, saying that they did not recognise Mohammerah as foreign territory, or that only the town and not the district of Mohammerah were acknowledged as Persian by the Treaty of Erzeroum. This appears not to have been pressed, and gradually dropped, for the claim has not been made since 1894.

In 1899 the Bussorah authorities were making an embankment on the Daiaji border, and were extending it across the border. On a personal protest by the Sheikh of Mohammerah's deputy they withdrew, and since then there have been no disputes as to this border. The Islands of Aghawat and Barin were formerly said to be under dispute; but the Turkish flag has occasionally in recent years been flown there without dispute. The sheikh or his family own land in Daiaji, and his father, before he became independent of the Chaab Sheikh, used to reside there at times.

In short, to my knowledge, during the last ten years, there has been no attempt to dispute the border as shown by Lieutenant Wilson at Daiaji, and both local Governments exercise full authority on their respective sides of that border.

I have, &c.

W. McDouall

Inclosure 5 in No. 674.

Extract from the French of Cufnet's "Turquie d'Asie," Bussorah, p. 232, "Vilayet of Bussorah."

(Translation.)

THE Moukata, in which are specially and almost exclusively cultivated the date, are on both banks of the river from Korna on the right bank and from Mezra on the left, as follows:—

Side of Kerdellan (left bank Shatt-el-Arab)—

Mezra.



El Dehedji (i.e., Daiaji) (at the limits of this Moukata commence the Persian possessions as follows):—

Nahr Yousef.  
Abou Djedie.  
El Tahsin.  
El Filieh.  
El Dourband.  
Hezan.  
Kout Cheikh Djaher.  
El Djarf.  
El Berem.  
El Harthe.  
Meyouhi (i.e., Manjuhi).  
Kosseibe (i.e., Gusba), situated opposite Fao, residence of the mudir of the Nahie of the same name.

When the fortifications of Fao were commenced the Ottoman engineers wished also to construct at Kosseibe, in order to defend both banks of the Shatt-el-Arab; but they were surprised to learn that the territory situated on the left bank belonged to Persia. The fortifications of Fao, which gave place in 1890 to a political incident, promptly and happily settled, are to-day nearly finished. In connection with the same incident the question relative to the territory from Nahr Yousef to Kosseibe has been settled by a commission *ad hoc*, which has definitely attributed this territory to Persia.

Inclosure 6 in No. 674.

*Lieutenant Wilson to Major Cox.*

Sir,

*Mohammerah, June 12, 1909.*

WITH reference to my letter of the 29th May, 1909, I have the honour to state that the Survey of India have since informed me that the boundaries on all maps issued by them are inserted by the Foreign Department, and that the Survey of India have no responsibility in the matter.

2. I enclose one copy of a tracing,\* sent to me by the Survey of India, of a map bearing on the Turco-Persian boundary claims. I was unfortunately vouchsafed no information as to the authorship† of source of the original; its value lies in the fact that it corroborates the opinion previously expressed, that the Mediating Commissioners' line ran direct from Faihyah to Hawizeh.

I have, &c.

A. T. WILSON.

Inclosure 7 in No. 674.

*Memorandum by Major Cox.*

IT will be noticed that His Majesty's consul at Mohammerah in his despatch dated the 12th June last, and addressed to the Political Resident, Bushire, states that, to his personal knowledge, the boundary shown on Lieutenant Wilson's map at Daiaji has been for some years acknowledged as correct by the two local Governments, while in his letter to Resident dated the 29th December, 1904, of which the purport was forwarded with Residency letter dated the 29th January, 1905, to the Government of India, he stated that the Khayen Creek was the boundary acknowledged by local authorities on both sides. The apparent discrepancy between these two statements is to be explained thus:—

If the boundary-line is taken from the embouchure of the Karun River, it follows the centre of the deep-water channel of the Shatt-el-Arab, passing between the Islands Uman-ul-Rassis, Umm-al-Khassasif, and the Persian mainland until it reaches a point

\* Not printed.

† The authors of this map were the Mediating Commissioners who defined the frontier as shown in 1850.—A. P.

opposite the mouth of the Khayin Creek; it then leaves the Shatt-el-Arab, and for about 5 miles follows a small creek running parallel to the left bank of that river between the Persian mainland and Agawat and Barin Islands until the village of Daiaji is reached. From that point the boundary-line turns almost due north, passing between Daiaji and Saiyid Gharib (*vide* map marked "B").

His Majesty's consul, in his letter dated the 29th December, 1904, was writing on the subject of Turkish and Persian jurisdiction on the Shatt-el-Arab, and therefore quoted the Kayin Creek as the boundary, since west of that creek the frontier-line leaves the Shatt-el-Arab. In his despatch dated the 12th June, 1909, however, the question was not as to the point at which the frontier-line left the Shatt-el-Arab, but as to the western land frontier of Persia, and he agrees with Lieutenant Wilson that the southern and western frontier-lines should meet at, or in close proximity to, Daiaji.

July 4, 1909.

P. Z. COX, Major,  
*Political Resident in the Persian Gulf*

[35733]

No. 675.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 27.)*

(No. 170.)

Sir,

*Gulahek, September 9, 1909.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith copy of a despatch which I have received from His Majesty's acting consul at Tabreez, reporting the arrival of the governor-general of Azerbaijan at that place, and the subsequent relations between his Excellency and the Russian military authorities.

The difficulties of Mukhber-es-Saltaneh's position upon his arrival at his post without troops or adequate funds cannot be too greatly emphasised, but his Excellency appears from the first to have fully realised the necessity of conciliating the Russian military authorities, and though his attitude in regard to Sattar Khan and Bagher Khan was at the beginning injudicious, his ready acceptance of Mr. Smart's advice argues a just appreciation on his part of the urgency of in no way giving ground to the Russians for interference.

The activity of the Russian authorities is at this juncture to be regretted, and must, as Mr. Smart points out, encourage such reactionary leaders as Rahim Khan, but, on the other hand, a complete withdrawal of the Russian forces at the present moment would inevitably call forth vigorous protests from the foreign community of Tabreez.

Since the withdrawal of Turkish troops from Urumia, and while the town remains without a governor, the unrest of the Kurds must give rise to disorders, and the possibility of a reoccupation of the district by Turkey remains a standing menace. I shall endeavour to hasten the appointment of a strong governor to Urumia, and it is to be hoped that the dispatch of troops as escort to the governor-general—these left Tehran on the 4th instant, as reported in my telegram No. 717 of the 6th instant—will enable his Excellency to deal effectively with the situation and materially strengthen the position which his moral influence has already gained for him among the population of Tabreez.

I have, &c.

G. BARCLAY.

Inclosure in No. 675.

*Acting Consul Smart to Sir G. Barclay.*

(No. 26.)

Sir,

*Tabreez, August 29, 1909.*

WITH reference to my telegram No. 181, I have the honour to report that the governor-general made his entry into Tabreez on the 20th instant without any state.

On the 25th instant the Mukhber-es-Saltaneh returned my visit, and spoke to me very frankly on the general situation and the policy he proposed to pursue. He was quite sure that he could maintain order without the Russian troops, whose presence was rather a hindrance than a help to the pacification. As long as the Russians were at Tabreez and the late Shah at Zerguendeh, the reactionaries, especially Rahim Khan,

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would be encouraged to resist the constitutional régime. The conduct of the Russians in sending an expedition to Karadagh without even notifying him, and in generally interfering in the internal administration of the province, weakened his authority and rendered the task of the governor almost impossible. He was aware that the Russians were hostile to him, and, although he would do his best to cultivate friendly relations with them, he had not much hope of conciliating them.

He then explained to me his plans regarding Sattar, Bagher, and the fedais. He wished to keep Sattar and Bagher, and form the fedais into a regular force. The fedais had robbed hitherto because they had been in a state of war and under no recognised Government. If properly paid and disciplined they would be a useful force, and would at any rate rob less than the tribal horsemen coming from Tehran. He knew that Rahim Khan was meditating revolt, and the fear of Sattar and his fedais alone restrained him. If they were removed Rahim Khan would begin plundering round Tabreez.

I told Mukhber-es-Saltaneh that I entirely disagreed with him and warned him that, unless he got rid of Sattar and Bagher, and broke up the fedais, it was hopeless to expect the Russian troops to withdraw. I showed him a copy of a written order, seized by the Russians from fedais near Marand, bearing the seal of Sattar, to one of his lieutenants, charging him to proceed against the Khan of Maku. Such proceedings on the part of a person having no official position were intolerable. The fedais had become a state within a state and a terror to all the merchant and moneyed classes. Unless they were energetically suppressed, British merchants would be the first to protest loudly against the withdrawal of the Russian troops.

Mukhber-es-Saltaneh seemed to be impressed by my arguments.

He said, however, that he could take no steps in the direction I had indicated until the arrival of the troops from Tehran. I impressed on him the imperative necessity of his conciliating the Russians, without whose co-operation his task would be exceedingly difficult.

The two great problems before the governor-general are the fedais and the three powerful reactionary chiefs, Samad Khan, governor of Maragha, Ikbâl-es-Saltaneh, Khan of Maku, and Rahim Khan. With regard to the fedais, Mukhber-es-Saltaneh has just sent me a message to the effect that he proposed to have a frank consultation with my Russian colleague on the subject. He added that, if Mr. Miller and myself insisted on the removal of Sattar and Bagher and the suppression of the fedais, he would conform to that policy as soon as he had sufficient force and money to do so. As regards the three reactionaries mentioned above, Samad Khan is a good governor, of the old style, and, if not persecuted, would serve the constitutional Government. Mukhber-es-Saltaneh proposes to retain him at his post, and he is also coming to a friendly agreement with the Khan of Maku. With regard to Rahim Khan, although nothing has yet been decided, probably the only course open to the governor-general will be stern repression, as soon as he is in a position to operate against that turbulent bandit. Meanwhile, these three chiefs are showing signs of apprehension and are all in communication with the Russians. It is to be hoped, however, that the Russians will not interfere and prevent the normal course of events. The Russian military authorities have shown some undesirable activity during the past month, but I am inclined to think that this is due to the initiative of my Russian colleague. They have had two affrays with fedais, one at Zal, as reported in my telegram No. 180 of the 12th instant, and the other at Timcheh, both villages near Marand. At the latter village the inhabitants, from whom the fedais were extorting money, called in the Russians, who drove out the fedais, killing and wounding several, and taking some prisoners. There were no casualties on the Russian side in either affray. Mr. Miller has at last consented to hand over the prisoners, who had been detained in the Russian camp, to the governor-general.

A small detachment of Cossacks, by mistake and much to the annoyance of my Russian colleagues, disarmed the inhabitants of Karamalik, a reactionary suburb of Tabreez.

The expedition to Karadagh, reported in my telegram No. 182 of the 21st instant, is very regrettable, both on account of the complications which may arise from the passage of troops through disturbed districts and also on account of the unfortunate suspicions regarding the intentions of the Russians which this expedition has aroused in Tabreez. Rahim Khan accorded the troops a magnificent reception on their arrival at Ahar.

It is obvious that if the Russian military authorities continue to show the same activity now that the governor-general has arrived, the latter's credit in the province

will be much impaired. It is, therefore, most desirable that considerable reductions should now be made in the Russian force, which is much too large for its avowed objects. As reported in my telegram No. 184 of the 26th instant, my Russian colleague said he would recommend his Government to begin the gradual reduction of the troops, leaving only two companies of infantry, 400 Cossacks, and half a company of sappers, in all about 1,100 men for the town and the Julfa road. Mr. Miller evidently counts on this force's remaining here through the winter. He tells me that the Persian Minister in St. Petersburg has pressed for the immediate withdrawal of all the troops, asserting that Mukhber-es-Saltaneh has undertaken to ensure general security in that event. However excellent Mukhber-es-Saltaneh's intentions may be, it would be most inadvisable to withdraw all the Russian troops before a strong force has arrived from Tehran and the fedais have been suppressed. At the mere rumour of large reductions in the Russian force, the British merchants here expressed to me their great anxiety at the prospect of being left without the protection of the Russian troops. The announcement of their total withdrawal at this moment would call forth vigorous protests from nearly all Europeans here, including the British.

The general state of the province is about the same as last month, though there is a slight improvement in Eastern Azerbaijan. The nationalists at Ardebil executed a number of reactionaries who had just come out of "bast" at the Russian consulate, but since the arrival of the new governor, Fath-es-Sultan, the town has been quiet. The Shahsevens have for the present ceased from their depredations and caravans are coming through from Ardebil to Tabreez. Merchants, however, do not dare yet to trust their goods on the Tehran road.

Muhtashen-es-Saltaneh and the Urmi deputation are still at Tabreez while Urmi remains governorless. Now that the Turkish troops have withdrawn from the Urmi district, it is most dangerous to leave Urmi without a governor and protecting force against the Kurds. A Kurdish outbreak would probably suit Turkey's policy, as it could be used as an argument for the reoccupation of the Urmi district. Already an incident has occurred which may have serious consequences. Some Kurds were persecuting the inhabitants of Mar Sergis, a Christian village 6 miles from Urmi, close to the summer residence of the Archbishop of Canterbury's mission. The Russian vice-consul, M. Boris Miller, after vainly trying to get the impotent local authorities to take the necessary steps, sent a Russian officer with twenty-six soldiers and nine Cossacks of the consular guard to drive the Kurds out of the village. The Kurds, collecting in some force, resisted the Russians with rifle-fire, wounding two soldiers and capturing five runaway Cossack horses. The Russians, finding that they could not dislodge the Kurds, fell back into the town. According to the account supplied to me by the Rev. F. B. Brown, of the English mission, on the next day (the 24th August) M. Boris Miller, in deference apparently to Persian objections to the use of Russian troops, dispatched armed Syrians against the Kurds, who, according to the latest information received, are still established on the hillside dominating Urmi at a distance of about 6 miles. According to Boris Miller, the Kurds are being incited, if not actually led, by Turkish officers. Fifty Russian soldiers leave to-morrow to strengthen the consular guards at Urmi, but my Russian colleague assures me that no further offensive operations will be indulged in. It remains to be seen what view the Turks will take of the Russian action.

With such anarchy prevailing all over the province and the difficulties caused by the activity of the Russian troops, the task before the Mukhber-es-Saltaneh is difficult in the extreme. He cannot count on the co-operation of the Russians, but he enjoys the confidence of the population of Tabreez. He is prudent, tactful, and sensible enough to compromise when necessary. If he can succeed in winning over the Russians, and if the late Shah is soon removed from the country, it should not be beyond his power to pacify the province to such an extent as to justify the total withdrawal of the Russian troops. Of course this result cannot be obtained unless he receives a reliable force from Tehran and is able to find money for his empty treasury. The Persian Government have only promised him 50,000 tomans, but he is trying to raise locally a loan of 100,000 tomans.

I have, &c.

W. A. SMART.



*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey—(Received September 27.)*

(No. 171.)

Sir,

*Gulahek, September 9, 1909.*

IN my despatch No. 156 of the 12th August I forwarded copy of a protocol signed by Mr. Churchill and M. Baranowsky, the dragomans of the two legations, and the delegates of the Persian Government, recording the arrangements which had been made for the surrender of the Crown jewels by the ex-Shah, and the grant of a pension to him of 75,000 tomans per annum, and fixing the 17th August as the date of his departure. It had been intended that this protocol should be ratified by the representatives of the two Powers and the members of the Persian Cabinet; but, as you are aware, before the date fixed for Mohammad Ali's departure, certain questions were raised which were not dwelt with in the protocol, which was therefore never ratified. I now enclose copy of the protocol which has taken the place of the abortive one. This instrument contains much that was in the previous one, but it also embodies the results of the negotiations relative to the questions, the raising of which made it impossible to send Mohammad Ali away on the date originally fixed. Two of these questions involved long discussions with the Persian Government and a telegraphic correspondence with St. Petersburg, which, as regards one of the questions, was unnecessarily protracted, owing to the Russian Government having allowed M. Chapchal and others of his kidney to have a say in the matter.

You will notice that these questions—that of the ex-Shah's debt to the Russian Bank and that of the departure with Mohammad Ali of the reactionaries in bast in the Russian Legation—are, in so far as the protocol settles them, arranged as desired by the Russian Government.

The Persian Government takes over the ex-Shah's debt and raises his pension to 100,000 tomans a-year, receiving in return the surrender of His Majesty's private estates. The details of the arrangement for the transfer of the debt are in process of negotiation between the Russian Bank, the Russian Legation, and the Persian Government. The security is to be the northern customs receipts, and the debt is to carry 6 per cent. in the place of the 9 per cent. or 12 per cent. hitherto borne. As regards the reactionaries in the Russian Legation, they are to be allowed to depart with Mohammad Ali, provided they give their power of attorney to their representatives, whom claimants may sue in the presence of a member of the Russian Legation. The question whether the presence of a member of the legation is to be admitted in cases where the bastis are sued through their representatives for matters arising hereafter, *e.g.*, disputes about Kanat rights, is left for settlement later between the Russian Legation and the Persian Government, and in this connection I transmit copy of a joint note which my colleague and I have addressed to the Persian Government. The four words, "pour les affaires passées," referred to in this note were the subject of long discussion in our negotiations. The delegates of the Persian Government strongly pressed that they should be inserted in article 9 after the words "poursuite civile." This would have excluded the presence of the member of the Russian Legation from cases in respect of claims arising hereafter. The contention of the delegates as regards bastis was quite in harmony with the view which this legation has taken in the past, that bast does not cover the future: but amongst the persons at the Russian Legation were certain "Russian-protected persons." These are on a different footing, and although the manner in which Russian protection has been granted in the past is a crying abuse, I could not deny that so long as the persons in question enjoyed Russian protection, and my Russian colleague was not prepared to withdraw his protection, they were entitled to the intervention of the Russian Legation, and I therefore supported my colleague. I should mention parenthetically that the delegates of the Persian Government refused to recognise the Russian protection enjoyed by these persons as other than the ordinary protection afforded by bast, and so strong is their feeling on this question that, if my Russian colleague gains his point in the negotiations foreshadowed in the enclosed note, they will probably prefer that the bastis proper should be given the extension of their ordinary privileges involved by an admission that bast covers the future as well as the past, than that any distinction should be made between those who are merely bastis and those who besides being in bast are Russian-protected persons. As we could not agree on the point at issue, it was decided, in order not on this account to delay Mohammad Ali's departure, that we should present to the Persian Government a note recording that the question should be left in suspense.

The enclosed protocol was signed by the two representatives last night, and is to be signed by all the members of the Persian Cabinet this morning. All the stipulations, the execution of which was prescribed as a preliminary to the ex-Shah's departure, have been carried out, and it is hoped that by the afternoon Mohammad Ali will be able to leave the Russian Legation with the reactionaries in his suite.

I have, &c.

G. BARCLAY.

*Inclosure 1 in No. 676.*

*Protocol signed August 25, 1909.*

EN but d'accélérer le départ de la Perse de Sa Majesté Mohammad Ali Mirza, ex-Schah de Perse, qui se trouve actuellement sous la protection des Légations d'Angleterre et de Russie, le Ministre d'Angleterre et le chargé d'affaires de Russie d'une part, et les Ministres du Gouvernement persan de l'autre part, ont dressé d'accord le protocole suivant:—

Article 1<sup>er</sup>. Sa Majesté Mohammad Ali Mirza ayant déclaré avoir délivré au Gouvernement persan tous les bijoux et autres objets de la couronne qui étaient en sa possession, le Gouvernement persan, après avoir dressé une liste de tous les bijoux et autres objets dont il a pris livraison, présentera aux deux légations une liste de ce qui manque, et de ceux qui ont été changés, et les deux légations obtiendront de Mohammad Ali Mirza des explications précises avec tous les détails possibles sur le sort de ces bijoux et autres objets, et dans le cas où quelques-uns de ceux-ci se trouveraient entre les mains de Sa Majesté elle-même ou des personnes qui se trouvent en "bast" à la Légation de Russie, ou que les détails donnés soient inexacts, les deux légations feront tout ce qui leur sera possible pour obtenir la restitution de ces objets.

Art. 2. Si à partir du 3 (16) juillet, 1909, il serait prouvé par-devant les tribunaux des deux légations que Sa Majesté Mohammad Ali Mirza aurait vendu, engagé, ou fait disparaître, à partir de cette date, des bijoux ou autres objets de la couronne, la valeur de ces objets sera déduite de sa pension par le Gouvernement persan s'il est impossible de restituer les pièces elles-mêmes.

Art. 3. Sa Majesté Mohammad Ali Mirza délivrera au Gouvernement persan tous les documents qu'il possède concernant les bijoux de la couronne engagés dans les banques ou autres maisons de prêts, ou chez des particuliers, contre des avances faites à Sa Majesté, et le Gouvernement persan pourra, selon son gré, dégager ces bijoux ainsi engagés.

Art. 4. Toutes les dettes personnelles de Sa Majesté Mohammad Ali Mirza, soit à la Banque d'Escompte de Perse, s'élevant vers le 1<sup>er</sup> janvier, 1909, à 1,413,434 tomans 6 krans 85 centimes, y compris les intérêts, soit envers les sujets étrangers, contractées avant le 3 (16) juillet, 1909, communiquées au Ministère des Affaires Etrangères avant le 19 août (1<sup>er</sup> septembre), 1909, qui devraient être toutes prouvées et dûment appuyées par des documents en ordre, seront transférées au compte du Gouvernement persan, qui sera responsable pour le paiement de ces sommes. Les détails de ces transactions formeront l'objet de documents spéciaux qui doivent être signés au plus tard le 29 août (11 septembre), 1909.

Art. 5. Sa Majesté Mohammad Ali Mirza remettra au Gouvernement persan toutes ses propriétés personnelles qui se trouvent principalement dans l'Azerbaïdjan. Sa Majesté délivrera au Gouvernement persan tous les documents les concernant et signera un document spécial les transférant au Gouvernement. Concernant les propriétés engagées à la Banque d'Escompte de Perse, cette dernière délivrera un document au Gouvernement persan en lui confirmant ce transfert. Quant aux propriétés, en cas de controverse, en principe on se basera sur le registres du Gouvernement persan.

Art. 6. Le Gouvernement persan accordera à Sa Majesté Mohammad Ali Mirza et à sa famille, à l'exception de Sa Majesté Sultan Ahmad Schah et de Mohammad Hassan Mirza, le valiahd actuel, une pension annuelle de 100,000 tomans, payables chaque trimestre d'avance, à partir du départ de Sa Majesté de la Perse, par l'entremise de la Banque d'Escompte de Perse.

Art. 7. En cas du décès de Sa Majesté Mohammad Ali Mirza le Gouvernement persan accordera à sa veuve et à ses enfants, à l'exception de Sa Majesté Sultan Ahmad Schah et de Mohammad Hassan Mirza, le valiahd actuel, une pension de 25,000 tomans par an, qui sera partagée entre eux. En cas du décès de chacun de ceux-ci sa part cessera automatiquement d'être payée.



Art. 8. Sa Majesté Mohammed Ali Mirza quittera Téhéran pour l'étranger quarante-huit heures après la signature de ce protocole.

Art. 9. Pour ce qui concerne les personnes actuellement en "bast" à la Légation de Russie, et qui jouiront des privilèges du "bast" pour leurs actes politiques passés, et dont une liste a été communiquée au Gouvernement persan dans la note No. 349 du 20 Shaban (6 septembre) de la Légation Impériale de Russie, il est entendu qu'elles ne quitteront pas la Perse sans laisser à Téhéran un fondé de pouvoirs nommé selon les conditions stipulées, et qu'en cas de poursuite civile qui pourrait être éventuellement instituée contre une de ces personnes, le fondé de pouvoirs sera tenu de se présenter au tribunal persan en présence d'un membre de la Légation de Russie pour répondre et donner satisfaction au nom de la personne qu'il représente. Cette clause concernant la présence d'un membre de la légation formant exception ne constitue pas un précédent.

Art. 10. Si quelques-unes de ces personnes revenaient en Perse elles ne jouiraient plus des privilèges susmentionnés et elles ne seraient plus reçues comme "bastis" dans aucune des deux légations.

Art. 11. Les deux représentants s'engagent à donner à Sa Majesté Mohammad Ali Mirza des injonctions sérieuses afin de s'abstenir dorénavant de toute agitation politique contre la Perse, et le Gouvernement Impérial de Russie promet, de son côté, de prendre toutes les mesures efficaces afin de ne pas permettre de semblables procédés d'agitation de sa part. Si Sa Majesté Mohammad Ali Mirza quitte la Russie et s'il est prouvé à la satisfaction des deux légations que d'un pays autre que la Russie il aurait fait des agitations politiques contre la Perse, le Gouvernement persan aura le droit de cesser de payer sa pension.

Fait en triple à Zerguendeh, ce 25 août (7 septembre), 1909.

G. BARCLAY.  
E. SABLIN.  
FARMAN FARMA, *Minister of Justice.*  
SIPAHDAR, *Minister of War.*  
SERDAR ASSAD, *Minister of Interior.*  
MUSTAFA-UL-MAMALEK, *Minister of Finance.*  
SANI-ED-DOWLEH, *Minister of Education.*  
SERDAR MANSUR, *Minister of Posts and Telegraphs.*  
MOSHAR-ES-SALTANEH, *Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Inclosure 2 in No. 676.\*

*Joint Note communicated to Persian Government.*

VU que dans l'article 9 du protocole concernant le départ de la Perse de Sa Majesté Mohammad Ali Mirza, les délégués du Gouvernement persan voulaient après les mots "de ces personnes" ajouter les mots "pour les affaires passées," ce qui aurait soulevé des difficultés et donné lieu à des discussions, les mots susindiqués ont été exclus du protocole jusqu'à un arrangement ultérieur entre le Gouvernement persan et la Légation de Russie.

Le 23 août (5 septembre), 1909.

[35735]

No. 677.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 27.)*

(No. 172.)

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith the usual monthly summary of events in Persia for the last four weeks.

I have, &c.

G. BARCLAY.

Inclosure in No. 677.

No. 9.—*Monthly Summary of Events in Persia (August 7 to September 8, 1909).*

*Tehran.*

THE protocol drawn up the 3rd August, which provided for the departure of the ex-Shah at latest on the 17th August, was not ratified or carried out, and after protracted negotiations another protocol was drawn up and completed by the 7th September providing for a pension of 100,000 tomans for Mohammed Ali Mirza, who transfers all his personal property to the Persian Government, which also takes over his personal debts, including one to the Russian Bank amounting to some 300,000*l.* The negotiators on the part of the Persian Government were the prominent members of the Nationalist committee, known as the "Directoire," including Hussein Kuli Khan Nawab, Taki Zadeh, Vosouk-ed-Dowleh, Mustashar-ed-Dowleh, and other prominent Nationalists.

The elections for fifteen members for Tehran for the National Assembly were completed in the middle of August. The following persons were chosen:—

- |                           |                                    |
|---------------------------|------------------------------------|
| 1. Haji Seyyid Nasrullah. | 9. Sani-ed-Dowleh.                 |
| 2. Ehtesham-es-Sultaneh.  | 10. Hussein Kuli Khan Nawab.       |
| 3. Vosouk-ed-Dowleh.      | 11. Assadullah Mirza.              |
| 4. Hakim-ul-Mulk.         | 12. Sheikh Mohammed Hussein Yezdi. |
| 5. Sadik-i-Hazret.        | 13. Yahya Mirza.                   |
| 6. Mustashar-ed-Dowleh.   | 14. Motamin-ul-Mulk.               |
| 7. Taki Zadeh.            | 15. Vahid-ul-Mulk.                 |
| 8. Zoka-ul-Mulk.          |                                    |

On the 1st September Mohammed Hassan Mirza, the Shah's younger brother, was officially proclaimed as valiahd, and on the same day a general amnesty for political past offences was proclaimed. Many conditions were, however, attached to this amnesty.

On the 28th August His Majesty's Minister presented his new credentials to Sultan Ahmed Shah.

Vezir Akrem, who was appointed governor of Tehran in August, has been replaced by Motamid-i-Khakan, a brother of Sadik-es-Sultaneh, the Persian commissioner for the oil company.

The new Turkish Ambassador, Ghalib Bey, arrived at Tehran early in September.

The Tehran edition of the *Habl-ul-Matin* newspaper has been suppressed and the editor punished for publishing a seditious article. At present there are about ten newspapers in Tehran, of which several are dailies. The "*Iran-i-No*" (or Modern Persia), is the latest, and is owned and run by a certain Mr. H. Basil, who was formerly the "*Daily Mail*" correspondent. It has lately published several articles of which the Russian Legation has complained officially to the Persian Government.

The Government appears to be in the hands of the Nationalist committee mentioned above, with whom it would seem that Sipahdar, the Minister of War, is not in sympathy. Most of the deputies elected for Tehran for the National Assembly are members of this committee. They have maintained order in Tehran, and have sent troops to Tabreez and Shiraz. In spite of forced contributions levied from the upper classes, they are in urgent need of money, and have applied to the Imperial Bank for an advance of 100,000 tomans on jewellery, to be sent to the Crédit Lyonnais, Paris, valued at 500,000 tomans. This operation the chief manager of the Imperial Bank has strongly recommended to his board.

The Bakhtiari and fedai are, on the whole, behaving well. One of the latter murdered two persons, and wounded a third in the bazaars a few days ago, and was subsequently court-martialled and shot.

The last public execution was that of Mir Hashem early in August. This man was a noted bad character who had been in the employ of the ex-Shah. He richly deserved his fate.

G. P. CHURCHILL, *Oriental Secretary.*



P.S.—The Zil-es-Sultan is still detained by order of the Government at Resht, and he is being pressed to pay 60,000*l.* in cash as a forced subscription to Government. He continues to evade paying, and wishes now to return to Europe.

The ex-Shah left the Russian Legation on the 9th September accompanied by his wife and a considerable suite, including Amir Bahadur Jang. His departure from Zerguendeh was witnessed by a large number of people. His Majesty was accompanied by about twenty Russian Cossacks and three Indian sowars as far as Mehrabad, where he spent the night. From there to Enzeli he will be escorted by three Cossacks and three sowars sent by the two legations, as well as a member of the staff of each. It has been arranged by the Russian Government for the ex-Shah to reside at Odessa.

G. P. C.

#### *Tabreez.*

1. Mukhbar-es-Sultaneh, the new governor-general, arrived on the 20th August from Europe via Julfa.

2. About the 23rd August three detachments of Russian troops, each about eighty strong, left Tabreez for the Meshapur district, Ahar, and Sopb respectively. The chief of the Staff and other general staff officers accompanied the detachments. The pretext given for the dispatch of these troops was that certain Christian villages which had been pillaged by a relative of Rahim Khan had appealed for help, but the Russian consul-general admitted to His Majesty's consul that the real reason was to map the country. Mr. Smart pointed out the danger of undesirable incidents occurring, and also of a Russian force joining Rahim Khan at a moment when the Persian Government was threatening him. Mr. Smart expresses the opinion that his colleague's explanations are not quite sincere. M. Miller agrees with Mr. Smart that a gradual reduction of Russian troops in Azerbaijan should be begun, but he seems to think that some 1,100 should remain at Tabreez during the winter to guard the Tabreez-Julfa road.

3. Some "fedais," who, according to the Russian account, had wounded and carried off an employé of the Russian Road Company to a village between Marand and Julfa, were attacked by twenty-five Russian Cossacks about the 10th August. The Cossacks had one horse killed. They killed three and wounded seven of the "fedais," the remainder fled, and the employé was rescued. According to the Persian account the "fedais" were extorting money from the villagers who called in the Russians. The incident caused no excitement.

#### *Resht.*

1. The town has remained quiet. Sardar-i-Motamid has been appointed governor of Ghilan and Talish.

2. Zil-es-Sultan, who returned to Persia from Europe against the advice of the two Powers, thereby forfeiting his right to their protection, was arrested at Manjil when on his way to Tehran and brought back to Resht. He is not in any way ill-treated, and is allowed to move about freely, but is always kept under observation by twenty men, styled "guards of honour." He is understood to have given the new Government a promise to pay them 60,000*l.*, besides foregoing the repayment of 14,000*l.* lent by him to the Nationalists two years ago. He has, however, paid nothing, but is in communication with two of his sons in Tehran who are endeavouring, by threatening to take refuge in the Russian Legation to get that legation to obtain the release of their father. The latter has, through His Majesty's vice-consul at Resht, appealed to Mr. Churchill and M. Baronowsky to help him.

3. Private advices state that the Kavkaz-Mercury Company, which manages the Baku-Enzeli steamer service and also transports goods from Enzeli to Tehran, is deliberately holding back goods at Baku on the ground that the Enzeli-Tehran road is unsafe. There is no foundation whatever for this idea, the road having remained perfectly safe throughout the troubles in Persia.

4. The nomination of M. Olferieff, Russian vice-consul at Ardebil, to Van and of M. Schritter, Russian consul-general for Ghilan, to Erzeroum has given rise to much comment. It is generally believed that the Russian Government are dissatisfied with these consular officers for not reporting correctly on public opinion and feeling in Persia.

5. The six members for Ghilan in the National Assembly have been elected. Some of them have already arrived at Tehran.

#### *Astrabad.*

Early in August Salar-i-Moazaz, governor of Kutool, demanded the payment of taxes by the people. On the latter refusing to pay he joined the Dujees, and sent some Day Turkomans to Kutool, where they burnt several villages and carried off a large number of cattle. The people then rose and plundered the property of Salar-i-Moazaz, and the latter, having narrowly escaped with his life, is now trying to raise a force among the Turkomans. The Jaferbai and Day Turkomans are said to intend to fight the constitutional Government. Repeating rifles are said to have been brought from Russia to Gunush Teppe for sale. Sipahdar has telegraphed to Salar-i-Mukarram appointing him deputy governor, and promising to send him two regiments of infantry.

#### *Meshed.*

The town and district have remained undisturbed. Rukn-ed-Dowleh, who has been confirmed in the appointment of governor-general by the new Government, complains that he has no power. The local Assembly have informed him that he must do nothing until precise instructions reach him from Tehran. A boycott of Russian goods exists; Major Sykes has endeavoured to get it stopped, but states that the Russians continue to act in the most tactless manner. The boycott was on the increase in the middle of August. The appointment of a member of the Kawam-ul-Mulk's family to be Russian consular agent at Shiraz has caused much ill-feeling at Meshed. Prince Dabija has been behaving in a rather more friendly and reasonable manner in his dealings with His Majesty's consul-general.

#### *Turbat-i-Haidari.*

1. The news of the deposition of Muhammad Ali Shah was well received at Turbat. The British and Russian consuls were invited to and attended an entertainment in honour of Sultan's Ahmad's accession.

2. On the 20th July six Russian Cossacks left for Karez escorting treasure. On the 29th six arrived from Karez en route to Kerman. On the 1st August ten arrived to relieve part of the Russian consular guard, and ten relieved men left for Russia.

3. Rafat-ed-Dowleh arrived at Turshiz and took up the appointment of governor on the 11th August.

4. In the middle of August Shuja-ul-Mulk with 300 horsemen was said to be near Zawa. His mission was to recover the property of the late Shaji-ul-Mulk, which was seized by Assadullah at Doulatabad. The latter was preparing to resist, and the latest news is that he has been killed.

#### *Seistan.*

1. Hissam-ed-Dowleh has been dismissed from the governorship, and Shaukat-ul-Mulk has been re-appointed to the post.

2. The Minister for Foreign Affairs has called for a report from the Foreign Office agent regarding the best method of stopping arms caravans.

3. Baron Teherkassov, the new Russian consul for Seistan, arrived at Birjand on the 28th July and was given a very good official reception by the governor. The traders, however, abstained from going out to welcome him. As the Russian consul is likely to remain at Birjand for the winter, Mr. Howson has been appointed His Majesty's acting vice-consul at Birjand.

4. The news of recent events at Tehran was received with great satisfaction by the trading and well-to-do classes at Birjand. The town was illuminated for two nights. It is commonly said that Persia owes it to British action that a reactionary régime under Russian auspices has not been established in Persia.\* In Seistan the news caused no excitement.

5. Lieutenant-Colonel von der Flaas recently said that he hoped to leave Seistan shortly to take up the command of a regiment. He has been busy making detailed enquiries in the frontier districts of Seistan regarding troops, arms, and equipment. A list of queries has been confidentially circulated by Russian agents, and rewards have been offered for information.

6. The Khan of Sunnikhana and his confidential secretary lately mentioned to



Major Kennion that when the Ameer was last at Herat he sent messages to the Khan offering him protection if he was oppressed by the Shah. Major Kennion states that this district has always had leanings towards Afghanistan, and he thinks the Khan would welcome a change of masters.

7. During July 5,882 cases were treated and thirty-seven operations performed in the consular hospital.

8. M. Milkevitch, the Russian bank manager, left Seistan for Russia on the 2nd August. He will not return. No mention has been made of a successor.

9. The Seistan-Meshed telegraph line is in urgent need of some repairs to the wires just outside the telegraph office at Seistan. The Russian telegraphist states that it is not his business. The British telegraph official has done such repairs as he can but they are only temporary and may break down any day.

10. Major O'Connor took over the duties of consul in Seistan from Major Kennion at Meshed on the 5th September.

#### *Ispahan.*

1. The town has been remarkably quiet. The new chief of police is proving himself very efficient. There is, however, much discontent in the town against the incapacity of Samsam-es-Sultaneh who, on his side, appears to be more and more disgusted with his task. He states that he has several times sent in his resignation. He views with disfavour the appointment by Sirdar-i-Assad of Salar-i-Jung as governor of Yezd, and of three other Khans as chiefs of certain regiments. Salar-i-Jung arrived at Ispahan on the 22nd August, and left on the 25th for the Bakhtiari country. It is doubted if he will eventually go to Yezd.

2. Considerable interest has been displayed in the elections for the National Assembly, the results of which were to be published on the 5th September.

3. Iman Kuli Khan has been placed in charge of the Tehran and Yezd roads. Most of the roads appear to be much safer than for some time past. The Shiraz road as far as Abadeh has been quite safe lately. A caravan of 700 animals which reached Ispahan about the 14th August, gave an unsatisfactory account of the Sultanabad road. The only robbery reported was that of the post to Tehran, near Murchikhurd, on the 2nd August.

4. Asaf-ed-Dowleh, ex-governor-general of Fars, arrived on the 19th August from Shiraz, and left for Tehran on the 26th.

5. Reports from Sultanabad describe the surrounding country as being in great disorder, owing to the depredations of the Lurs. The latter are under the governor of Burujird and the governor of Iraq, Kaim Makam, having no troops, is powerless to control them, or to restore order. The Kasas, Farahan, and Sareband districts have been overrun by Lurs, and it is believed that the carpet-making industry has suffered severely. In Sultanabad many people have Russian flags which they intend hoisting in case of danger. A Russian flag has been hoisted over the village of Gils belonging to Saram-ed-Dowleh. It is not known if these flags have been sent from Tehran or from Ispahan. The prevailing insecurity is making the new Government unpopular.

#### *Yezd.*

1. Since about the middle of August, Yezd has been cut off from all communication by road with other places. Several large bodies of robbers, 200 to 600 strong, have been on the move. They are reported to belong to the Arab tribes of Fars who are subject to Kawam-ul-Mulk. Many posts have been robbed. On the 24th August, two English missionary ladies returning to Yezd from the hills were robbed of their belongings and threatened by a band of robbers said to have been Fars tribesmen. His Majesty's Minister has requested the Persian Government to take immediate steps to punish the robbers and recover the stolen property. On the 28th August the town was reported to be quite quiet.

2. The elections for the National Assembly have been delayed by the action of some town roughs, who threatened to fire on the people if the elections were continued.

3. Salar-i-Jung, Bakhtiari, has been appointed governor of Yezd. He was at Ispahan on the 22nd August and has since gone to Bakhtiari country. He has not yet taken up the governorship.

#### *Kerman.*

1. On the 17th July a telegram was received from Sipahdar announcing the accession of the new Shah, and confirming all officials in their posts. The town was

illuminated for three nights on a not very lavish scale. The Kermanis are not fond of the Kajars, and they are also sceptical as to the other tribes submitting to the leadership of the Bakhtiari.

2. The danger of a movement on Kerman by Baluchis seems to be over. Sardar Saeed Khan, Baluchi, has written to Major Cox that he has no intention of undertaking an expedition. He arrived at Bampur about the 15th July and there met Bahram Khan, whose force was said to number 3,000. It appears that a joint open revolt was contemplated, but Saeed Khan hesitated to commit himself until he was certain that the Central Government was powerless. He is said to have withdrawn from Bampur after paying the garrison of the fort, on condition that if a Shah is ruling they hold the fort, but if a National Assembly is set up he will send them off to Bam.

3. Towards the end of July there was a slight disturbance in the town, in which one man was killed and two were wounded. It arose out of a quarrel between a son of the late Agha Baqir and the deputy-governor. The latter has resigned, and has been replaced by Nasrat-ul-Mumalik. Nizam-es-Sultaneh's appointment to the governorship has been cancelled.

4. On the 20th August Mr. A. Wright, of the Imperial Bank of Persia, who left Kerman in spite of the warning of His Majesty's consul that the road was unsafe, was held up by robbers at Nasirieh, some 60 miles west of Kerman. The robbers numbered from 600 to 1,000. They do not appear to have intended any harm to Mr. Wright, but to have wished to prevent him making known their movements to the authorities. One of Mr. Wright's escort is, however, reported to have died of wounds received from the robbers. Mr. Wright was released on the 23rd August, and was joined by Mr. James, of the Indo-European Telegraph Department, who had come out from Kamalabad to get news of him, and to repair the telegraph line which had been cut by the robbers. They subsequently found themselves in Rafsinjan, when it was being attacked by the robbers, and though it does not appear that they were themselves attacked they were in some danger from stray bullets. The robbers later withdrew, and on the 26th August were 15 miles south-east of Kamalabad. They are said to be Fars tribesmen—Baharlus. On receiving a complaint from His Majesty's Minister as to their conduct, the Minister of the Interior ordered Kawam-ul-Mulk at Shiraz to take immediate steps to control the tribe, which is under his orders. Kawam-ul-Mulk is reported to have started with a force for this purpose, and has meanwhile had the relatives of the chiefs of the tribe arrested at Shiraz. He has also telegraphed to the robbers that he will ravage their homes. At the beginning of September the robbers were still busy plundering villages.

#### *Kermanshah.*

1. Mr. McDouall, on transfer from Muhammerah, arrived at Kermanshah on the 16th August, and was met by representatives of the governor and the Foreign Office agent.

2. Zahir-ed-Dowleh retains the post of governor. He is somewhat helpless against Zahir-ul-Mulk, but has been promised support by the Central Government, who have dispatched thirty Persian Cossacks and seventy irregular horsemen to assist him. Sipahdar telegraphed to the townspeople that the English and Russian nations had greatly helped in getting the constitution, and there should be no ill-feeling against them. He also telegraphed that Mukhtar-es-Sultaneh had been appointed to command the military forces in Kermanshah, and that he would arrive shortly with a regiment of his own. This will curtail the power of Zahir-ul-Mulk, in whose hands the regiments at present are.

3. The three members of the National Assembly for Kermanshah have been elected.

4. From a report received at this legation from His Majesty's consul-general at Bagdad it appears that Abdullah, Zinjani, a well-known priest of Najaf, went early in August to Kasr-i-Shirin to telegraph in his own name and that of Mullah Muhammad, Khorassani, that revenue should be paid to the new Shah, and that steps should be taken to quiet the people. On the 21st August the priests of Kermanshah received a telegram from Mullah Muhammad, stating that they should do their best to stop disturbances such as, he had heard, had occurred at Kermanshah, and prevent their recurrence.

5. The Russian consul sent a telegram in Persian to his legation recently, complaining that the Foreign Office agent was not attending to matters concerning foreigners, and urging his dismissal.



6. Two circular telegrams were received by the Governor from the Minister of the Interior on the subject of guarding the roads. Their purport was that the road guards should be dressed in uniform and should receive wages, so that they may not molest travellers, and that better guards should escort foreign travellers.

#### Shiraz.

1. The town has remained quiet, awaiting the arrival of the new governor, Sahamed-Dowleh, who left Ispahan by post-carriage on the 2nd September. Lieutenant Crosthwaite, who brought up the reinforcement for the consular guard, started for Bushire with five sowars, but a severe attack of fever compelled him to return to Shiraz from Dashtarjin. The Arab tribes seem to have got completely out of hand, the zone of their operations extending to Rafsinjan and Yezd. They interfered with telegraphic communication near Shiraz seventeen times between the 5th and 25th August. The Kawam-ul-Mulk, though among the tribesmen, appears to have been unable to control them. Latest reports are, however, to the effect that he has started with a force to restore order. This is the result of orders from the Central Government. The Qashgais appear to have remained quiet, and His Majesty's consul reports that a notable feature has been the control exercised over them by Soulat-ed-Dowleh. The latter left Shiraz for Abadeh on the 16th August to meet the new governor-general. The main Ispahan road has been completely closed by robbers as far as Abadeh, and Mr. Middleton, late of the Imperial Bank of Persia, was on the 18th August robbed on it two stages from Shiraz. He had left Shiraz without informing His Majesty's consul or obtaining guards. At this time of year most caravans use the Sarhad road to Ispahan, and this route appears to have remained open. One hundred and fifty Persian Cossacks and 150 other horsemen left Tehran for Shiraz on the 3rd September as an escort for the governor-general. The Lari Seyyid is reported to have retaken Lar on the 30th July. His probable movements caused some anxiety, but Mr. Bill thinks that Soulat-ed-Dowleh will take care that he does not disturb the neighbourhood of Shiraz.

2. On the 16th August, the Russian consul spoke to Mr. Bill about the appointment of Nasr-ed-Dowleh as Russian consular agent. He asked whether negotiations were proceeding at Tehran and said he understood that the appointment had created a bad impression in London. Mr. Bill replied that this was the case, and that he thought that probably in view of the importance of the matter, His Majesty's Minister was awaiting the arrival of the new Russian Minister at Tehran to get the question settled. M. Kadlubouski laid stress on the difficult situation he would be in if the appointment were publicly cancelled. He suggested that Nasr-ed-Dowleh should go "on leave" to Europe, and that while he was away, a Russian vice-consul, to be secretary to the consul-general at Bushire, should be appointed. The consular agent would thus be superseded. Mr. Bill said that he had already recommended the departure of Nasr-ed-Dowleh, and that the question of the appointment should be dropped. M. Kadlubouski said that he believed that Nasr-ed-Dowleh was ready to go, but had asked that a Russian subject be placed nominally in charge of his property. What would be Mr. Bill's attitude if this were done? Mr. Bill replied that he had rejected a similar proposal made by the Kawam. If the present proposal were accepted, either Russian protection would be invoked constantly throughout Fars, or it would be discredited as valueless. He thought neither was desirable from the Russian point of view. His desire was that both consuls should work together in an entirely impartial manner. To this M. Kadlubouski agreed, but Mr. Bill thinks he is likely to persist in recommending his own proposal privately. Nasr-ed-Dowleh called on Mr. Bill the next day, and said he wished to leave Persia, but the Persian Government had three times refused him permission to do so. The question of cancelling his appointment awaits M. Poklevski's arrival. Meanwhile M. Sabline has agreed not to protect his property as proposed by M. Kadlubouski.

#### Bushire.

1. On the 12th July telegrams were received at Bushire stating that the chief priests of Najaf were contemplating an advance into Persia, and preaching holy war against Russia. Seyyid Assadullah convened a meeting in support of them, and a subscription was opened. 600*l.* was promised, of which 240*l.* was remitted to Ispahan on the 16th to the Nationalist leaders.

2. As soon as Darya Begi withdrew from Tangistan, Rais Ali and Hassan Bakshoo reoccupied their villages. The leniency shown these men by Darya Begi under orders

from Tehran is to be regretted. Hassan Bakshoo arrived on the 29th with twenty-five men near Subzabad, 7 miles from Bushire. He was said to have come to complain to the local assembly against Darya Begi.

3. On the 21st July, Darya Begi received a telegram from Sipahdar instructing him to inform khans, sheikhs, &c., of the Nationalist success, and to order them to refrain from making disturbances, otherwise they would have to answer for the consequences. On the same day the governor received a telegram announcing that holidays should be observed for three days on account of the accession of the new Shah. All the leading people were summoned, and the telegram was read to them. The bazaars were closed, and there were some illuminations and fireworks. The principal entertainment, however, was got up by Mirza Hussein, the German consulate mirza assisted by Haji Mohammed Hassan (Messrs. Wonckhaus' broker) and Ali Ahremi, a French consulate employé. The entertainment took place on the sea front, and was a great success. Darya Begi called and congratulated Mirza Hussein and his friends on the success of their entertainment. The three men were all supporters of Seyyid Murteza in the late disturbances, and may have done this to curry favour with Darya Begi; more probably it was done with a view to impressing on the people the importance of Mirza Hussein.

4. The local assembly meets several times a week. On the 26th July the departure of the reinforcement for the Shiraz consular guard was discussed as also were telegrams on the subject received from the Sardar-i-Assad and others. Sardar-i-Assad said in his telegram that strict orders had been sent to Soulat-ed-Dowleh and to Seyyid Abdul Hussein Lari not to make trouble. Seyyid Assadullah telegraphed to these two leaders in the same sense. At a meeting held on the 2nd August, Darya Begi read out two telegrams from the Minister of the Interior. One called upon his Excellency to recover 1,200*l.*, robbed from the Bundar Abbas Customs, and also the rifles stolen from the Bushire Customs. The second telegram directed his Excellency to expel Seyyid Shubber from Lingah, apparently on the complaint of the Customs Department. Seyyid Assadullah called upon the members to help Darya Begi to carry out the orders regarding the recovery of money and guns. In regard to the second matter, it was decided that Sheikh Ali Dashti should go to Lingah and enquire into the matter, in case the affair had been misrepresented by the director of customs. A suggestion was made by Seyyid Assadullah that the Assembly should nominate a small court of justice to settle cases.

5. The Bushire-Shiraz road has lately been in very bad condition, there being constant fighting at Konar Takhteh. Caravans have recently been using the Firuzabad route.

6. Major Cox, having left for Europe on three and a-half months' leave, Major Trevor officiates as resident and consul-general.

#### Bunder Abbas.

News was received on the 16th July of the Nationalists' successes at Tehran, and that the Shah had taken refuge in the Russian Legation. The telegram conveying the news was publicly read in the house of Sheikh Ali. News of the accession of Sultan Ahmad Shah was received with great pleasure by the people on the 18th, the bearer of the good news, the Persian telegraph official, being publicly presented with a robe of honour and a gold watch. The whole bazaar was closed on the 17th July, and a meeting of the leading men was held. A subscription was opened for a holy war against the Russians, and 150*l.* were promised. His Majesty's consul is, however, confidentially informed that one of the most respectable merchants in the town, himself the second largest subscriber, succeeded in purloining the subscription list at the meeting itself. More difficulty than usual is therefore likely to be experienced in realising the subscriptions.

#### Lingah.

Sheikh Saleh, Zabit Charek, and Keis has, by a stratagem, arrested his kinsman Mohammad Hassan, who threatened to seize Keis, and has thereby relieved the British Indian traders residing in Keis of a good deal of anxiety. Mohammad Hassan is the same man who illtreated a Hindoo in 1907 and subsequently fired on the boat of the residency agent, Lingah, for which he was punished by Darya Begi.



## Mohammerah.

1. Writing on the 17th July His Majesty's consul reported that Sardar Arfa had given a lease to the Anglo-Persian Oil Company of the land required by them.

2. Previous to his departure from Mohammerah Mr. McDouall was entertained at dinner by the Foreign Office agent, by the director of customs, and by Haji Rias, on behalf of the Sardar Arfa. Haja Rais, on behalf of Sirdar Arfa, expressed the keenest regret at Mr. McDouall's departure and high appreciation of his services to Mohammerah. He also heartily thanked the British for their assistance in restoring the constitution, and bringing about a better state of things in Persia.

3. The date crop is likely to be 25 to 75 per cent. better than that of last year, and perhaps the best for a decade.

4. Sheikh Hanzal remains in custody. The general opinion is that he plotted against Sardar Arfa's life, and that the latter is justified in confining him.

C. B. STOKES, Major,  
Military Attaché.

[35738]

No. 678.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 27.)*

(No. 18. Commercial.)

Sir,

*Gulahek, September 5, 1909.*

IN the course of the last two or three years His Majesty's consul at Sistan pointed out more than once the difficulties to which Birjand merchants were subject in passing their Indian imports through the Customs, but in spite of repeated representations on the part of His Majesty's legation, the Central Administration of Customs did not find it possible to improve the position of the traders. Now, however, I have the honour to report that I have been successful in persuading M. Mornard to establish, as an experiment for six months, a custom-house at Birjand, whereby the difficulty will, I hope, be effectually overcome.

Hitherto, Birjand merchants in Indian goods have had two alternatives. They could either clear their goods at Nasratabad, which entailed a long circuitous route and exposed the merchandise to damage by water and the pack animals to damage by flies in the Helmund swamp; or they could appoint an agent to represent them at the custom-house at Kuh Malik-i-Siah. This latter course entailed considerable difficulties, however, as regards payment of dues and the possibility of finding a reliable agent, Kuh Malik-i-Siah being a remote and very unhealthy frontier post.

The establishment of a custom-house at Birjand will confer various benefits on traders in that district.

They will be able always to use the new Palang Kuh route from Kuh Malik-i-Siah and thus save both time and expense in transport.

The interest on their money for the period that hitherto elapsed between the payment of customs dues at Kuh Malik-i-Siah or Sistan (Nasratabad) and the receipt of the goods in Birjand will be saved, and they will obtain the convenience of storing their goods in the bonded warehouse at Birjand until they deem it advisable to clear them.

The only conditions that M. Mornard has found it necessary to attach to the establishment of the new custom-house are that the goods shall be subject to a summary examination at the frontier, and that the importer shall be held responsible for any false declaration or attempted fraud.

These measures have been necessitated by the experience of the customs administration at Meshed, where arms have often been smuggled under the description of glassware and sealed at the frontier without examination for transit to Meshed. At that place the seals were found broken, the arms having been extracted *en route*. The importer was never at a loss to produce technically satisfactory evidence as to how the seals had got broken in transit, and without the above-mentioned conditions such abuses could not be stopped.

The Birjand custom-house is to be opened on the 1st November, and it is to be hoped that traders will support the administration as much as possible in what must be regarded as a praiseworthy experiment on its part.

I have, &c.  
G. BARCLAY.

[35749]

No. 679.

*Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 27.)*

(No. 493.)

Sir,

*St. Petersburg, September 12, 1909.*

I INFORMED M. Sazonow yesterday that the Persian Government were desirous that the erection of a second wire on the Tehran-Shahrud line should be commenced without delay, and I had added that I had understood from the memorandum, which the Russian Government had communicated on the 16th (29th) May last, that the Imperial Government were also anxious that the work should be proceeded with as soon as possible. In these circumstances I presumed that I might telegraph to my Government that the Russian Government had no objection whatever to the necessary work being at once commenced on the line. His Excellency said that I had correctly interpreted the wishes of the Russian Government, and that I could telegraph in the sense which I had mentioned.

I have, &c.  
A. NICOLSON.

[35750]

No. 680.

*Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 27.)*

(No. 494.)

Sir,

*St. Petersburg, September 12, 1909.*

I HAVE spoken both to M. Sazonow and M. Poklewsky in regard to the continued presence of Russian troops in Persia, and they have both assured me that not only they themselves, but also the Ministers of War and of Finance, are desirous of taking the earliest possible steps towards largely reducing the Russian forces. They, at the same time, both complained of the attitude of the Persian Government towards the Russian authorities, which they characterised as unnecessarily irritating. I intimated that this attitude would probably change immediately the Persian Government witnessed the withdrawal of the whole or a large portion of the Russian forces. I told M. Sazonow that the Persian Minister had called upon me, and had dwelt on the unfortunate effect which the presence of Russian troops was causing among the population, and that he had expressed the hope that the Russian Government would soon withdraw their forces. He had said that he himself had no doubt in his own mind that the Russian Government were anxious to reduce the number of their troops, as the prolongation of their stay in Persia was costing a considerable sum of money, and was not improving the position of Russia. I told M. Sazonow that I had mentioned to Isaak Khan that I believed that immediately M. Poklewsky arrived in Tehran he would examine the question of the withdrawal or reduction, and that I was sure that he was correct in his opinion that the Russian Government had no desire to retain the troops a moment longer than was necessary. At the same time, it seemed to me that the solution of the question would be greatly facilitated and hastened if the Persian authorities adopted a friendly and conciliatory attitude towards Russia. The latter was a neighbour, and a very powerful neighbour of Persia, and it would be unwise to cause her irritation over comparatively minor questions. M. Sazonow thanked me for what I had said to Isaak Khan, and said that M. Poklewsky was leaving for Tehran on the 15th instant, and would lose no time in dealing with the question of the troops. I replied that I was glad to hear this, as the sooner all causes of distrust and suspicion were removed from the minds of the Persian Government and people the better it would be for all parties.

I am under the impression that M. Poklewsky will, in deciding on the reduction of the troops, endeavour simultaneously to arrange with the Persian Government certain of the questions which are at present in dispute.

I have, &c.  
A. NICOLSON.



[35753]

No. 681.

*Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 27.)*

(No. 499.)

Sir,

*St. Petersburg, September 14, 1909.*

M. POKLEWSKY informed me last night that the Persian Minister here had addressed a request to the Russian Government that the Russian bank at Tehran should be authorised to advance a sum of 2,000,000 roubles, a little over 200,000*l.* I enquired of M. Sazonow this afternoon whether the Russian Government were disposed to entertain this request, either to the full amount or for a more moderate sum. His Excellency said that the Minister of Finance was much opposed to making any further advances to the Persian Government; and, moreover, the attitude of the latter had of late been so exceedingly irritating and unfriendly that the Ministry for Foreign Affairs were not at all inclined to recommend any advances. The moment was scarcely well chosen to ask favours of the Russian Government, but if the assembly, when it met, evinced a desire to be more conciliatory the question of an advance might then be considered. I asked if the Persian Government had indicated any willingness to accept a control over the expenditure of any moneys which might be furnished them. M. Sazonow replied in the negative, and enquired whether the Imperial Bank of Persia had come to any arrangement as to an advance. I said that I did not know how this matter exactly stood at present, but that I would enquire.

I am to see the Minister of Finance to-morrow, and in the course of conversation I will ascertain from him his views as to affording pecuniary assistance to the Persian Government.

I asked M. Sazonow whether he thought that the Persian Government, in their financial distress, might not turn to other countries for some assistance if the Russian Government were to maintain their *non possumus* attitude. He replied that he did not believe that Germany would care to risk lending money to a Government whose stability was by no means assured; and, moreover, German finances were hardly so flourishing as to be in a position to be hazarded in ventures in Persia.

I have, &amp;c.

A. NICOLSON.

[35755]

No. 682.

*Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 27.)*

(No. 501.)

Sir,

*St. Petersburg, September 14, 1909.*

I HAD the honour to forward by post a copy of the *aide-mémoire* which I received from M. Sazonow to-day in regard to the Russian authorities undertaking repairs on the Meshed-Nasratabad telegraph line. The intention of the Russian Government to execute these repairs is it is true not in accordance with the assurance given in the *aide-mémoire* of the 5th March, 1908, "Qu'aucune réparation ne sera faite par les employés russes sur la section Khaf-Seistan"; but according to the information which they have received the execution of repairs is urgently required if a breakdown of telegraphic communication is to be avoided. Moreover the Russian Government in 1908 expressed their readiness to agree to any measures which His Majesty's Government might propose with a view of maintaining the telegraph line in proper working order, and I am unable to discover that any proposals were put forward in response to this suggestion. As more than a year has elapsed since this offer was made on the part of the Russian Government, it would be difficult, it seems to me, for us to object to the necessary repairs being executed by the Russian Government, especially as I presume our officers are maintaining the Tehran-Meshed line in an efficient condition.

I made no remarks when M. Sazonow handed me the *aide-mémoire*, beyond an observation that I personally much regretted that it was considered that the opportune moment had not yet arrived for effecting the exchange of the two telegraph lines. M. Sazonow enquired whether the two administrations could not of their own initiative effect the exchange, and thus present the Persian Government with an accomplished fact. I replied that this course could hardly be followed. The lines were not the property either of the British or of the Russian Government, and all that the two Governments were entitled to do, unless I was mistaken, was to maintain the upkeep of the line; and even their right to do this much was, so far as I was aware, not acknow-

ledged and embodied in any formal agreement with the Persian Government. I related to his Excellency the origin of our control over the Meshed line, as it had been initiated during the time I was chargé d'affaires at Tehran, and I expressed my belief that the right of the Russian Government to supervise the Seistan lines was not more precise and definite than was ours. We would, therefore, have to approach the Persian Government on the subject, and, so far as I recollected, it had been the opinion of our two legations that the question could be more conveniently and more innocently broached by the two telegraph administrations than by the official representatives of the two Governments.

I have, &amp;c.

A. NICOLSON.

[35756]

No. 683.

*Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 27.)*

(No. 503.)

Sir,

*St. Petersburg, September 16, 1909.*

I ENQUIRED of M. Kokovtsoff yesterday what were his views as to the request which had recently been made by the Persian Government for an advance of 200,000*l.* from the Russian Bank. His Excellency said that personally he was much opposed to any further advances being made to the Persian Government. The state of affairs in that country afforded no guarantee either that the money would be properly expended or that it would ever be repaid. Russia had already lent considerable sums to Persia, and but little benefit had accrued. The country was still in a state of anarchy, and there seemed little prospect of order being evolved. He considered that the present Government contained no elements of stability, and he was disinclined to risk any further financial grants. I said that without some means it would be difficult for any Government to maintain order, and that of course some supervision would have to be exercised over the proper expenditure of the advances. M. Kokovtsoff remarked that an efficient control, even if accepted by the Persian Government, would be exceedingly difficult in present circumstances to exercise. However, if His Majesty's Government were willing to adventure an advance, he would be ready to follow their example, though it would, in his opinion, be throwing good money away. I said that I felt sure that my Government would make no advance without some control being established, but perhaps the banks might, on some security, furnish a modest financial aid. M. Kokovtsoff said that he did not see what advantage would be gained by small advances of 50,000*l.* or 100,000*l.* He dwelt at some length on the insecurity of the roads, and on the losses to which Russian trade had been subjected, and expressed the opinion that the presence of the Russian troops alone afforded security that the trade routes would be kept open. He was anxious that the number of Russian troops should be largely reduced, but some evidence would have to be shown that the Persian authorities were in a position to prevent a relapse to brigandage and disorder. He would send me a translation of a report which he had received from the Russian bank manager at Tehran of a conversation which the latter had had with the Sipahdar, and which he thought would be of interest to me.

I have, &amp;c.

A. NICOLSON.

[36197]

No. 684.

*Note on the State of the Bushire-Shiraz Road, August 1909.—(Communicated by Major Cox, September 27, 1909.)*

A FACT about the present condition (of insecurity) of the Bushire-Kazerun-Shiraz road which seems to call for more attention than it has yet received was pointed out to me by Mr. Mackerdich at Borasjun. He told me that for some time past men of the villages on the road have been realising all their available capital in order to buy a rifle, they then adopt the profession of tofangchi and prey on the kafilas using the road. Their livelihood depends on the road being used as a trade route, but their numbers and their extortions and thefts tend to make commerce impossible.

Soulet-ed-Dowleh's recent action with regard to the Firouzabad route has resulted in all the traffic being deviated from the Kazerun route, and the tofangchis on the

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latter road are now reduced to desperate straits, and in order to bring the kafilas back to their own road they are moving over in bands to rob on the Firouzabad route so as to make the latter even more hazardous than the former.

The important point is that there are now about 2,000 men on the Bushire-Kazerun road who have sunk their all in the purchase of a rifle, and have no possible means of earning a living save by extorting money from charvadars and by petty thefts of merchandise, and it would seem that they will have to be taken into consideration when any scheme for the policing or protection of the road is being formulated.

On my journey down from Shiraz, accompanied by five sowars of the 12th Cavalry, when passing through Deris, near Kazerun, I was surrounded by a party of about twenty tofangchis demanding money. When I refused to pay anything, one tofangchi covered me with his rifle, and I have no doubt my caravan would have been robbed, but for the presence of the sowars.

Mr. Mackerdich says that the tofangchis will continue to live by plunder and extortion until the import of cartridges into Southern Persia is stopped.

The reinforcement marching to Shiraz was the first caravan to use the road for four months, and charvadars in Shiraz refuse to use the route unless escorted, the brutality of the tofangchis being dreaded by them as much as extortion.

J. S. CROSTHWAITE,  
Second Assistant Resident.

[35967] No. 685.

*Treasury to Foreign Office.—(Received September 27.)*

Sir,  
I AM directed by the Lords Commissioners of His Majesty's Treasury to acknowledge the receipt of Sir F. Campbell's letter of the 23rd instant, relative to the suggestion made by His Majesty's Minister at Tehran that the consular guard at Shiraz should be maintained at its present strength at any rate to the end of next year, in view of the disturbed state of the province.

Their Lordships direct me to request you to inform Sir E. Grey that, on the understanding that the measure is considered necessary for the safety of the British consulate and that the Secretary of State for India in council concurs, they consent to one-half of the expense involved being charged to Imperial funds.

I am, &c.  
T. L. HEATH.

[35957] No. 686.

*India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received September 27.)*

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Viscount Morley, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram to the Viceroy, dated the 22nd September, relative to the proposed topographical survey in Western Persia.

*India Office, September 25, 1909.*

Inclosure in No. 686.

*Viscount Morley to Government of India.*

(Telegraphic.) P.  
PROPOSED topographical survey in Western Persia. Please see papers forwarded with letter dated the 17th instant from secretary, political department, India Office. Please state whether services of officer for survey can be spared and arrangements stated in company's letter of the 6th instant be made. Necessary action should be taken as soon as possible, if you agree. Cost defrayed by company.

[36007]

No. 687.

*India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received September 27.)*

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Viscount Morley, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 27th September, regarding Abu Musa.

*India Office, September 27, 1909.*

Inclosure in No. 687.

*Government of India to Viscount Morley.*

(Telegraphic.) P.  
REFERENCE is invited to letter dated the 22nd ultimo from resident, Persian Gulf, and letter dated the 1st instant from India Office to Foreign Office, respecting Abu Musa. We share view of resident that, unless island is closed altogether to oxide industry, British interests and prestige in Gulf will be detrimentally affected by pledge given to German Government involving cessation of mining operations. If industry were closed altogether, question of compensating sheikh would be raised, and our position in the Gulf might be reacted upon. Please let us know whether communication has been made to German Government in terms suggested by Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (*vide* letter dated the 23rd ultimo from Foreign Office to India Office).  
September 27, 1909.

[35881] No. 688.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 27.)*

(No. 740.)  
(Telegraphic.) P.  
ZIL-ES-SULTAN.  
Gulahek, September 27, 1909.

Please see my telegram No. 731 of the 19th September.  
His Imperial Highness has paid to the Persian Government 100,000 tomans which he raised with the assistance of the Imperial Bank.  
He will leave by the next steamer from Enzeli.

[35934] No. 689.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 27.)*

(No. 741.)  
(Telegraphic.) P.  
INDIAN oil guard.  
Tehran, September 27, 1909.

Please see your telegrams Nos. 432 and 458 of the 23rd August and the 9th September respectively, and my telegram No. 720 of the 8th September.

Twenty tomans a-month for four to five months would be required for the four men of the escort for Wilson's tour.

When I learn that the remainder of the guard leave I will report to you.

I venture to suggest that you might await the detailed proposals as to the Mohammerah consulate, which will be sent to the India Office by the Government of India, before deciding the question of retention of the escort after the conclusion of Mr. Wilson's work on the Kerkha.



[35882]

No. 690.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 27.)*

(No. 742.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Tehran, September 27, 1909.*

MY telegram No. 520 of the 1st July.

Nasr-ed-Dowleh has spontaneously resigned the appointment of Russian consular agent. This is a most satisfactory solution of the question.

[35596]

No. 691.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir A. Nicolson.*

(No. 1313.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Foreign Office, September 27, 1909.*

MESHED-NASRATABAD telegraph line.

You may comply with Russian Government's request concerning repair, mentioned in your telegram No. 446 of the 14th September. You should at the same time suggest that another instrument of the same pattern should be procured in place of the one now at Birjand.

[36089]

No. 692.

*Treasury to Foreign Office.—(Received September 27.)*

Sir,

*Treasury Chambers, September 27, 1909.*

IN the circumstances represented in Sir F. Campbell's letter of the 20th instant, I am directed by the Lords Commissioners of His Majesty's Treasury to state that they concur in the proposal of Sir Edward Grey to admit as a charge to Imperial funds one moiety of the cost incurred by the Government of India in connection with the attendance of Lieutenant Ranking to give evidence at the court-martial proceedings instituted against the late consular escort at Ispahan for insubordination.

I am, &amp;c.

T. L. HEATH.

[36103]

No. 693.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 28.)*

(No. 743.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Tehran, September 28, 1909.*

INDIAN oil guard.

Please see second paragraph of my telegram No. 741 of yesterday.

I learn from Major Trevor that on the 25th September the oil guard left Mohammerah.

[36206]

No. 694.

*India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received September 29.)*

Sir,

*India Office, September 27, 1909.*

WITH reference to your letter of the 9th September, 1909, as to the privileges allowed to the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, Limited, in connection with the exchange of telegrams between their central office and their representatives in Arabistan, I am directed to enclose herewith copy of a note on the subject by the director-in-chief, Indo-European telegraph department. Viscount Morley concurs in Mr. Kirk's view that the existing arrangements might be continued pending the assumption of the control of the Arabistan lines by the Indo-European telegraph department, after which the privileges now enjoyed by the company should be withdrawn.

I have, &amp;c.

COLIN J. CAMPBELL.

Inclosure in No. 694.

*Note by the Director-in-chief, Indo-European Department.*

IT was only on the 15th August last that the Persian telegraph administration opened their offices at Mohammerah for international traffic. I understand that previous to this a message from Mohammerah had to be posted to an agent at Ahwaz, and was then telegraphed onwards provided the line was in working order, a state in which the Arabistan lines seldom are. There is a probability that these lines will before long come under the control of the Indo-European telegraph department, and until this question is settled, which it should be very shortly, the privileges now enjoyed by the Anglo-Persian Oil Company in connection with the transmission of their telegrams between London and Persia might be permitted to continue. As soon as the Arabistan lines are in working order it would be desirable to withdraw the concession.

H. A. KIRK.

*September 17, 1909.*

[36148]

No. 695.

*India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received September 29.)*

THE Under Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Viscount Morley, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram to the Viceroy, dated the 22nd September, relative to the escort for Mr. New.

*India Office, September 28, 1909.*

Inclosure in No. 695.

*Viscount Morley to Government of India.*

(Telegraphic.) P.

*India Office, September 22, 1909.*

SEE your telegram dated the 9th September. His Majesty's Government have sanctioned escort for Mr. New. As regards informing Persian Government, Sir G. Barclay will use his discretion.

[36196]

No. 696.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 29.)*

(No. 744.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Tehran, September 29, 1909.*

THE Ministry for Foreign Affairs has been offered to Ala-es-Sultaneh.

After assuring himself that his appointment would not be unwelcome to the two legations he has accepted office.

[36299]

No. 697.

*Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received September 30.)*

Sir,

*Admiralty, September 29, 1909.*

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, copy of a report dated 12th August, and of its enclosure, from the senior naval officer, Persian Gulf, relative to the Taona pirates.

A copy has also been sent to the India Office.

I am, &amp;c.

W. GRAHAM GREENE.

[1665]

5 Q



Inclosure 1 in No. 697.

*Commander Litchfield to Commander-in-chief, East Indies.*

Sir, "Sphinx," at Bushire, August 12, 1909.  
 WITH reference to my letter of the 24th July I have the honour to forward a report in triplicate from the commanding officer, His Majesty's ship "Redbreast," of his proceedings in execution of the service referred to.

2. The political resident has been informed, and the letters from the sheikhs of Charek and Abu Thabi have been forwarded to him.

The prisoner, Ghaithoo bin Jasim, who the sheikh of Abu Thabi refused to receive, has been disposed of in accordance with the resident's request, copy attached.

His Majesty's ship "Redbreast" sailed for Bussorah under the command of Lieutenant E. J. N. Tisdall yesterday, immediately after handing over the prisoner to an escort on board the mail steamer for Bahrein.

I hope that the change of climate will benefit the crew.

3. Other matters arising on the report are dealt with separately.

I have, &c.

SHIRLEY LITCHFIELD,  
 Commander and Senior Naval Officer, Persian Gulf.

Inclosure 2 in No. 697.

*Lieutenant Tisdall to Commander Litchfield.*

(Extract.) "Redbreast," at Bushire, August 6, 1909.

I HAVE the honour to report the following proceedings of His Majesty's ship "Redbreast":—

At 6.4 P.M. on the 23rd ultimo Lieutenant-Commander Shuter weighed and proceeded, calling at Kais Island at 10.25 A.M. on the 25th, at the request of the residency agent, to endeavour to obtain information as to the whereabouts of Mohamed and Ahmed-bin-Jasim.

Weighed, and proceeded to Charak at 4.20 P.M. the same day, arriving there at 7.30 P.M.

On the morning of the 26th Sheikh Saleh, of Charak, came on board to see Lieutenant-Commander Shuter. During the interview Sheikh Saleh first said the pirates were not landed, but subsequently admitted that they had landed some way down the coast and gone inland to a place called Nakhjami, but that the place was out of his jurisdiction, and that he could therefore not capture them until they returned to his territory.

After some persuasion Sheikh Saleh swore on the Koran that he would do his utmost to effect the capture of these men, and, should he succeed in doing so, he would immediately inform the residency agent at Lingah.

A letter from Sheikh Saleh to the resident is enclosed.

Lieutenant-Commander Shuter was placed on the sick list on the 27th, but continued to direct the movements of the ship.

I arrived at Linga at 5.35 P.M. on the 27th, landed the agent, and proceeded direct to Abu Thabi.

Immediately on arrival I landed, and interviewed Sheikh Tahnoon and gave him the resident's letter.

After reading the letter Sheikh Tahnoon declined absolutely to take over the prisoner, on the grounds that if he were kept in bonds in this hot weather he might die; if he were not kept in bonds he might escape. In either case the sheikh feared he would be held responsible.

In addition to this many relatives of the murdered man were living at Abu Thabi, who had determined to kill the pirate when opportunity offered, and he could not be answerable for his safety if he were landed.

Sheikh Tahnoon also said he wanted three prisoners and not one, also that he wanted to deal with them himself.

I endeavoured to impress upon the sheikh that his action in the matter would create a very unfavourable impression upon the resident and the British Government.

In spite of all arguments, however, the sheikh remained adamant.

I arrived at Lingah at 7 P.M. on the 30th.

Lieutenant-Commander Shuter's condition became worse while at Lingah, and he was sent to Bombay by the slow mail which left Lingah on the 1st instant.

I was informed by the Residency Agent at Lingah that it would be necessary to hire lighters and coolies at Lingah, as none could be obtained at Basidu.

Accordingly I hired two lighters and thirty coolies, and proceeded to Basidu at 12.30 P.M. on the 2nd, anchored outside for the night, and went in at daylight.

Owing to the very poor quality of the coal I decided to proceed direct to Bushire to communicate with you and obtain proper coal.

There has been a considerable amount of sickness among the ship's company during this cruise, the proportion of Europeans being unusually large.

Inclosure 3 in No. 697.

*Major Cox to Commander Litchfield.*

Sir, Bushire, August 10, 1909.  
 IN thanking you for your letter dated the 7th August, 1909, and for the action taken by His Majesty's ship "Redbreast," and in confirmation of signal communications which have passed between us, I have the honour to inform you that, in view of the *non-possumus* attitude of the sheikh of Abu Thabi, and pending final news from Charek indicating whether there remains any likelihood of our effecting the apprehension of the other two pirates during the present pearling season, I propose as a temporary measure to send the prisoner Ghaithoo-bin-Jasim to the political agent, Bahrein, for custody.

I request therefore that he may be delivered on board the slow mail steamer now in harbour to the file of sepoy of my detachment who have been detailed to escort him to Bahrein.

I shall be glad if the irons that he is wearing can be left on him for return subsequently from Bahrein.

I have, &c.

P. Z. COX, Major, Political Resident in  
 the Persian Gulf.

[36268]

No. 698.

*Treasury to Foreign Office.—(Received September 30.)*

Sir, Treasury, September 29, 1909.  
 I HAVE laid before the Lords Commissioners of His Majesty's Treasury Mr. Mallet's letter of the 9th instant and the correspondence which accompanied it, on the subject of a proposal for the installation of a British system of wireless telegraphy in the Persian Gulf at the joint expense of the Imperial and Indian exchequers.

Their lordships direct me to state that they agree in principle to the division in the manner proposed of such expenditure as may be proved to be necessary, and they will be prepared to consider the limits of such expenditure when the exact scheme recommended by Sir E. Grey and Viscount Morley and an estimate of its cost are before them.

I am, &c.

G. H. MURRAY.

[34836]

No. 699.

*Foreign Office to India Office.*

Sir, Foreign Office, September 30, 1909.  
 I AM directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 16th instant, in which you forward a copy of a letter from the Government of



India pointing out that, in addition to the pay of the military attaché at Meshed, there are certain miscellaneous expenses connected with the appointment which, in their opinion, should be shared equally between the British and Indian Governments.

Sir E. Grey observes that the total expenditure during the current financial year is thus likely to amount to 2,372*l.*, or 1,445*l.* more than the maximum amount of pay which the Lords Commissioners of the Treasury have agreed to share with the Indian Exchequer. He has examined the items of this supplementary expenditure, and, after careful consideration, he has arrived at the conclusion that it is not such as he could properly recommend their Lordships to sanction. Apart from the general considerations relating to the necessity for a substantial reduction in the cost of the Indian consular establishments in Persia, to which, as you are aware, Sir E. Grey attaches great importance, he is of opinion that the special expenditure now contemplated would neither be in accordance with precedent nor with the requirements of the post of military attaché. There are, as the Secretary of State is no doubt aware, twelve British military attachés in various parts of the world, and their sole cost to His Majesty's Government consists in their pay and in travelling allowances when sent on a journey; this is likewise the case with the military attaché at Tehran, who receives a travelling allowance limited to a specific sum, according to the duration of his journeys. In these circumstances Sir E. Grey is unable to endorse the view of the Government of India, that the post at Meshed should constitute a solitary and costly exception, and he considers that the division of the expenditure involved with the Imperial Exchequer is subject to grave and insuperable objection.

I am, &c.

F. A. CAMPBELL.